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MEMOIRS

OF *THE*

DUKE OF ROVIGO.

VOL. IV.

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MEMOIRS

OF THE

DUKE OF ROVIGO,

(M. SAVARY,)

WRITTEN BY HIMSELF:

ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE

HISTORY OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

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VOL. IV.

PARTS I. AND II.



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MEMOIRS

OF

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THE preparations for departure were completed by seven o'clock the next morning. The report of the approaching departure of the Empress soon got into circulation. The people hurried in crowds to the palace; and the Place du Carousel was soon filled with a multitude of men and women anxious to cut the traces from the carriage, to send away the horses, and to behold the regent generously running with them the last chances of fortune. So great, however, was the respect still borne to her person and her wishes, that notwithstanding the immense crowd of people who were all

desirous of preventing her departure, not the slightest manifestation was given of such an intention. The least effort on our part would, nevertheless, have saved our cause, as the Empress was far from approving the resolution adopted. Prince Joseph and the arch-chancellor equally disapproved of it, and had given it the support of their votes merely in consequence of the Emperor's positive orders. But neither the one nor the other was mistaken as to the infallible effect of that resolution.

Such was also the impression upon Maria Louisa's mind. All saw what ought to be done; but none dared to issue the requisite orders. Joseph proposed to the Empress that she should take the lead. The Empress referred to the council of regency, saying that the Emperor had appointed it as the guide of her actions; that it behoved its members to trace out the conduct she should pursue; and that on no account could she presume to oppose the Emperor's will. Joseph then observed, that previously to quitting the capital it was proper at least to ascertain the numerical amount of the forces which threatened it; and he accordingly started at break of day to satisfy himself on the subject. The Empress was desirous to wait his return, as agreed upon between them, previously to adopting any determination. But the most alarming intelligence, the most contradictory reports succeeded each other at every moment. She yielded to the urgent entreaties of the minister of war, and at the hour of eleven in the morning she stepped into her carriage.

The Empress was attended by those whom she had specially named to accompany her, and took her departure under her usual escort of guards. The assembled crowd testified every mark of interest in her fate at this painful moment; but if any one had been bold enough to cut the traces from the horses, there would have been an end of all farther responsibility; all hesitation would have disappeared, and the capital would have been saved. It was a remarkable fact that the King of

Rome evinced the utmost resistance at the moment of his being taken to his mother. The child cried out that his papa was betrayed, and he was determined not to go. He grasped at the curtains of the apartment, saying that he was in his own house, and would *not* quit it. Nothing but the ascendancy of Madame de Montesquiou could calm him; and she only succeeded in persuading him that he should allow himself to be taken to his mother, by faithfully promising to bring him back.

After the departure of the Empress the power fell into the hands of Prince Joseph, who quitted the Luxembourg, where he resided, and came to establish himself at the Tuileries. He endeavoured to protract the defence, and to take advantage of the few resources remaining to us, only showing himself indifferent to what was not for the good of the Emperor's service; for it must be acknowledged that a spirit of intrigue was at work about his person. Even previously to the breaking off of the armistice of Lasigny, some slight attempt had been made to persuade him that he should declare himself protector of the empire, and cause the senate to pronounce the Emperor's forfeiture of the throne. The leaders in this plot were very nearly the same men who a fortnight afterwards exerted themselves to procure the recall of the house of Bourbon, with which they had either felt a repugnance to connect themselves, or had not as yet any settled intercourse. Prince Joseph not only repelled the insinuation, but he demonstrated to those who had thrown it out how great was the danger of an attempt, the least consequence of which would be to destroy the few resources still remaining to the Emperor, whose shadow still protected us. Such an attempt might even be the occasion of a civil war, and bring Frenchmen into open contact with each other; and at any rate, whatever might be the chances of success, no mistake could be greater than that of supposing him capable

of taking part with his brother's enemies. He added, that he was willing to forget the proposal thus made to him, provided it was never mentioned again, nor followed up; otherwise he would cause proceedings to be instituted against the authors of it.

The Prince of Benevento remained in Paris with the arch-treasurer and the ministers. The moment was drawing near when this lengthened state of agony was to terminate.

The departure of the Empress could not be kept a secret from the enemy, who were at the gates of the capital. It was also the signal for a countless number of private departures, which had been postponed until that occurrence; so that the road from Paris to Chartres presented an immense line of carriages of every description. None but the beholder of such a sight can form an adequate idea of it. Let the reader picture to himself the confusion attendant upon such a scene of distress, and he will then feel less difficulty in accounting to himself for the consequences which followed in its train.

The southern part of Paris was completely deserted, and the whole population of the environs flocked towards the north of the capital. Nevertheless, the enemy, who had on the preceding days driven before it, on the road to Meaux, the small corps under the orders of General Compans, had just forced it back a second time to the immediate vicinity of the gate of Bondy, between the pond of La Villette and the heights of Ménilmontant. The allied sovereigns were in person on the spot.

On the other hand, the corps of Marshals Marmont and Mortier having been summoned to the relief of the capital, had reached Saint-Mandé on the night previous to the attack. They immediately took up their positions in order of battle. Marmont had his right leaning upon the river Marne, and had spread Mortier's troops on his left under the heights of

Montmartre. He had the command of both corps,* had caused Romainville to be reconnoitred, and, from the reports brought to him, was under the impression that the allies had not made their appearance. He accordingly marched upon

* Epernay, the 17th March, 1814.
Half-past six in the evening.

Monsieur le Duc de Raguse,

The Emperor has learned on his arrival at this place that the enemy have crossed the Seine by the bridges at Pont, and are marching upon Provins. His Majesty has determined to proceed to Troyes. The Emperor's head-quarters will be to-morrow at Semoins, and at Arcis on the following day. His Majesty leaves General Vincent at Epernay.

It is the Emperor's wish, Monsieur le Maréchal, that you should assume the command of your own corps and of the corps of the Duke of Treviso, who is at this moment in Rheims with two divisions of infantry, and with the cavalry under General Roussel, besides Charpentier's division at Soissons. The minister of war will have sent a general of brigade with some troops to Compiegne.

His Majesty desires that you will keep the cavalry constantly in motion, so as to overawe Blucher and to gain time. If Blucher should cross the Aisne, you are to dispute every inch of ground, and cover the road to Paris. It is probable that the Emperor's movement will compel the enemy to recross the Seine. It will have the effect of arresting Blucher's march, and of relieving the corps of the Duke of Tarentum, which would then be sent to your assistance.

In all matters of importance, Monsieur le Maréchal, you are to write in cyphers, by the road of Epernay, and by intelligent messengers, who know at all times how to avoid the high roads.

It is of the utmost consequence that you should send repeated orders to Durutte's division, which is composed of the different garrisons on the Meuse, to join you by the way of Rheims, Réthel, or Châlons. Dispatch orders to this effect by every possible channel.

As the Marshal Duke of Treviso is your senior, since he is of the original creation, you should rather have the appearance of concerting with him than of assuming the chief command: this is a question of pure delicacy, which will not escape your penetration.

I commission the Duke of Treviso to appoint a major for the command of the town of Rheims, of its national guard and batteries; and to send off General Corbineau to-morrow for the purpose of his overtaking the Emperor.

I recommend to the Duke of Treviso to bestow all his attention to the object of organising the national guard and the levy en masse, and of procuring some draft horses for the battery left at Rheims.

the village, where, however, the Russians were strongly posted. The action began, and soon became warmly contested. The Duke of Padua, who led the right, could not maintain his ground. Having been compelled to quit the field, in consequence of a musket-shot received in the midst of the action, he was replaced by General Lucotte, who retreated to the burial ground of Père la Chaise, for the purpose of restoring order in his ranks. This retrograde movement completely uncovered the road from Belleville to Saint-Mandé. The Duke of Ragusa was compelled to abandon the attack of Romainville, and to hasten back to protect the former village. It was high time he should do so, for General Compans had retreated from the position which he occupied in the basin of La Villette. The Russians, who were no longer kept in check by our troops, had moved forward, and were already debouching upon his right, whilst the Duke of Ragusa was still in ignorance of the retreat of his subordinate officer. Nevertheless, he stood his ground, and succeeded in carrying his movement into effect.

Whilst these events were taking place, Paris was witness to a scene which redounds to the shame of those in whom it originated. The national guard had been for upwards of a month urging the necessity of its being provided with muskets, instead of those ridiculous pikes with which the greater part had been furnished for their only weapons: they had often repeated the demand without ever being attended to. I wrote to the Emperor on the subject, and he replied in these words: "You make a foolish request; the arsenal is full of muskets; they must be made available."

If Blucher should assume the offensive in the direction of Rheims, so as to place this town in the enemy's line of march; and should neither you nor the Duke of Treviso be in a condition to defend it, you would then, either of you, withdraw in your retreat the garrison and artillery, as well as the national guards of the levy en masse.

(Signed) The Prince Vice-constable, Major General Alexander.

I had exhibited this letter to Prince Joseph and to the minister of war. The reply of the latter was, that he had but very few muskets at command, and he preserved them for the army, which stood in constant need of them. I was therefore unable to obtain any. It was only at the moment of the attack made upon the troops posted under the walls of Paris that the Duke of Feltre consented to deliver up to the national guard four thousand muskets, instead of twenty thousand, which they were in want of; and, to complete the mischief, these four thousand muskets were only distributed when the different legions were already assembled. The cars loaded with these arms were brought before them, and they were immediately distributed. It was only during the preceding night that the ordnance department had received directions to deliver up the muskets; but at that time the fate of Paris was no longer doubtful.* The minister of war was foremost in declaring that he considered the capital as lost. Why then did he not open the arsenals to the populace at that moment, and give up their contents to it, since there existed no other means of preventing their falling into the enemy's hands?

Prince Joseph had established himself at Montmartre at break of day, and had summoned the members of the council of defence to join him. I was one of the first to attend the summons. The drums were beating in all directions about Paris; the citizens assembled; the suburbs displayed the most unbounded patriotism. I was much surprised, on reaching Montmartre, not to find the least preparation for a defence. Two or three field-pieces had been mounted on the heights, whilst there were upwards of two hundred disposable ones in the Champ de Mars, which might have been transported to any point of Paris by means of the carriage horses of that capital. The minister of war had only to say the word: but he remained silent. No preparations were made for a defence: the very platforms were not even drawn, nor any

esplanade raised for the purpose of erecting a battery of cannon.

Montmartre was, moreover, destitute of troops, and the national guards were under the necessity of occupying it. At no time could their presence have been rendered so available as at the moment of their receiving the four thousand muskets which had with so much difficulty been wrung from the arsenals.

The enemy, whose plan of attack was already agreed upon, had developed all the resources at their command. They were rapidly gaining ground on the heights of Belleville and Ménilmontant, where it had been found impossible to oppose to them a fourth part of the troops which they had deployed in that direction.

The members who were to compose the council of defence had not yet arrived. *Prince Joseph* prevailed upon me to ascertain in person what was going forward at the point where the contest appeared to be most severely carried on, and to bring back an account of my observations. I proceeded to the spot along the outside of the wall of enclosure. Our troops were already beginning to give way. Nevertheless they courageously fought every inch of ground; a courage the more praiseworthy as the contest could not be attended with any favourable result.

The occurrence of another accident greatly increased the danger of their position: the two marshals were under the necessity of repairing to the council of defence; and whilst on their way from the heights of Ménilmontant to the heights of Montmartre, the enemy, who were already in such overwhelming numbers, had the farther advantage of being no longer opposed to those who were personally entrusted with the command.

The council was composed of the minister of war, of the two marshals, of the commandant of Paris, and of a few other general officers. They received at every moment the most

disastrous intelligence; and saw from their point of meeting the enemy's troops covering the plain between Saint-Denis and the capital. Nevertheless the heads of the respective corps who had returned to their posts imparted to the defence a character of enthusiasm which had for some time the effect of overawing the allies. The latter, however, were constantly receiving fresh reinforcements, and the sun had not yet performed two-thirds of its course. A more protracted resistance was no longer deemed possible. Marmont communicated this painful state of affairs to Prince Joseph, who replied to him by a note couched in the following terms:

"Paris, the 30th March, 1814.

"If the Marshal Duke of Treviso and the Marshal Duke of Ragusa can no longer maintain their positions, they are authorised to open a conference with Prince Schwartzenberg, and with the Emperor of Russia, who are in front of them.

(Signed) "JOSEPH.

"Montmartre, a quarter past twelve at noon.

"They will retreat towards the Loire."

Marmont immediately opened a communication with the enemy. His flags of truce were greeted with a volley of musketry on the road of Belleville, but obtained a more friendly reception in the direction of La Villette. They were admitted to a hearing, announced that the marshal was authorised to treat, and demanded a suspension of arms, which was immediately granted.

During the occurrence of these events at Belleville, General Dejean arrived in Paris with dispatches from the Emperor. This prince was in the environs of Arcis-sur-Aube when he learned the march of the allies upon the capital. He immediately foresaw the fatal consequences which were likely to result from this movement, and instructed Colonel Gourgaud to proceed in all haste and take possession of the bridges

at Troyes, and dispatch from that town a courier to announce to the minister of war that the army was hastening to relieve the capital. Colonel Gourgaud had no sooner reached Troyes than he was overtaken by General Dejean, who was dispatched direct to Paris. The post-house had no relays of horses; Gourgaud gave up the one he had succeeded in obtaining, and Dejean proceeded on his way. He arrived at the moment when the action was most briskly contested, alighted at his father's house, mounted another horse, and hurried off in all speed to Montmartre. Prince Joseph was just gone. He hastened after the prince, overtook him in the middle of the Bois de Boulogne, handed over the Emperor's dispatches, and urged him to return to Paris. The prince refused, saying that it was too late, and that he had authorised the marshals to treat: he however prevailed upon the general to repair to the marshals and make known to them the order of which he was the bearer. Dejean accordingly overtook Marshal Mortier, who was fighting near the canal of La Villette, and communicated the instructions confided to him. Fresh overtures had been made: the allies, or Austria at least, appeared disposed to listen to them: both parties were on the point of coming to an agreement. It was of the utmost importance to obtain, at any price, the delay of a few hours, and save the capital from the evils of a hostile occupation. The Duke of Treviso quickly adopted this idea: he called for a drum, and in the midst of the grape-shot which was decimating his squares, he wrote the following letter:

"Under the walls of Paris, the 30th of March, 1814.

"To his Serene Highness Prince Schwartzenberg, commander-in-chief of the combined armies.

"Prince,

"Negotiations have been again opened: the Duke of Vicenza has taken his departure with the intention of repairing to the presence of his Majesty the Emperor of

Austria. Prince Metternich must be at this time with the Emperor Napoleon. In this state of things, and at a moment when matters may be amicably arranged, it behoves us, Prince, to spare the effusion of blood. I am sufficiently authorised to propose arrangements: they are such as to claim attention. Accordingly, Prince, I do myself the honour to propose a suspension of arms for twenty-four hours, during which we might treat of terms, in order to save from the horrors of a siege the city of Paris, *in which we are determined to defend ourselves to the last extremity.*

"I request your Serene Highness will accept the assurance of my distinguished consideration; and I avail myself of this opportunity to renew the expression of the sentiments of personal esteem I entertain towards you.

(Signed) "THE MARSHAL DUKE OF TREVISO."

The Duke of Treviso had scarcely dispatched his letter when one of the Duke of Ragusa's officers came to inform him of the convention entered into by this marshal. The step he was taking necessarily became superfluous from that moment. He justly foresaw that the intelligence transmitted by him to the generalissimo of the allies would be considered as a lure held out for the purpose of gaining time. Such indeed was the fact. Schwartzenberg was not satisfied with expressing a doubt of the overtures alluded to by Marshal Mortier: he even contested the possibility of an amicable understanding;* and yet the negotiations announced by the marshal were by no means imaginary.

* The 30th of March, 1814.

Monsieur le Duc,

I have just received the letter with which your Excellency has honoured me. The intimate and indissoluble union subsisting between the allied sovereigns is the surest pledge to me that the negotiations, which you suppose to have been separately entered into between Austria and France, have no existence in fact, and that your information on the subject is wholly unfounded.

Indignant at finding that his negotiation had failed in the object of concluding any terms, the Emperor had adopted the determination of being his own diplomatist, and of opening a direct communication with the Emperor of Austria. In the night of the 25th to the 26th of March, he had sent for Colonel Galbois, entrusted him with dispatches for that Prince, and after particularly enjoining that he should avoid the Russians, and parley with none but the troops of the sovereign to whose presence he was repairing, he had said to him: "Proceed in all haste; *you are the bearer of peace.*" The colonel succeeded in escaping the cossacks, but was unable to penetrate as far as Dijon. Nevertheless he met with a most friendly reception, and obtained, on the morning of the 28th, the assurance that the proposals he had transmitted were accepted. An adjutant of the Emperor of Austria, who came to communicate to him the intentions of that Prince, stated that each of the three principal sovereigns was authorised to treat, and to affix his signature in the name of the other two: that peace was made not with Austria alone but with the whole coalition. The colonel pressed for a written answer; but the drawing up of a document of so much importance required time, and the smallest delay might again place every thing at hazard. He took his departure upon the repeated assurance that the written document should be immediately dispatched. This was actually done; but a party of cossacks fell upon the flags of truce who were the bearers of it. Both Frenchmen and Austrians were carried

The declaration I have the honour to transmit to you herewith is an incontestible proof of it.

It must wholly depend upon you, M. le Maréchal, and upon the authorities of the city of Paris, whether that capital shall be spared from the unavoidable evils which threaten it.

I request your Excellency will accept the assurances of my distinguished consideration, and of the personal esteem I bear towards you.

SCHWARTZENBERG.

off; and the enterprise meditated against Paris was the more actively followed up after this occurrence.

It was, no doubt, unknown to Schwartzenberg; since, instead of admitting the overtures of the Duke of Treviso, he replied to him by transmitting an odious document, to which I shall presently have occasion to revert. Matters remained in the state in which they had been left. It never occurred either to Dejean or to Mortier to inform Marmont of the proximate arrival of the Emperor, in order that he might avail himself of the delay occasioned by a suspension of arms, and make another effort to maintain his ground until nightfall.

The two marshals quietly met at the gate of La Villette, where they agreed with M. de Nesselrode and Count Orloff upon the terms of capitulation, which were signed by Colonel Fabvier and Colonel Saint-Denys, the one an officer of the staff, the other the first aide-de-camp of the Duke of Ragusa.

Thus terminated that deplorable business; and the fate of France was thenceforward decided.

Nevertheless, the Emperor had only asked of Paris that it should defend itself for four or five days. He had announced, on quitting the capital, the possibility that, in consequence of the manœuvres he was under the necessity of adopting, the enemy might come close up to the walls of that immense city; but he would lose no time in hastening to its rescue. A promise had been made to him that no alarm should be felt at the enemy's approach; but this assurance was not borne out by the fact. Paris is no doubt free from reproach: all the citizens were ready to follow any leader; and if, instead of leaving in the arsenals and in the Champ de Mars the arms and artillery which were found there by the enemy, they had been given up to the population of Paris some few days sooner, they assuredly would have turned them to a better account. An error of so grave a nature ought only to be laid to the charge of those narrow-minded men who, thirsting for favours and for power, had, by dint of

cringing and of protestations of fidelity, succeeded in securing to themselves the exclusive confidence of their chief. These were the men who sealed our fate by their want of courage in moments of peril.

Whilst Prince Joseph was prevailed upon to adopt the fatal resolution which I have just adverted to, the ministers, and all those who formed the active part of the government, were still in Paris. It was no doubt greatly regretted at this time that Paris was not in a state of insurrection; but there only remained a few hours for distributing arms, disposing of the numerous artillery in the Champ de Mars, raising up the street pavements, and in general for assuming the attitude of a city determined to defend itself. All this might have been effected a few days sooner; but when the citizens of Paris found that greater reliance was placed upon the enemy than upon themselves for preserving the capital, it was natural for them to entertain a poor opinion of those to whose care their fate had been committed. All met one another with a feeling of intense anxiety: all inquired what would be the end of such a state of things.

I was still upon the heights of Belleville when the council of defence which was held at Montmartre came to its final determination. I proceeded to the gate of Saint-Antoine, went over the suburb, which was prepared to obey any order, except that of surrender: all were clamorous for arms: an army might have been raised of those men who entertained such sentiments. As I was ascending the boulevard Saint-Antoine to repair a second time to the gate, I met a calash with the Duke Dalberg, who was returning from the interior of the suburb. I asked him from whence he came; and found him extremely agitated. I was greatly surprised at meeting him, and reflected for a moment on the circumstance, being still ignorant of the resolution just adopted at Montmartre. It was easy for me to have made him pay the forfeit of his intrigues; but the game was lost: a public execution would have an-

swered no purpose; and I allowed him to proceed on his way.

From the gate of Saint-Antoine I returned to Montmartre. There was still a free passage along the outer boulevard; but the enemy were at no great distance from it. On arriving at the foot of the height, I learned that an aide-de-camp of the Emperor had arrived, and that Prince Joseph had just passed by with the Duke de Feltre, in whose company he had proceeded along the outer boulevard leading to the gates of Mousseaux and of the rue du Roule. I struck off by the inner boulevard in order to gain upon and overtake him at the gate of the Champ Elysées; but I was too late. The officers of the national guard informed me that he had taken the direction of the Bois de Boulogne. I was endeavouring in vain to account for his following that road, when I was overtaken by a quarter-master of the Parisian guard, who had hastened after me from the suburb of Saint-Antoine. He brought me a letter from one of my private secretaries, who stated, that he had just received a pressing letter for me from the high-judge, and that a circumstantial acknowledgment was required of its having come to hand. I hurried home, and found an order for me to quit Paris immediately and follow the road taken by the Empress.

I was informed that M. de Talleyrand had called two hours before; that he had waited for me, and, on going away, had expressed his intention to return, being desirous of having a conversation with me. On considering the hour at which the letter from the high-judge was dated, I guessed the motive of M. de Talleyrand's visit. As he had remained at home whilst I was proceeding to the different gates, he had received before me the dispatch which enjoined him to quit Paris, and was desirous of conversing with me upon the subject. I was correct in my conjectures. M. de Talleyrand returned almost at the very moment of my arrival at my hotel, and spoke to me of the embarrassment into which he was

thrown. He did not altogether refuse to quit Paris, though he was not very anxious to remove. He renewed his attacks against those whom he accused as the authors of all the misfortunes which were falling upon us, and sincerely pitied the Emperor for placing dependence upon those *ignorant men* who had ruined him. He added, however, that the ill-usage he had received from the Emperor had entirely destroyed the sentiments of affection which he formerly entertained towards him; nor could he forget his having been sacrificed to a few wretches. He was nevertheless desirous, for the advantage of all, that the edifice should not crumble to pieces, and Paris was the only place where it could be saved from destruction. He requested I would authorise him to remain, pursuaded as he was, that by so doing, I should perform an essential service to the Emperor and the whole community.

I did not allow myself to be caught by this lure; and replied to the diplomatist, that I not only did not authorise his remaining, but enjoined him as far as it was in my power, to depart immediately and repair to the presence of the Empress. I even intimated to him, that from the present moment I should watch his departure, and adopt measures for compelling him to that course. I accordingly appointed agents to have an eye upon the actions of that personage. He pretended to yield assent to my injunction, but hastened to solicit from the prefect of police that authority which he had failed to obtain from myself. The prefect refused. M. de Talleyrand was compelled to proceed on his way, but took means for having himself stopped on the road and ordered back to Paris. This was certainly an act of prudence on his part, or his plans were not yet matured. What object, in fact, could have been answered by his so perseveringly soliciting an authority to remain in Paris? If his arrangements had been completed, it would have been sufficient for him to keep himself concealed for a few hours, at the end of which time he would have found himself in the midst of the Russians. But he was sure of

nothing. He dreaded the future, and, happen what might, he wished to have an excuse in store for remaining in the capital. He impressed the allies with the conviction that he had it in his power to accomplish the Emperor's ruin; and he persuaded his own dupes that the allies hesitated; but that he hoped to conquer their repugnance, and restore the Bourbons to the throne.

CHAPTER II.

The author quits Paris—M. Pasquier and M. de Chabrol remain in charge of the duty of watching over the safety of the capital—The author is strongly inclined to retrace his steps—M. de Talleyrand still—The Emperor's opinion that the previous features in that person's conduct were pledges against his ever joining the Bourbons—Sketch of the proceedings of diplomatic men against the various branches of that house.

M. DE TALLEYRAND had no sooner left me than I made every preparation for my own departure. I sent for M. Pasquier, the prefect of police, and after acquainting him with the order given to me, I desired he would remain in Paris, and apprised him of the consequences which I foresaw would necessarily result from a determination I had vainly resisted. I did not conceal from him my apprehensions of the extent of the evil, and of the attempt that would be made to subvert the existing government; adding, that he would undoubtedly be applied to for his concurrence in such an attempt. I obtained his promise of acting with the utmost circumspection, and of his strictly discharging his public duty, from which a man of honour ought never to deviate. I told him that M. de Chabrol, the prefect of the Seine, in whom the Emperor had reposed so much confidence as to entrust him with the administration of Paris on the first ap-

proach of the storm, was receiving from the minister of the interior a mission of a nature in all respects analogous to that which I was committing to his own care: that by combining their efforts they might avert serious evils, and raise themselves to the highest pinnacle of honour. M. Pasquier was long aware of my private opinion respecting the eventual issue of the contest. I had often communicated to him the extent of my apprehensions, and upon many subjects I had held a very confidential intercourse with him. I congratulated myself in having it in my power to leave him in Paris under existing circumstances, as much out of regard for the consideration which his talents had secured to him, as on account of the reputation he had acquired by his upright character. He replied in such a manner as to confirm me in the exalted opinion I had formed of him. He told me that he entertained no doubt of the existence of many sinister projects; but, for his own part, he would never appear in any other character than that of a magistrate appointed to preside over the public tranquillity; so long as he might be left in authority, he would never wield it but for the attainment of that object. I have never altered my opinion of M. Pasquier, notwithstanding all that has since happened, and I have no doubt that he would have exerted every endeavour to check a popular commotion; but the impulse emanated from too high a source; and he was compelled to follow the stream. So unbounded was my confidence, that I committed to his care a portfolio containing all the letters which the Emperor had done me the honour to address to me during my administration, being unwilling to expose it to the risk of a plunder to which I might be more particularly subjected in the event of a revolution, which I felt to be near at hand. He undertook the charge, on condition of his being allowed to consign it to the flames, if it should expose him to any personal danger. This apprehended danger having actually occurred, the valuable deposit was accordingly destroyed. I had caused my secret correspondence to

be removed, and had burned all the papers that were calculated to compromise those individuals who were attached to my administration, feeling myself bound to relieve from every kind of uneasiness a crowd of persons who had rendered faithful services to me in my official capacity.

Ever since the beginning of February, there had remained in the offices of the ministry of police no document that could expose them to the consequences of private revenge or to any other danger. I left in Paris the chief secretary of that department, in order that he should retain the charge of the *personnel* of the administration, and I instructed M. Anglès, who had the superintendence of the district beyond the Alps, to join me at Blois. M. Réal, who was at the head of another district, received a similar intimation. With respect to M. Pelét de la Lozère, who was appointed to the third district, he was performing a mission in the south of France. Every arrangement having been made, I took my departure at the hour of half-past four in the evening, and attempted to proceed by the gate of Sèvres; but it was so much obstructed by carriages, that I determined to pass through Orleans, conceiving that I should meet with no impediment along that road. I was right in my conjecture.

At no period of my life was my mind in such a state of agitation as at the moment of quitting Paris. I was even tempted at one time to retrace my steps, and was on the point of infringing the direct instructions of the Emperor that I should not remain in Paris if the Empress should be compelled to take her departure. Nevertheless, when I reflected upon the consequences which might have attended so inexcusable an act of disobedience, in the event of affairs taking a different turn from that which I flattered myself I might impart to them, I felt apprehensive of exposing my responsibility to such risks. I was not free from uneasiness respecting M. de Talleyrand; and if I neglected to procure his arrest, and force him away along with me, the omission is to be

ascribed to the circumstance of my having no place at command where I could lodge him in safety. I could not be ignorant of the different parts he had acted by turns during the course of the revolution. I was aware of his having served every faction which had successively obtained possession of power, of his having invariably found himself moored in safe anchorage whenever a storm had burst over our heads, and of his having always sided with the stronger party. I also knew how greatly he must have been disaffected towards the Emperor, and how much he had to apprehend from the party which had placed him in so unfavourable a position towards the Prince. I could entertain no doubt, therefore, of his seizing upon the earliest opportunity of taking a signal revenge of his enemies, and of securing to himself a position so commanding as to place him beyond the reach of their animosity.

The Emperor was still more alive than I was to these various circumstances. He had, besides, near his person M. de Bassano, who was assuredly not friendly to M. de Talleyrand, and who was well acquainted with his character under every point of view. So far, however, from issuing any orders against him, he gave strict injunctions that he should not be molested, and allowed him to sit in the council of regency. It must be acknowledged, at the same time, that the sentiments which he manifested until the last moment, were far from justifying any measures of severity. Why did the Emperor retain him in his service notwithstanding the warnings he had received of M. de Talleyrand's underhand manœuvres? because he was acquainted with circumstances in his previous conduct which could not but be a check to the plans of revenge which he meditated, and because the recollection of his early services was not entirely obliterated. The Emperor was never known to forget the services rendered to him, and he never wholly deserted a man who had at any time given him satisfaction, were it even but on a solitary occa-

sion. He often scolded, or gave severe reproofs; but almost instantly forgot what had passed. His moments of ill-humour generally proceeded from a report made to him, which had sometimes no connexion whatever with the ground of reprimand. I have frequently heard him assert that M. de Talleyrand had his fair side; that he had given more pledges than any other man against his taking part in any rising in favour of the house of Bourbon; and I have always been persuaded that this consideration had alone prevented the Emperor from dismissing him altogether from his councils, a course which was constantly recommended to him. The previous proceedings of that diplomatist appeared in fact to afford a sufficient pledge for his future conduct.

M. de Talleyrand was one of the members of the Constituent Assembly who had been most violent in attacking the court of Versailles. At a later period, he relied upon his public and avowed acts to win the confidence of the Directory, under whom he served in the capacity of minister for foreign affairs.

On the return from Egypt, he was one of those who contributed most powerfully to the overthrow of the Directory, and to the dispersion of the party who laboured to call the Duke of Orleans, or in default of the Duke, a Spanish prince to the throne of France.

On the occasion of the trial of George Cadoudal and his accomplices, in the year 1804, he was the person who pointed out the Duke d'Enghien as the only one answering the description of the individual alluded to by two of Cadoudal's agents in their depositions. (See the particulars of that event in the second part of the first volume.) He fixed the determination adopted in regard to that prince, by remarking, that the individual pointed out could be no other than a prince of the house of Bourbon, because the Bourbons were alone interested in preventing the revolutionary party from taking advantage of the blow meditated by Cadoudal on his visit to France.

He drew attention to the circumstance, that of all the princes of the house of Bourbon, the Duke d'Enghien was the only one whose firmness of character and whose peculiar place of residence could give countenance to the suspicions created by the depositions of George's companions. He supported his individual opinion by details which he had derived from the correspondence of certain agents of his own department, and caused that measure to be adopted which was eventually carried into effect. He was almost the only person in France who was in the secret, and who perhaps knew, or had at least the means of foretelling the issue of the measure. He wrote to the diplomatic envoys at the courts of the several princes on the right bank of the Rhine, for the purpose of justifying the violation of their territory. I admit that this formality was enjoined to him by the nature of his office; but it must also be admitted that he displayed a remarkable degree of reserve on the occasion; since a single expression dropped in the saloon of the hotel de Luines, where he was on terms of constant intercourse at the time, would have been sufficient to defeat the object in view.

The First Consul, who was not even aware of the existence of a Duke d'Enghien, saw nothing more in M. de Talleyrand's exertions on the occasion than an act of attachment to his person; since the only object of Cadoudal and his accomplices was to take away his life; and in the zeal which he displayed in prosecuting them, the minister could contemplate nothing else than delivering up to the sword of justice all those who had taken a part in the attempt. The Duke d'Enghien was not the heir to the crown. Under no circumstances could he have been called to it; and the Emperor could derive no personal advantage from putting him to death. He was even ignorant of his proximity to Strasburg. The police was not better informed on the subject; for its system did not possess at that time the extensive ramifications which it acquired at a later period. Whatever took place beyond the

frontiers was *exclusively* watched, reported, and followed up by the ministry of foreign affairs. The part taken by M. de Talleyrand in that business greatly contributed to protect him from the attacks of his enemies, who were endeavouring to represent him as an agent of the house of Bourbon. The Emperor, who was much displeased at the incorrect information given to him on this occasion, never allowed the least expression of blame to escape him against any one. He was not unmindful of the intention manifested to serve him; but he also treasured up a recollection of the errors committed by those who had been actuated by zeal for his service; and he did so for the purpose of avoiding similar mistakes on future occasions. Independently of this feature in M. de Talleyrand's conduct, which might well be set down in the account, M. de Talleyrand afforded several other guarantees for his fidelity.

He had been the principal agent in the plan of dethroning the Neapolitan Bourbons in the year 1805: and lastly, he it was who proposed the dethroning of the Spanish branch of that family, a measure prepared long beforehand. His own partisans pretend that he was a perfect stranger to the latter plan. But nothing more is required than mere common sense to discover that a treaty by which such mighty interests were disposed of could never have been decided in a day, and that previously to regulating the indemnities to be given to those whose political existence must sink in consequence of the changes meditated in Spain, many negotiations must have been carried on, especially as the question had never been discussed in written communications, but had been treated between the Prince of the Peace and M. de Talleyrand, through the channel of Izquierdo, the confidential agent of the Spanish minister.

The document I have quoted in the second part of Volume II, is moreover a clear proof that the negotiation was followed up by M. de Talleyrand himself. He it was who demanded the cession of territory, and insisted upon a change in the

order of succession. This, however, was not the only part he took in that business. He was not only the person who followed it up, but I have no hesitation in affirming that he gave the first idea of it.

After the battle of Friedland, the Emperor had entrusted me with the command of Konigsberg, and of all Prussia Proper. Previously to that battle M. de Talleyrand had repaired to Dantzic, in order to await the issue of events, and the instructions of the Emperor, who wrote from Tilsit to desire he would take up his residence at Konigsberg. He had scarcely reached the latter place when a courier brought him a letter from the Emperor. I had also received a dispatch by which the Prince ordered me to get in readiness a pontoon train, which was in the arsenal of the town, and to send it forward by the canal, so that it might reach Tilsit without loss of time. I communicated my orders to M. de Talleyrand, who showed me the letter he had received. The Emperor informed him that "Alexander had solicited an armistice for a few days. He had granted it. Alexander had afterwards proposed an interview, which he was not over-anxious to accede to. He had not yet made up his mind, but would consider the proposal; and if peace was not immediately concluded, his determination was formed to cross the Niemen without farther delay. He was the more inclined to this course as the Russians had no longer any army, whilst two-thirds of his own forces had not been engaged on the field of battle of Friedland." He concluded by directing M. de Talleyrand to join him. The Emperor's statement was correct; only three corps had been engaged at Friedland, with a single division of cuirassiers, independently of the dragoons and light cavalry. Having been charged with the management of the affairs of France at the court of Russia after the conclusion of peace, I travelled from Tilsit to St. Petersburg with the several corps of the Russian guard; and the officers I met and conversed with admitted

that, independently of the guard, they had, properly speaking, no army left to them. According to a calculation in which we mutually agreed, the Emperor of Russia could not have opposed to us a larger force than twenty-two thousand men of regular troops. We should have crossed the Niemen, a movement the Emperor could easily effect, having upwards of a hundred and fifty thousand men at his command. We were only at the 20th or 22nd of June, and Poland was mad for an insurrection. During my stay in Russia, I often had occasion to satisfy myself that these were the considerations which had determined the Emperor Alexander to solicit the celebrated interview on the raft at Tilsit.

On receiving the order to repair to Tilsit, and observing what the Emperor stated in the letter which he wrote to me, M. de Talleyrand accelerated his departure as much as possible, saying to me, "Be in no hurry to send off your bridge. I trust the Emperor will have no occasion for it. What could he have to do beyond the Niemen? We must make him renounce his idea respecting Poland. Nothing is to be done with those people: with the Poles, no organization can be imparted to any thing else but disorder. An opportunity now offers for honourably concluding all matters. It must be laid hold of, and with the greater speed, as the Emperor is called away to an affair of much higher importance in another quarter, which he has the means of introducing into a treaty of peace. Should he neglect this course, whenever he may embark in that affair, he will be called back to this spot by fresh embarrassments. Whereas he may this very day bring every thing to a close, the rather so as the plan which he meditates is a rational consequence of his system."

How could it, in fact, be supposed that M. de Talleyrand was a stranger to the affairs of Spain? Supposing even that he had contemplated to betray the Emperor by prevailing upon him to enter into those terms of peace which were con-

cluded at Tilsit, he had not to deal with a madman. The Emperor was fully aware of the condition of the Russian forces: nothing remained of the Prussian army but the recollection of it; whilst our own army might almost be said to be unbroken. In this state of things, what could prevent the Emperor from carrying into effect any plans he might have meditated? It was, nevertheless, M. de Talleyrand's intention to divert him from the idea of crossing the Niemen and restoring the kingdom of Poland. It followed as a necessary consequence that he must have explained to him his reasons for so doing; and since it was attended to, and peace was concluded, how can it be taken for granted that M. de Talleyrand should have neglected to urge upon him the advantage of entering into an explanation with the Emperor Alexander in respect to his ulterior views, at a moment when he might have obtained the acquiescence of that Prince in whatever he proposed? This admission is still more impossible when it is borne in mind that he was fully sensible of the necessity of Alexander's concurrence in order to prevent a renewal of the war.

The most limited understanding will readily perceive that it would have been the height of folly in the Emperor to renounce the immense advantages he had derived from the war, and embark on an enterprise such as that upon Spain, without coming to an understanding with the Emperor of Russia, who might return to arms as soon as we should have withdrawn our troops, and enter into an alliance with Austria, who was no party to what was agreed upon at Tilsit. Had the peace which was signed on that occasion rested upon any other bases than those upon which it was actually concluded, it might then be alleged that Russia was a total stranger to the affairs of Spain. In her then powerless state, her monarch came in person to treat at the Emperor's head-quarters; and when, instead of being required to make sacrifices, he divided with us the spoils of the vanquished, nothing short of insanity

could have prevented our bestowing attention to the views which we meditated, and have thus rendered their success problematical, by neglecting to give an interest in them to the only power which could obstruct their accomplishment.

So far from suffering any loss of territory, the Emperor of Russia obtained that the states of his father-in-law, the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, which had been invaded, should be restored to him. He interceded in behalf of his ally the King of Prussia, and succeeded so effectually that Frederick William was reinstated in the possession of a portion of the provinces wrested from him. With respect to the Emperor of Russia himself, he obtained the grant of a district which was taken from the territory of that prince. We rendered him a still more effectual service. We stipulated nothing on behalf of the Turks, who had lost Wallachia and Moldavia by arming in our favour. It would have been easy for us to include them in the treaty we were concluding. We had on our side the right of the strongest and that of justice, both which would have fully justified us in stipulating for our allies, as the Russians were doing on behalf of their own friends. Unquestionably, these several transactions did not take place without our receiving some compensation from the Emperor Alexander; who, having nothing of his own to bestow, felt it incumbent upon him to give his countenance to our views. Had not this been the case, we should have been left without an excuse for abandoning the Turks to their fate. I could only account to myself for the conduct which we adopted on this occasion from what Alexander did me the honour to communicate to me of the conversations he had held with the Emperor respecting Turkey, and their future views with regard to that country. I have no doubt that matters would not have been arranged altogether in the manner anticipated by the Emperor of Russia; but I was not provided with any instructions on the subject.

He no doubt announced certain views which he meditated

upon Turkey; the Emperor, on the other hand, could not have failed to speak of his own views upon Spain, with that reserve, however, which sovereigns are wont to impart to their mutual intercourse. It is impossible to suppose, even if the terms of reciprocal confidence were not of an unbounded nature, that Alexander was ignorant of the Emperor's projects upon Spain. Had the question been one of mere arrangement of differences, we should not have allowed the Russians to take those advantages over our allies which we actually gave up to them. On the other hand, it would have answered no object whatever to deceive the Russian autocrat in regard to the intentions entertained respecting the Spanish peninsula: he could never have been the dupe of such an artifice. He was aware that the Spanish royal family had inherited all the rights of Philip V., and that so long as his descendants should sway the sceptre, the work of the French revolution could possess no stability. He knew that *the enterprising acts* of a warlike prince whom chance might call to the throne of Spain would be sufficient to place every thing in jeopardy. Does not history tell us that when Louis XV. in his infancy was attacked with the small-pox, King Philip V. fancied that the danger of his nephew was designedly kept from his knowledge, and prepared to return to France for the purpose of asserting his right to the crown? I think I have demonstrated the improbability of Russia having been kept in ignorance of the changes meditated in Spain. M. de Talleyrand, therefore, could not but have been aware of them. The contrary supposition must lead to the inference that he had acted a sorry part at Tilsit, a complaint which has never been laid to his charge.

CHAPTER III.

Sequel of the preceding chapter—Petty speculation of M. de Talleyrand, and of the Prince of the Peace—Congratulations addressed to the author by the former diplomatist—His perseverance in invariably hunting down the Bourbons might well justify the opinion that any understanding between them was wholly impossible.

THE following fact may also be adduced in support of my assertion. The conscription raised after the battle of Eylau furnished the portion of troops destined to compose the corps which advanced towards the Adour and the province of Roussillon in the course of the following summer. The direction thus given to them sufficiently pointed out what was to be their ulterior destination. Now, I ask, what individual in the French empire could possibly have demonstrated the necessity of such an expedition? who could have given a warning of the dangers which might at some future day threaten that part of our frontiers,—who else but the minister for foreign affairs? Who could have given the Emperor an account of the secret dispositions of the Prince of the Peace? who could have laid before him the proclamation addressed to the Spaniards by that favourite? assuredly no one else but the minister for foreign affairs. One more observation before I conclude. What are the grounds of the treaty of Fontainebleau? the unfavourable notions furnished at different times by the Prince of the Peace respecting the hostile intentions of the Prince of Asturias towards France. That wretched man, who sought to secure a position for himself which would protect him from the threatened vengeance of the heir to the crown, earnestly urged the attention of the cabinet of the Tuileries to the plots which Ferdinand was unceasingly hatching against King Charles IV. He announced that if

there was any farther hesitation in taking a part against that prince, or some measures with respect to the kingdom, he could answer for nothing; that the first consequence of the accession of the Prince of Asturias to the throne would be a change in the policy of Spain. In the interval between these communications and the conclusion of such a treaty as that of Fontainebleau, many proposals and replies to them must necessarily have intervened. However daring a minister may be, a great distance must be measured previously to consenting or even proposing to deliver up his masters, or at least to his abusing the confidence they have reposed in him, by frightening them at first respecting the dangers into which he had drawn them, and afterwards inducing them to withdraw to their American possessions, in order that he might the more freely receive the price of his treachery; for, in short, the Prince of the Peace had undertaken to prevail upon King Charles IV. to remove to Mexico with his family, in imitation of the Prince of Portugal, who had left Europe for the Brazils. His intention was to accompany him as far as Seville, secretly desert him at that place, and proceed to assume possession of the Algarves as his own principality. It was in fact the proposal which he made at the council of Aranjuez, to abandon Spain and retire to Mexico, which decided the movement of which the Prince of Asturias took the lead.

When we consider the time which was required to come to an understanding on these points, and carry our reflections back to the period when the affairs of Spain originated, we are compelled to admit that they could never have been meditated or carried into effect except under M. de Talleyrand's ministry. Had it been otherwise, it would have been necessary to set a direct negotiation on foot, to keep pace with his own ordinary duties; which negotiation he assuredly would have opposed by every means in his power until he had compelled the intrusive diplomatist to give way. It would have been no less his duty than his right to adopt such a course.

Admitting even that the enterprise upon Spain had wholly emanated from the Emperor's mind; it was nevertheless impossible for this prince to give it effect without certain preliminary steps, without his developing his own ideas, and procuring their adoption by those men whose situation required that they should mature them in Spain as well as in France. Now, I ask, which of us was the most calculated for a negotiation that allowed of no intercourse in writing, and yet required the keeping up of an active correspondence? that man, unquestionably, who for the ten or twelve previous years had presided over all the transactions which had taken place between France and Spain; the man, in short, who had strengthened the credit of the Prince of the Peace, with whom he had had a long series of previous intercourse of every description. No one else in France could have been entrusted with such a negotiation; for what documents could have been placed in the hands of a person who would have had to commence by an overture insulting to the feelings of the most debased character? The more I reflect on every circumstance that must have preceded the conclusion of the treaty of Fontainebleau, the more I retain the conviction that the plan of changing the Spanish dynasty is a conception of which the whole merit belongs to M. de Talleyrand and to the Prince of the Peace. It is the joint production of both diplomatists, and was only submitted to the Emperor when it was found possible to demonstrate to him the facility of carrying it into effect. I will develope my reasons for forming this opinion. By following, after the battle of Friedland, the plan he had meditated of restoring the kingdom of Poland, the Emperor might have made sure of success. He could not have abandoned that gigantic enterprise in order to attempt another, unless the success of the latter had been clearly demonstrated to him; that is to say, unless he had previously made himself ac-

quainted with whatever had been done in furtherance of such an object.

If the idea of the changes in Spain had originated with the Emperor, it would have been much more easy for him to give them effect, after restoring the independence of Poland, which would have possessed sufficient strength in itself to keep in check the remaining power of the Russian empire; and Austria was unable to oppose any thing that might be meditated beyond the Pyrenees. Supposing, therefore, that such had been the Emperor's after-thought, it may safely be asserted that there existed a lever which set the enterprise in motion sooner than he intended; that lever was the Prince of the Peace, who, finding himself on a bed of thorns at Madrid, was hastening by every means in his power the downfall of his masters, in order to escape the ruin which threatened him. He stood already on the breach, was calling for assistance, and pretended that he could hold out no longer; that his own credit once gone, France would lose possession of Spain. Being placed in this dreadful position, he magnified the danger in order to hasten the application of the remedy, and he consented to whatever was proposed to him. Now a man like M. de Talleyrand, who well knew the situation and resources of the Prince of the Peace, could not fail to impose upon him conditions analogous to the state of embarrassment into which he was thrown.

Amongst the many considerations which inclined M. de Talleyrand not to abandon the Prince of the Peace, there were several which operated also as inducements for compassing his ruin; and this is the place for relating an anecdote known to very few persons. After the return from Egypt, when the First Consul had become chief of the state, he found that an arrangement had been entered into between France and Spain; the latter power had engaged to pay to the former, during the existence of the war, a monthly sum of five millions of francs.

The wretched state of our finances compelled the First Consul to allow that state of things to remain undisturbed; but after the battle of Marengo, when order began to be restored, he instructed M. de Talleyrand to write to Spain that as France had no longer any need of the money, he renounced his right to claim it, and restored the amount to King Charles as a testimony of the desire which he felt not to be a burden upon his allies.

M. de Talleyrand disapproved of the resolution, and pointed out to the First Consul that, if instead of relinquishing the whole sum, he began by renouncing one half only, this would be attended with a better effect. It would show the progressive improvement of our affairs; and we might moreover claim the merit of having attentively watched the moment when it was found possible to dispense with a succour which was burdensome to Charles IV. The First Consul adopted the idea, and issued in consequence an order for the remittance thenceforward of two millions five hundred thousand francs a month. He conceived that his intentions had been carried into effect. Quite the reverse: Spain continued to pay the whole subsidy, and it was only after the peace of Luneville, when he ordered the second part to be relinquished, that she ceased paying the five millions imposed upon her by the treaty of Bâle. The public treasury, not receiving any thing more from Spain, had struck that item out of its registers. There existed no farther means of defrauding, and there was felt to be danger in continuing to receive the tribute. The treasury received no more than the two millions five hundred thousand francs authorised by the Emperor; and yet Spain had continued to pay the stipulated five millions. What became of the difference? How was the fraud carried on? This is what we are about to explain.

If the Emperor, instead of dividing the remittance into two portions, had left it unbroken, there would have existed no means of practising deception, because the treasury of Spain

would have had no remittance to make to that of France. M. de Talleyrand could not have avoided writing to Madrid in conformity with the nature of his instructions, or even mentioning the subject to the ambassador of that power in Paris: he would otherwise have exposed himself to the most serious consequences, if the Emperor had been the first to speak upon it to the ambassador, as might have been the case. On the other hand, had he not communicated the First Consul's intentions, and had Spain continued to pay the total amount of the subsidy, the treasury would have rendered an account of it; the First Consul would have found out that his orders had been disobeyed, and M. de Talleyrand would have failed to derive a profit from the business. The Prince of the Peace was similarly situated at Madrid. Had M. de Talleyrand made the slightest communication to the French ambassador in that capital, the latter might have spoken to the King, and it would have been impossible for the Prince of the Peace to apply a single franc of the money to his own use.

As this prince was all-powerful, and as he disposed of every thing at court, he alone had the means at his command of allowing a monthly sum of five millions of francs to be taken out of the Spanish coffers, and yet of suffering no more than two and a half millions to enter the French treasury. He was a very unlikely man, however, to permit the spoliation of the remainder without stepping in for his share of the spoil. He was the less disposed to act so disinterested a part as nothing could be done without him. The negotiation was safely carried on between both ministers by means of certain agents of the Prince of the Peace, who were constantly in Paris. I am ignorant of the precise amount of the share which each party secured to himself; but the Emperor was aware of the fraud; and he related the circumstances to me. Now it must be admitted that he could not wish for more favourable circumstances to induce him to negotiate with the Prince of the Peace respecting his projects upon Spain (if

the idea originated with himself). MM. de Talleyrand and Godoy stood reciprocally in equal need of acting with proper consideration towards, and perhaps of ruining each other. They were the only two men who, without any apprehension of wounding each other's feelings, might mutually set about discussing whatever related to affairs of the nature of those in agitation in respect to Spain. The former had every sort of motive for rejoicing in the elevation of the latter to the summit of power. So far was this circumstance from being injurious to him, that it helped to obliterate every thing that had taken place between them, and gave a degree of consistency to his present and future position, unless, however, an opportunity should have offered for effectually accomplishing the ruin of the Prince of the Peace. This circumstance of the spoliation of one half of the subsidy from Spain is one of those which did the most serious injury to M. de Talleyrand in the Emperor's mind. Though well acquainted with all the details of that business, he continued to employ him, because, as he said, that diplomatist might also be considered under a fair aspect.

It is in vain that the friends of M. de Talleyrand and himself would attempt to make it be believed that he was a perfect stranger to the enterprise upon Spain. The report has no doubt been industriously spread that he had taken no part in it; he even succeeded in conveying this idea to the diplomatic body which had remained in Paris whilst the Emperor proceeded to Bayonne, where he had taken along with him the Duke de Cadore as minister for foreign affairs. Those gentlemen of the diplomatic body reported to their respective courts what was stated in Paris, adding to their report that M. de Talleyrand had no connexion with what was going forward, and was even opposed to it. He strongly encouraged this opinion, and perseveringly circulated it, as it was of a nature to create a desire for his return to the ministry. The fact, however, is so undeniable of his having had a

share in every thing relating to the enterprise, that when the Prince of Asturias and his brother, the Infant Don Carlos, quitted Bayonne to repair to the place fixed upon for their residence, the Emperor ordered him to proceed to Valencey for the purpose of receiving them, and to remain for some time in their company. He accordingly repaired to that residence, and commissioned Major Henry, who was on his return to us, to present his friendly regards to me. "You will tell General Savary," added he when taking leave of the major, "that no one ever gave a better account of a mismanaged business than he has done of the one in which we are embarked. I cannot but pay him my compliments on the occasion: he has saved us from very serious evils."

M. de Talleyrand was ignorant of what I had been doing in Spain, and only formed his opinion from the result; but his very congratulations were an admission that there existed some other project, which was to have been executed in a manner different from the turn which it had actually taken. There is no doubt that affairs would have assumed quite another aspect if the King and royal family had simply taken their departure for America. This is the course which M. de Talleyrand had contemplated and prepared; and to this circumstance alone is to be ascribed his professing himself a stranger to what was taking place in Spain. He most probably spoke in this sense during his stay with the princes at Valencey; but no other inference should be drawn from it than that, having been removed from public affairs, he felt no interest in their success; and that it was more advantageous for him to coincide in opinion with those who disapproved of that enterprise, than to attempt to justify it; but no sensible man at all acquainted with the internal administration of France at that period can, without doing violence to his own judgment, entertain any doubt of the direct and immediate share taken by M. de Talleyrand in the changes of dynasty in Spain. On this occasion, however, he was foremost in evincing

a desire to destroy that branch of the house of Bourbon, as he had been to destroy the reigning branch at Parma, in the first instance, and then in Tuscany, when the latter country had been bestowed upon the Infant of Parma, from whose son it was again wrested through M. de Talleyrand's instrumentality. Generally speaking, he was of opinion that there existed no security for the Emperor's dynasty so long as the sceptre of any country should be swayed by a branch of the Bourbon family.

Besides these several considerations, the unseemly nature of the private life of M. de Talleyrand, who was a priest in wedlock, will fix the conviction that few men were more interested than he was in opposing the events which so soon followed the departure of the Empress from Paris.

This sentiment appeared to be imposed upon him by a variety of other circumstances to which I was no stranger. Independently of the pledges which M. de Talleyrand was considered to have given in favour of an order of things which extended its protection to his own domestic arrangements, it must be observed that it required rather stronger grounds than mere suspicions to justify the adoption of violent measures against him; for he was, undeniably, one of the first personages of the empire. Even supposing that I had been in possession of any fact criminatory of his conduct, I could not have resorted to any measures against him without previously obtaining an authority from the council of regency, and, in its absence, from Prince Joseph: but neither the one nor the other would have allowed me to act against M. de Talleyrand without their first considering the motives and acknowledging the necessity of such a proceeding. Each of them might be placed in a similar situation; and the cause of M. de Talleyrand, in this case, was necessarily viewed as one of a personal nature to both. Had I ventured upon causing his arrest on my own responsibility, a loud clamour would have been raised against me, and not without great show of

reason. Nevertheless, had I been put in possession of any incipient act of manifest guilt, I should not have hesitated in the conduct I had to pursue. If, for instance, the English newspapers, when giving an account of the arrival of the agent sent to the Count d'Artois, who was then at Vésoul, had not mutilated the name in such a manner as to prevent my discovering it, I should have instantly taken my measures, because I knew enough of previous circumstances, in respect to the individual in question, to be satisfied that even if he had not been dispatched by M. de Talleyrand, the latter could not be ignorant of his departure any more than of the object of his journey.

In the absence of that information, I acted with circumspection; the more so, as, when I reflected on all that had been said to me respecting the hopes so fondly entertained by those persons who were formerly attached to the house of Bourbon, I could have no doubt that the intrigues set on foot were as little alarming in their consequences as the dust kept in agitation by a whirlwind. The reports, in fact, which reached me from all those parts of France which had been deluged with the blood spilt during our civil discords, and where the royalist party had not been wholly uprooted, were such as to give little cause for uneasiness to the public authority. There, as well as in every other portion of the empire, the people were resigned to yield obedience to the course of events, which would ere long assume a decided character.

CHAPTER IV.

M. de Talleyrand was privately in favour of a regency—The author is on the point of repairing to the presence of the Emperor—Considerations which prevent his adopting that course—The Emperor's arrival at the Cour de France—He sends Caulaincourt to Paris—Probable motives which influenced the refusal of the author's services—M. Tourton; his protestations contrasted with his conduct—Talleyrand's artifices—Bourienne and the Duke of Ragusa.

WHEN it is considered that the rupture of the conferences at Châtillon-sur-Seine was not known in Paris until the 22nd of March, and that the allies entered that capital on the 30th, it will be clearly seen that the conspirators had been forestalled, that their ideas were yet unsettled, and that they had not agreed upon any particular course of conduct. In this state of uncertainty, therefore, it was most conformable with the dictates of prudence to wait until the real intentions of the allies should assume a gradual developement. M. de Talleyrand had too much penetration not to perceive this. He was too circumspect to hazard an attempt which could not have been productive of a decisive effect; because, had he acted in this manner, common sense would have at least suggested to him the necessity of concealing himself in Paris on the very day of his receiving an order to depart, instead of coming to solicit my authority for remaining behind. This course was the more easy of adoption, as it was only requisite that he should obtain the delay of a few hours. I have since learned that the project he had in view, when he eluded the order to remove, was to set to work in favour of a regency. He confided this circumstance to a person who reported it to me, and who was acquainted with it before his own departure for Blois.* The sequel will show to what trifling circumstance

* "What was the object in contemplation? It was of a two-fold nature; deliverance from a yoke which had become insupportable; and *a continuance of*

his failure of success was owing. It was in every respect his decided interest to endeavour to promote the adoption of a regency. Under this order of things he would preserve all his advantages, together with the influence of the men of the revolution: he would moreover escape the unceasing vexations to which he had been subjected during the two last years of the Emperor's reign: he would also avoid the inconveniences to which he would sooner or later be infallibly exposed after the restoration of the house of Bourbon; and if the installation of the government of the regency were not accompanied with measures of a personal nature against the Emperor, a very unlikely circumstance, he would have the farther advantage of being enabled to contribute to the return of that prince to the government. He had it in his power, therefore, to recover the position which he had lost upon his quitting the department of foreign affairs.

My mind was a prey to this alternation of contradictory ideas; but had I not been arrested by these various considerations, and if, instead of intimating to M. de Talleyrand my orders for his departure, I had resorted to measures of violence, and forcibly sent him to Blois, the return of the house

the established order of things. This was evidently the wish of all who exercised any influence in public affairs; and these are the only persons who claim general attention in the great convulsions of empires. The most justifiable wishes are not always the first attended to: thousands of people imagine that they have restored the King to the throne, because they anxiously desired that event, a sentiment for which they are entitled to every praise; but as they neither exercised any power, nor any active influence, they retain the only advantage that cannot be *contested* to them, their own honourable sentiments. Wishes, however ardent they may be, do not constitute might: care should be taken not to confound them together, for they are wholly dissimilar in their nature. Let us therefore take it for granted that the mass of men who had been for the last quarter of a century in possession of power, and who wielded it at pleasure, who had given to France the different forms of government which were imposed upon it; that these men *aimed at the two-fold object we have just pointed out*. Any one who should raise a doubt on the subject can never have resided for a single moment in Paris."—De Pradt, *De la Restauration de la Royauté*, page 33. Chez Rosa.

of Bourbon would still have taken place; for Paris abounded in men eager for commotions and for obtaining places of public employment. There was felt so great an indifference for the existing order of things, that a cossack was almost fancied to be a *Washington*. The experiment of dethroning sovereigns was so familiar to many intriguers, that in seeking for one individual so disposed, the Emperor of Russia would readily have found a hundred. What excuse could I have given if, after carrying away M. de Talleyrand, the same occurrences had happened which actually came to pass? Would not every one, and the Emperor in particular, have been justified in saying—Our minister of police is a consummate blockhead: he has deemed it an act of great wisdom to raise the enmity of M. de Talleyrand, at the very moment when the latter was under the necessity of serving the Emperor in attention to his own safety. In the blindness of his zeal he forces away from Paris the very man he should have sent there, if he had not happened to be on the spot. If his own common sense did not point out to him the course he ought to pursue, he had no right, at all events, to indulge in such latitude of authority. By what right does he assume to himself to arrest a dignitary of the empire without an order from the Emperor, particularly after he had communicated to the sovereign the forebodings of his mind, without receiving in return any special instructions for his guidance?

I should undoubtedly have been taxed with ignorance and presumption, if not even with much more serious charges, for venturing upon such a course. The Emperor would never have forgiven me such a want of penetration. How often has he not reprimanded the police for arresting individuals upon mere suspicion! It must be admitted that the situation in which I was placed was one of sufficient delicacy to call for the most mature consideration of every measure I might adopt. I have already stated the fact of my having solicited of the Emperor to appoint me his commissioner in Paris, in

the event of the enemy's obtaining possession of the capital; but he had desired me, in reply, to follow the Empress if the course of events should compel that princess to quit Paris. The trying circumstances in which we were placed, and the positive injunctions of the chief of the state, sufficiently enjoined me to be circumspect in my conduct.

I conceived that I had done every thing in my power under the latitude of action allowed to me; and I cannot, at this very day, reproach myself with the slightest failure in the performance of my duty. I accordingly directed my course towards Orleans, and overtook at Etampes M. Molé, the high-judge, who had followed the same road for the purpose of avoiding the obstructions which prevented the possibility of proceeding by the road through Versailles, Rambouillet, and Chartres. We imparted to each other our gloomy presentiments, which very shortly assumed a character of reality.

A courier was brought to me in the night, who was the bearer of an order for the Empress, then at Rambouillet, to repair to Blois. This courier informed me that he had quitted the Emperor in the afternoon at the town of Fontainebleau, where he had just arrived with M. de Caulaincourt, and that he had immediately left it for Paris, to which city the whole army was proceeding, though its advanced guard had not yet reached Montereau. The first impulse of my mind suggested to me that I should start to join the Emperor: reflecting, however, that it might become necessary to adopt various measures at Blois, or in any other place at which the Empress might stop, I relinquished that idea in obedience to the order given to me to repair to the presence of the princess. I was the more readily induced to adopt this course, as, by comparing the hour at which the courier had quitted the Emperor at Fontainebleau with what must have taken place in Paris before he could arrive there, I easily discovered that he would be apprised of every thing before I could join him. My conjecture was fully verified by the event. I accordingly

continued my journey to Orleans, and afterwards to Tours, where I thought the Empress had arrived, as I conceived that the courier would not find her at Rambouillet, and would only overtake her at Tours, which was her original destination. *Having been mistaken in my surmise, I was under the necessity of returning to Blois, which I reached previously to the arrival of the Empress.*

The occurrences at Blois were of so trifling a nature in comparison with those which were about to take place in Paris, that I naturally give precedence to the latter in my narrative.

The Emperor pushed on as far as a place called the Cour de France, which is the second stage from Paris on that road, and is at the distance of about three leagues from the gate of the capital. He met at the Cour de France General Hullin, who was on his way from Paris, which he had left after the capitulation concluded by Marshal Marmont with the enemy. He learned from that general officer that the capital had surrendered, that the French troops were to evacuate it in the night, and the enemy to take possession the next morning. It is impossible to form an idea of the painful impression which this news created upon his mind. He had anticipated the possibility of the enemy's marching upon Paris, and had mentioned the circumstance to the officers of the national guard previously to his own departure for the army. He had expressed to them his wish that they should hold out for a few days, so as to enable him to hasten to their assistance. He had kept his word, since Paris had only been attacked that very morning; and before the close of day he was already at its gates with his whole army. But instead of a defence of a few days, the capital did not resist for the space of a few short hours. It was not yet mid-day, in fact, when the determination was adopted of coming to a capitulation. All this can only be ascribed to the cowardice of some, and to the blind eagerness of others to rely upon the enemy's generosity. After the rupture of the conferences at Châtillon,

the Emperor, as I have already stated, had made a movement towards the fortresses of Lorraine, with the whole of his army. Being, however, informed on his way of the march of the grand army of the allies upon Paris, he instantly retraced his steps from the point at which he had arrived, for the purpose of forcing the passage of the Maine at Vitry-le-Français. But the enemy had provided for the defence of that place, and he would have lost too much time in attempting to carry it. He had, accordingly, to relinquish all hope of the important advantage which he might have derived from returning to Paris in the rear of the enemy's army, whose line of operations he had succeeded in cutting off; and he immediately took the surest road by following the banks of the Seine. He had certainly not loitered on his way. Had Paris held out for two days longer, his army would have entered it; and every one is well acquainted with his skill in the management of affairs. He would have had no hesitation to throw the arsenals open to the people. His presence would have inflamed the multitude. He would have imparted a salutary direction to their enthusiasm, and Paris would no doubt have imitated the example of Saragossa; or, to speak more correctly, the enemy would not have ventured to make any attempt upon it; for, independently of the Emperor's being for them a Medusa's head, it was ascertained at a later period, that in the battle which preceded the surrender of the capital, they had nearly consumed the whole of their ammunition. Tears of blood are ready to flow at the bare recollection of these facts.

The Emperor's situation was bitter beyond description. He was hastening to Paris with all speed; but the corps of Marshals Mortier and Marmont were leaving it to take up a position on the road to Fontainebleau. He was only accompanied by M. de Caulaincourt, and M. de Saint Agnan, one of his equerries. He dispatched the former to Paris with unlimited powers, directing him to exercise the functions of

his commissioner in the capital so long as the enemy should stay there, and he returned to Fontainebleau. The army shortly afterwards debouched before him. He assembled the guard who formed the advance, passed them in review, informed them of the events which had recently taken place, and announced his intention of marching forward.

"Soldiers!" said he to these gallant fellows, "the enemy has gained three marches upon us, and taken possession of Paris. We must drive them out of it. Some worthless Frenchmen, some emigrants whom we had pardoned, have set up the white cockade, and joined the enemy. Dastards that they are! they shall receive the reward of this new crime. Let us swear to conquer or die, and to cause that three-coloured cockade to be respected which has accompanied us for these twenty years past in the road to glory and renown." The proposal was greeted with general acclamations, and the guard proceeded to range itself in a second line behind the river of Essonne.

The measure adopted by the Emperor, of sending M. de Caulaincourt to treat for peace on any terms, was assuredly the most judicious under existing circumstances. But the Duke of Vicenza was, of all the high functionaries, the one least acquainted with the administrative details of a mighty city, upon whose destinies those of the state were depending. I was well acquainted with the power of opinion exercised over the people by the several municipal authorities of the city; and this was my motive for drawing the Emperor's attention to the necessity of fixing beforehand upon a commissioner thus qualified, and for offering my own services in that capacity. This was in every respect the peculiar duty of a minister of police. If the Emperor felt a want of confidence in me, he ought instantly to have removed me from the administration, instead of compromising so many interests by a single act.

I was not blind to the motives of the refusal which he gave

to me. It did not proceed from any want of confidence in my abilities. The Emperor was better able than any one else to appreciate them in the several negotiations which he had entrusted to me. Neither could it arise from any mistrust of my military talents, since, of all those he had left in Paris who belonged to the profession of arms, I had been the most frequently engaged on the memorable fields of battle of which nothing is now left beyond the bare recollection of them to console us at the close of our historical career. When I happened to be with the army, the Emperor employed me in every enterprise. Of all his aides-de-camp, I was the one of whose activity and bodily health he was the most unsparing. I had so often been scolded, as to have acquired a considerable share of prudence and penetration. The Emperor must certainly have thought so, since he furnished me some opportunities of acquiring glory in certain chief commands, where I acted in perfect independence of his controul. I had been fortunate enough not to disappoint his hopes; or at least fortune had crowned all my military combinations with success. It was after the encounter at Ostrolenka that he gave me the ribbon of the Legion of Honour with a pension for life of twenty thousand francs. It was, in short, on the field of battle that I had won the honours which had been heaped upon me. Nevertheless he bestowed his confidence in another quarter. I was at no loss to discover from whence had proceeded the blow thus directed against me.

In the situation in which the Emperor was placed, his mental faculties were wholly absorbed by the care he had to bestow upon the army, of which he was the soul. I had often beheld him under circumstances of a much less painful nature, when fighting by his side. He was exclusively wrapped up in military combinations, and gave little or no attention to the affairs of the administration, which he relinquished to the respective public functionaries who followed in his suite. I had received at Troyes, after the battle of Brienne, an order

to adopt a variety of measures which had certainly never entered his mind. The same, or perhaps worse, may have happened on this occasion: such at least is the conjecture I have formed on the subject. It has occurred to me that he had communicated to some of the persons of his suite the proposal I had made, that he should leave me in Paris at the moment of the enemy's arrival; and that this individual, who had already determined upon my ruin, had prevented his acceptance of my proposal by observing that I was by no means adequate to the task; that I should place myself under the controul of M. de Talleyrand, who already exercised a kind of magic spell over me. These shameful insinuations alone were calculated to prevent the Emperor from reposing in me that confidence to which I was entitled, as a reward for the zeal I was evincing in his service at a time when every one was beginning to desert him.

How often during the course of that campaign had I not occasion to regret not having been called to the administration a few years sooner! I should then have acquired that moral strength in it which is conferred by the power of public opinion, and I should unquestionably have turned it to a useful account.

As the Emperor always formed his judgment upon mathematical bases, there was but one plain course to be pursued, that of pure and undisguised truth in any report or proposal made to him. It unfortunately happened that, during the two last years of his government, he was incessantly harassed by men of low passions, and given to petty intrigues, who sprang up in swarms around him. Marshals Bessières and Duroc coincided in opinion with me on the subject. We often lamented together the occurrences that were taking place under our eyes.

M. de Caulaincourt, on his arrival in Paris, made himself acquainted with the state of affairs previously to repairing to the head-quarters of the Emperor Alexander at Bondy, the first

stage on the road to Strasburg. M. de Talleyrand, who had quitted Paris in conformity with his instructions to follow the Empress, had returned to the capital; and it has been reported to me that he was stopped on the road by M. Tourton, chief of the staff of the national guard, who found himself at the head of that corps in consequence of the departure of Marshal Moncey, its commander-in-chief, and of M. de Montesquiou, the second in command. This, I was told, was mutually agreed on between them; a farther proof that M. de Talleyrand had not made up his mind to any particular course of conduct, and was even apprehensive of the responsibility of taking upon himself to remain at the theatre of the most important events. Such was the fatality which attended the Emperor, that the several chiefs of legions of the national guard who were provided with places at court, or with public employments, had been desired to follow the Empress, though she had not the least occasion for their services, instead of being left in Paris to direct the movements of the persons under their orders, which was the only inducement on the

* I was also assured by a person who took part in all the events, and to whom I expressed my surprise at such conduct, that M. Tourton was still indebted to the treasury a considerable sum out of what had been advanced to him by the Emperor's desire in 1811; it exceeded a million of francs. During the interregnum which existed between the installation of the provisional government and the King's arrival, M. de Talleyrand caused him to be put into possession of the notes which he had still to redeem from the hands of the treasury. It is possible that he may have obtained the sanction of the Count d'Artois for this act. On that point I can say nothing, and am merely relating the circumstance such as it was reported to me. If true, it sufficiently explains the subsequent conduct of M. Tourton. An investigation at the treasury would bring the matter to light.

The conduct of Tourton the banker is the more extraordinary, as he was most clamorous in favour of the plan of arming the national guard. He was repeatedly calling upon me, and protesting his attachment to the Emperor, proposing, at the same time, the formation of a corps of *trusty fellows* (this was his expression), who would march, as he said, for the purpose of reviving the spirits of the army on its return from Leipsic. To this excess of zeal he was indebted for his being selected as the chief of the staff of the national guard.

part of the Emperor for placing them at the head of the national guard. They had no sooner left than they were immediately replaced, and the choice fell upon men of directly opposite opinions; a course which secured the means of carrying into effect every contemplated measure.

M. Tourton forgot all the favours conferred upon him by the Emperor, who had made considerable pecuniary advances at a moment when the honour of his firm was compromised; advances which had not been reimbursed at the time of his taking up arms against his benefactor.

M. de Talleyrand having returned to Paris, bent his mind to the object of securing a position for himself which might prevent the Emperor Alexander from dispensing with his services whilst carrying into effect those projects which he was known to entertain. He immediately caused a meeting to be convened of those men, ever ready for a movement, who are to be found in the various classes of society; and he had not to encounter any opposition, since there prevailed a total absence of every thing that might afford the slightest indication of the Emperor's personal influence. M. de Talleyrand was not slow in discovering the means which he had at command. He organised upon paper a provisional administration, but took no decided part until he had first ascertained what was the Emperor of Russia's final determination. He passed the whole evening with the Duke of Ragusa at his residence in the Rue du Paradis, in the suburb of St. Denis, where the marshal was still to be found, as he had the whole night before him to evacuate Paris, which the enemy were only to enter on the following morning. Many of Marmont's friends were also in his company. M. de Talleyrand was well aware that whatever the Emperor Alexander might attempt to do, he could not concur with that prince without first having at his command a portion of the army, which was the only physical and moral strength remaining to the Emperor Napoleon. He was not

blind to the fact, that so long as it remained unbroken, it would fix the general opinion of the nation in such a manner, that the party which was preparing to alter the existing authority would succeed at most in kindling a civil war, which would render every thing once more problematical.

By persuading Marshal Marmont to detach himself from the Emperor's cause, he had, independently of the advantage of occasioning a farther reduction in the Emperor Napoleon's resources, that of affording greater facilities to the Emperor of Russia for carrying into effect whatever measures he might determine upon. He exerted himself therefore to draw Marmont into his views. There had existed no previous connexion of a public nature between them; nor even any social intercourse that might furnish him with an opportunity of opening proposals of so delicate a nature for the Duke of Ragusa, who still nourished, in all their fervour, the sentiments which had sprung up in his breast with the first laurels he had culled in the campaigns of Italy. But M. de Talleyrand held at his disposal M. de Bourienne, the companion of the marshal in his youthful days, and whose sincere attachment for the Emperor had been of cotemporary growth, having rendered him effectual services during the twelve most laborious years of his life. Bourienne had been removed from the cabinet, in consequence of imputations cast upon him. The Emperor, to whom he was represented as a man unworthy of the confidence reposed in his character, afterwards appointed him his minister at Hamburgh, where Bourienne fixed his residence until the annexation of that country to France. On his return to Paris, he was assailed by the same spirit of enmity. Those intriguers who had procured his removal from the cabinet felt alarmed at the possibility of the return of a man of talent to favour, and neglected no means of dissuading the Emperor from recalling, or even again employing him in any capacity whatever. Absurd reports were brought back to him respecting M. de Bourienne, which

drew down many petty attacks upon the latter. Finding himself deserted by his sovereign, and the sport of such persecutions, Bourienne took part with the Emperor's enemies.

I do not approve of his conduct, but I cannot help pitying him, being well acquainted with the injustice of the reproaches levelled at his character. I had defended his cause to the best of my abilities; and whenever I mentioned his name, the Emperor appeared to be kindly disposed towards his former secretary. It did not, however, depend upon me to procure his being named to a suitable employment, and to prevent his becoming the Emperor's personal enemy. I failed in all my endeavours. Bourienne espoused the cause of the adverse party, and brought to it all his talent and activity. The inmost sentiments of Marmont's heart were known to him. He was intimately acquainted with him during the campaigns of Italy and Egypt; and was gifted with too much penetration not to have perceived the weak side by which he might be successfully attacked. He had besides at his command an auxiliary fully capable of corrupting any heart which it might be Talleyrand's interest to win over. This was Montessuis, a former aide-de-camp of the marshal, who was familiar with all the sentiments of his chief.

The intrigue was just set on foot; but it was managed by men of too much experience to neglect the means of bringing it to maturity by the time when it would be advisable to unfold it to the Emperor of Russia, in order to derive all the advantages that were anticipated from it. Care was accordingly taken to represent to Marmont, as a point already settled and agreed on, the necessity of a revolution, in which he was even marked out for the principal part. He was addressed in the name of friendship, and was urged not to lose this opportunity of preserving the honours he had acquired, of saving France, and of placing himself in an attitude which would enable him to be of service to his friends. Let us hasten to acknowledge it, whilst we are yet in time to do so; Marmont showed

himself true to his early attachment. He was proof against all the attempts at seduction, and withdrew, after declaring that nothing should detach him from his duties, and that he would die at the Emperor's side. A friend of Madame la Maréchale who was present at this scene, related to me that he did not quit the Duke of Ragusa until eleven o'clock at night, and that he returned home with the conviction upon his mind that the Duke would keep his word, and sooner die than abandon the Emperor's cause. Such was the opinion of himself which the marshal had left behind him amongst his friends at the moment when he quitted Paris to join his troops on the road to Fontainebleau. M. de Talleyrand had obtained nothing from him; but he was too deeply skilled in the science of judging the human heart to renounce the hope of overcoming the marshal's scruples; and the sequel will show by what means he succeeded in leading him astray.

CHAPTER V.

Caulaincourt's mistake—He imagines that all is over—Alexander avoids an explanation—He sends Nesselrode to sound the feelings of the leading men in Paris—Madame Aimée de Coigny—Talleyrand's request—Alexander alights at his hotel.

In his endeavours to ascertain the state of affairs in Paris, M. de Caulaincourt could not fail to perceive that the spirit of intrigue against the Emperor was already at work. Its movements were the more visible as it was wholly unrestrained, in consequence of the removal of all those who might have thrown any obstacle in the way of its progress. As in whichever direction he turned he found all government places filled up by intruders, he could not but ascribe these changes to certain previous communications with the enemy. This conviction was the more powerfully forced upon him by the

circumstance that, when at Châtillon, he had had more opportunities than any one else of judging of their intentions. He became the dupe of appearances, and fancied that every thing had been prepared beforehand, whilst, on the contrary, nothing had yet been determined upon. M. de Talleyrand, whom he did not fail to visit on his arrival, confirmed him in his erroneous impressions; for experienced intriguers have a peculiar tact in representing as already effected what remains as yet unaccomplished.

M. de Caulaincourt, whose chief mission was at the headquarters of the Emperor of Russia, hastened to repair thither with the greater eagerness, as there alone it would be in his power to solve the enigma by the language that might be addressed to him, when he would be enabled to regulate the conduct he should pursue in respect to the second part of his mission, that which related to his remaining in Paris as the Emperor's commissioner during the stay of the allies in that capital.

As soon as the capitulation had been signed and notified to the civil authorities, the municipal council met and proceeded in a body to Bondy, in order to request of the Emperor of Russia that he would spare the capital from injury. It was headed, according to the customary form, by the prefect of the department and the prefect of police; had commenced its journey on the day after the signing of the capitulation, and had consequently got the start of M. de Caulaincourt. The Emperor Alexander detained the deputation a long time before he granted it an audience; and from what was reported to me by an eye-witness, he gave them a rather harsh reception; such was at least their first impression. Nevertheless he softened his tone, and said to them, amongst other things, that "the chances of war had placed him in possession of the capital; that he was not hostile to the nation, and had but one enemy in France against whom alone he waged war. I lament," he added, "the evils which he has drawn down upon you,

and shall endeavour to mitigate them, by quartering as few troops as possible in Paris, and stationing the remainder in its vicinity." He asked if there were many barracks in Paris, and was told in reply that they could admit of a body of ten thousand men. "Well, then," was his reply, "this will be some relief to the inhabitants, to whom neither I nor my allies wish any harm. You may give them this assurance as coming from them as well as from myself." He dismissed from his presence the municipal body, who remarked that he had avoided entering upon an explanation of the plans which every one knew he was meditating to carry into effect.

Whilst the municipal body was repairing to Bondy, the Emperor Alexander had dispatched to Paris Count Nesselrode, his minister for foreign affairs, the same who had been attached to the last Russian legation. His mission was intended for the purpose of sounding the views of the leaders of the party, and of correctly ascertaining the resources at the disposal of the conspirators. Nesselrode alighted at the hotel of M. de Talleyrand, whom he knew to have very recently opened a closer communication with Hartwell. The conditions transmitted by Madame Aimée de Coigny had been accepted. This lady, who had been in turns Duchess de Fleury and Madame de Montron, and, in consequence of her divorce, had resumed her first name, had communicated with her grandfather, Marshal de Coigny, who resided in London. The latter hastened to lay before the King the repentance and attachment of M. de Talleyrand, and to submit, at the same time, the reservations of that diplomatist. "Accept his offer," replied the Prince: "provided I re-ascend my throne, you may promise every thing." This bargain, which was known to Castlereagh, could be no secret to the Emperor of Russia. Nesselrode was at liberty to select between the projects laid down at Frankfort and London, whichever most suited his views. His choice was soon made.

Alexander had long formed the determination of changing

the dynasty which ruled over France, if the course of events should not militate too strongly against his views. This had been the settled idea of his mind ever since his conference with Bernadotte at Abo; and he unquestionably called Moreau to his councils for the express purpose of his concurring to give effect to his wishes. Nesselrode accordingly summoned Talleyrand to keep his promises. The latter replied by expressing his readiness to do so; but stated that, in order to insure success, it was necessary that the Emperor Alexander should bestow upon him a signal mark of favour, which might enable him to wield all the influence that was requisite for giving effect to his promises. Alexander immediately sent word that he would alight at his hotel, and make it his residence.

On quitting the gate of Paris for the purpose of repairing to Bondy, M. de Caulaincourt announced himself to the Russian advanced posts as the bearer of a flag of truce. He was detained until the Emperor's orders should be received. Alexander directed that he should be admitted; and on his way to the Russian head-quarters he met the municipal body, which was on its return to the capital.

I do not recollect whether M. de Caulaincourt reached Bondy previously to his being admitted into the presence of the Emperor of Russia, or whether he met him actually proceeding towards Paris with the intention of entering it at the head of his army, which was already assembled and in readiness to follow him; but I am quite certain that on his being admitted to an interview, Alexander addressed him in these words: "Is this a proper time to call on me, when the mischief is past all remedy? I cannot converse with you at present. Return back to Paris: I will there see you." M. de Caulaincourt accordingly returned in the utmost despondency at finding all his presentiments realised. He proceeded to the prefecture of the Seine, and to that of the police, where no farther doubt was entertained as to the intentions ascribed

to the Emperor of Russia. No one dared any longer to exceed the limits of his duty, or to compromise himself any farther towards the man whom fortune was crowning with her favours. If M. de Caulaincourt had attempted to display his character of commissioner on the part of the Emperor, the least that could have happened to him was not only his being refused admittance to the Emperor of Russia, who was to arrive that very evening, but his being actually sent away. He was therefore under the necessity of leaving every one in their state of stupor and inaction, and of merely watching the course of events; a position which was for him of the most painful nature.

The Russian column entered Paris at twelve or one o'clock of the day after the capitulation for its surrender. This was a moment of intense suffering for those exalted minds who were witnesses of a sight so humiliating to Frenchmen, hitherto so justly proud of the renown of their country.

Our armies have also made triumphant entries into foreign capitals, and have done so moreover after memorable battles, whose names have been given to the campaigns in which they were fought. The campaign of Marengo will long retain the name of that town, as well as those of Austerlitz, Jena, and Moscow. They will always stand as monuments of our history in spite of the attacks of envy: but although in the sequel of events so glorious to our arms the vanquished have had the consolation of making us expiate our victories, we have never witnessed their families rushing forward to meet or to welcome us as their liberators; they never stooped to kiss our feet. Nothing but the picture of affliction met our sight. We never witnessed any abject scenes at Vienna and Berlin, where there existed a just cause for apprehending our resentment. All asserted their national dignity; nor did we ever receive more attention than what it was indispensable to pay to us.

It was reserved for Paris to exhibit the disgraceful con-

trast, and to prove to the enemy that it had remained perfectly indifferent to the glory we had acquired, although it had been made the depository of so many trophies. This mode of expressing myself will probably not escape the ordeal of criticism; but my reproaches are exclusively directed against those men who disgraced themselves on the occasion. I hold up to public scorn the servile acts of that period, in order that our descendants, being fired with those sentiments of indignation which such acts are calculated to inspire, should be made acquainted with the nature of the stains it behoves them to wipe away.

Every thing in France is of fertile and ready growth: the laurels of victory are natives of its soil, and the means were at command for reaping an ample harvest of them, a sure proof that they had been properly cultivated; and that wheresoever they were transplanted, it became necessary to submit them to the process of naturalization. The despoilers of those laurels have turned them to the account which any ill-gotten property would be applied to; but their roots and the climate of their original growth are still our own. All is not lost wherever there remains the germ of blended courage with true patriotism.

An immense crowd of people had collected to witness the entrance of the Russian army. Curiosity attracted the greater part, and a feeling of indignation brought forth the remainder. Those who had hitherto formed the insignificant portion of society, where they were kept within the bounds of decorum, broke through the restraints by which their private hatred was held in check. Women, some of them of high titles, were seen to transgress the boundaries of self-respect, so far as openly to give way to paroxysms of the most shameful enthusiasm. They rushed through the cavalcade forming the group which accompanied the Emperor of Russia, evincing an eagerness to behold him much more calculated to draw down a sentiment of contempt, than a kindly feeling

towards them. Others, who subsisted upon the Emperor Napoleon's liberality, were driving through the streets in calashes, collecting the people together, and uttering imprecations against the man whose favours had been constantly showered upon them. Others, in short, whose time of domestic mourning had scarcely expired, and whose tears should have continued to flow for the loss of near relatives, exhibited themselves in public on the occasion of this triumph, and appeared in it with branches of myrtle and laurel leaves, which they scattered under the horses' feet, instead of seeking amongst the population for avengers of their departed husbands. They employed themselves in weaving crowns for those who had deprived those unhappy men of life, and did so with the very flowers which they should have kept in reserve to ornament the graves of their husbands.

Each individual of that numerous army which the allies displayed to the gaze of the capital carried a white scarf on his right arm, as an emblem calculated to stir up the population. It was asserted, and the enemy gave countenance to the assertion, that the above distinguishing mark had been given to the troops of the coalition because it had happened that, in consequence of their having no means of mutual recognition, owing to the great variety of their uniforms, they had mistaken each other for enemies, and come to open contact. Whether this be true or false, the multitude, whose judgment is never formed but upon ocular evidence of facts, ascribed to this rallying sign a very different interpretation, which greatly favoured the execution of the plans of the Emperor of Russia.

Paris and its vicinity were filled with the enemy's troops: they also pushed forward some advanced corps on the roads to Fontainebleau and Orleans.

The Emperor of Russia, who had reserved to himself the part of Agamemnon in the crusade, clearly saw that he now held in his hands the fate of that very monarch, to whose

magnanimity he had personally appealed at a period not far removed, and on the occasion of a triumph much better earned than the one which he was at this moment celebrating with so much pomp. There is in real power an innate sense of generosity: the heart which finds no place for that noble virtue is naturally barren of the qualities so requisite to the man who aims at raising himself above the rest of his species. The Emperor Alexander made the troops file off before him, and then proceeded to the residence of M. de Talleyrand, agreeably to his expressed intention. The means which were to be set at work had been agreed upon at the interview between the diplomatist and M. de Nesselrode. The Autocrat immediately resumed the discussion, and felt no difficulty in adopting the conviction that what he most anxiously wished for was also the most judicious course.* The Em-

* After stating the magnanimous intentions of the allies, in nearly the same language which he uttered to ourselves, as will shortly be seen, the Emperor Alexander said to M. de Talleyrand that he was unwilling to come to any settled determination without previously conferring with him on the subject; that one of three courses was to be adopted :—

1st—To make peace with Napoleon, after previously taking every measure of security against him.

2ndly—To establish a regency.

3rdly—To recall the house of Bourbon.

M. de Talleyrand, in his reply, dwelt upon the inconvenience that would result from the adoption of either of the two first proposals, and endeavoured to indispose the minds of the council against them. He then urged the propriety of adopting the third course, as the only one which was suitable to the existing circumstances, was in unison with the wishes of all, and calculated for general acceptance, and which would, moreover, have the effect of putting an end at once to the prevailing system of tyranny, and afford ample guarantees to the warmest advocates of liberty under the sway of princes whose character for moderation was well known, and who had benefited by the lessons of misfortune, and by a long residence in the land of freedom. The aptitude of the proposal was not disputed; but a doubt was entertained of the very existence of a desire of which not the slightest manifestation had been found on the whole line of march, since the population had, on the contrary, evinced a feeling of hostility. Great stress was laid upon the resistance shown in the army, as well by the raw recruits as by

perer's downfall was determined upon; but it was felt to be desirable that the national vanity should be spared from

the veteran soldiers. They had, a few days before, at the Fère Champenoise, been witnesses to the fact that a corps of many thousand men, recently torn from the plough, had fought to the last man against the allied troops, into the midst of which they had unguardedly fallen. Those men having been taken by surprise and surrounded, the Emperor Alexander was forced to rescue the few that remained from that certain death which they continued to brave. No attention was therefore paid to the assertion that the recall of the house of Bourbon would find no opposition in a large mass of the people. The Emperor asked M. de Talleyraud what were the means he had it in contemplation to adopt, towards obtaining the result he had in view. These, he replied, were to be found in the constituted authorities. He could almost answer for the senate, and the impulse given by the latter would be followed by Paris and the whole of France. However solid were the reasons which he alleged, and however great the confidence placed in the influence which he was calculated to exercise over the senate, his views still met with resistance; and it was to overcome this resistance that he felt it necessary to call to his aid my own opinion, and that of Baron Louis, and proposed to the Emperor to question us as individuals whom he had for many months past found embarked in the same political interests, and in a search after the means for giving effect to them.

This proposal having been accepted, M. de Talleyrand introduced us into the apartment where the council was sitting. The members were placed in the following order: The King of Prussia and Prince Schwartzenberg were on the right, and close to the piece of ornamental furniture in the centre of the apartment: the Duke de Dalberg was on the right of M. de Schwartzenberg. MM. de Nesselrode, Pozzo di Borgo, and Lichtenstein followed. Prince Talleyrand was on the left of the King of Prussia: Baron Louis and I were next to him. The Emperor Alexander was in front of the assembly, and kept walking to and fro. This Prince, assuming a decided tone of voice, which was aided by a most animated gesticulation, began by telling us that he was not the person who had begun the war: that he had been hunted down in his own dominions: that neither a thirst for conquest nor revenge had brought him to Paris: that he had done all in his power to save from the horrors of war that capital, upon which he bestowed the most honourable expressions: that he should feel inconsolable at its experiencing any of its calamities: he did not wage war against France: his allies as well as himself only acknowledged two enemies in the world, the Emperor Napoleon and any one who might be opposed to French liberty. He then addressed himself to the King of Prussia and to Prince Schwartzenberg, and asked them if such were not their own sentiments. Their acquiescence having followed this appeal, he went a second time over a great part of the same ground with considerable animation; laying particular stress upon his feelings towards us, which penetrated our hearts with admiration and

humiliation; and it became a settled point that French hands should accomplish what would have been rejected by the people, if attempted by the allies. M. de Talleyrand was accordingly directed to bring his friends together, and concert with his accomplices the measures of which the existing circumstances required the adoption.

It might be said that his choice had been made beforehand. A plausible pretence was afforded him by the fact of the capital having been left without any public administration. He had recourse to the senate, and immediately addressed letters of convocation to the different members of that body who were still to be found in Paris. This measure was altogether illegal, and irrevocably compromised those who became parties to it; but the chiefs of the coalition knew full well by what means a spirit of boldness may be infused into the composition of men. They had secured the future prospects of those who hastened to the calls of seduction;* and they could

gratitude; after repeatedly assuring us that the French were perfectly free; that we were equally so; that we had only to make known what we conceived to be the general wishes of the nation, and that those wishes should be supported by all the power of the allies: he put the question to each of us separately. When it came to my turn to speak, I broke out into a declaration that we were all royalists: I added that all France was equally so: if she had not displayed that feeling, the cause was to be ascribed to the negotiations kept up at Châtillon: they had had the effect of throwing a damp over every thing: the case was the same in Paris, which would take a decided part as soon as it might be called upon, or when it might find it safe to do so; and from the influence which Paris exercised over all France, ever since the breaking out of the revolution, its example would have a decisive character, and be followed throughout the country. The Emperor again appealed to the King of Prussia and to Prince Schwartzenberg: they replied in a sense quite in unison with the opinions we had just expressed. "Well, then," said the Emperor Alexander, "I declare that I will no longer treat with the Emperor Napoleon." It was observed to him that Napoleon was alone excluded by this declaration, which did not extend to his family; and upon our representations the Emperor added these words—"nor with any member of his family."—(De Pradt, *Précis Historique de la Restauration*, pages 54 to 59.)

* Astonished at receiving no manifestation of the national sentiments, finding themselves to be treading upon a new ground, and in the midst of elements wholly

not hesitate to afford guarantees to such as were ready to compromise themselves. They promised not to treat with Napoleon or with any member of his family, and mixing up, by an odious fiction, a handful of traitors with the whole French nation, they covered the walls of the capital with a document, wherein, after collecting the votes of the French people, they declared:

"That if the conditions of peace were to contain stronger guarantees when the object in view was to chain down the ambition of Bonaparte, they must now be of a more favourable nature, since, by returning to a wise system of government, France herself will offer the pledge of future tranquillity.

"The sovereigns accordingly proclaim that they will no longer treat with Napoleon Bonaparte nor with any member of his family.

"They respect the integrity of ancient France such as she existed under her legitimate monarchs. They may be disposed to do more, because it is a professed principle with them, from which they have never swerved, that it is requisite for the happiness of Europe that France should be great and powerful.

"They will acknowledge and guaranty the constitution which the French nation may establish for itself. They accordingly invite the senate to establish, immediately, a provisional government which may be enabled to meet the wants

unknown to them, the allies felt desirous of aiding their judgment by the experience of those individuals whom they conceived to be best acquainted with the internal state of France. MM. de Talleyrand and Dalberg had more especially attracted their attention. However slight my own claim to share in this honour, it had been conceded to me. The attention towards us was carried so far as to provide for our future fate, in case it had been compromised by the issue of events.—(De Pradt, *Précis Historique de la Restauration*, page 26.)

of the administration, and to prepare the constitution best adapted to the French people.

"The intentions I have just expressed are held in common with me by all the other powers.

(Signed) "ALEXANDER.

"Paris, the 31st of March, 1814, at three in the afternoon."

Those persons who had been most instrumental in favouring the measures of Talleyrand were far from anticipating all the evils those measures would infallibly occasion; they were even persuaded that it was reserved to them to avert them. Did the Emperor of Russia, in this first interview, confide to M. de Talleyrand the secret of his mind and the project he actually meditated? I can hardly believe it, notwithstanding M. de Pradt's assertion. I certainly possess no other data to build upon than my own conjectures. But these are not wholly destitute of weight. I will presently define them.

CHAPTER VI.

Composition of the provisional government—M. de Pradt—The Duke of Vicenza is ordered to withdraw—Marmont; means adopted for seducing him—M. de Bourienne—The Duke of Ragusa will listen to no advice—Artifices resorted to by Alexander—M. de Talleyrand *still*—He dispatches emissaries to Fontainebleau and to Essonne—Marshal Oudinot—Montessuis—Marmont *allows himself* to be seduced from his duty—Council of general officers.

I WAS informed by a person who acted as secretary to M. de Talleyrand on the occasion to which I have adverted, that this great disorganiser had drawn up his task in a two-fold manner. He had placed on the list of those whom he intended to compose the provisional government, the following persons:

1st—Himself in the character of president.

2nd—Beurnonville, who had been his agent in Spain and in Russia.

3rd—Jaucourt, his colleague in the revolutionary career.

4th—Dalberg, his own dependant, whom he had married to the daughter of Madame de Brignole.

5th—M. Barthelemy, the senator, a man universally esteemed.

These choices assuredly afforded no indication of an intention to recall the elder branch of the house of Bourbon, and they guaranteed a constant majority to M. de Talleyrand's own opinions. It was only after his conference with the Emperor of Russia that he substituted the Abbé de Montesquiou for M. Barthelemy. The bargain with Hartwell was not, therefore, what he had most at heart; and if the Emperor Alexander had not led him to foresee that he inclined towards the return of the house of Bourbon, it is probable the diplomatist would have paid little attention to his treaty. What proves how little he was disposed to act in behalf of legitimacy, is, that even after having acquired a knowledge of the real sentiments of the Autocrat, he only selected the Abbé de Montesquiou from amongst all the friends of monarchy, in order to preserve a majority, in the event of the Emperor of Russia's not having so far declared himself, but what there might yet remain some hope of making him adopt an idea which it had perhaps been found hazardous to develope to him, and which would have met with obstacles, if the government had been composed of any more members of M. de Montesquiou's sentiments.

The government being once framed, the next object of attention was to fill up the principal places in the administration. The Abbé Louis, a counsellor of state, was chosen for the finance department;

M. Beugnot, a counsellor of state, for the interior;

M. Malouet, a counsellor of state (under banishment), for the marine department;

General Dupont for the war department;

M. Anglès, a master of requests, in charge of the third district of police, for the administration of general police;

General Dessoles, for the command of the national guard;

The Archbishop of Mechlin for the legion of honour;

And M. de Bourienne for the administration of the post.

These preliminary labours being completed, M. de Talleyrand repaired to the senate, where the several measures were formed into a decree.

The persons whom M. de Talleyrand had associated to his views took possession of the respective branches of the administration which they were called upon in so illegal a manner to occupy, without encountering any opposition, because every one feels a degree of satisfaction in placing his responsibility under cover where there exists a necessity for receiving at every moment a fresh impulse.

These places having been filled up, the administration became organised, and proceeded at once to work. It openly avowed, or at least did not disguise its intentions; but it had not yet hoisted up any signal, nor assumed any other colours than the national ones.

M. de Chabrol, the prefect of the Seine, and M. Pasquier, the prefect of police, were retained in their places, because they were found useful in both the hypotheses upon which M. de Talleyrand had built his scheme. Those two magistrates were not men of the revolution; they could only follow the impulse of events; for that purpose only had they been left in Paris.

M. de Talleyrand assembled at his residence the members of the provisional government, and presented, or, to speak more correctly, surrendered them to the Emperor of Russia, who only conversed with them in the language of one ready to protect the mighty labours they were about to undertake.*

* "A man who called himself my ally," said the Emperor Alexander to the deputation appointed by the senate to present to him the resolution just adopted by that

He was sufficiently acquainted with mankind to know that this was the surest way of inducing them to fall in with his views. I have been told by the Archbishop of Mechlin himself that when this presentation took place, he solicited a private conversation with the Emperor Alexander, who granted his request; and he then told him that "whatever plans might be in contemplation, public opinion would never declare itself so long as there existed no certain knowledge of his private sentiments; that at any rate, the presence of M. de Caulaincourt in Paris kept every one in check."

The power of the Emperor Alexander was established upon foundations sufficiently solid to secure the success of what he was about to undertake. He gave an audience to M. de Caulaincourt the same evening. The latter has never communicated to me the details of the interview; but he was assuredly not received in the character of French ambassador, though the Emperor of Russia showed him the same kindness as heretofore. The Duke of Vicenza was but too well aware of what was about to happen. He was the only one who had held a sufficiently direct intercourse with that Prince not to be afraid of assuming, without transgressing, the tone of language best adapted to existing circumstances. It is to be presumed that he did all in his power to avert the storm, or at least to retard its explosion. All his efforts, however, were unavailing. Alexander drily signified to him that his presence operated as a restraint upon public opinion, and prevented it from breaking out, whilst it was necessary for the sovereigns to be made acquainted with it, in order that they might come

body,—"a man who called himself my ally, came to my dominions in the character of an unjust aggressor (see Boutourlin's Admissions); against him have I waged war, and not against France (see the treaty of Paris). I am a friend of the French people. What you have just done has contributed to increase my friendly sentiments. Justice and prudence equally require that France should receive strong and liberal institutions in harmony with the lights of the age. My allies and I have only come for the purpose of affording our support to your decisions."

to a decision. He accordingly directed him to withdraw from Paris, as the allies had no answer to give to the communications of which he was the bearer.

This injunction, and above all, the declaration pasted upon the walls of the capital, had greatly promoted the prospects of the conspirators. The senators being taken by surprise at the suddenness of the storm, and kept in check by an intrigue which will be presently related, could oppose no resistance. The forfeiture of the throne was made the subject of deliberation. Each individual was more or less implicated: no one attempted to combat the measure; and the Emperor's downfall was decreed.

M. de Caulaincourt took his departure, and returned to Fontainebleau, where the Emperor had collected his feeble army, which did not amount to sixty thousand men. The state of his mind on learning the reply of Alexander may easily be conceived. He had with him Marshals Berthier, Moncey, Lefebvre, Ney, Macdonald, Oudinot, Mortier, and Marmont, whose head-quarters were at Essonne, midway on the road from Fontainebleau to Paris: those of Marshal Mortier was near Villeroi, a little in the rear of Essonne, towards Fontainebleau; so that the corps of the first-named marshal formed the head of the column.

Previously to quitting Paris, Marmont had transmitted to the Emperor the capitulation to which he had affixed his signature, and had informed him, that if he attempted to force his way back to the capital, he might expect to find it all in arms against him. The aide-de-camp delivered the message such as he had received it from the Duke of Ragusa; but he was not proof against the effect of his being made to tell so shameful a falsehood. It brought on an illness, which kept him for a long time confined; and he acknowledged to a person who repeated his words to me that this guilty act of weakness had poisoned his peace of mind.

Marmont himself repaired to the presence of the Emperor

at Fontainebleau, but was silent as to what had passed at his own house on the night of the capitulation. He withdrew, and had already returned to Essonne, when M. de Caulaincourt passed through that town on his return from the audience with the Emperor of Russia. The Emperor had kept the marshals about his person in ignorance of the dangers which impended over the state; but they had their families in Paris, and were soon informed of all that had been done, and of all that was farther meditated. A resolution was in course of adoption, the watchword of which had not yet been uttered. The walls were lined with proclamations of Louis XVIII. The idea of the return of this Prince was allowed freely to circulate. I cannot take upon myself to say whether it was by directions from, or with the consent of the Emperor of Russia, who wished to sound the public opinion without appearing to influence it, in order to recede from that point if it became necessary to substitute another idea, which he foresaw the possible necessity of his adopting; or whether M. de Talleyrand had caused the proclamations to be placarded on the walls, in consequence of secret instructions from the Prince, or of communications with him. It is quite clear, however, that they were both fully aware of what was going forward. A single word from them would have put an end to this state of confusion.

Notwithstanding the anonymous character which it was pretended to give to the King's proclamations, there was no mistaking the source from whence they emanated. Whether they were circulated by direction of the Emperor Alexander, or of M. de Talleyrand, they both had motives for keeping aloof. I must explain my meaning. The Emperor Alexander had never ceased to repeat that he only waged war against the Emperor; that he had nothing to say against France, nor against the French people. He held this language for the purpose of detaching the nation from their chief, of rendering the latter unpopular, and of turning to a

settled object the impulse which it was intended to give to the multitude. If he had openly avowed the plan which he carried into effect, no one would have been the dupe of his speeches; and he could not, in such a case, have committed a greater mistake than to allow of the placarding of the proclamations of Louis XVIII. in the several towns of which he took possession. Had he done so, he would have found the country people hastening in crowds to enlist under the banners of an insurrection, which would have acquired an easy organization. His fallacious promises of happiness had the effect of anticipating the movement, and eventually secured the victory to him.

It not only became necessary for Alexander to deceive the nation; he had also to impose upon the Emperor of Austria, and to keep in reserve the means of pleading in his own justification the power of public opinion, and of ascribing to its dictates what was exclusively his own work. It was not therefore until after the rupture of the conférences at Châtillon, and until within sight of Paris, that the proclamations were spread amongst the French advanced-posts.

The Emperor of Austria had unquestionably many private grounds of complaint against the Emperor Napoleon; but one can never do him the injustice to suppose that he could have been insensible to the humiliating part he was made to act, by being fastened to the car of the conqueror, who assigned to him no other share in the triumph than the disgrace of dethroning his daughter. It cannot well be laid to the charge of this Prince that he would have beheld, with utter indifference, every act having a tendency to that object, if the Emperor of Russia had allowed him to see through his design. There exists not a father, whatever may be his situation in life, who does not endeavour to persuade himself that a deception had been practised upon the Austrian monarch, who had presented his daughter to the affection of the French,

graced with her own virtues, and rich in the tender affection of her parent.

It must also be taken for granted, that had this monarch suspected nothing short of the intention of the Emperor of Russia in crossing the Rhine to be dethroning his daughter, he would not only have answered her letters in a very different tone from that which he adopted, in the correspondence he kept up with her ever since the invasion of our territory; but, instead of confining himself to the recommendation that she should prevail upon her husband to make peace, he would have frankly told her of the dangers to which she was personally exposed. It must farther be added, that he would not have kept himself at so great a distance from the head-quarters of the allied army, which he only came up with at Paris. He was made to see matters in the light in which the Emperor of Russia thought proper to exhibit them. These were the considerations that prevented the Emperor of Russia from avowing the plan of a revolution which would from thenceforth have been looked upon as his own work.

M. de Talleyrand had still more powerful motives for acting with circumspection. In the first place, he was not in reality over-anxious for the return of the elder branch of the house of Bourbon, with which he had too many accounts to settle, and little leisure to treat of his own private interests. He clearly foresaw that the will of the Emperor of Russia would rule paramount: nevertheless, he did not despair of persuading him, in an unguarded moment, to adopt a determination which, so long as it should not be publicly announced, might be liable to undergo a change.

On the other hand, he knew how hopeless it was for him to accomplish the object he had in view whilst the army should remain true to the Emperor, because the majority of the nation would always rally round its standards. He steered clear of all these difficulties by inspiring with hopes the party

who were desirous of the plain and simple return of the house of Bourbon, and calming the uneasiness of those who feared the consequences of such an event. He availed himself of both to bring his plans into effect. He had dispatched M. de Montessuis to Marshal Marmont at Essonne; and sent, at the same time, General Lamotte* to the Duke of Reggio, under whom he had served in the capacity of his aide-de-camp.

These two messengers had each a different language to hold, in order that their missions might be attended with a uniform result.

Their means of persuasion were the assurance that the Emperor of Russia was resolved not to treat with the Emperor, against whom alone all his efforts were directed; and that, with this single exception, he would grant whatever might be proposed to him.

This was the language agreed upon in respect to Marshal Oudinot, because it was intelligible to him, and of a nature to be circulated amongst the troops, to which it might suggest the idea of a cowardly desertion, which the marshal himself encouraged, under the impression that nothing more was required than to sacrifice the Emperor. Great care was taken not to present the question to him under another aspect; for his previous political conduct was not calculated to encourage the notion that he could ever come to terms with the Bourbons. He saw a bright prospect before him, lent a willing ear to every proposal, and agreed to whatever was required of him, without even reflecting on the consequences which such an acquiescence was about to produce.

Montessuis adopted a different course in regard to Marmont. He announced to the marshal that Alexander's determination was taken; that this Prince had declared his determination no longer to treat with the Emperor, nor with any member of his family. He described in vivid colours the misfortunes about to

* The brother-in-law of Roux-Laborie.

fall upon France, its intestine divisions, a civil war with its attendant horrors; for it had been a settled point that the idea of a regency should be relinquished, as it would necessarily occasion the return of the Emperor to power. He laid the greater stress upon this point as it was the only means of compelling Marmont to come to a decision, and of giving a definite object to his defection. Had the regency, in fact, been proclaimed, his own position would have been secure; whereas every thing became compromised when brought into contact with revolutionary anarchy. He accordingly could not hesitate on the adoption of whatever might be proposed to him, were it even the return of the Bourbons, because, on the one hand, he had his own honours to preserve, and his vanity made him indulge the hope of acquiring fresh favours by setting the example of abandoning the Emperor. These were the only considerations calculated to draw Marmont from his duty; and unless a part of the army could be induced to desert its colours, it would be altogether impossible to give effect to the wishes of the Emperor of Russia. Montessuis added, that a state of anarchy would necessarily spring up if some determination were not quickly come to, in order to bring every thing back under some controuling authority; the essential object was to have a rallying point. This, he said, was so much in unison with M. de Talleyrand's sentiments, that the latter had just written to Count d'Artois, as he preferred the Bourbons, who had been proclaimed at Bordeaux, to the jacobins, who were beginning to raise their heads in all directions. If he, Marmont, whose social qualities were calculated to win all hearts, his patriotic sentiments of so exalted a nature, and his military talents so well known, would consent to cover himself with glory, by setting to the army the bold example of joining that party, he would avoid a civil war, a service more honourable than the possession of the most splendid crown. He added, that, independently of the personal satisfaction he would derive from such an act, his

example would give him the first claim to favour, the rather so, as the King's commissioners were taking note in Paris of all those who presented themselves, and were receiving their oaths of allegiance and fidelity. This was false. One more traitor was sought for. Marmont saw through the snare, and scornfully rejected the part reserved for him.

The spirit of intrigue was not discouraged at this failure. It sent forth fresh emissaries; and a crowd of persons were seen flocking to Essonne, who, though loaded with the Emperor's favours, were not the less ardent in their endeavours to detach the marshal from his service. The Duke still resisted; but he had consented to listen to persons whom he ought not to have admitted to his presence. He soon paid the forfeit of this act of temerity. The leaders of the party which had espoused the enemy's cause were so far compromised, that no other alternative was left for them but success or banishment. They were sensible of this, and neglected no means of accomplishing the defection which they were so desirous to bring about. They set to work those magistrates who were likely to exercise any influence over the marshal; they dispatched some of his own friends to him; and whilst they represented the Emperor's cause as irretrievably lost, they urged Schwartzenberg to make such an offer as might, in some respects, be a plank of safety to him, by means of which he might hope to escape from the wreck. The generalissimo consented: his overtures were well received, and the bases of the defection agreed upon.* The Duke of Ra-

* Letter from Prince Schwartzenberg to the Marshal Duke of Ragusa.

The 3rd of April.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

I do myself the honour to transmit to your Excellency by a safe hand all the public papers and documents requisite for putting you in full possession of the events that have occurred since you quitted the capital, together with an invitation from the members of the provisional government that you should join the standards of the true cause of France. I urge you in the name of your country

gusa was, however, fully aware, that if it were possible for him to deceive his troops, this was not the case with regard

and of humanity, to listen to proposals which must put a stop to the effusion of the precious blood of those gallant men who are ranged under your orders.

Reply of the Marshal Duke of Ragusa.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

I have received the letter which your Excellency has done me the honour to write to me, as well as all the papers which were forwarded with it. The army and the people are relieved from their oath of allegiance to the Emperor Napoleon by the decree of the senate. I am disposed to concur in a friendly understanding between the army and the people, which must have the effect of preventing all risks of a civil war, and of stopping the effusion of blood. Accordingly, I am ready to withdraw with my troops from the ranks of the Emperor Napoleon's army, under the following conditions, which I require you to guarantee to me.

Article I.—I, Charles Prince of Schwartzenberg, marshal and commander-in-chief of the allied armies, guarantee to all the French troops which, in consequence of the senate's decree of the 2nd of April, may quit the standards of the Emperor Napoleon, full liberty to retire unmolested into Normandy, with arms, baggage, and ammunition, and with all the respect and military honours which the allied troops are bound to pay to each other.

Article II.—If, owing to this movement, the events of the war should occasion the Emperor Napoleon to fall into the hands of the allied powers, his life and his liberty shall be guaranteed to him, within a limit of territory, and in a country circumscribed in its extent, according to the choice of the allied powers and of the French government.

Answer of Marshal Prince Schwartzenberg.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

I cannot adequately express to you the satisfaction I feel on learning the readiness with which you yield to the invitation of the provisional government, of joining the banners of the French cause in conformity with the decree of the 2nd instant.

The distinguished services you have rendered your country are universally admitted; but you crown them by restoring to their country the few gallant men who have escaped the consequences of one man's ambition.

I request you to believe that I have particularly appreciated the delicacy of the Article of which you demand the adoption, and which I agree to with respect to the person of Napoleon. Nothing can be more characteristic of that noble sense

to the general officers: he knew that the failure or success of his views wholly depended upon them. He accordingly determined to communicate to them the proposals which were made to him, under the pretence of their being personally interested in the matter, and of his unwillingness to decide upon the principal act of their lives without their approbation. He summoned them to a kind of council, which was attended, amongst the rest, by generals Compans, Souham and Bordesoulle. The latter was unquestionably one of the bravest men in existence. He must have been strangely imposed upon, when he could consent to go over to a hostile army; for he was much more likely to have fought it single-handed.

Marmont, who exercised a certain power over the opinions of others, an ascendancy, moreover, necessarily emanating from his military command, the weight of which was fully felt by those under him, communicated to his generals what had just taken place between M. de Montessuis and himself. He gave them a long and painful detail of all the evils to which his country was about to fall a prey, if some one did not set the example of rallying round a power which might hereafter acquire solidity, and preserve France from a state of anarchy. He told them that this power was the house of Bourbon, which the allies were recalling to the throne, and with which Paris was already in open communication; that neither France nor Frenchmen would lose by the change, as the Emperor alone would be sacrificed. As for himself, he announced to them that his mind was already made up: he had called them together to make them acquainted with his resolution, and left them at liberty to form their own determination. He was well aware that a mind of a superior stamp never fails to draw weaker

of generosity which is innate in Frenchmen, and which distinguishes your Excellency in a more especial degree.

Accept the assurances of my high consideration.

(Signed) SCHWARTZENBERG.

At my head-quarters, the 4th of April, 1814.

characters after it, especially under circumstances the nature of which was beyond the reach of ordinary understandings.

The generals of his army could not, besides, suspect the intentions of their chief from the moment that the Emperor's personal fate was concerned. They imagined that he obeyed the law of imperative necessity, and they adopted the same course of conduct, whilst they deeply lamented being reduced to desert the cause of their sovereign.

The intercourse opened by Schwartzenberg was followed up. The conditions of the act of defection were discussed and agreed upon, but not signed. * Marmont accordingly retained the position which he then occupied. He continued to form the head of a column, either in consequence of any farther hesitation on his part, or because he was desirous of recovering from the effects of the artifices employed to bring him over.

* Article I.—The French troops which, in consequence of the senate's decree of the 2nd of April shall quit the standards of Napoleon Bonaparte, are at liberty to retire to Normandy, with arms, baggage, and ammunition; and the same respect and military honours shall be shown to them as the allied troops are bound to pay to each other.

Article II.—If, owing to this movement, the events of the war should occasion Napoleon Bonaparte to fall into the hands of the allied powers, his life and his liberty shall be guaranteed to him, within a limit of territory, and in a country circumscribed in its extent, according to the choice of the allied powers and of the French government.

Chevilly, 4th April, 1814.

CHAPTER VII.

The Emperor of Russia hesitates—Alarm of the conspirators—The provisional government is on the point of being dissolved—Council held—General Dessoles; his uneasiness with respect to Mademoiselle de Dampierre — M. de Pradt—The Emperor makes his arrangements for marching to Paris—His reasons for not doing so—Abdication—Marmont again—Guilty project—The species of guarantees required by the allies—Astonishment of M. de Nesselrode—There would have been much less hesitation in Russia.

AFFAIRS were not going on so satisfactorily in Paris. The Emperor of Russia had so cautiously kept in reserve the means of altering his determination, that, according to what was reported to me by M. Anglès, the conspirators considered for a moment that all was over. Matters went so far, that on retiring from a conference which had been held at the residence of the Emperor of Russia, M. Anglès ordered his travelling carriage to be prepared for a journey, feeling persuaded that every thing was settled. The engagement entered into by Marmont restored tranquillity to all guilty consciences.

There were to be found in Paris some individuals of sound sense, who, though not altogether pleased with the imperial government, felt themselves degraded by being objects of speculation and traffic for certain intriguers long accustomed to serve and betray every party.

It was easy to perceive that a specific direction was given to the movement which was kept up without any indication being afforded of the power which supported it. Bordeaux offered a recent example. When the mayor of that city had declared for the Duke d'Angoulême, his influence had been used for the purpose of causing the royal banners to be unfurled. The notables had met, and proceeded in a body to demand of the general commanding the English troops which

had taken possession of the town, whether it was by his orders that signs were displayed which had a tendency to kindle a civil war; and the latter had replied that he gave no special countenance to any party, and left every one at liberty to act as he thought proper.

In Paris, the municipal body were excited to take part in the change of government. Some of its very members, such as M. Bellart, the lawyer, and M. Perignon, formerly a notary, had boldly thrust themselves forward. These circumstances had created a deep impression upon those who dreaded fresh turmoils, or were unwilling to serve as stepping-stones to a handful of intriguers. It occurred to several men of sound judgment to write anonymously to the Emperor Alexander, but in a style calculated to carry conviction to his mind. They were not sparing of representations to him respecting the degree of esteem or confidence which those men were entitled to who were busily at work under the protection of his name.

It is likewise very possible that the Emperor Alexander sought to acquire by other means a correct knowledge of the state of public opinion. Whether he was shaken by the mass of interests he would have to struggle against, or by some other consideration, certain it is that he was on the point of discarding the political break-necks who so closely adhered to his steps. In this state of indecision, how powerful would have been the influence created by the presence of the Empress in Paris!

Perceiving the Emperor Alexander's hesitation, M. de Talleyrand became apprehensive of his escaping from his grasp. He foresaw the impossibility of inducing any one to join in the measures requisite for preventing the future return of the Emperor Napoleon, if Maria Louisa remained on the throne. As the danger was daily growing more urgent and alarming, he gave up the idea of a regency and adopted the cause of the Bourbons. The adoption of this cause was not

unattended with personal inconveniences; but it excluded all idea of retracing his previous steps after a proceeding of so sudden and so extraordinary a nature: it could not fail to afford him the means of reverting to his first scheme, by setting the revolutionary party in motion previously to allowing the Bourbons to acquire a firm footing. This was no difficult matter: most of the places in the administration were held by men of that party.

We now behold Talleyrand determined to procure the adoption of what he had hitherto rejected by every means in his power. From that moment he only sought to remove the state of doubt shown by the Emperor Alexander, and did not hesitate, according to an old saying, in pinning him to the wall. It was certainly of the utmost importance that the Emperor should be induced to come to an immediate decision, as the diplomatist already found himself exposed to the reproaches of all those who had embarked with him in the undertaking. The provisional government was even on the point of dissolving itself. M. de Talleyrand possessed too much experience of men and of business to be wanting in coolness on this occasion. I am informed that he assembled the members of the provisional government at the close of the conference which had dispelled so many bright illusions. He drew a picture of the danger which they incurred, and easily persuaded them to follow him to the Emperor of Russia, who occupied the first floor of his hotel. He addressed the Emperor on the part of his colleagues, and observed that the persons who accompanied him had exposed themselves to the loss of every thing dear to them for the purpose of securing his triumph: they alone had kept the population of the capital within the limits of obedience, and had readily compromised the existence of themselves and of their families in order to serve his cause; and they were about to be repaid for their zeal by being given up to those sentiments of revenge which they had so blindly provoked.

In this lamentable state of things, they came in a body to request he would secure an asylum to them, if he persisted in the intention which he had manifested. Alexander calmed their mistaken apprehensions of personal danger. He said that his ideas were certainly not yet fixed, but that he would never desert men who had risked every thing for his service; and he would secure to them such means of existence as would meet their most sanguine expectations. Matters had proceeded thus far when M. de Talleyrand acquired the certainty that he might rely upon the defection of Marmont, and upon the zeal of Oudinot. From that moment he felt greater hopes of success, and took particular care to communicate them to the Emperor of Russia, who assembled on the following morning the council, wherein the question of overturning the imperial government in France was definitively discussed. I received from one of the members of the council the details of what took place at its meeting. It was composed of the Emperor Alexander, the King of Prussia, Prince Schwartzenberg, M. de Metternich, and, if I mistake not, the English ambassador; though I cannot be positive with respect to the latter.

The French members called to this council were M. de Talleyrand, the Duke de Dalberg, M. Louis, General Dupont, General Dessoles, the Archbishop of Mechlin ; and, if I recollect rightly, MM. de Montesquiou, (the abbé of that name), Beurnouville, and Jaucourt. The discussion was opened by the Emperor Alexander. He declared his intention of overthrowing the imperial government; but stated it to be his wish, previously to a public announcement of the circumstance, to ascertain what order of things might be substituted for it, so as to avoid a return of those internal dissentions which had for so many years disturbed the repose of the country. He addressed himself to M. de Talleyrand, requesting him to state his opinion on the subject. The latter feeling averse to expressing before so many persons an opinion which

might not perhaps be adopted, and might eventually be the ground of his removal from the government about to be established, acted in this instance the part which I had seen him resort to when called upon to attend at any of the Emperor's councils.

He spoke with his usual flow of words; laid great stress upon the necessity of crushing the Emperor, but enumerated at the same time the powerful interests which rested upon the imperial system and were inseparable from it. He stated the impossibility of substituting in its stead any other than an order of things affording to every one a guarantee for the possession of what he had acquired, a departure from which course would be the signal for a fresh anarchy. He cautiously abstained from giving a clearer expression of his sentiments, but his language sufficiently proved that he was still in favour of a regency. M. Louis gave utterance to opinions which were echoed by all the dependants of the diplomatist. It came at last to the turn of General Dessoles. When called upon to state his views as to what ought to be done, he replied with great animation in the following words, which he addressed to the Emperor Alexander: "Sire, the regency is a mere name; the tiger lies crouching behind it, and will soon spring up again, if that regency be proclaimed.* At any rate, my mind is made up. I ask nothing for myself; but, Sire, what is to become of Mademoiselle de Dampierre? Save her! I again beseech you to save her!" Astounded at the warmth of this appeal, the Emperor of Russia was inquiring

* Those who are acquainted with General Dessoles will feel no surprise at this answer. It is of a complexion with the infamy of his soul, and quite in harmony with the features of his countenance. There is, however, nothing extraordinary in this atrocious expression; it is a revival of the lucubrations of 1798. The general who, in rendering an account of the means which he resorted to for the purpose of raising an insurrection in the Marches, felt a pleasure in anticipating that "it was a revolution resting upon principle," could not be expected to be over-discriminating in his expressions when the question was debated of creating a fresh one.

who was Mademoiselle de Dampierre; "Sire, she is my wife; she is Madame Dessoles: she is certainly not connected in any direct manner with the question now under debate; nevertheless, she is Mademoiselle de Dampierre. Save what is dearest to me in life!" This trivial alarm of a conjugal nature had the effect of unruffling for a moment the gravity of the council; but its calm was soon restored, and the discussion continued. The turn of the Archbishop of Mechlin came next. He boldly discovered his game. "Gentlemen," said he, "it becomes us to speak in plain language. You are determined to lay the Emperor aside altogether. In that case, why not restore to France a government under which it has enjoyed whole centuries of uninterrupted happiness? I have no hesitation in asserting in this place that such is the secret wish of the great majority of Frenchmen; and if they are fearful of avowing it, it is to be ascribed to the circumstance that the national spirit is kept in check, and afraid of manifesting itself without the certainty of being supported. For my part, I must declare, that after we have overthrown the Emperor, the only rational plan is to recall the Bourbons." Alexander put a stop to the discussion, and, turning to Frederick William, "King of Prussia," said he, "what is your opinion?"—"I coincide with the Archbishop of Mechlin," replied Frederick William. The Emperor of Russia continued to take the votes of the other foreigners, who all agreed with the King of Prussia. Alexander in his turn delivered his own opinion, and said that it was a question of very high importance to determine upon the government which ought to be established in France without creating confusion, and without risking the repose of its neighbours: he thought the house of Bourbon was best calculated for the nation; nevertheless he should postpone his decision until the following day. He had been informed of the arrival at the advanced posts of a deputation from Fontainebleau: he would receive it, and consider afterwards what ought to be done. The council broke up. I

have already stated that every thing that took place in Paris was fully known at Fontainebleau; matters were even greatly exaggerated, although the evil was no doubt of a most serious nature. Nevertheless, the Emperor did not allow himself to be influenced by the reports that were circulated about him. Being wholly bent upon military combinations, he was preparing to make a fresh attempt when the Duke of Vicenza arrived. He was not the bearer of very pleasing intelligence; but the allies at least were no longer averse to a regency. The state of affairs was truly alarming; the ardour of the soldiery was at its height. Napoleon continued his arrangements for the purpose of trying the chance of war; but his generals had lost all enthusiasm; they were tired of wars and battles; all felt a kind of dread at the new risks about to be encountered. In the midst of this prevailing uneasiness, the decree of forfeiture reached Fontainebleau. Napoleon was no sooner informed of it than his hesitation ceased. A civil war presented itself to his view in all its horrors. He withdrew, and penned with his own hand the act which was to deprive him of power. * Having signed his abdication, he appointed commissioners, who, in transmitting it to the allies, should discuss the interests of France and those of the gallant men who had faithfully adhered to him. He named the Duke of Vicenza and the Prince of Moskwa to act in that capacity; but he had no sooner appointed them than he recollected his old aide-de-camp. He instantly associated Marmont to them, and felt desirous that his oldest com-

* "The allied powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon is the only obstacle to the restoration of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he is ready to descend from the throne, to quit France, and even to part with his life for the welfare of the country, which is inseparable from the rights of his son, from those of the regency of the Empress, and from the maintenance of the laws of the empire.

"Given at our Palace of Fontainebleau, the 4th of April, 1814.

"NAPOLEON."

panion in arms should be the person to discuss the interests of his family. As, however, it was intimated to him that the interests of the army ought also to be advocated ; that a man who had hitherto possessed a smaller share of his affections Macdonald, for example, would carry more weight; he yielded assent, and agreed to name the Duke of Tarentum. Nevertheless, he was still swayed by a feeling of partiality. The plenipotentiaries were specially directed to apprise the Duke of Ragusa that though he had not formally chosen him, he could not refuse bestowing this last mark of confidence to his fidelity, which was guarantied to him by favours commensurate with the marshal's services ; if, therefore, the latter did not deem himself more usefully engaged at the head of his corps than in Paris, he was at liberty to join the plenipotentiaries, as they were instructed to dispatch a courier from Essone, who would return with the necessary powers.

On arriving at Essone, the plenipotentiaries communicated to the Duke of Ragusa what had taken place at Fontainebleau, the abdication assented to by Napoleon, and the object of their mission to Paris. They also transmitted to him the message of which they were the bearers. This circumstance must have created a painful sensation upon the marshal, since he had, as we have related, just entered into conditions with the Austrian generalissimo. He did not disguise from his colleagues on what terms he stood with the allies. He declared to them that his mode of proceeding bore an isolated character, merely from the circumstance of the dispersion of the army, and the difficulty of coming to a right understanding: but from this moment he would irrevocably join and accompany them to Paris, in order to explain to Prince Schwartzenberg the changes that had occurred in his position. He cautioned his generals, at least according to his own statement, not to make the slightest movement until he should send them fresh orders ; and he repaired to the enemy's head-quarters, where the plan of the convention was

annulled without the slightest opposition. The three marshals and the Duke of Vicenza continued their journey, and repaired to Paris for the purpose of negotiating in common. They alighted at the hotel of M. de Talleyrand, where, as I have already stated, the Emperor of Russia had taken up his residence; and they communicated to the diplomatist the motive of their journey and of their mission. One of the plenipotentiaries drew him aside, and said that if he could obtain a regency, they (without naming any one) were determined to take part against the Emperor, so as to prevent his return to power. He did not state what he meant by taking part against the Emperor. M. de Talleyrand replied that "every thing should be arranged; the allied sovereigns demanded no more than such a guarantee, and would grant whatever was applied for, as soon as they should acquire the conviction that Napoleon would never again appear." M. de Talleyrand could desire nothing better than this confidential communication: it greatly heightened his credit, and clearly proved that nothing could be done without him. He went to the apartments of the Emperor Alexander; apprised him of the arrival of the marshals, and related what had just taken place, without omitting the overture made to him. Nothing undoubtedly could be more satisfactory to them; for what could be more clear than the constant demand made by the Emperor Alexander of a guarantee against the return of the Emperor Napoleon? The name itself was not openly avowed; but the affectation with which guarantees were called for left no room to doubt what was the object actually contemplated.

He judged of Frenchmen by the standard of some other nations. He was so far wrong: this mode of proceeding is ill suited to our manners. I heard from one of M. de Talleyrand's secretaries* that when every thing was concluded, that is to say, when the forfeiture was pronounced, M. de Nessel-

* Roux-Laborie.

rode could not understand our scruples. "What a country!" he said; "what a nation! that a mere trifle should keep you back! This would not be the case with us; all would be over in a quarter of an hour. So much the worse for the sovereign who sets himself up in opposition to the interests of all. Nothing in the world is so easily found as a sovereign."

The Emperor of Russia caused it to be intimated to the deputation of marshals that he would receive them at nine or ten o'clock the next morning. They withdrew, in order to meet during the night at Marshal Ney's hotel; and were visited there, and fed with the idea that the Emperor alone was an obstacle to a satisfactory adjustment of every thing. Were it not for him, the sovereigns would grant a regency or any other government they might think proper to select. These insinuations were unavailing, since the Emperor himself had enjoined his plenipotentiaries to consider him as wholly out of the question, and to submit to any sacrifices that might be personal to himself.

I have been furnished by an individual who was present at this meeting, with all the details of what was said and done on the occasion; and they clearly prove to what an extent the blind confidence entertained in the sentiments of the Emperor of Russia had been carried; that confidence, however, has been the source of too many and too bitter tears to warrant our now making it a reproach to those who participated in it. It was still imagined that M. de Talleyrand was favourably disposed towards a regency, and I think this opinion was well founded, though it must be admitted that the diplomatist was as ready to adopt any other hypothetical case.

Caulaincourt has since informed me that this was a mistake, that M. de Talleyrand had from the very commencement openly declared himself in favour of the house of Bourbon. I am persuaded, on the contrary, that such was not the fact. When, however, the business was once settled, it was better to assume the merit of having brought it about than to admit

that he was opposed to the change. It is also possible that M. de Talleyrand had allowed his intercourse with Hartwell to become known, in order to increase the confusion, to reserve for himself greater chances of success, and have it in his power to obtain better conditions. It is even probable that the allies availed themselves of this circumstance, in order to wrest from the Duke of Vicenza those sacrifices they were desirous of imposing upon him; for, as we are informed by one of the auxiliaries they had brought over to their side, they did not anticipate such immediate success in the pursuit of their views, and were desirous of completing by means of intrigue what was already begun by force of arms.* In this case, however, convinced as he was that M. de Talleyrand was in favour of the Bourbons, why did not M. de Caulaincourt put the marshals on their guard? Why did he take them to the house of a conspirator, whom he should have avoided by every means in his power? The least inconvenience that could befall them from the course into which he was leading them was that of bringing them to confess to the fox, as it actually came to pass. It is probable, nevertheless, whatever he may have subsequently asserted to the contrary, that he was himself the dupe of the false character assumed by M. de Talleyrand; otherwise, the inference to be drawn from his conduct would be that he had it in contemplation to deliver up the marshals. This supposition would add great weight to the unfavourable suspicions entertained in respect to his own stay at Châtillon.

They might have met at many other places, and have then repaired to the presence of the Emperor Alexander, rather than be compelled to call upon M. de Talleyrand, if he was actually considered by them as an enemy. It is painful to me to make known the real facts; but the truth is, that finding the Emperor's downfall to be unavoidable, they only wished

* "The first idea of the enemy at that period was to make peace; to bind Napoleon down by severe conditions, and *take two or three years longer to accomplish his final ruin.*"—(De Pradt *Récit Historique de la Restauration*, p. 56.)

to withdraw from his service without dishonour, and to prepare the means of securing a position with the government about to succeed that of Napoleon; being under the impression that it was possible to retain what had been acquired under the cloak of an act of cowardice.

CHAPTER VIII.

Alexander admits the marshals to his presence—Marshal Macdonald—The Autocrat insists upon the required guarantee—An end is put to the negotiation by the intelligence brought of the defection of the sixth corps—MM. Sosthène and Archambeau mount their horses—Talleyrand—By whom his speech is drawn up—His agitation—He would have uttered any other speech he might have happened to find in his pocket—The senate.

THE Emperor of Russia received the deputation of marshals agreeably to his promise, and after listening to their message, he informed them that he could not treat any longer with the Emperor Napoleon. He added, that, independently of the objections which he, as well as his allies, felt for any kind of accommodation, the repose of Europe, which depended on that of France, did not admit of his paying attention to the proposals entrusted to them. He felt no wish to injure our frontiers, or to destroy or make any inroad upon the fabric raised by the French army, for which he entertained the highest esteem. He was disposed to give them every proof of it by the choice he should make of the form of government, which it was his intention to propose for their acceptance. He observed that, whatever might be that government, he should always have particularly at heart to keep up a friendly understanding with men who had raised their country to so high a pitch of glory. He spoke in a firm tone, and appeared the more resolute in his intentions,

as he was acquainted with the overture made to M. de Talleyrand. He was besides fully aware that the determination adopted was of a positive nature; that it had been taken at the residence of the Prince of Neufchatel, in consequence of the communications held between Marshal Oudinot and M. de Talleyrand's envoy. The plan which was formed previously to the battle of Champ-Aubert had even been again brought forward at this meeting; it was nothing less than that they should deal with the Emperor Napoleon in the same manner as Romulus had been dealt with, and formally treat with the enemy.

As soon as the Emperor had ceased to speak, the Duke of Tarentum gave utterance to his sentiments. He had been less favoured by the Emperor than any other marshal; and he showed himself the most deserving of the rewards which had been heaped upon others. He laid great stress upon the merit of the Emperor's sacrifice, insisted upon the rights of his dynasty, and the propriety of adopting a regency: reverting then to the subject which most engaged the attention of the allies, the person of Napoleon, he remarked, that if he was the only ground of difficulty in the way, every thing was at once decided, since the powers with which they were invested prescribed to them that they should leave him out of the question. The continuation of his dynasty was therefore as free from objection as it was from any danger. The transfer of the supreme power ought the less to become a subject matter for discussion, as the intentions just manifested by Alexander, in his own name and in the name of his allies, were perfectly conformable to the constitutions of the state, and favourable to the rights of him who in the order of nature was pointed out by those very constitutions as the legitimate heir to the throne.

Macdonald proved himself no less cogent in his reasonings in this discussion, than honourable by the courage which he displayed in defending the interests of the regency, as being

fully calculated to guaranty to every one the preservation of what they had acquired; an object which the Emperor Alexander expressed his determination to secure. This Prince was at a loss for an answer, and no longer insisted on any thing more than the necessity of a guarantee against the possibility of the Emperor's return to power. It did not become the marshals to name the guarantee required. It was incumbent on the allies themselves to specify what were the sacrifices which they were desirous of imposing, and to explain what they meant by the expression of guarantee. The plenipotentiaries pretended not to understand it. The allies, on the other hand, did not deem it advisable to speak in a clearer language.

The discussion was beginning to flag: the Emperor of Russia replied in an evasive manner, when a message was brought to him from his private apartments that his presence was required on a matter of immediate importance. He withdrew, and returned again in a few moments to the apartment where the marshals had remained waiting for him. He addressed them in these words: "Gentlemen, persuaded as I was by your observations, and feeling desirous of giving a special mark of my esteem to the French army, which you represent in this place, I was on the point of yielding to your entreaties, and of acknowledging the form of government which it is your wish to obtain; but that very army, which you describe to be unanimous in its sentiments, proves itself to be in direct opposition with what you announce to me, since it is actually divided in opinion. I have this moment been informed that the corps of the Duke of Ragusa has reached Versailles this very morning, and ranged itself under the banners of the Duke d'Angoulême. In order to remove all farther irresolution on the part of those troops which might feel disposed to imitate the example of this corps, I throw all my power, and that of my allies, on that side of the scales."

This declaration was a direct reply to whatever objections might have been raised. The marshals darted a glance of contempt at Marmont, who was present at the meeting. He was struck with shame at hearing the expressions of the Emperor of Russia, and said: "I would readily sacrifice an arm to avert this event." "An arm, Sir!" replied Macdonald, "rather say your existence." In a moment all was terminated. I have even been told that, at the sitting to which I allude, the Emperor of Russia said to Marshal Marmont, "Marshal, you were in a great hurry."

I have already observed that this Prince had allowed himself to be forced into an engagement never more to treat with the Emperor, or with any member of his family. His declaration was a bad beginning; Marmont's defection completed the work. Talleyrand, who had so shamefully planned the disgrace of the marshal, took every care to circulate the fact of his defection. He caused it to be placarded in every direction, and was wholly engaged in endeavouring to cull the fruits of it. He laid hold of every thing that was calculated to persuade the multitude that he alone was the pivot upon which the revolution was working its way.

Ever since the Emperor Alexander's arrival in Paris, M. de Talleyrand's saloon had been constantly filled with those who came to ascertain what turn affairs were likely to take. The fate of France was no sooner decided than M. Archambault de Périgord, M. de Talleyrand's brother, M. Sosthène de la Rochefoucauld, and a few more individuals, put large white cockades to their hats, and rode in all directions through the streets for the purpose of announcing what had just taken place, and of reviving the hopes of their party.

Although the national guard of Paris were in expectation of a change of government, they were at a loss to account for what was taking place; and I was told by an officer of that corps who commanded at the post which is stationed at the angle of the Rue de Marigny, and the Rue du Fauxbourg

St. Honoré, that he was on the point of ordering his men to fire when M. de Périgord came with his white cockade to harangue the people of that district of Paris. The public mind was far from being prepared for the events to which all were witnesses; and M. Archambault was indebted for his life to the casual circumstance of his having been recognised by the commanding officer.

M. de Talleyrand neglected no means of giving circulation to the news of Marmont's defection: he spared none of his dependants; the more persons he could employ in the task, the more firmly he established the opinion that the return of the Bourbons was his own work, and the object he all along had had in view. His name possessed no doubt very great weight, but was insufficient for sanctioning a revolution which struck at so many interests and recollections. He was sensible of the fact, and endeavoured to supply this defect. All the senators received an invitation to dine with the Emperor Alexander, and took special care to attend. The dinner passed off in conversations on ordinary topics; nothing had as yet been discussed when champaign was served up. Alexander then rose, and addressing his guests, renewed the assurance that he was very far from being their enemy, or the enemy of the French nation. As a proof of this he said that he yielded to the wishes expressed to him by the most honourable and most distinguished men of the country; and he proposed the health of the King of France—of His Majesty Louis XVIII.

The senators conceived that every thing had been prepared beforehand, and drank success to Louis XVIII., as they had done to the Emperor Napoleon.

The company withdrew to the saloon, and each one asked his neighbour what had taken place previously to his arrival. The same question was put by all; and all felt persuaded that some deliberation had been held; it did not occur to any one that they had been the dupes of an act of deception. No time

was left to them for reflection; the iron was struck whilst it was still hot; the senate was convoked for the following day, and the revolution was accomplished. The catastrophe was accelerated, because it was felt that any farther delay would considerably increase the objections to this mode of proceeding in the choice of a sovereign. The senate pronounced the forfeiture of the one, and the election of another with as much docility as they formerly evinced in running over the calls for a conscription.

Although that corps was composed of enlightened men, the greater part of whom had been loaded with the Emperor's bounties, it did not occur to any of its members to point out that the convocation made was no less treasonable than unconstitutional. It was not urged by any of them that the senate was made use of as an instrument to destroy an edifice of which it was the *conservative* body, and that in pulling that edifice to pieces they were in a great measure crushing their own offspring. Can the senators plead in justification that they were led astray? Assuredly not. It was impossible to speak in plainer language than M. de Talleyrand when he pronounced the Emperor's forfeiture of the throne. Whatever might have been the private arrangements of this diplomatist with the enemy, the senators had no right to forget their duty, when the moment arrived for asserting it. They might, by a dignified resistance, have covered themselves with glory; whereas no epithets are strong enough to convey a proper sense of their deserts, especially on a perusal, in their deliberation of that fatal epoch, of the article which preserves to them the enjoyment of their respective emoluments.

M. de Talleyrand was made the tool of an intrigue which induced him to abandon his project of a regency, by exhibiting to his view a safe anchorage for his private interests. I have been told by the Archbishop of Mechlin himself, that having been to visit M. de Talleyrand on the morning of the very day for which the senate was convoked, he found great

difficulty in persuading him to hold to that body the language in which he had spoken to him, and that he, the Archbishop of Mechlin, had himself prepared the speech for him whilst his valet was dressing his hair. He even added, that if M. de Talleyrand had found another speech in his pocket, and drawn it out instead of the former one, he was equally prepared to pronounce it.

This circumstance will not surprise those who are acquainted with M. de Talleyrand. They must on more than one occasion have found him the dupe of an obscure intrigue, and lending the assistance of his name in order to raise himself into importance in the public opinion, which only retains the recollection of those names, the appearance of which in all political scenes has rendered them familiar to every one. Many traits in M. de Talleyrand's character are exhibited in the picture drawn of Cardinal de Retz. Like the latter, he stirred up all those disorders which were productive of such serious consequences to the state, notwithstanding that peace was the constant object of his wishes. His natural inclinations were for peace, and he needed it more than any one else. The Emperor used occasionally to tell him that he had given a wrong direction to his course of life. Nevertheless M. de Talleyrand has always had an uncontested field of action, whenever the shafts of ridicule were to be dealt, or vice was to be the reigning fashion.

Had the senate the power to re-assemble? Unquestionably not, without a legal convocation transmitted to each senator by the president of that body, who was in attendance upon the Empress at Blois. Could it deliberate in a city occupied by enemies who were at war with the nation? What might not be the consequence of such an assertion? Could it take away a power which did not emanate from itself? Did the Emperor owe his election to the senate? According to the constitutions of the empire, was the supreme power conferred by the senate? Certainly not; and the Emperor himself had

refused the suffrages of its members in any other capacity than as private citizens. The nation itself had individually voted the Emperor's elevation to the imperial dignity; the senate had merely been instructed to verify the votes of the departmental districts, and attest the register of them, that is to say, to certify the numbers who voted in the affirmative, and those who were of an opposite opinion. It could not therefore interfere in a proposal which it was foreign from its competency to discuss, and still less take the lead in a question wholly unconnected with its functions. It must be acknowledged that General Mallet, in his attempt of the 23d of October, 1812, had formed as correct an estimate as M. de Talleyrand himself of the assistance that might be derived from the senate; and Louis XVIII., by dismissing that body, has done it the justice to which it was so fully entitled, whatever may have been its claims to the gratitude of that prince. It would in fact have been the height of impolicy to maintain an institution which had just set so deplorable an example of disobedience.

After these deliberations of the senate, the provisional government drew up a duplicate of the act, which was transmitted to the King in London by a general officer. A courier was also dispatched to the Count d'Artois, who was still at Vesoul, another to the Duke d'Angoulême, at Bordeaux, and a third to the Duke de Berry, at Jersey. The walls of Paris were covered with every species of publications; it thenceforward became the object of every one to conciliate the favour of the new sovereign. Couriers were sent off to the armies of the south, to the large towns, and to the fortresses which had remained blockaded ever since the invasion of the territory.

I shall have to return to these details; but I must first relate the circumstances attending the defection of Marmont's army, which furnished a pretence to the Emperor of Russia

for the resolution he adopted, or placed him under the necessity of adopting it, if he had not actually made up his mind previously to the occurrence in question.

CHAPTER IX.

Means resorted to for the purpose of accomplishing the defection of the sixth corps—The Emperor's enemies were more particularly intent on sowing the seeds of seduction amongst his confidential officers—Course which might have been adopted in this emergency—Digression on the subject of legitimacy—The Empress regent—What ought to have been done.

AFTER the departure of the marshals from Fontainebleau for Paris in their character as commissioners, the Emperor found himself isolated, and a prey to the most intense uneasiness. He found no resource in the Prince of Neufchatel, excepting in matters of military administration. He sent for Marshal Marmont, under the impression of his being at his head-quarters at Essone, and not supposing that he had accompanied the other marshals to Paris. Essone is at the distance of six leagues from Fontainebleau. The Emperor, whose impatience made him overlook the length of road to be travelled over, sent several officers in succession to summon Marshal Marmont to his presence. The arrival at Essone of three officers who followed each other at short intervals of time greatly alarmed general Souham, who imagined that the treachery in which he had participated was discovered, and that he was on the point of being arrested; he was at a loss to explain the absence of the marshal, and still more so to assign any motives for his journey to Paris. He called together the general officers of that army to whom Marmont had confided his intentions; communicated the apprehensions created upon his mind by the successive arrival of

the officers coming from Fontainebleau, and did not disguise from them his fear that every thing was discovered. They accordingly deliberated respecting the measures to be adopted, and saw no safer course for them than to break up immediately with the whole corps of troops. This resolution was adopted and carried into effect on the very day on which Marmont had quitted his head-quarters; so that the marshal had scarcely reached his hotel in Paris, when his army was breaking up from Essone. General Souham * ordered his troops under arms in the night-time; and they commenced their march towards Paris under the impression that the movement was one of a general nature. The whole army followed them. As that corps formed the advanced guard, it was wholly unacquainted with what was occurring in its rear. The generals were at the head of their respective columns. Precautions had been taken † in order that their falling in with the enemy's advanced posts should not be productive of any difficulty until the whole column should have reached the territory occupied by the Russian army; this was the plain between the post station of the Cour-de-

* It will hardly be credited that after the return from Elba, which occurred in the following year, the general who had principally contributed to the defection had so little sense of shame as to be one of the first to repair to the Emperor's presence.

† General Order of Prince Schwartzenberg to the coalesced Armies:

"The enemy's corps under Marshal Marmont will march by Juvisy on the high road to *Fresnes*, at which place it will halt for the purpose of obtaining supplies. It will then continue its movement agreeably to the instructions of the provisional government.

"The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth corps will hold themselves in readiness for any event towards nightfall: the army of Silesia will do the same. The enemy's corps will be accompanied as far as Fresnes by two cavalry regiments of the fifth corps, and from thence to Versailles by two regiments of Russian cavalry of the corps of reserve. Owing to this circumstance, and to the *unfriendly spirit* of the inhabitants of Versailles, this town is to be strongly occupied by the allied troops."

France and the post station of Villejuif, on the road from Fontainebleau to Paris. The Russian army was placed under arms, and sent to the rear of General Souham's column a strong body of cavalry, which immediately deployed, and took up a position in order to prevent the retreat of those unfortunate troops, who were beginning to suspect the treachery of their generals. What resource was left to them to escape from the snare into which they had been led by those whom they had merely obeyed from a sense of duty? They were on the point of tearing them to pieces; and the generals only saved themselves by means of the precautions they had previously adopted.

The pages of history exhibit no other example of such an act. But the Emperor's enemies seemed to make it their study to wound him in his dearest affections. They had secured the services of Marmont, one of his first pupils in war, whom he had formed under his own eye, and loaded with his favours. Marmont had fought in the campaign of Italy, and in every succeeding one. The Emperor had brought him forward as entitled to the confidence of the army, because he possessed his own confidence, although fortune had neither crowned his talents nor his courage. Marmont, in short, whose future career the Emperor had felt delight in anticipating, was the very man selected for the attacks of intrigue, and imposed upon so far as to be induced to place his chief at the mercy of the allies, by throwing open to them an easy access to the asylum where he was at rest under the fidelity and protection of those legions from which he was on the eve of separating by the mere law of necessity. When the Emperor was apprised of this defection, his ideas assumed a darker colouring; a circumstance easily to be accounted for, although he had spontaneously made an act of self-abnegation: he nevertheless foresaw all the evils that were impending over France, which the work of seduction had just deprived of a third of its remaining power. He

was still ignorant of what had occurred in Paris since the arrival there of the deputation of marshals; but after what had taken place, nothing farther could have astonished him. Nevertheless, he had yet considerable resources at his command. He might retreat to the Loire, call to his assistance the troops under Marshals Soult and Suchet, which were stationed in Lower Languedoc, as well as the corps of Marshal Augereau. In a case of necessity he might even have thrown himself into Italy, with all the troops that would have consented to follow him. In that country, the cradle of his glory, all hearts were devoted to him; and the interest excited by a hero deserted by so many ungrateful subjects would have collected around his banners a multitude of those men whose elevated minds disdain to consider personal sacrifices. Had he adopted this course, many corps of troops would have remained faithful to his cause. A mere consideration of the number of general officers who commanded the fortresses from the shores of the Elbe to the ancient frontier of France will be sufficient to convince any one of the truth of my assertion. This idea occurred to the Emperor; but he was dissuaded from adopting it by the reflection that he would thereby become instrumental in rekindling a civil war, the extinction of which throughout France had been one of the first benefits conferred by his government; and that in the event of success, he would have the painful duty to perform of spurning some for their ingratitude, and punishing others for their guilt.

He also considered how difficult would be the task devolving upon him of removing from the minds of the French the blind confidence with which they were surrendering themselves to their enemies; and, in short, that since they abandoned him in so important a crisis, the consequences of their imprudence could never be laid to his charge. It was proposed to him that he should abdicate, in order to allow freedom of action to all those who had faithfully adhered to

his cause, and who, at the risk of whatever fate might have befallen them, would have followed his fortunes whatever course he might determine to adopt.

It was not possible for the Emperor to pull down the fabric he had himself raised. His abdication, with whatever character it might be invested, could not be a lawful one, unless made in favour of his son. When he received the crown at the hands of French citizens, he was not put in possession of the right to transfer it to any other than the person pointed out by the constitutions of the state as his successor. Consequently, neither the act of a senate assembled in the midst of the enemy, and at the nod of their chiefs, nor the intrigues of a handful of traitors, had the power to confer the crown; still less could it be bestowed by the acts of seduction carried on by foreigners, or by the treason of generals in command of corps of troops. Independently of this, the defection of the sixth corps was only the work of two or three guilty generals. The troops constituting the strength upon which the greatest dependence was laid, were strangers to this iniquitous proceeding: they had been imposed upon. When they discovered the treachery of their chiefs, both officers and soldiers were much more disposed to shoot them, than to obey their orders.

The rights of the Emperor's successor were established, and wholly independent of Napoleon's own will. They never could be wrested from him, except by a national vote expressed under circumstances free from restraint. If it was with the view of avoiding a revolution in France that the enemy afforded their support to the machinations of a few wretches, they could not have adopted surer means of preparing the materials for a second revolution.

They insisted that they only waged war against the Emperor, and that they entertained no enmity towards France or the French people. It is possible, however difficult, to conceive that a nation should be reduced to the painful ne-

cessity of separating from its monarch, when it had lost the power of triumphantly rescuing him from the resentment of his enemies, who thought proper to charge him with all the evils with which they alone were afflicting mankind. The sacrifice of the person of the monarch being however obtained, what occasion was there for depriving the whole nation of the enjoyment of those rights which it had purchased at the cost of such extraordinary efforts, by wresting from it the first of human prerogatives, that of framing its own laws and government? Would the nations who have robbed us of the benefit of those laws, and trampled upon our constitution, suffer the infliction of such an insult upon their own? The English, who have so largely contributed to our misfortunes, and have displayed the most anxiety to destroy us and to contest our political rights, are of all people in the world the most attached to the statutes of which they have obtained the acquisition at the cost of revolutions of a far more sanguinary character than ours. I am compelled against my will to travel out of my subject: another reflection, however, and I have done. The English, after one of their revolutions, which had driven their lawful king to fly for safety to France, called a prince of the house of Brunswick to the throne of England, and did not wait for the extinction of the fugitive family before they acknowledged that prince, or established his legitimacy. The powers of Europe have assuredly acknowledged the choice made by the English nation of a prince of the house of Brunswick; and not one of those powers ever dreamed of compelling England to take back the Stuarts, with the single exception of France, who afforded an inconsiderable assistance to the fugitive monarch. It was therefore by the will of the people that the house of Brunswick was put in possession of the throne of England, to which no pretenders exist at the present day, the family of the Stuarts being now extinct.

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The chief of that branch which was called to the throne is unquestionably the lawful monarch of the English nation.

We have lately beheld the marriage of the princess, heiress to the British throne, with a prince of the house of Cobourg.* The children that may be born of this marriage will unquestionably be no more than princes or princesses of Cobourg. The Princess Charlotte will be queen; but will the throne be filled after her by princes of the house of Brunswick or by princes of Cobourg?

This question will certainly not occasion any difficulty: the throne of England will therefore be transferred to the family of Cobourg. Nevertheless, the family of Brunswick is the only legitimate one. Why should the crown be handed over to the family of Cobourg? Because it is so determined by the English constitution. By whom but by the people was that constitution established? Nations have therefore the right to create their own laws and monarchs. What would the English say if the French or any other nation were to address this language to them? Although the Prince of Cobourg be the sovereign pointed out by your constitution, nevertheless we insist on your retaining such a prince of the family of Brunswick, who are your lawful sovereigns? They would unquestionably fight for their rights, without considering themselves as rebels, brigands, &c. &c. Why should not the French enjoy the same privilege in favour of an established order of things? To compel them to renounce it, is to offer violence to their feelings, and to overlook those rights which others would be so ready to protect in their own case. The rights of the Emperor's son were not deficient in solidity; they were incontestable. But those rights were deserted by friends who should have sacrificed their lives in asserting them.

* This was written before the death of that princess, who left no children.

This was an irreparable error; and the intriguers of that period have totally failed in the attempt to acquit themselves of their neglect, by asserting that Austria had not voted for a regency. Could it be expected that the Emperor of Austria would suddenly point his bayonets at his allies, when he saw that the public mind did not evince sufficient steadiness of purpose to repel with energy the influence of those who felt no interest in maintaining the order of things established in France at the cost of so many efforts, and who had, on the contrary, a very powerful interest in again creating disunion amongst us. In consequence of their having followed the impulse given by the agitators of public tranquillity, a sentiment of indifference was created in that monarch, who could not feel otherwise than dissatisfied on the one hand, at the state of desertion in which the Empress was left; and, on the other, at the inattention paid to the object of securing his alliance, which was nevertheless to become the guarantee of a system already acknowledged, and forming the bond of union of so many existing interests.

Common sense must have suggested that those considerations which had impressed the Emperor with the necessity of an alliance contracted in the days of his power, were of far greater importance with respect to his son, and that those individuals who pretended that he should be set aside ought to be looked upon with a suspicious eye. It was consonant with true wisdom that France, in order to save her independence, should place herself under the protection of her natural guardian, who could be no other, on this occasion, than the father of her Empress.

Let us suppose that, instead of being overthrown by the acts of a coalition, the Emperor had been killed in battle; would the state have been disturbed, and at the same time a monarch have been demanded of the sovereigns, possessing the requisites pointed out by our constitutions? In such an emergency, those constitutions assigned the supreme power to the regent

until her son had attained his majority. Had this princess been invested with the public authority, would any surprise have been felt at her aiding herself in her external policy by the counsels of her father? Assuredly not; and this was the union of powers which the enemies of France were bent upon opposing. Can it be believed that if the national will had declared in favour of the Empress, the coalition would have dared to dethrone her in the presence of her own father? Impossible! because it is unsafe to contend against the soundness of a principle which interests in an equal degree the dignity of two nations. The edifice would then have been saved from destruction; that state of supremacy which was irksome to Europe would have been lost; but the social order would not have been shaken in France, and no sign would have been discovered of that abject condition into which she has since fallen. As soon as Austria beheld that the nation kept aloof from her, it behoved her to become at least indifferent to what might happen to France, and, in common with our other enemies, to take back with an unsparing hand what she had previously lost. She had no other means left her of keeping pace with the extension of power which the others were acquiring.

It would be a mistaken notion to suppose that Austria will ever meddle in the affairs of France at the risk of rekindling a war in Europe. She is far too cautious and prudent to adopt such a course, and has acquired a sad experience of the fact that a war often leads beyond the mark originally aimed at. France has missed the opportunity of binding her destinies to those of Austria, which country will find it much easier to accomplish the ruin of France than the latter to avert it. Time will show whether every thing had not been settled beforehand between the Austrian and Russian empires. If this should turn out to be the case, Russia must have deceived her ally; for it is impossible to believe that the Austrian minister should have been accessible to the

influence of private passions, and have sacrificed to them the policy of his country, by destroying a power equally interested with Austria in watching the future proceedings of the Russians. No one was better acquainted than M. de Talleyrand with the extent of the danger that threatened the empire. There is no doubt that if he had, at this crisis, been the minister of the regency, he would have carefully avoided the course into which he led all parties, in order to create a position of a personal nature to himself, on the return of a system which, but a few days before, appeared to the eyes of all, and to him in particular, like an abyss of which none could measure the depth. He aimed at obtaining forgiveness for his former conduct, redoubled his efforts accordingly, and was not arrested by any difficulty that he met in his way.

It is quite clear that every one was sacrificed to M. de Talleyrand's temporary interest. He trembled, on the one hand, at the possibility of his disappearing from the political scene on the return of the regency, and of being exposed to the dangers of penury; on the other hand, he dreaded to see France under the influence of Austria, and himself, therefore, in a rank inferior to that of M. de Metternich, against whom he entertains a feeling of personal animosity. "M. de Metternich really fancies himself a great personage," were his expressions to me at that period. Such was the nature of those vile passions which threw us into the arms of the Russians, who handed us over to the English. We must look to a much earlier source for the cause of our political destruction, which is altogether unconnected with the Emperor Napoleon, who was made the pretext for accomplishing it. Ever since the days of Peter the Great, Russia has been extending her power with rapid strides over Europe, which, being wearied by lengthened wars at the epoch of that prince's appearance, committed the egregious error of allowing him to destroy the power of Sweden. Europe has since acted a still more inju-

dicious part, by suffering Poland to be swept from the list of nations, and Turkey to be subjugated by Catherine II. The partition of the throne of the Iaghellans was no sooner accomplished, than Russia employed every means of acquiring influence in Germany amongst a multitude of petty princes, whose attention has constantly been turned to a more powerful state: this habit has grown upon them in consequence of the state of vassalage in which they have been held by the Germanic empire.

Russia was favoured by England, who was augmenting her strength in the same ratio in which that of France was diminishing, and who at that period had very little to apprehend from the extension of Russia, a country standing in absolute need of the produce of British commerce. Her policy was wholly turned towards France and America, whose successes were beginning to alarm the mother country. England failed to perceive that those successes would be so great at a future day, that if Russia were to join the cause of America, both countries united would be adequate to the attempt of oppressing the rest of Europe. France, on the contrary, has a vital interest in driving out of Germany the influence which Russia pretends to exercise in that country, and must in so far harmonise with the wishes of Austria. Ever since 1798, Russia, under Paul I., felt a natural desire to meddle with, and claim a share in the coalition of Austria against France. If her efforts have been purchased at a dear price, she has set a high value upon her services. Considering the rapid strides she has made, and the point she has now reached, is there any state of Germany that has not paid more dearly for the liberty which it has yet to receive, than for the aggrandisements it had acquired by remaining faithful to its alliance with France? Russia has played the surer game, as she is only compelled to defend a frontier, is not called upon to protect its rear, and has under her sway an immense population, one-half of which was in direct hostility to her a quar-

ter of a century ago: that population has now fallen to the lot of a few Russian lords, just as the cattle grazing upon any land is the property of the landlord. Such, however, are the principles in adherence to which Russia has triumphed over liberal ideas, and has, under pretence of protecting the liberties of Europe, poured her Asiatic hordes into the capital of France.

Before a second reign shall pass away, Europe will see how her liberators have profited by the lesson. Catherine II. had not in her dominions a sufficient number of men capable of reading and writing, to supply one for each village. At the present day, the daughters of cossacks are acquainted with music: perfumes form a part of their toilet. The plunder of the neighbourhood of Paris has been carried into the heart of Tartary. The Emperor Napoleon did not stand alone, the whole of France joined him in the attempt to arrest the projects of Russia upon Germany, which the Russians contemplated to involve in utter ruin. They aimed at crushing the only rival which they had been taught to dread. We shall now see what will check their career; and to speak in plain language, we must acknowledge that the Emperor of Russia has only acted for the advantage of intriguers, and of his own people. Deceived by a few political break-necks, who had formed a group around him, he flattered himself that he might add the part of a legislator, and of a founder of governments, to that of a conqueror. In disturbing the repose of France, he has done no more than compromise the safety of Europe.

It may easily be conceived that M. de Talleyrand and the agitators who followed his banner should have seen and desired nothing more than a temporary interest and a better personal position; but that the chief of the coalition, who could settle the destinies of the Continent upon a firm basis, fix the mutual relations of the various states composing it, and secure two centuries of peace to the world, should have

renounced such an exalted glory, in order to make himself the leader of a party and to gratify a low revenge, is altogether inconceivable. To what mental aberration are we to ascribe the circumstance, that a man who might have gathered the blessings of so many nations, should have courted their hatred? We must suppose he was indifferent to it: nevertheless, he must have discovered that the most powerful princes fall victims in the long run to the prick of a mere pin. He had seen the proof of this in Russia, as well as in France. It appears, however, that he soon discovered his mistake; since he spread the report that he had been compelled to act in a manner contrary to his intentions. This was also the burden of the song of M. de Talleyrand; so appalling appeared to each his own work; so reluctant were they to incur the responsibility of their respective acts. I saw M. de Talleyrand on my return from Blois. I was still at liberty at that period to converse with him on public matters; and I expressed my surprise at the course he had adopted. He repelled my suspicions with the utmost warmth. He insisted upon his having strongly urged the plan of a regency; but Alexander had irrevocably decided, and had required the recall of the Bourbons. That prince considered their return as the completion of his own glory and that of the allies who had so long fought to replace them on the throne: nothing could induce him to alter his determination. Such was M. de Talleyrand's language to me: the act was therefore of a compulsory nature; there was no choice *left*. This, however, is one more combination to be added to the rest. We shall see how they will steer their way through, and shall act accordingly.

CHAPTER X.

Address to the army—The Emperor abdicates—His reservations—Corsica is offered to him—Considerations which induce him to prefer the island of Elba—The Empress at Blois—She wishes to join the Emperor—Russian escort—Arrival at Orleans—M. Dudon—In what manner he acquits himself of his mission—The Empress takes leave of the members of the government—Deplorable condition of that princess.

WHILST these transactions were taking place in Paris, the intelligence of the defection of the 6th corps had reached Fontainebleau. Colonel Gourgaud, who had been on a mission to Essone, hastened back to inform the Emperor that Marmont had entered into a treaty with the allies; that he was personally in Paris; that his troops, set in motion under pretence of marching upon the capital, were already in the heart of the Russian columns, and that Fontainebleau was now wholly unprotected. Napoleon could not give credit to so extraordinary a report: he had it repeated to him, and still refused to believe in it. The defection was unfortunately too positive a fact; he could no longer doubt it: his friends, his dependents deserted him; but the army remained true to his cause, and he appealed to its courage and fidelity.

"TO THE ARMY.

"Fontainebleau, 5th of April, 1814.

"The Emperor thanks the army for the attachment it has evinced towards him, and especially for its having admitted that France is centred in him, and not in the people of the capital. A soldier follows the good and bad fortune of his general, and the dictates of honour and religion. The Duke of Ragusa has not inspired his companions in arms

with these sentiments. He has gone over to the allies. The Emperor cannot sanction with his approval the condition under which he has taken this step. He cannot accept of life and liberty at the mercy of one of his subjects.

"The senate has taken upon itself to dispose of the French government. It has forgotten that it is indebted to the Emperor for the power of which it is now making an improper use; that the Emperor alone has saved a portion of its members from the storms of the revolution, drawn the remainder out of obscurity, and protected them from the national hatred. The senate relies upon the articles of the constitution for the purpose of upsetting it; it does not blush with shame at directing its reproaches against the Emperor, without considering that, as the first body in the state, it has taken part in every event. That body has gone to such lengths, as to presume to accuse the Emperor of altering the acts in the course of their being published. It is well known to the whole world that he had no need of descending to such low artifices. A mere nod was tantamount to an order for the senate, which always went beyond what was demanded of it.

"The Emperor has always been accessible to the remonstrances of his ministers; and he expected from them, in the present circumstances, the most unqualified justification of all the measures he had adopted. If the language of the public addresses has been one of pure enthusiasm, in that case the Emperor has been deceived; but those who have held such a language have only themselves to blame for the consequences of their flattery. The senate does not blush at alluding to libels published against foreign governments, forgetful of the circumstance that they were drawn up by its own members. As long as fortune remained true to their sovereign, these men faithfully adhered to him, and no complaint was heard against the abuse of power. If the Emperor had felt that contempt for mankind which has been

laid to his charge, the world would now have an opportunity of acknowledging that he had sufficient motives to justify such contempt. He held his dignity from God and from the nation; they alone could deprive him of it. He has always considered that dignity as a burden; and he only accepted it under the conviction that he was alone calculated to bear its weight.

"The happiness of France appeared to centre in the Emperor's destiny. Now that fortune has declared against him, the national will could alone succeed in persuading him to remain any longer on the throne. If he is to consider himself as the only obstacle in the way, he is ready to make the greatest of sacrifices to the welfare of France. He has accordingly sent the Prince of Moskwa and the Dukes of Vicenza and Tarentum to Paris for the purpose of opening a negotiation. The army may rest well assured that the Emperor's happiness will never be set up in opposition to the happiness of France."

The defection which the Emperor complained of had been the cause, as I have explained, of the failure of the negotiation which he was communicating to his troops. Perpetually trembling at the bare name of the father, the allies had refused to acknowledge the son, and demanded the absolute forfeiture of his dynasty. The Emperor was outrageous at so bold a pretension. He had once held out a friendly hand to them after their defeats; and now they were not satisfied with hurling him from the throne, but insisted also upon proscribing his successor. It was far better for him to try once more the chance of fortune. Unfortunately, however, the work of seduction had not slumbered. General-officers and commanders of corps had gone over to the traitors. The public papers and reports brought at every moment the news of some fresh defection. It appeared impossible to

avoid a civil war. He resigned himself to his fate, and the sacrifice on his part was completed.*

* TREATY OF FONTAINEBLEAU.

Article I.

His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon renounces for himself and his successors and descendants, as well as for each member of his family, all right of sovereignty and dominion over the French empire, the kingdom of *Italy*, or any other country.

Article II.

Their Majesties the Emperor Napoleon and the Empress Maria Louisa retain the enjoyment of those titles during their lives; the mother, brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the Emperor shall equally preserve, wherever they may be, the title of princes of his family.

Article III.

The island of Elba, selected by the Emperor Napoleon for his place of residence, shall form during his life a distinct principality, to be possessed by him in full sovereignty and right of ownership. There shall, besides, be granted to the Emperor Napoleon an annual income of two millions of francs in inscriptions upon the great book of France, of which one million shall revert to the Empress.

Article IV.

All the powers engage to exert their good offices in order that the Barbary states may respect the flag and territory of the island of Elba, and that it may be placed on the same footing as France in her intercourse with the Barbary states.

Article V.

The duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, shall be given in full sovereignty and full property to Her Majesty the Empress Maria Louisa; they shall afterwards pass to her son, and his descendants in a direct line. The Prince, her son, shall from this moment assume the title of Prince of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla.

Article VI.

There shall be placed in reserve certain domains, in the countries which the Emperor Napoleon renounces for himself and his family; or rents shall be as-

The enemy had entered Paris on the 30th of March. We had now reached the 8th of April. This short space of time

signed on the great book of France, producing an annual income of two millions five hundred thousand francs. These domains or rents shall belong in full property, and to be disposed of at their own will, to the Princes and Princesses of his family, and be divided amongst them, so that the revenue of each may be in the following proportion: to the Emperor's mother, three hundred thousand francs; to King Joseph and his Queen, five hundred thousand francs; to King Louis, two hundred thousand francs; to Queen Hortensia and her son, four hundred thousand francs; to King Jerome and his Queen, five hundred thousand francs; to Princess Eliza, three hundred thousand francs; to Princess Pauline, three hundred thousand francs. The Princes and Princesses of the Emperor's family shall moreover preserve all the moveable or immoveable property, whatever may be its nature, which they may possess in their private stations, and in particular those rents which they also enjoyed in that character on the great book of France, or the Mont-Napoleon of Milan.

Article VII.

The annual allowance to the Empress Josephine shall be reduced to a million of francs, in domains or in inscriptions on the great book of France. She shall enjoy in full right her moveable and immoveable property of a private nature, and continue in such enjoyment conformably to the French laws.

Article VIII.

There shall be given to Prince Eugene, viceroy of Italy, a suitable establishment out of France.

Article IX.

The property possessed by His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon in France, whether as extraordinary or as private domain, shall remain to the crown. From the funds placed by the Emperor Napoleon, whether on the great book or in the bank of France, in forest-shares or in any other manner, there shall be reserved a capital not exceeding two millions, to be applied to gratuities in favour of the persons who may be borne on the list that will be signed by the Emperor Napoleon, and handed over to the French government.

Article X.

All the crown jewels shall be restored to France.

Article XI.

The Emperor Napoleon shall replace into the treasury and other public chests

had sufficed for utterly destroying the fruit of a series of labours so honourable to Frenchmen.

all monies and negotiable paper that may have been taken out by his order, with the exception of the civil list.

Article XII.

The debts of the household of the Emperor Napoleon, such as they exist at the signing of the present treaty, shall be immediately discharged out of the arrears due by the treasury to the civil list, according to statements which will be signed by a commissioner to be appointed for the purpose.

Article XIII.

The engagements of the Mont-Napoleon of Milan towards all its creditors, whether Frenchmen or foreigners, shall be strictly fulfilled, without any alteration being made on that subject.

Article XIV.

All necessary safeguards shall be furnished for the unobstructed journey of the Emperor Napoleon, of the Empress, of the Princes and Princesses, and of all those of their suite who may wish to accompany them, or to settle out of France, as well as for the removal of all equipages, horses, and effects belonging to them: the allied powers will consequently provide the officers and men who are to form the escort.

Article XV.

The French imperial guard shall furnish a detachment of twelve or fifteen hundred men of all arms, to serve as an escort as far as Saint-Tropez, the place of embarkation.

Article XVI.

There shall be furnished an armed corvette, as well as the requisite ships for the conveyance of the Emperor Napoleon and his household to their destination: the corvette shall belong to His Majesty in full property.

Article XVII.

His Majesty will take with him and retain as his body-guard four hundred men, officers, subalterns, and privates, to be selected from those who may volunteer to accompany him.

Article XVIII.

All Frenchmen who may follow His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon or his

The facts I have just related are not laid down in the order of their occurrence. Nevertheless, their accuracy is unquestionable. I have ascertained the fact by means of the information which I still had at command during the first weeks after my return.

The sacrifice being accomplished, the negotiation was soon

family shall be required, if they do not wish to lose their privilege of Frenchmen, to return to France within the period of three years, unless they should be appointed to any of the public situations which the French government reserves to itself the power of granting at the expiration of that period of time.

Article XIX.

The Polish troops of all arms which are in the service of France shall be at liberty to return home with their arms and baggage, as a testimony of their honourable services: the officers, subalterns, and soldiers, shall preserve the decorations granted to them, and the pensions affixed to those decorations.

Article XX.

The high allied powers guaranty the execution of the articles of the present treaty; they bind themselves to obtain their adoption and fulfilment by France.

Article XXI.

The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged in Paris within the space of two days, or sooner if possible.

Done at Paris, the 11th of April, 1814.

(Signed) Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza; Ney, Duke of Elchingen; Macdonald, Duke of Tarentum; Prince Metternich; Count Stadion; Count Rasumowsky; Count Nosselrode; Castlereagh; Baron Hardenberg.

We have accepted the above treaty, in all and each of its articles. We declare it to be accepted and ratified, and promise a strict observance of it. In proof of which we have given the present declaration, signed and invested with our imperial seal.

(Signed) Napoleon.

So done at Fontainebleau, the 12th of April, 1814.

The minister, secretary of state,

Duke of Bassano.

concluded. The only question was to regulate individual interests. The allies threw no difficulties in the way. They offered Corsica to the Emperor, who refused it; foreseeing that sooner or later they would find him to be too near France, and he would be under the impossibility of defending himself if it should be attempted to force him out of his asylum. He told me himself, after his return from the island of Elba, that when he found, by the conduct of the King's government, that he might again be called upon to appear on the public scene, he had more than once experienced regret at not having accepted the island of Corsica. He gave the preference to Elba, because it could not give umbrage to any one, nor create any alarm as to the future application of the means which the latter island might place at his disposal.

He felt no difficulty in obtaining this trifling remnant of the power thus wrested from him. It was agreed that France should supply him with an annual subsidy of two millions of francs; and that he should be at liberty to take with him twelve hundred men, drawn from amongst such of his former soldiers as might volunteer to accompany him. Pecuniary indemnities were also stipulated in favour of the members of his family. However painful was his position, he neither forgot his servants nor his friends. He asked that the arrangements which he had adopted in their behalf should be respected; that they should not be disturbed in the possession of the property he had bestowed upon them, such as donations of annuities upon the state and upon the Mont-Napoleon of Milan. He stipulated that out of the private funds which he relinquished to the crown, there should be reserved a sum of two millions in favour of a certain number of officers whom he pointed out. Every thing was granted to him which he applied for.

The allied sovereigns acknowledged and guarantied all the transactions entered into with him; but they carried

none, or very few of them, into effect. The fate of the Empress was regulated in a similar manner: she was at first to have the grant of Tuscany; and yet she only received the duchy of Parma and Placentia. It was to be supposed that the conditions of those different treaties would be strictly fulfilled; for, indeed, the inheritance was sufficiently splendid to admit of their waving all objection respecting the incumbrances upon it. This, however, was not the case; and the contrary was soon made manifest.

It is time we should return to Blois, where the Empress was staying with her son and the ministers. The Emperor kept her regularly informed of his position, and appeared more afflicted at these reverses of fortune on her account than on his own. That Princess was made to perform certain public acts, which could no longer be productive of any good effect. Notwithstanding her youth, she had sufficient penetration to foresee the impending catastrophe. It was proposed to her that she should go to Orleans, in order that she might be nearer to Fontainebleau. She replied, that the Emperor had desired her to remain at Blois; and she was determined upon waiting in that town the issue of events, be they what they might. Several officers, who had been dispatched by the Emperor, entered Blois in regular succession. He had adopted this mode of communication, because he could no longer place reliance upon any other.

He was acquainted with all that had taken place in Paris; and no longer doubted the fact of attempts having been made to seduce from their duty those who were in attendance about him, and about the person of the Empress. The events which had occurred on the first days of April were only known at Blois in consequence of the order given to the director of the post-office at Orleans not to allow any post-office' conveyance to pass through on its way from Paris without first sending it to Blois. One of these conveyances soon made its appearance; and a knowledge was thereby ac-

quired of all that had taken place in the capital. The dispatches which it carried were stopped; and as similar measures had been adopted on the roads to Brittany and the Mans, the circulation of the unfavourable news was suspended for some days. The Empress had fallen a prey to the deepest anxiety. During the week of her stay at Blois, her face was constantly bathed in tears. She had formed a very different idea of Frenchmen from that which their present conduct justified.

The malice of those who compelled her to descend from the throne, has imputed to her want of energy a part of the misfortunes which befel us; and yet no blame can properly attach to her. If instead of being less than twenty-two years of age, the Empress had reached that period of existence at which experience brings a firmness of character along with it, and allows a woman to surround herself with men entitled to her confidence, and to listen to their counsels, the events would probably have taken a different turn; but she was not so situated. The Emperor had appointed the persons who surrounded her; and she set the example of submission to his will. In private, as well as in public, she never relaxed from that rigid observance of the laws of propriety which were imposed upon her youth, and which forbade all kinds of private conversation with any one, excepting those who had been named as her counsellors. I had many times the honour of seeing her during those painful moments; and had an opportunity of satisfying myself of her unvaried attachment to the Emperor.

"Those who were of opinion that I should remain in Paris," said the Empress one day to me, "were quite right: the soldiers of my father would not, perhaps, have driven me out of it. What am I to think of his allowing such indignities to be offered to me?" She was in this state of anxiety when she learned the fatal determination brought on by the intrigues of the capital. She received this intelligence from Colonel Galbois. That gallant officer having been dispatched

from Fontainebleau on the 6th of April, had great difficulty in avoiding the troops of the allies which intercepted the road to Blois. The account of his mission was given by himself: we will quote his own words.

"I reached Blois at an early hour on the following morning, the 7th of April: the Empress immediately admitted me to an audience. She was greatly surprised at the Emperor's abdication. She could not believe it possible that the allies should contemplate to dethrone the Emperor Napoleon. '*My father,*' she said, '*would not allow it. He repeated to me over and over again, when he placed me on the French throne, that he would always maintain me in that station; and my father is rigidly true to his word.*'

"The Empress desired to be left alone, in order that she might meditate on the Emperor's letter.

"I afterwards saw the King of Spain and the King of Westphalia. Joseph was in deep affliction; and Jerome loud in his complaints against Napoleon.

"Maria Louisa sent for me. Her Majesty was in a state of great excitement, and announced to me her intention of proceeding to join the Emperor. I observed to her that this was impossible. Her Majesty then said to me with warmth: '*Why so, Colonel? You are about to join him yourself: my proper place is near the Emperor, at a moment when he must be so truly unhappy. I insist upon going to him; and I shall deem myself well off any where, provided I be in his company.*' I represented to the Empress that I had found great difficulty in coming as far as Blois, and should have to encounter much greater ones in going back to the Emperor. Nothing, in fact, could be more perilous than such a journey. The Empress yielded with the utmost reluctance. At last, she determined upon writing a letter.

"I succeeded in overtaking the Emperor. He read Maria Louisa's letter with the utmost eagerness, and appeared greatly affected at the kind interest which she took in his

fate. The Empress spoke of the possibility of collecting an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men. The Emperor read that passage of the letter in a loud voice, and addressed to me these remarkable words: '*Doubtless I might still hold out another campaign, and offer a successful resistance; but I should be kindling a civil war in France, and I will not do so . . . . besides which I have signed my abdication, and I will not recall what I have done.*'"

The Emperor, according to Colonel Galbois' report, was not insensible to the firmness displayed by the Empress; but he did not share in her sanguine expectations. He wrote her word to proceed to Orleans; and it will hardly be believed that the officer, who was the bearer of his dispatch, was ordered to be accompanied by an aide-de-camp of the Emperor of Russia, who, on the banks of the Loire, was to serve as a protection to her who had formerly been the sovereign of half of Europe. It is true that some hordes of cossacks were already marauding in the neighbourhood of Beaugency. The chivalric mind of the Emperor of Russia suggested to him the more gallant course of sending one of his aides-de-camp to protect the journey of the Empress, rather than order off, to at least a respectful distance, those bands of plunderers. This can only be accounted for by his feeling a secret pleasure in assuming the appearance of protecting the Empress. We shall soon see that he kept another species of insult in reserve for her. The arrival of that aide-de-camp at Blois, on such a mission, created an unfavourable impression. He issued passports to the suite of the Empress, who could not accompany her on her journey except under the Muscovite's protection. The members of the government proceeded with their sovereign as far as Orleans. The passport given by the Russian aide-de-camp proved of service to them: for a party of cossacks actually pushed on as far as Beaugency, and plundered some of the equipages of the suite.

The Empress arrived at Orleans, where she was received

with all the honours due to a sovereign: the troops were under arms, and the public acclamations followed her to the very palace, notwithstanding that the people were acquainted with every thing that had taken place in Paris. I fell a prey to the most gloomy reflections when I beheld the town of Orleans full of troops: we had left a still greater number at Blois, to which place were successively removed the depôts at Versailles and Chartres, as well as the column of troops of the guard which accompanied the Empress; all which movements had taken place in conformity with orders from the minister of war. How happened it that all these troops were joined to the corps of Marshals Mortier and Marmont, which defended Paris? No other reason can be assigned, than that the neglect was intentional, since they amounted to more than twenty thousand men. If to those troops be added the resources of the arsenal of Paris, it must then be acknowledged that there was exhibited a want of judgment, or a want of courage; and that the Emperor's service on this occasion was very ill attended to.

The Empress had scarcely reached Orleans when an agent of the provisional government made his appearance. The object of his visit was not known; but he had just been released from the dungeon of Vincennes: his mission portended nothing favourable. The conjectures to which it gave rise, soon assumed the character of reality. M. Dudon, who had been put into confinement for having quitted his post, deserted the army of Spain, and instilled into the whole country through which he passed the feeling of terror to which he had himself given way, carried in his pocket a document calculated to gratify his revengeful spirit. It was a decree (such at least as made its appearance in the *Moniteur*), the reasoning of which too well expresses the system of deception resorted to at that period, not to be again made public in this place. It was worded as follows:—

"The provisional government, being informed that in consequence of orders from the sovereign whose forfeiture has been solemnly pronounced on the 3rd of April, 1814, considerable funds have been carried away from Paris on the days immediately preceding the occupation of the city by the allied troops; that those funds have been removed by various means of transport to several points of the kingdom; that they have even been swelled by the plunder of many public chests in the departments; that the municipal chests, and even those of hospitals, have not escaped that system of pillage; and being desirous of bringing back to the treasury, as speedily as possible, the funds which have been withdrawn from it, and which belong to the public service,

"DECREES AS FOLLOWS:

"Article I.—Any person holding in deposit or retaining funds proceeding from the abstraction and plunder above described, is required, as soon as he shall be informed of the present decree, to make a declaration of the said funds to the mayor of the district nearest to the place of his residence, in order that the deposit of the said funds may accordingly be effected into the chest of the receiver-general, or the municipal chest of the said district.

"Art. II.—Every person entrusted with the transport of the said funds, whatever may be his capacity, is required instantly to stop the same, to make his declaration to the mayor of the nearest district, and to effect the deposit of those funds in the manner stated in the preceding Article.

"Art. III.—Every commandant of military escorts is called upon to act in the manner prescribed in the above Articles, and to look to the immediate deposit of the funds.

"Art. IV.—Every magistrate, civil or military administrator, prefect, mayor, or commandant of a town, is required, as soon as he may have information of a transport of the nature described in the present decree, to oppose by all the

means at his disposal the passage of the said transport, and to see that the deposit of the funds conveyed by it be made in the manner pointed out in the foregoing Articles.

"Art. V.—All persons named in the Articles of the present decree, who shall not pay implicit obedience to the injunctions that may be made to them, shall be held civilly and personally responsible for the sums which may have been withdrawn by their neglect or disobedience, shall be declared plunderers of the public chests, and as such prosecuted according to law, both in their persons and in their properties.

(Signed) "THE PRINCE OF BENEVENTO.
"THE DUKE DALBERG.
"FRANÇOIS DE JAUCOURT.
"BEURNONVILLE.
"MONTESQUIOU.

"Done at Paris, 9th of April, 1814."

The decree was positive in its injunctions. It dwelt upon the subject of plunder of public funds: nothing more just than to bring back to the treasury what had been improperly withdrawn from it. Unfortunately, the facts did not justify the intentions expressed in the decree; or rather, the intentions are manifestly in contradiction to the facts: for M. Dudon was no novice in the business; he was not likely to commit a mistake. If he had, he did not do so in the present case, since his operations were approved of. Let us now consider the course which he adopted. He repaired from Paris to Orleans by the direct road, which could not have been that by which the government of the Regent had carried away any public chests, since it had not taken that road. Besides which, previously to M. Dudon's being sent on his mission, it had been, or at least might have been, well ascertained by an inquiry into every branch of administration, that no public funds whatever had been carried off.

The object in view, however, was not the recovery of this description of funds, which is always readily effected. Who, in fact, did M. Dudon apply to on his arrival at Orleans? To M. de la Bouillerie, the treasurer of the civil list, and as such possessing no public funds. It was wished to lay hands upon the money which that functionary had in his chest; but it was well known that the decree could not reach it; accordingly no serious attempt was made upon him in order to obtain possession of his funds.

Recourse was had to M. Janin, of Chambéry, an officer of the select corps of gendarmerie, who had charge of escorting the money. The young man, finding this to be an opening for him on the road to fortune, consented to M. Dudon's wishes. He assembled his detachment, ordered of his own authority the horses to be put to the transports containing the Emperor Napoleon's private treasure; for they had not been unloaded; and he commenced his march for Paris, where he arrived without meeting any obstruction on the way.

In this manner was the private treasure carried off; no respect was even paid to the Emperor Napoleon's wardrobe. On the 12th of April the cars were brought back to the court-yard of the Tuileries, which they had left on the 30th of March preceding.

In the short space of three days, therefore, M. Dudon had repaired to Orleans, and brought away from it a heavy transport, which ought to have taken four days, at least, to travel over the ground between that town and the capital. How was the journey performed with such extraordinary rapidity? How is it possible to reconcile the date of the decree with that of the return of the funds? I cannot account for it, unless I admit a rather plausible version circulated at the time; this was, that the decree was not so much intended to authorise a plunder which had not been reckoned upon, as to sanction what had actually been done.

Be this as it may, the spoils had well nigh been the occa-

sion of discord amongst the soldiers who carried off the booty: each one claimed the honour of having originated the idea, and urged his right to a larger share. The intervention of friends was resorted to; and the prize was deemed sufficiently valuable to reconcile the differences of all parties.

It has since been asserted that the occurrence above related only took place after the dissolution of the provisional government. This is incorrect; as is sufficiently attested by a consideration of the date of the decree. The money, moreover, arrived in Paris on the very day of the entrance of the Count d'Artois into that capital. The prince could not order that to be done which was already effected. I now return to the conduct of the agent of the provisional government.

His mission appeared of so pressing a nature, that hardly sufficient time was left for carrying into effect various arrangements which the Emperor had prescribed, when M. Dudon unfolded the object of his journey. He was desirous of annulling the orders given in consequence of the Emperor Napoleon's instructions; but it was pointed out to him that those of which he was the bearer could not have a retrospective effect; and he was compelled to take matters as he found them. It is proper to observe, that the money which the provisional government had sent directions to seize upon was the Emperor's property; it did not proceed from the public revenue; it had not been drawn out of the public coffers: there could be no justice, therefore, in requiring its being returned, if any indeed ever found its way back into the treasury. If it was lodged in the public chests, it could only be entered as proceeding from an act of plunder; for it never can have been found that any money had been withdrawn from those chests for the Emperor's service.*

The agent of the provisional government claimed the crown

* The sums which were contained in the boxes exceeded twenty millions of francs.

jewels, which were returned upon a regular schedule, and with the most scrupulous exactness. None were wanting except the diamond called 'the Regent,' which was generally kept separate, in consequence of its high value, and of the facility there existed for carrying it off. No one was aware that the Empress kept in a work-bag the mounting of one of the Emperor's swords in which it was set. An account was brought to her of what was going forward; she immediately took out the mounting, and gave it up. The jewels which were her own property were in the same place with the rest; she did not ask a single question with the view of ascertaining if they had not also been carried off. M. Dudon was not yet satisfied; he took possession of the scanty supply of plate which had been removed for the use of the Empress and of her son; he *did* not leave her a single cover, and went to such lengths that it was found necessary to borrow the plate and china belonging to the bishop at whose house she resided, for the two days during which she still remained in Orleans.*

Such was the conduct held towards the daughter of the Emperor of Austria, the ally of the Emperor of Russia, and within view of the latter, who had one of his aides-de-camp at Orleans. It cannot be denied that the Emperor Napoleon acted in a very different manner when in the days of his

* It is proper to observe in this place, that at the time of the Emperor's accession to the government there was not a single silver spoon at the Tuileries, not a piece of plate nor any table linen. Whatever is to be found at the present day in the palaces of the King, has been purchased out of the savings made from the Emperor's personal allowance, and not with the funds of the public treasury. The crown jewels have been all purchased or withdrawn by him from the places where they had been pledged previously to his accession to power. It is fair, however, to admit that the latter were so purchased or redeemed with money belonging to the public treasury. With regard to the plate, I recollect the time when it was found necessary to hire some from the goldsmiths of Paris, whenever the First Consul had company to dine with him. The services of plate at present in use at the Tuileries partly proceeded from the plate of General Bonaparte, which was melted and remodelled with the imperial arms.

prosperity he was the arbiter of the destinies of many princes and kings, and especially of the relatives of the Emperor Alexander. The period of the residence of the Empress at Orleans was one of uniform suffering for that unhappy princess; each moment brought fresh causes of alarm along with it. The Emperor had written to her to dismiss the ministers, the members of the government who had accompanied her, as well as the great officers of the crown. She gave publicity to this order, and each one testified his eager desire to repair to her presence and to lay at her feet the last mark of their respect by assuring her of their deep regret at her misfortunes. She received in succession all those who presented themselves; she begged of each to retain some recollection of her, and expressed a wish for their happiness; her face was bathed in tears, which would have melted a heart of stone; she held out her hand for them to kiss, and afterwards dismissed them.

CHAPTER XI.

State of destitution into which the Empress is thrown—A desire is expressed that the Emperor should put an end to his existence—Anecdote on this subject—Mesdames de Montebello and de Montesquiou—The Empress regrets not having become a canoness—Painful uncertainty in which she is placed—Future prospects which open to her view.

On the day following this mournful ceremony, the Empress found herself almost deserted and alone in the town of Orleans; every one had taken the road back to Paris. I had also taken my departure, when an accident which I shall presently relate compelled me to return to Orleans, where I staid two days longer. The episcopal palace, at which the Empress was residing, had assumed an altered aspect; hardly

any other persons were to be seen except the two or three ladies who had remained in attendance upon her and the King of Rome. The moments which the Empress passed in this manner must have been bitter beyond description; her situation was such that she could no longer enjoy any repose. The Duchess de Montebello, her lady of honour, was the only person living with her on terms of close intimacy. The other ladies who accompanied her were not admitted to the same degree of confidence. Madame de Montesquiou enjoyed no greater share of it than was necessarily bestowed upon the individual who had wholly devoted herself to the care of watching over the tender years of the King of Rome. The arch-chancellor had not come so far as Orleans. On leaving Blois he had taken the road back to Paris: his advanced age, added to his infirmities, rendered any change of place extremely painful to him; so that, in these trying moments, the Empress had no other person than her lady of honour to advise with.

Having been presented to the confidence of Maria Louisa by the Emperor himself, that lady had justified the choice of the sovereign by the most unremitting attentions. Maria Louisa entertained for her a friendship as sincere as if she had been one of her sisters, and took great delight in conversing with her respecting that sister. The lady of honour was, as well as the sovereign, wholly devoted to the Emperor; like her, however, she was also greatly affected at the storm that had burst over their heads. They collected every report; communicated to each other their feelings of alarm; and thus increased the state of anxiety to which they were both a prey, though under circumstances of a very different nature.

The general topic of conversation for some days past had been a pretended design formed by the Emperor of making an attempt upon his life. I do not believe that any one ever took upon himself to advise his terminating his career in such

a manner: those alone who were longing to be released from all ties of gratitude towards him have expressed any surprise at his having had the courage to outlive such accumulated misfortunes. For my part, I am of opinion that had he put an end to his life, such an act would have been censured and ridiculed. This course is only befitting a man who cannot escape the infamy that attaches to him; but a great mind should always be proof against the shafts of misfortune. The report of the Emperor's death had at first been circulated at Blois, and afterwards in a more circumstantial manner at Orleans. It was even asserted that letters had been received from Fontainebleau, announcing that all would be over the next day.

These reports had certainly reached the ears of the Empress; for she fell into a state of nervous affection, which deprived her of sleep. Madame de Montebello was equally restless. The various reports in circulation had produced such an effect upon her, that she fancied every one to be a messenger of death.

The Emperor wrote almost every day to the Empress, who was quite alone at Orleans. He did not urge her to join him at Fontainebleau: he did not even ask her to do so, presuming, no doubt, that she would better consult her personal advantage by remaining at a distance from him, than by coming to share in his misfortunes; a step which might possibly have been displeasing to her father, to whom the Emperor recommended she should write, since he had no means at his command of affording her protection. The tender attachment he felt for her, imposed upon him the painful sacrifice of dissuading her from joining him, however much he would have derived consolation from her presence. I have beheld this princess inwardly struggling between two contending sentiments; what her attachment for the Emperor suggested to her heart, and what her deference for the least intimation on his part had made it a law for her to comply with. She did me the honour to address to me at Orleans the following words: "I

am indeed much to be pitied. Some advise me to proceed, others to remain. I write to the Emperor, and he does not reply to my request. He tells me, to write to my father. Alas! what can my father tell me, after the injuries which he allows to be inflicted upon me? I am deserted, and must now trust entirely to Divine Providence. It had once suggested to me the wisest course, when it inspired me with the idea of becoming a canoness. I should have done much better in yielding to that inspiration, than in coming to this country.—To repair to the Emperor! impossible, without my son, who looks up to me as his natural protector. On the other hand, if the Emperor is apprehensive of an attempt being made upon his life, a very improbable circumstance, and is compelled to fly, the embarrassment I should be to him might occasion his falling into the hands of his enemies, who, there is no doubt, have sworn his ruin. I know not what to decide upon. I only live to shed tears." In fact, they were running in abundance down her face whilst she concluded these words.

Whenever an officer from the Emperor made his appearance, he was announced to Madame de Montebello, who rose to receive him, if he arrived during the night: she then entered the apartment of the Empress to hand in the letters directed to her. M. Anatole de Montesquiou presented himself at this time, coming direct from Fontainebleau. He first went to his mother, in the King of Rome's apartments, from whence he had himself announced to the Duchess. He was introduced into a room where she had passed the night wrapped up in a shawl, and stretched upon her bed without undressing. She received M. Anatole de Montesquiou in this manner; and without giving him time to open his lips, "Well," she said, "is it all over?—Is he dead?" Anatole, who was not aware of her previous state of alarm, felt at a loss to understand the question. "Who do you mean, Madam?" he replied; "to whose death do you allude?"—

"Why," rejoined the lady of honour, "the Emperor's death. We have been told here that he had destroyed himself."—"No, Madam," said M. de Montesquiou, "he is not dead; he is in good health. How can you believe the reports circulated by his enemies? Here is even a letter which he has intrusted to me for the Empress."

Madame de Montesquiou, the mother of this officer, who was extremely strict in the practice of every virtue and of every duty, was not so easily alarmed; but she only saw the Empress when the King of Rome was taken to her. If she had possessed any influence over her majesty, she would no doubt have given her some useful advice. This, however, could not have been productive of much good: for, during the four years that the Empress had resided with us, she must have often heard that the Austrian alliances always proved fatal to France; and ever since that power had declared against us, the Emperor of Austria's conduct had been so unceremoniously censured, that some of the observations applied to it must have reached the ears of the Empress. It must, however, be acknowledged, that they were but too well warranted by the events. She was fully sensible of it; and had sufficient penetration to distinguish the truth, whatever disguise it might assume.

She could not conceal from herself the effect which her father's conduct was calculated to produce upon the minds of the whole nation.

"I can understand," she was sometimes heard to say, "that the people should feel an aversion for me; and yet there is no fault of mine. But why did my father promote my marriage, if he meditated the projects which he is now carrying into effect?"

Her imagination was exaggerating the fact; for at all times the utmost respect was felt towards her.

Her mind was a prey to a crowd of conflicting ideas with regard to events beyond the reach of her inexperience; but

whatever might be said to induce her to come to a determination, she had lost all confidence in the future, and was prepared for whatever might occur. It has been made a matter of reproach to her that she did not go to the island of Elba. This was unjust. Her conduct, however, has only been disapproved of by those who were ignorant of her position, and of that of the Emperor, by our very enemies, who being fully sensible of the power of opinion which that princess and her son exercised over France, sought every means of rendering her unpopular. It was only paying a merited compliment to the sound sense of the nation, to suppose it would look with a feeling of aversion upon any error emanating from a vicious heart. This feeling, however, could not apply to the Empress, who was too sincere to be the object of suspicion.

I have stated all the motives which formed the basis of her determination. I will now add to them a few reflections, which may serve to explain how far that determination may have been influenced by the advice of her immediate attendants. Madame de Montebello, who was possessed of a very large fortune, was not at all disposed to bury herself alive in the island of Elba. Her inclinations led her back to Paris, where she could live in a state of independence. She was sufficiently acquainted with the feelings of the Empress, to be well satisfied that if she again met the Emperor, no power would ever prevent her from sharing his fate: in which case the Duchess would be under the necessity of accompanying her. Accordingly, she urged with great warmth the propriety of her adopting the course recommended by the Emperor, that of addressing herself to the Emperor of Austria; as no sooner should that princess be restored to her family, than her attendant would be relieved from all further obligations. * The entreaties of the lady of honour

* It has been asserted that the Emperor's letters to the Empress were delivered

were backed by some treacherous hints. The Empress was told that the Emperor had never loved her; that he had enjoyed the favours of several mistresses since his marriage, and had only wedded her through motives of policy; but that, after the turn which matters had taken, she would be exposed to unceasing reproaches. The Empress gave way to these representations. She wrote to her father; and it was no doubt owing to his invitation that she repaired from Orleans to Rambouillet. We shall soon see what occurred at their meeting. Let us now return to certain allegations still put in circulation by the allies for the purpose of misleading public opinion.

CHAPTER XII.

Declaration of the 19th of March—Reproaches directed against the Emperor—The armistice—Counter-project—Who are we to blame? the Duke of Vicenza or the Emperor?

We have seen that Prince Schwartzenberg had replied to the overtures of the Duke of Treviso, by transmitting to him a document insulting to the Emperor's character. It was a fresh manifesto; in which, following up the system of deception put in practice at Frankfort, the allies opposed a pretended moderation to the ambitious views of the sovereign who was fighting in defence of his territory. Ever ready to lay hold of any circumstance calculated to alienate from us the public opinion, they took advantage of the errors committed by the diplomatic branch of his service to arraign the intentions of the chief of the state. Let us re-assign to every

up to Prince Schwartzenberg. This act of treachery is too base to be credited. The assertion is probably false.

one the share that belongs to each in this series of unfortunate or cowardly acts, ending in the destruction of that splendid edifice of glory which it had taken twenty years to erect.

Did the Emperor obstinately persist in continuing the war, regardless of the calamities which oppressed his subjects? Did he, as the allies accused him of having done, reject any project of reconciliation tendered with the view of procuring an armistice on those conditions upon which he might have obtained a peace? Let us inquire into the facts.

Trusting to the declaration of Frankfort, the Duke of Vicenza, in the powers which he had drawn up for his own guidance, imposed upon himself the obligation of no longer treating upon any other bases than those which the sovereigns themselves had promulgated. Having been detained, however, at the advanced-posts of the enemy, he soon acquired the conviction that nothing was farther from the intention of the allies than to grant to France those limits of which they had held out the promise. He solicited fresh powers, in which no mention should be made of frontiers no longer likely to be obtained. These powers were expedited on the 4th of March, in such terms as the negotiator had looked for.

Napoleon had hesitated to invest them with his signature; either from deeming it an error in principle to begin, in a work of negotiation not yet entered upon, by a concession the consequences of which might be of the most serious nature, or from considering the bases laid down at Frankfort as the only plank of safety he could lay hold of in the wreck of his fortunes. The idea of submitting to any other conditions was an oppressive weight upon his mind.

In the mean while, a letter was brought from Châtillon, addressed to the Duke of Bassano.

The Duke of Vicenza expressed himself as follows: "We must not give way to feelings of illusion; the power and re-

sources wielded by the enemy are immense. If the Emperor possesses armies sufficiently numerous with the aid of his genius to ensure victory, nothing in that case should induce us to give up an inch of ground within our natural limits; but if we have been so far betrayed by fortune as not to possess the resources we stand in need of, let us yield to necessity what we can no longer defend, what our courage can no longer re-conquer . . . obtain, therefore, from his Majesty a positive determination. In a question of so much importance, a decisive course must be adopted . . . . *I must not be bound down by any restrictions. Does the safety of France depend upon a peace or an armistice to be concluded within the space of four days?* If so, I solicit precise orders, *which may leave me at liberty to act.*"

The Duke of Bassano handed the dispatch to the Emperor, and urged him to yield to necessity. Napoleon reluctantly listened to him. He pointed out to his minister a passage in Montesquieu's works, which he appeared to be running over in an absent manner. "Read this aloud," said the Emperor. The minister read as follows: "Nothing, in my opinion, exceeds the magnanimous resolution taken by a monarch who swayed a sceptre in our days, rather to bury himself under the ruins of the throne, than to accept of proposals which no king ought to listen to. His mind was too elevated to suffer him to descend lower than his misfortunes had already brought him; and he was well aware that a crown may be restored to its splendour by a display of courage, but never by an act of infamy."*

Twelve years before this time Napoleon had said to his minister, who was beginning to obtain a great share of his confidence, "I am acquainted with a man who will listen to any thing." The Duke of Bassano recollected the expression.

* Grandeur et Décadence des Romains, chap. v.

"I know of a still more magnanimous act," he replied to Napoleon; "that of sacrificing your glory, in order to close the precipice into which France would be plunged along with you."—"Well, then, be it so," rejoined the Emperor; "conclude peace. Let this be Caulaincourt's work: let him sign what he pleases, in order to obtain it. I may have the strength to bear the shame of such a peace, but never expect that I shall dictate the terms of my own degradation." The recent example of the congress at Prague had already been a lesson to the Duke of Bassano; and ought to have taught the Duke of Vicenza how impossible it would be to obtain that Napoleon himself should propose one by one the conditions he would have to submit to.

The prince relied altogether upon his plenipotentiary, whose opinion, expressed in energetic language, had just been submitted for his perusal. He ordered the following answer to be written to him:—"It appears that the conditions have been already agreed upon before-hand between the allies; as soon as they shall have communicated them to you, you *are at liberty to accept them*, or to refer the question to me within a delay of twenty-four hours." The alternative in this case might have embarrassed the proceedings of the plenipotentiary. The Duke of Bassano earnestly insisted that a fresh order should be issued for the purpose of removing the conditional nature of the former one. This gave rise to a long conversation, which continued until a late hour of the night. He was at last authorised to write on the 5th; and he accordingly dispatched in all haste the following letter:—

"I yesterday sent you a courier with a letter from his Majesty, and the full powers you had again asked for.

"His Majesty being on the eve of his departure from Troyes, he directs me to send you a second courier; and to inform you in explicit terms that his Majesty grants you

a carte-blanche to bring the negotiations to a favourable issue, to save the capital, and to avoid a battle, upon which depend the last hopes of the nation."

These expressions, which were unreservedly approved of by Napoleon, were energetic and precise. Nevertheless, the Duke of Bassano did not deem them strong enough. He felt it necessary to procure for the authority which they conveyed, a character of greater strength and solemnity, in order to serve as an ample guarantee to the plenipotentiary, whatever use he might make of it, and to protect him in case of need from the consequences of his own responsibility. With a view to this object, he added the following words:

"The conferences must have commenced yesterday, the 4th. His Majesty has deemed it advisable not to wait until you should have brought the first overtures to his knowledge, in order to avoid the smallest delay.

"I am therefore instructed, M. le Duc, 'to intimate to you, that it is the Emperor's intention you should consider yourself invested with all the powers and all the authority necessary in these important circumstances, so as to enable you to adopt the course which may appear to you most suitable to the object of arresting the progress of the enemy, and of saving the capital."

Those were the powers given by the sovereign. We have now to see the use to which the negotiator applied them. The congress had opened on the 5th of February. The sitting, which was adjourned to the following day, did not take place: a circumstance affording time for the French plenipotentiary to receive his *carte-blanche*. This document came to his hands in the course of that day. The enemy's ministers again met on the 7th, and announced the conditions upon which they were willing to make peace. They were nearly similar to those which the Emperor was on the point

of assenting to, when he was informed of Blucher's imprudent march. Nevertheless, so far was M. de Caulaincourt from accepting them, that he threw every difficulty in the way. *He claimed the bases laid down at Frankfort: wished to know which of the powers was to derive the benefit of the sacrifices imposed upon France; to what purpose they were to be applied; and even insisted upon being furnished with a statement developing the views of the allies in their combined form.* These pretensions were altogether incompatible with existing circumstances; and only calculated to raise a doubt of the intentions of the sovereign in whose name they were presented. This inconsistency was pointed out to the duke. He perseveringly insisted in claiming those very limits which he himself had urged the propriety of giving up; and after the lapse of two days consumed in an obstinacy which could be attended with no good effect, he yielded assent to what was required of him; but instead of concluding the proffered peace, he solicited an armistice, which his instructions did not authorise him to apply for. He went farther. At this painful crisis, in which the smallest delay might prove fatal, he did not even suggest the adoption of the extraordinary course which had originated with himself. He consulted M. de Metternich, who was at the distance of twenty leagues from the spot, and laid his intentions before him. Nothing could be better calculated to meet the views of the allies. They had all witnessed the invasion of their respective capitals: our eagles had been planted in Vienna, Berlin, and Moscow. Their pride was wounded at the recollection of those achievements; and they thirsted with a desire of visiting upon us the degradation which we had inflicted upon them.

The triumph obtained at Brienne appeared to hold out a pledge of their succeeding in the object of their ambition: they wanted nothing more than the delay requisite for reaching Paris. A peace on those terms, upon which it was

pretended to force the Emperor's acceptance of it, offered the ready means of their succeeding in the views they meditated. The conditions tendered were of the most painful nature. It was expected that he would hesitate in giving way; and his hesitation would enable the allies to accomplish his downfall. Their appalling calculations were justified by the unaccountable pretensions set forth by the Duke of Vicenza.

The foreign diplomatists were in a state of undisturbed security, when Caulaincourt suddenly recalled the step he had taken, and consented immediately to relinquish, for the sake of an armistice, every point which had been the subject of discussion in anticipation of a peace. The Chevalier Floret, to whom this confidential communication was made, instantly imparted it to M. de Stadion, by whom it was transmitted to Count Razumowski. The latter did not delay a moment in making up his mind upon the subject. The English plenipotentiaries had no personal injury to avenge. The Count was aware that peace would be instantly concluded, as soon as they should learn that France relinquished Antwerp and Belgium. There existed but one means of averting such an event: he laid hold of it; and demanded, in the name of his sovereign, that the conferences should be suspended. He was no doubt fully sensible of his being indebted to the two-fold error of M. de Vicenza, for the advantages he had acquired. The latter diplomatist, however, was not a man possessed of any personal importance. The only object was to effect the Emperor's ruin; and care was accordingly taken to impute to him the blunders of his negotiation.

The allies were not satisfied with affixing this false imputation upon the Emperor; they farther accused him of having long delayed in furnishing his counter-project of a peace; of having, in short, again brought forward pretensions wholly incompatible with the existing state of affairs. Let

us now consider whether those ill-timed pretensions are to be ascribed to him, or to his plenipotentiary.

Napoleon had caused the following observations to be addressed to his plenipotentiary on the 25th of February: "Prudence no doubt requires that every means should be resorted to for coming to an arrangement; but his Majesty is of opinion, and he desires I will again write to you on the subject, that these means, or at least the data by which you may acquire a knowledge of them, *should be found out by yourself; and that any information concerning them cannot be furnished by him to you, but must necessarily be supplied by you to him* . . . The Emperor agrees with you in opinion that this is the favourable moment for treating, if there be a possibility of concluding a peace; but in order to judge of the existence of such a possibility, *he must be made acquainted with those lights, which the negotiations, or your intercourse with the negotiators, shall afford him.*"

Instead of those data, that information, those lights adverted to by Napoleon, he merely received representations void of any useful hints respecting the general posture of his affairs. The dispatches of his plenipotentiary contained common-place observations on war, recommendations and demands, in which the rules of propriety were occasionally transgressed. The grand equerry proved himself as ill calculated to treat with his sovereign as with the allies: he did not enlighten his judgment: he only inflicted wounds. The Emperor always felt less disposed than ever to give way, after the receipt of any of his letters.

On the 2nd of March the Emperor had sent from La Ferte-sous-Jouarre the elements of a counter-project. On the 8th he addressed to the Duke of Vicenza a long letter, of which we republish the following extract:

"M. de Rumigny has just arrived . . . . The draught which

his Majesty has sent you with his letter of the 2nd, contains the materials of the counter-project which your Excellency is empowered to present . . . . His Majesty has left you every latitude in the revision of it . . . . It is necessary to make sacrifices for the attainment of peace . . . Those sacrifices bear upon certain portions of territory, Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine, the annexation of which, effected as it was *in a constitutional manner*, has been acknowledged by numerous treaties. The Emperor cannot, under these circumstances, propose the abandonment of any part of the territory. He may consent to certain concessions, if peace cannot be obtained by any other means; but this he can only do when such concessions shall be demanded of him in bulk, according to the project which the allies have handed in to you. That project, however, is their first demand, and their first demand cannot well be their *ultimatum*. You will reply to them by accepting the proposals made by them at Frankfort; and such reply, being also the first on your part, cannot be considered as your *ultimatum*. His Majesty is better acquainted than any one else with the state of his affairs: he is therefore more sensible than any one else of the necessity of obtaining peace: he is, however, unwilling to secure it upon conditions more severe than those which the allies might actually be disposed to admit."

The Emperor, therefore, would have consented to those conditions, if his plenipotentiary, who had been carrying on negotiations for upwards of a month, had been capable of understanding them, of appreciating their value, of being fully impressed with their importance, and had demonstrated to his sovereign that the allies would never depart from them. A man of determined character would have discovered in that letter abundant grounds to warrant his coming to a conclusion. The dispatches in question contained this farther passage: "You are in possession of his

Majesty's sentiments respecting the proposals which they might consent to accede to." (Those proposals are detailed at full length in that letter which distinctly names Dutch Brabant, Wesel, Cassel, Kehl, and Mentz if necessary.) "If the allies are satisfied with these, nothing stands in the way of our concluding a peace. If they require more, you will have to discuss each case, in order to procure a modification of them. *You will proceed, orally, to any lengths you think proper:* and when you shall have succeeded in obtaining a positive *ultimatum*, you will then have it in your power to refer the question to your government for its final instructions."

If this letter exhibits a state of embarrassment and hesitation on the part of Napoleon, and a certain degree of displeasure at a plenipotentiary who gave him advice without affording him any effectual assistance, it also indicates that *he desires to have peace*, acknowledges its necessity, and by being only withheld through an apprehension of yielding to conditions which the enemies might otherwise abstain from insisting upon. "You will proceed, orally, to any lengths you think proper." This was another carte-blanche, subject to a subsequent sanction of the proceedings. But if the plenipotentiary, after having availed himself of it, and succeeded in obtaining a positive *ultimatum, should not have it in his power to refer the question*, in consequence of the formal declaration, that if he does not accept the conditions within twenty-four hours, the negotiation would be immediately broken off, he is then to give way, and to subscribe to the conditions, unless the phantom of his personal responsibility should arrest him. *

* "Will not such a peace, or rather such sacrifices, be a constant ground of complaint on the part of your Majesty against your plenipotentiary? Will not many persons in France, who now feel the necessity of those sacrifices, make them a matter of reproach to me six months after the downfall of the throne shall have been averted?"—(Dispatch of the 5th of March.)

The Emperor's intentions were not better fulfilled on this occasion than they had been on a former one. The two declarations which the Duke of Vicenza caused to be inserted in the protocol of the conference of the 10th were not, as required by the allies, a counter-project framed on the draught sent to him by the Emperor on the 2nd, but mere observations, which rather magnified than softened down the pretensions he was urging.

This was not overlooked by the Emperor, who instantly sought to apply a remedy. He wrote from Rheims, where the Duke of Vicenza's dispatches had overtaken him, a letter containing important concessions, complicated by certain conditional expressions, which would have had the effect of replunging his plenipotentiary into those perplexing predicaments which had grown habitual to him.

It was difficult to manage that minister. He felt an unwillingness to penetrate the meaning of any observation; would take nothing upon himself, and required the most precise orders. But when those orders enjoined him to make peace on any terms, he took alarm at their very precision. This is what occurred at the beginning of February. But after six weeks of protracted negotiations, he should have seen his way clearer before him, and might have been expected to lay aside some of his timidity. He should have been sensible that a long polemical discussion was no longer seasonable, when events were progressing with rapid strides, and when his couriers took four days to reach the imperial head-quarters.

At this critical juncture, the transmission of unlimited powers was the only means of attaining the object in view, if still within reach. The Duke of Bassano was authorised to issue them: but in order to produce a more striking impression on the plenipotentiary's mind, he persuaded Napoleon to address him direct. Those letters, dated from Rheims, the 17th of March, contain the following passages:—

"His Majesty having taken into consideration the contents of two letters, dated the 13th, the duplicates of which reached him last night, and the originals this morning, allows you all necessary latitude, not only as to the mode of proceeding you may deem it proper to adopt, but also for the purpose of making, in a counter-project, such concessions as you may conceive to be indispensable towards preventing a rupture of the negotiations . . . . .

"M. le Duc de Vicence, I give you full authority to make all the concessions that are indispensable for the purpose of keeping up the negotiations, and of *eventually obtaining a knowledge of the ultimatum of the allies*, it being understood that the concessions to be made by the treaty shall have the effect of procuring the evacuation of our territory, and the mutual restoration of all prisoners of war, &c. &c.

(Signed) "NAPOLEON."

Another letter from the Duke of Bassano, dated the 19th, contained a renewal of this authority, with an explanation that Napoleon placed no limits to its exercise. "*It* is high time," the letter went on to say, "*that we should at* last acquire a knowledge of the specific sacrifices which *France is* required to make as the price of obtaining peace." At the very moment when Napoleon was dictating these words, and still pressing for information on a point which his negotiator ought long ago to have cleared up to him, the allied plenipotentiaries declared at Châtillon that the negotiations were at an end. Let us again turn to their proceedings.

They had replied on the 13th to the verbal declarations made by the Duke of Vicenza on the 11th, by circumscribing the duration of their proceedings to a term of twenty-four hours. This plenipotentiary, therefore, could no longer entertain a doubt that the plan of a treaty which they handed in must have been their *ultimatum*, barring a few modifica-

tions. He demanded a fresh delay; it was granted, and he presented at last a counter-project on the 15th.

He therein made no allusion to Dutch Brabant, to Wesel, Cassel, Mentz, or Kehl; all which he was authorised to relinquish. His declarations of the 10th neither modified nor softened down any point; no interest was overlooked in them. Neither the Princess Eliza, the Grand-duke of Berg, the Prince of Neufchatel, nor the principality of Benevento. The most petty German prince was taken under the protection of the French plenipotentiary, who demanded by the 16th Article, *that the arrangements to be made* respecting ceded territories, and the indemnities to be granted to dispossessed princes, should be regulated in a special congress, in which France was to take part;—a protection the more praiseworthy on his part, as he acted in direct opposition to the intentions of Napoleon, unequivocally expressed in the letter of the 8th, of which M. de Rumigny was the bearer: "The Emperor will throw no difficulty in the way in regard to the state of possession in Germany. He attaches no importance to interfering in it, and will allow the allies full liberty to act on that subject in any manner they think proper."

Astonished at this circumstance, the allies sarcastically reminded the French plenipotentiary, that he had offered six weeks before as the terms of an armistice what he now refused as the conditions of a peace. The negotiations were accordingly broken off. Who are we to blame in this case? Who is answerable for the consequences of the rupture? Surely not the Emperor.

CHAPTER XIII.

Arrival of the Count d'Artois in Paris—There is only one more Frenchman—Arrival of the Emperor of Austria—Religious ceremony—Servile conduct of some of the marshals—The Emperor is urged to depart—He penetrates the motive of those entreaties—Measures which he adopts—The author is unable to take leave of him—Augereau—The proclamation was not issued by him.

THE Count d'Artois, who, it will be recollected, was still at Vesoul, left that town as soon as he received the courier who brought him intelligence of the events which had taken place. He reached Paris on the 12th of April. A crowd, impelled by motives of curiosity, had collected on his way. He made his entry into Paris with a kind of triumphal pomp, and was harangued by M. de Talleyrand, who was in attendance at the gate of Bondy, with the members of the provisional government. He answered this address, and uttered the words so often repeated since: "Nothing will be altered; there is only one more Frenchman amongst you."

Great publicity was given to this reply, as it is customary to do with respect to every word issuing from a prince. In this case, a particular object was aimed at, that of calming the fears of those who dreaded a return to the sway of emigrants.

The Count d'Artois mounted a horse at the gate of Saint Martin, proceeded along the suburbs, down the Boulevards, the Rue Napoleon, the Rue de Rivoli, and alighted at the Tuileries. In Paris, the slightest occurrence attracts a crowd of spectators; and one of this description was so little expected a month before, that the feeling of curiosity was in proportion to the surprise generally felt.

The entry of the Emperor of Austria took place a few days after the arrival of the Count d'Artois. That prince came

by the road leading from Burgundy. All the allied troops were placed under arms, and proceeded to meet him as far as the gate of Saint-Antoine, with the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia at their head. The three sovereigns returned together on horseback, followed by the same troops, which proceeded along the Boulevards from the Bastille to the Place de la Révolution, where they filed off. It is very difficult to credit the assertion that the Emperor of Austria should have consented to the project of dethroning his daughter; and yet no reasonable motive can be discovered for his absence from the allied army. The least unfavourable opinion that can be formed of his conduct is, that in order not to appear to participate in the act, or from an apprehension of being involved in scenes of parental tenderness, he had prolonged his absence, and left to his allies the care of sacrificing his daughter. It must be acknowledged that they have amply performed the task allotted to them, and that the Empress was justified in complaining that she was deserted, and could place no reliance on a father who tolerated the insults to which she was subjected.

Every species of degradation was heaped upon us. It was a struggle who should most debase himself; and our posterity will refuse to credit what I am about to relate.

A few days after the entrance of the allied army into Paris, the Emperor of Russia ordered divine service to be celebrated according to the Greek rite, and a *Te Deum* to be sung in thanksgiving for the capture of Paris. With a view to increase the pomp of this ceremony, he directed that an extensive scaffolding should be raised on the Place de la Révolution, upon which an altar was erected. As this altar happened to be placed over the very spot where Louis XVI. had been sacrificed, and nothing had been published on the subject of the religious ceremony of the Russians, it was generally believed that all these preparations were intended for the purpose of celebrating some expiatory service;

but the truth soon became known. The whole allied army was ranged round the altar, near which were placed the Greek clergy, who were in attendance at the Emperor Alexander's head-quarters. This prince soon made his appearance, accompanied by the King of Prussia, and all the princes and generals belonging to the allied army. It will scarcely be believed, however, that in the midst of this assemblage who came forward to thank the Almighty for our destruction, and to raise their voices in chorus over the lifeless remains of our unfortunate soldiers, some marshals of France were to be seen in full uniform; it was a contest between them and the cossacks who surrounded the Emperor Alexander, who should be nearest to the autocrat. Bereft of all further authority, these men had quitted their troops for the purpose of assisting at a ceremony which covered them with shame, and they did so in the very heart of a capital already indignant at the degradation it was compelled to submit to. It was reserved for unhappy France, whose glory had been raised to so high a pitch, to fall on a sudden to the most abject condition, and to be compelled to record by the side of the grandest achievements those disgraceful and unbecoming acts which tarnished their brilliancy.

From the time of the battle of Fleurus, in 1794, to the battle of Wagram, the Austrian armies had constantly waged against us an unsuccessful war. We twice obtained possession of their capital; and yet, though deserted by fortune, not one of their officers was ever false to his standard, not one of their generals ever disgraced the national uniform.

The Emperor was still at Fontainebleau, where he was making preparations for his departure for the island of Elba. He first set in motion the twelve hundred men of his body-guard, who had determined to share his fate, together with a hundred Polish soldiers, who preferred to follow him rather than place themselves under the standards they had so

long opposed; for the Emperor Alexander had already united in Paris those troops to his own army.

The Emperor was urged to quit Fontainebleau. It was represented to him that the King was to reach Paris on the 21st of April, and that he ought not to be within so short a distance as to hear the firing of the cannon, which would be the signal of his public entry. The Emperor readily penetrated the motives which influenced those who urged him to depart; but he paid no attention to them. He was aware that his life was aimed at, and he deemed it more prudent not to commence his march until the handful of men who were to watch over his safety should have it in their power to protect him from the snare which might be thrown in his way. He wished to have it in his power, in case of need, to throw himself into the midst of those gallant men, and travel in their company to the sea-side, if that precaution were found to be necessary: he was, therefore, indifferent to whatever was said to him with the view of accelerating his departure. He was still beset by importunities. He took leave of every one, and thereby restored freedom of action to those men who anxiously looked forward to the moment when they might quit him without dishonour. He was, in fact, almost wholly isolated on the last days of his residing at Fontainebleau. He owed it to the Prince of Neufchatel to express the wish of retaining him in his company: he had sufficiently loaded him with favours and wealth to justify his supposing that Berthier would not desert him in his adversity: he accordingly proposed that he should accompany him; and he felt the more confidence in doing so, as he was ignorant of the meeting that had taken place at that prince's residence, where the resolution was adopted of proceeding to the most painful extremes, unless he abdicated the throne.

Being obliged to reply to the Emperor's overture, Berthier protested his fidelity, and promised not to desert him;

but he asked leave to repair to Paris for a few days, in order to settle his affairs, and destroy a few papers which had been left in his closet. The pretext was sufficiently plausible not to give rise to any suspicion. The Emperor, however, who was gifted with great penetration, was not at a loss to guess his real meaning. "Berthier," he said to him, "you do not speak your mind; this is quite wrong on your part. If you desire to quit me, why not candidly say so?"

Berthier renewed his protestations, and pretended to be hurt at the bare suspicion. Nevertheless, he failed to convince the Emperor, who drily replied to him: "Go, Berthier; go to Paris: you have also other business there; but I predict that we shall never meet again; and whatever assurance you may give me of your return, I place no dependence upon it." Berthier proceeded to Paris, and never more appeared.

The Emperor was buried in reflections upon all the circumstances which he fancied must have preceded the recall of the house of Bourbon; and it could not be otherwise. I know that he did me such little justice at first as to believe that I had taken part in that event, when in writing from Fontainebleau to his brother Prince Joseph at Blois, he made the following observation: "You tell me nothing of the minister of police." Prince Joseph, in his reply, did me the justice I was entitled to. I was not hurt at the Emperor's question. It was a natural consequence of the events which took place within his view, and which were calculated to make him suspect every one. There were besides many officious beings about his person, who were glad to feed his suspicions. Nevertheless, I experienced the most bitter regret at being unable to take leave of him; this was wholly out of my power: otherwise, I should have felt the utmost indifference at the hints thrown out against me, having always

entertained the utmost reliance on the sentiments emanating from the Emperor's mature reflection, and paid very little attention to the opinions of those who were about him; but, I repeat it, my attendance was utterly impossible.

Caulaincourt alone was allowed to go and come without molestation, because he had the charge of regulating whatever concerned the Emperor's interests. It was not until the 23rd of April that this prince felt himself enabled to take his departure.

During the interval of nearly a fortnight, which he passed in this manner at Fontainebleau, the particulars of the events which had altered the aspect of France had been communicated from one extremity to the other of that extensive country. The vilest publications emanated from the press, and excited to the work of re-action. All those virulent attacks had preceded the Emperor on the road he was to take, and kindled the popular rage. It was fortunate for him that the precaution was taken of having him accompanied by commissioners from England, Austria, and Russia. The very monarch who had been the exclusive object of the attachment of the French was compelled to seek the attendance of his enemies about his person, in order to escape the revengeful feelings of Frenchmen. This painful extreme is a fact too well established to escape being recorded in history.

The commissioners repaired to Fontainebleau, and were presented to the Emperor as safeguards for the protection of his person; but it was to the full as much with the view of being prepared against the projects he was supposed to entertain, as out of interest for his person, that they were sent to him. Nevertheless, they proved of essential service on the way through Provence. Those three individuals were men of honour, who did not quit Napoleon a single moment, and who discharged their duty with honourable punctuality.

On the day of departure the troops took up arms, and

ranged themselves in the court-yard of the palace of Fontainebleau. The horses were already put to the Emperor's carriages, which were in waiting at the foot of the great staircase, according to custom. Previously to entering it, he felt desirous of taking leave of his troops, and coming up to the guard, he addressed them with great animation in the following words :—

"Soldiers of my old guard, I bid you farewell. For the last twenty years I have ever found you treading on the road to honour and glory. In these later times, no less than in the days of our prosperity, you have ever shown yourselves true patterns of courage and fidelity. With such men as you are, our cause could never have been lost; but the war would have become interminable: it must have been a civil war; and the wretchedness of France would have been the more complete. I have sacrificed all my private interests to those of my country: I am about to take my departure. As for you, my friends, continue to serve France. Her happiness was my only thought: it must ever be the object of my wishes. Pity not my fate. If I have consented to outlive my political existence, it is that I might still be instrumental in promoting your glory. I will write the noble deeds we have achieved together. Farewell, my children; would that I could press you all to my heart!"

He desired the eagles to be brought to him, grasped them in his embrace, and resumed: "I cannot embrace you all; but I do so in the person of your general. Farewell, my soldiers; prove yourselves at all times worthy and gallant men." This scene had drawn tears from their eyes. "Great is our loss when we lose such a man!" said they to each other. The allies are well aware of what they are doing, when they tear him away from France."

The Emperor was nearly stifled with emotion; he was compelled to offer violence to his feelings in order to force himself away from the ranks of those gallant soldiers; he stepped into his carriage, and drove off. In this painful circumstance, I had the good fortune to render him a last mark of my devotedness to his service; the following was the occasion of it.

Immediately after the occurrence of the events at Bordeaux, I had sent some agents to that city for the purpose of ascertaining what might be done. They had found the public mind disposed to join in any attempt, and came to inform me of the measures they had adopted to drive away the enemy. The news of the abdication reached them on the road; they stopped at Orleans and fell in with other agents recently arrived in that town, but with views of an opposite nature. They entered into conversation, and ascertained the motive of the excursion of their comrades, who even proposed that they should join their party. My agents refused, reached Paris in all haste, and quickly apprised me of their having met a gang acting under the orders of a former equerry of the Queen of Westphalia, who were watching a favourable opportunity of rushing upon the Emperor and putting him to death. I lost no time in dispatching a courier to Fontainebleau, who, as good fortune would have it, arrived in proper time. The necessary precautions were adopted; the assassins dared not venture to attack some forty lancers who composed the escort, and they fell upon the equipages of the Queen of Westphalia, which they plundered.

It has since been pretended that Maubreuil had no other mission than to obtain possession of the crown jewels, and to seize upon the treasures with which the Emperor might have raised a party in his favour. I know that this pretence has been made use of with the view to obtain from the chiefs of the enemy's armies the orders calculated to procure any as-

sistance that might be required by the party sent to follow the track of the Emperor:* but this was highly ridiculous; for it was impossible to send on the 17th after property which was already in hands ever since the 9th. It has further been alleged, that the provisional government no longer existed at the time of Maubreuil's mission; but this assertion is incorrect; since the orders which were intended to secure the execution of the plot, bear the signature of Bourienne,† of

* "General de Maubreuil being entrusted with a mission of the highest importance, for which he is authorised to require the assistance of the Emperor of Russia's troops, the general-in-chief, Baron Saken, directs the commanders of troops to place them at his disposal whenever he shall apply for them, so as to enable him to effect the object of his mission.

L. S. "The General-in-chief of the Russian infantry,
"Governor of Paris,
(Signed) "Baron Saken.
"Paris, 17th April, 1814."

"General de Maubreuil being authorised to travel through France in respect of matters of the highest importance, and in the execution of very distinguished missions, and it being possible that he may have occasion to call upon the troops of the high allied powers, it is accordingly directed, in attention to the orders of Baron Saken, the General of the Russian infantry, that the commanders of the allied troops will supply him with men on his requisition, for the execution of his important missions.

"The General of the Staff,
L. S. (Signed) "Baron de Brokenhausen.
"Paris, 17th April, 1814."

† "General Administration of the Posts, and of the Relays of Horses.

"The Director-general of the post-office orders the post-masters instantly to furnish to M. de Maubreuil, in charge of an important mission, the number of horses he may require, and to see that he experiences no delay in the execution of the orders intrusted to him.

"The Director-general of the Posts,
(Signed) "Bourienne.
"Hotel of the post-office, and of the relays of horses,
"Paris, 17th April, 1814."

Dupont (of Baylen notoriety), * of Angles; † all ministers of the commission over which M. de Talleyrand presided.

The following details, however, will establish the opinion which ought to be entertained of the object contemplated by Maubreuil and his employers. I extract them from a judicial investigation, the accuracy of which has never been contested. ‡

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"The mission of Maubreuil and of his accomplices had two objects in view—an attempt upon the Emperor's life, and the carrying away of the property belonging to His Majesty and to all the members of his family.

* * * * * * *

"Maubreuil was long acquainted with Roux-Laborie, an intriguer, who availed himself of the catastrophe of the

* "Ministry of War.

"All military authorities are directed to obey the orders that may be given to them by M. de Maubreuil, who is authorised to call upon and make use of them as he may deem it necessary, he being charged with a secret mission. The commanders will see that the troops are immediately placed at his disposal, and that he experiences no delay in the execution of the orders confided to him for the service of His Majesty Louis XVIII.

L. S. "The Minister of War,
(Signed) "General Count Dupont.

"Paris, 16th April, 1814."

† "Ministry of General Police.

"All public authorities entrusted with the police of France, all commissaries general, commissaries of districts and others, are required *to obey the orders that may be given to them by M. de Maubreuil*, and to cause the immediate execution of whatever he may prescribe, he being charged with a secret mission of the highest importance.

"The Provincial Commissary in the department of General Police,
L. S. (Signed) "Angles.

"Paris, 16th April, 1814."

‡ Report of MM. Thouret and Brière de Valigny, acting imperial Solicitors.

31st of March, and of the favour of the Prince of Benevento, to obtain his nomination as secretary-general, attached to the provisional government.

" Roux-Laborie was the person to whom Maubreuil directly addressed his entreaties, after meeting with a refusal from M. de Sémallé.

" It is certain that for the last three months he had been every day to visit him, as much for commercial operations, which they contemplated carrying on conjointly, as in respect of political affairs, with which Roux-Laborie was thoroughly acquainted; and Maubreuil ardently desired to be concerned, by distributing proclamations *and good words*. He returned home at seven o'clock at night, and found five or six notes from Roux-Laborie, written in nearly the following terms; *'Make haste, then. Why do you not come? How can you keep one waiting so long? You really drive me to despair. I am in hourly expectation of seeing you at the prince's residence.'*

" Maubreuil stepped into a carriage, and proceeded in all haste to the prince's hotel, where Laborie introduced him into M. de Talleyrand's closet, and asked, ' Have you eaten any thing?'—' No,' replied Maubreuil; ' I have not, since morning. I have been running about town the whole day.' —' Well, then, go and take some soup. I have pledged my word of honour not to tell you a word of the business.'— ' Never mind the soup, and say what you want.'—' No, my word is pledged; go take your soup, and be back in an hour, an hour and five—an hour and ten minutes at latest. Remember that I expect a great act of self-devotedness from you. I have answered for this to the prince, and venture to trust I am not mistaken.'—' You know, my dear Laborie, that all my actions and sufferings aim at the object of recovering the rank I was destined to fill in the world before the revolution. Born an only son, with a large fortune, I feel the most poignant regret when I consider that my

name and my existence are as it were extinguished. Do whatever you please, so long as you put it in my power, even at the repeated peril of my life, to reach the goal which has always been the dearest object of my wishes.'

"'Very well; but be off immediately. Return in an hour, or at latest in an hour and ten minutes. I cannot listen to a single word more, and must leave you. Begone, begone.'

"Maubreuil went away in his carriage; stopped to take some soup at the house of Riche, the restaurateur on the Boulevard, and returned at eight o'clock to the prince's residence.

"Laborie was in attendance at the council. Being informed of Maubreuil's return by the first messenger of the council-chamber, he went to him, took him by the hand, led him to the same closet as before, made him sit down in the prince's arm-chair, and addressed him in these words:

"'You are a man of tried courage and firmness of character. You have an unbounded ambition: it shall be gratified beyond your most sanguine expectations, if you succeed in the matter to be entrusted to you. A profusion of wealth and honours are in store for you. You will receive two hundred thousand francs a-year; be raised to a dukedom; and made a lieutenant-general, and a governor of a province. But be prepared to run great risks. Can you, between this and five o'clock to-morrow evening, make sure of a hundred men of resolute character? This is what you are to do:—You will proceed to the head-quarters of Prince Schwartzenberg. You will receive money, horses, and whatever you may demand.'—'Well, what do you expect of me?'—'Why, it is our wish, my friend, that you should rid us of the Emperor. The Emperor dead, France, the army, everything gives way to us. Do you possess sufficient courage and resolution?—come, speak out.'

"'If an act of assassination is what you require,' replied

Maubreuil, 'I cannot answer your purpose. This surely cannot be the subject you have to propose to me.'

"'All that concerns yourself,' sharply interruped Laborie. 'Do as you please.—Manage to rid us of him; but lose no time. Proceed to-morrow to head-quarters. A great battle must be fought: whether you succeed before or after, is of little consequence: what we want is to get rid of him.'

"'A hundred men are too many: I only require a dozen, on whom I may rely. You must give me power to promote two or three degrees above their ranks those who may do faithful service: they must also be allowed pecuniary rewards in a like proportion.'

"'You shall have all you desire,' said Laborie: 'do as you list. What matters it to us, after all, whether we have ten or twelve colonels, and other officers, more or less? Will you wait the prince's return?—he is at the senate. He will repeat all I have said to you. Do you wish to see him?—It would be of no use.'

"'It is really quite useless,' replied Maubreuil: 'do as you please. I trust wholly to your word. My night will be engaged in going about to collect a dozen such individuals as I want.'

"Thus ended the conversation: we give it in Maubreuil's own words. But it is quite clear that Laborie explained himself in much more positive language on the extent and multifarious objects of the mission.

* * * * * * *

"True to his agreement with Laborie, Maubreuil repaired to his house at five o'clock in the morning of the 3rd of April: at the hour of nine he had not yet returned. Maubreuil went to the second appointment, at the residence of the Prince of Benevento. Laborie spoke only these few words to him: 'You have yet the whole day to prepare yourself. At the hour of five, my friend'—'At five I shall be with you,' said Mau-

breuil: 'I am quite glad of the delay; for as every thing is in utter confusion in Paris, I was unable to make my preparations during the night.'

"At five in the evening Maubreuil returned to Laborie, who spoke to him as follows: 'At nine o'clock, my good friend, at nine; we have great news; the best possible news; but keep yourself in readiness, and return at the hour of nine.'

* * * * * * *

"Maubreuil returned to the prince's residence at the appointed hour, and Laborie began the conversation. 'My friend, we have excellent news: Marmont has been prevailed upon to come over to us with his army; it appears that the other corps are on the point of doing the same. Several proposals have already been made to the marshals; we expect every success.'

"Maubreuil asked if this news interfered with his mission, and what he was to do. 'It certainly does not interfere with your mission,' replied Laborie; 'be still in readiness, but let us wait till to-morrow.' He then had a long conversation with Maubreuil, who has transmitted to us some fragments of it . . . .

"'Are you aware,' said Maubreuil 'that Royalists, Bonapartists, Constitutionalists, all are clamorous against the Prince? It is asked what he intends to do; and I also must ask you, for my own government, whether he is working for the Bourbons.'

"'But it is always so with Paris,' said Laborie. 'Scarcely two days have elapsed since their deliverance from the yoke, and they already complain. How unjust people are! Believe me, my friend, when I assure you that this very day, and in the very place where you now are, I stood trembling for the Bourbons from the hour of noon until four o'clock. It is painful to acknowledge that the house of Bourbon has been trifled with in a most cruel manner. M. de Caulaincourt thought on three occasions that he would gain the ascendancy

over the Emperor Alexander. What efforts has it not cost us to succeed! Add to our difficulties the subject of the regency. Austria, on the other hand, besides the Emperor of Russia so wavering and so exhausted, that he consigned, as it were, to M. de Nesselrode the task of giving the casting vote on that important question.

" 'You may now form an estimate of the obligations which the house of Bourbon are under to M. de Talleyrand. For my part, I may also add that I am quite exhausted. I never saw any thing to be compared to the labours of this day. To what means were we not compelled to resort for the purpose of wresting the declaration from the Emperor Alexander! You can form no idea of it: at last, however, we have succeeded. The decree of forfeiture will be pronounced to-night; and to-morrow the Bourbons will be recalled by the senate.'

" *The result of this conference was to postpone, but by no means to abandon, the execution of the plan;* and Laborie assured Maubreuil that if eventually the enterprise should not be carried into execution, the Prince would be equally beholden to him, and procure him a reward for his good intentions.

" On the following morning, 4th of April, Dasies called upon Deventeaux in order to ascertain the day of departure.

" Maubreuil came in at the time, and said to him, 'Our departure is only delayed for a few days.'

" From the 4th to the 18th, Maubreuil repaired four times a day to the provisional government. He sent by Prosper Barbier, his servant, a great number of notes to Laborie; but he furnishes us with no details of a correspondence of so active a nature, nor of proceedings so often repeated. He merely states that he presented several persons to Laborie, and amongst the rest Dasies, Montbadon, and General Montélégier. The latter was witness to the very earnest manner in which Laborie told Maubreuil to attend immediately to the drawing up of his commission of Maréchal de Camp by

General Dupont, the minister of war. Dasies acknowledged that he often accompanied Maubreuil; but insisted that he always remained in the ante-chamber.

"During this interval, from the 4th to the 18th of April, Maubreuil and Dasies adopted many steps which it is of importance to relate, as they are connected with one of the objects of their mission.

* * * * * * *

"The news of the Emperor's abdication arrived on the 12th of April. It created no change in the arrangements of the Prince of Benevento, who aimed at the absolute overthrow of the imperial family; and it is affirmed by Maubreuil in the most positive terms, that he can have no doubt on the subject, after all that has been said to him in the interval between the abdication and the receipt of his own instructions.

"By abdicating the crown, the Emperor had laid down his arms. Accordingly, the mission confided to Maubreuil could no longer from that moment be considered in any other light than as a project of assassination; he acknowledges it himself, and alleges frivolous and contradictory excuses, which only tend to prove his excessive embarrassment, and the impossibility under which he finds himself of justifying his conduct.

"He says that he was obliged to retain the mission confided to him, because it was *a state secret;* and that by refusing to accomplish it, he would have met the most unbounded confidence by the most consummate treachery, and drawn down upon himself the resentment of M. de Talleyrand and of the Count d'Artois, whom he considered, from the several reports made to him, to be fully acquainted with the premeditated plot.

"On the 16th of April, before the hour of noon, Maubreuil, with Dasies in his company, paid a fresh visit to Laborie, who handed him several letters for the minister of war, the minister of police, and the director-general of the posts, and said

on leaving him: 'My dear friend, do what you please, and as you please with the effects of all the Bonapartes: you have a *carte-blanche* in every thing, over every thing, and for every thing. The prince places so much confidence in you, that he is persuaded no one but yourself could properly answer the object he has in view.'

"With regard to the expression used by Laborie, *do what you please with the effects of the Bonapartes*, Maubreuil observes, that the cloak under which they had agreed to conceal the real object of the mission, was a pretended search for jewels and other property belonging to the crown.

"He replied to Laborie in these words; '*I give you my word* that I will do the best in my power; and I hope to succeed in so effectual a manner that every one will be satisfied.' * * * * * * * * * * * At six o'clock in the morning of the 23rd of April, Maubreuil called upon Roux-Laborie, and related to him the particulars of his journey.

"He pretends that he enjoined, or rather advised him to give up all idea of compassing the Emperor's death; adding, that for his part he could undertake no more than to carry him off, and convey him to Spain, or any other country which the Prince of Benevento might point out to him. Laborie on hearing this was unable to conceal his agitated feelings, which betrayed themselves on his countenance by a convulsive movement. He replied in the following words: 'My dear friend, what can be the meaning of this? can it be possible? I am really at a loss to understand you. At any rate that matter concerns you: for my part I will have nothing to do with it; it was your business to act; so much the worse for you if you fail. I give you my word that I would not answer for the consequences of the mischief you are about to occasion.' He uttered a few more broken and incoherent words, which divulged the extent of his embarrassment. Maubreuil spoke to him of the chests of the Queen of West-

phalia; all that must fall upon you; and if the Emperor of Russia should grow angry, the prince will have nothing to do with the matter."

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[The criminal proceedings were followed up; and the imperial solicitor near the tribunal of first instance, for the department of the Seine, came on the 16th of June to the following conclusions:]

"*Considering* that it appears from Maubreuil's admissions that M. Roux-Laborie, in his capacity of secretary-general attached to the provisional government, gave him, in several conferences held from the 2nd to the 18th of April, either at the Prince of Talleyrand's residence or at the Tuileries where that government held its sittings, the mission of assassinating the Emperor, as well as the Princes Joseph and Jerome, and to carry off the King of Rome: that, previously to the Emperor's abdication, Maubreuil had accepted the mission: that he certainly alleges in his defence his having no other intention than to act the part of a gallant soldier, at the head of a troop of resolute men, during the battle which was expected to take place: which excuse is doubly frivolous, 1st, because he acknowledges that this troop was to be clothed in the uniform of the imperial guard, the clearest indication which could be afforded of his intention to glide through the ranks under cover of a disguise, and to kill the Emperor in a treacherous manner; 2dly, because the Princes Jerome and Joseph were not with the army:

"That, after the abdication, the object of the plot underwent no alteration; and Maubreuil persisted in the determination to carry it into effect, fearing, as he himself admits, lest he might be visited with the resentment of the Prince of Benevento and of the Count d'Artois:

"That if the ostensible motive, the pretext of the expedition, was the recovery of the jewels of the crown, or of funds alleged to have been carried away by the imperial

family from Paris, and from several public departmental chests; a convincing proof that the mission had a much more important object in view which it was feared openly to acknowledge, is to be found in the very text and nature of the orders and powers given to Maubreuil on the 16th and 17th of April, by the ministers of the provisional government. Accordingly, a decree of that government, bearing date the 9th of April, and inserted in the *bulletin des loix*, enjoined all civil and military authorities to stop the passage of those funds, and to deposit them in a public chest without the smallest delay. Now, if the mission had had for its object the search after, or seizure either of those funds, or of the crown jewels, the powers conferred upon Maubreuil were, in this hypothesis, nothing more than a consequence of the decree, a means of securing the due execution of it; no mystery would have attached to them, and the mission conferred by those powers would not be announced as a *secret* one in the order issued by the commissary of the department of general police:

"That Maubreuil, on his journey to Fossard, sent Colleville to Fontainebleau for the purpose of watching the moment of the Emperor's departure, and the movements of the Princes Joseph and Jerome, who were then in the direction of Blois:

"That on leaving Fossard after the robbery of the money and jewels of the Queen of Westphalia, being fully aware that the Emperor travelled as far as Lyons under an escort of fifteen hundred men of the guard, Maubreuil adopted the determination of proceeding to overtake him beyond that city; a circumstance necessarily leading to the inference that he intended to assassinate the Emperor, and not to fight him in battle:

"That if he preferred returning to Paris, this was done not only with the view of accompanying the articles stolen from the Queen of Westphalia, but also to connect himself with three

or four persons on whom he might depend for the purpose of placing himself at the head of a detachment of cavalry wholly devoted to him, and with a certainty of being in time to overtake the Emperor, who only travelled by easy journeys:

"That on arriving at Chailly, on the road from Fossard to Paris, he ordered Lieutenant George, who escorted him with a few chasseurs of the guard, to proceed beyond Lyons, there to wait for the Emperor:

"That when he reached Paris, he wrote to the ministers of war and of the police that he had not yet fulfilled the *main object* of his mission, and had merely secured the chests of the Queen of Westphalia, which would no doubt be found to contain the crown jewels still missing:

"That he often saw Roux-Laborie, who broke out into the strongest expressions of displeasure and of reproach against him: that on the 25th of April, after a long resistance on the part of Roux-Laborie, it was agreed between them that the Emperor's life should be spared; but he was to be carried off and conveyed to Spain; from which circumstance it evidently results that up to the 25th of April, Roux-Laborie had ordered, and Maubreuil had taken upon himself to effect the assassination of his Majesty:

"That Maubreuil, in short, according to his own acknowledgment, has persevered until the time of his arrest, in the intention of executing that part of the plan, at least, which related to carrying off the Emperor; and was again preparing to depart with the view of accomplishing the object of this second mission.

"Considering, in respect to Dasies, that he repeatedly called upon Roux-Laborie in the company of Maubreuil; that he received from the ministers of the provisional government orders of a nature precisely similar to those given to Maubreuil; that he accompanied the latter on his journey, and did not quit him for a single moment; that he was ever

since the 3rd of April in the secret of the conspiracy preparing against the Emperor's life:

"That he admits his having encouraged Maubreuil to return from Fossard to Paris, in order to associate some other persons with the undertaking, and to take along with him a more numerous detachment of cavalry, pointing out at the same time to his notice the moment at which he ought to overtake the Emperor beyond Lyons:

* * * * * * *

"That upon its being observed by M. de Vitrolles that two chests were missing, one of which contained money, M. Deventeaux had it intimated to Maubreuil by Prosper Barbier, his servant, that he would be shot unless he immediately restored them:

"That Prosper brought in the evening to M. Deventeaux the dressing-case of Prince Jerome, the planks of the chest originally containing the eighty-four thousand francs in gold, which chest had given way, and four bags, apparently full of money, which M. Deventeaux neglected to count: that on the same evening, or during the night, M. Deventeaux, accompanied by Maubreuil, Dasies, and Prosper, deposited into M. de Vitrolles' hands, at the secretary of state's office, the dressing-case, the remains of the chest, and the four bags, the contents of which were not ascertained.

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"Considering that from the facts above related, it results, first, that the Prince of Talleyrand appears to have entertained or listened to the idea of procuring the assassination of the Emperor, of his two brothers, the Princes Joseph and Jerome, and the abduction of the King of Rome, in the month of April, 1814: that he also appears to have availed himself of Laborie, for the purpose of committing to Maubreuil and Dasies the execution of the plot; but considering, on the other hand, that he has not made any direct proposal

to them, and has not personally taken part in any interview or negotiation with them; that there only exists against him the declaration of Maubreuil, and the presumption that Roux-Laborie would not have ventured to procure for Maubreuil and Dasies the orders intrusted to them, without obtaining the prince's sanction:

"Considering the probability that the three agents who signed the said powers, under date of the 16th and 17th of April, 1814, must have known the object of the mission, for the accomplishment of which those orders were issued: that one of them, a commissary in the department of general police, gave to that expedition the epithet of a *secret* one, no doubt with the view of concealing the criminal object of the mission, which he was afraid of avowing; but considering also that the court of justice derives no positive information on the subject from any of the declarations; and that, in short, those agents may possibly have received the plain and simple order to issue such powers, without being previously initiated into the secret of the conspiracy formed against the lives of the Emperor and of his family:

"Considering that from the facts above related, it results:—

"1st—That Roux-Laborie is arraigned with having in the month of April, 1814, proposed to Maubreuil a mission, the object of which was to assassinate the Emperor, the Princes Joseph and Jerome, and to carry off the King of Rome:

"2ndly—That Maubreuil and Dasies are arraigned with having accepted the mission offered to them by Roux-Laborie;

* * * * * * *

"We demand, &c."

Maubreuil's attempt was the only one made against the Emperor in the first days of his journey. At no place from Fontainebleau to Avignon was any want of respect shown to

him. On passing through Lyons, which was occupied by Austrian troops, he left his valet behind to wait the arrival of the post from Paris, and to bring him the newspapers with all the works circulated over France, and growing out of the existing circumstances. He continued his journey, and shortly fell in with Marshal Augereau. The latter embraced the Emperor, expressed his deep regret at his misfortunes, and spoke to him with the same respect as heretofore. They had scarcely parted, when the Emperor was overtaken by his valet.

Amongst the public papers which the latter brought with him was the *Moniteur*, containing the proclamation issued by the same Marshal Augereau to his army, on announcing to it the return of the house of Bourbon. It was replete with invectives against the Emperor, whom he dared to accuse of cowardice. Nevertheless, he had come to embrace him. This may be easily explained; for all those who have known the marshal are aware of his being incapable of publishing such a document. I was informed by the person who drew up the proclamation addressed by Augereau to the troops under his command, on the occasion of the return from the island of Elba, that Fouché composed the first-named proclamation.

CHAPTER XIV.

Fresh attempts against the Emperor's life—This prince is on the point of being assassinated—Occurrences at Orgon—The work of seduction is unsparing of the very servants of his household—Talleyrand's object—Alexander approves of the plot—His visit to Rambouillet—The Empress obstinately refuses to receive him—She is at no loss to penetrate his intentions.

THE attempt confided to Maubreuil had failed of success. Another was organised at Avignon. Emissaries had been scattered about the town, and had found no difficulty in exciting the passions of the mob. It welcomed the Emperor with cries which indicated a thirst for his blood; and it was already showing a disposition to attack his carriage, when M. de Saint-Paulen, the commandant of the national guard, and afterwards chief of a squadron in the corps of gendarmerie in the King's service, hastened with a piquet to the spot, and arrested the progress of those wretches, some of whom had already laid hands upon the carriage-door. He kept the remainder in check, and the Emperor drove off without any other accident. It happened otherwise, however, at Orgon, a small town of Provence. An officer, who rode at full speed before the carriages in order to get the horses in readiness, had so far got the start of them as to be able to discover the criminal intentions entertained by the people of that district. He saw that a crowd had collected, and that there were agitators amongst them. He retraced his steps until he came up with the Emperor, to whom he reported what was going forward. The danger was most imminent; it was not quite clear that the foreign commissioners would succeed in enforcing respect for their character. A deliberation was held; and it was agreed that the Emperor should instantly put on one of their dresses, and that they should all

ride through the town at full speed, until they had escaped all farther danger. It was of such a nature, that having entered an inn for the purpose of drinking a glass of water, the hostess, who fancied she was speaking to strangers, said to them, "We are in waiting for him; we shall see whether he will succeed in passing through without being killed." This frightful wretch was confiding her guilty hopes to the Emperor himself! He retained his disguise until he reached the residence of his sister, Princess Pauline, who lived in the vicinity of Nice, and waited there for Generals Bertrand and Drouot, who were coming on with his carriages, and had narrowly escaped being torn to pieces. These occurrences were not of a cheering character. The Emperor, therefore, refused to repair on board the vessel which was in waiting for him. He embarked on board the English frigate *L'Indomptable*, cruising off that coast, and reached the island of Elba, where he was joined by the small band of soldiers who had resolved to share his banishment. I forgot to mention, that previously to leaving Fontainebleau, the Emperor had for his private servants a French valet and his mameluke, whose devotedness to him appeared to be unbounded. He had met with him when a child, brought him from Egypt, had him properly reared up, and settled a small fortune upon him, which placed the mameluke, under any circumstances, beyond the reach of want. This poor lad was assuredly impressed with the idea that he ought to expose his life in defence of the Emperor; and he nevertheless deserted him in the night preceding the departure from Fontainebleau. This mameluke was by no means a heartless man; but he was weak, and suffered himself to be seduced from his duty by the French valet, who, having formed the resolution of deserting his benefactor, followed the example of all cowards, and sought an accomplice to back him. He perverted the heart of the poor mameluke, who, previously to the commission of this guilty act, could never have suspected himself

capable of it. Their desertion left the Emperor without a single valet. It became necessary to find one out an hour before his departure.

I had been some days in Paris, and had occasion to call on M. de Talleyrand. He was with that valet, and kept me a long time waiting. I was at a loss to account for the circumstance that could have brought them into contact. He explained it himself; or, at least, he hinted the matter. As soon as the mameluke was gone, M. de Talleyrand came up to me, and informed me, with an air of satisfaction, that the Empress was not going to the island of Elba; that she had been, for a long time, a victim to the ill-usage of the Emperor, who was very harsh towards her: in short, he held so extraordinary a language respecting domestic affairs, with which I was better acquainted than himself, and respecting which I had formed a very different opinion, that I plainly perceived he had not disdained to extend his system of seduction to the very servants of the Emperor. He had set to work all those who had any influence over, or access to, the Empress, for the purpose of inducing that princess to adopt a determination calculated to forward the projects he already meditated; and could have sent for this valet with no other intention than to dictate to him a language of that description; because a confidential servant, disposed to talk, may give an appearance of truth to what he utters, especially when he relates matters of domestic privacy. I was the more intent upon considering the motives which could induce M. de Talleyrand to speak this language to me, as I well knew how much he was thwarted by the return of the Bourbons, with whom his friendly intercourse was confined to outward appearances. By setting the Empress against her husband, in such a manner as to exclude all idea of a return of affection, he prepared her to take part in the views which he meditated; such, at least, was my opinion; and I think it was not far removed from the truth.

The Empress was still at Rambouillet, from whence she contemplated to depart on her way back to Austria. Previously, however, to quitting France, a fresh insult was kept in store for her. Will it be believed, in fact, that the Emperor of Russia should conceive the idea of paying his respects to her?

This is the more unaccountable, as it is difficult to suppose he could have overlooked the fact that this visit was highly unbecoming; for, in short, he could not imagine that his presence would be agreeable to the Empress; and the impossibility, on her part, of refusing the visit gave her a claim to the respect which he ought, of his own accord, to have professed towards her.

He was unquestionably not the dupe of the stories told and propagated by M. de Talleyrand respecting the Emperor's pretended harshness towards the princess. The Emperor of Austria, under whose auspices he presented himself, was fully aware of the perfect harmony of their domestic life; and he had even occasionally expressed the mortification he felt at his daughter's enthusiasm for his son-in-law. He must no doubt have removed the erroneous impressions of Alexander, if the latter ever entertained them. Had such coolness actually existed, he was less justified than any other member of the coalition in making it a ground of reproach to Napoleon, for he could not have forgotten on what terms he lived at home: his domestic troubles were notorious to all. Be this as it may, the following details were communicated to me by a person belonging to the household of the Empress, and who was in immediate attendance upon her at the palace of Rambouillet. She overheard the conversation which took place, in the first instance, between her and her father, at which no third party was present, and the subsequent conversation kept up after the arrival of the Emperor of Russia. The private etiquette of the palace required that the ladies of the Empress should always be in attendance upon her; and

at those painful moments, the ladies who had the honour of belonging to her household were more strict than at any other time in the observance of their duties; so that when the Empress entered her saloon, some of them were in the adjoining apartment. At the palace of Rambouillet, this apartment happened to be her bed-room.

The Emperor of Austria was the first to arrive, having got the start of the Emperor of Russia. As soon as he entered, the Empress was left alone with him; and as it was well imagined that a serious explanation would take place respecting the manner in which she had been treated, the conversation was attentively listened to.

The Empress gave her father a respectful reception, and expressed great pleasure at again seeing him; but her tears plainly indicated her bitter mortification at the part she was made to act. She was naturally gifted with a lofty mind; and on this occasion she was unsparing of the reproaches which her offended dignity so justly called for. The Emperor of Austria, who was greatly attached to his daughter, could not succeed in his endeavours to console or persuade her by an appeal to her obligations. He however requested she would receive the Emperor Alexander, who was on the road, and would shortly arrive. The Empress turned pale with indignation; but, in the condition to which she was reduced, it was no longer in her power to resist.

Nevertheless, she did not exhibit to the eyes of the French the pitiful example of running after the man who had effected the downfall of her husband. Her first reply was a direct refusal, uttered with the firmness of a proud and lofty mind, which revolted at the idea that the Emperor of Russia should so far presume to forget what he owed to her.

The Emperor of Austria found no other way of calming her than by making the case a personal one. He earnestly entreated his daughter to give him that mark of obedience, and so far to assume a control over her feelings, as to stifle

her grief on the occasion; adding, that all the consequences of an *éclat* on her part would recoil upon himself; and that he was pledged to remove every difficulty on behalf of the Emperor Alexander, who was near at hand, and on the point of arriving. He had not yet succeeded in overcoming the resistance of his daughter, who replied to him: "What, then, will he make me a prisoner under your own eyes? If he compels me to receive him, by entering this apartment in spite of me, I will retreat to my bed-room: we shall see if he will presume to follow me."

The time was rapidly approaching, and the Emperor of Austria could get no promise from his daughter, who obstinately refused to give way. The Emperor Alexander's carriage was already heard approaching by the grand avenue of the palace; and she still persisted in closing her apartment against him. The moments were but short: the Emperor of Austria urged his daughter by the most pressing entreaties: she still resisted, whilst the Emperor of Russia was entering the court-yard of the palace. The Emperor of Austria went to receive him according to the forms of etiquette, and conducted him to the apartment where he had left his daughter. What an interview! what a situation for all three! The Emperor of Russia could not fail to read the effect produced by his visit upon those features which had for the last twenty days been bedewed with tears. He was probably ignorant of the situation of the Empress, who was informed of the smallest details of what had taken place in Paris previously and subsequent to the reception he had given to the deputation of marshals. She was also acquainted with every thing that had been planned against her husband; and must have possessed an extraordinary degree of self-command to check her feelings on seeing the author of the bitter sorrows which preyed upon her.

The Emperor of Russia accosted the Empress with every apology for the liberty he took of appearing in her presence

without previously soliciting her permission; adding, that he only ventured to do so under the auspices of the Emperor of Austria, who had obligingly consented to plead his excuse. He was lavish in his protestations to the Empress, and requested she would condescend to apply to him for any thing that concerned her, as he should feel flattered at any opportunity of being of service to her, and of testifying his anxiety to anticipate all her wishes. This is the substance of the Emperor of Russia's language to a princess whom he had just forced to descend from the throne, and from whose brows he had torn the diadem. He could certainly be at no loss to understand the sentiments she nourished in her breast. She accordingly replied to this profuse tender of services by a cold return of thanks, adding, that she had nothing more to solicit beyond the mere liberty to return to the bosom of her family. The conversation dropped, and the Autocrat took leave of the Empress.

I was told by the late Countess de Brignole, whom I saw before her departure for Vienna, that no circumstance had occasioned so much pain to the Empress as this visit to her.

We must suppose the Emperor of Russia to have been apprehensive lest the youthful sovereign, feeling justly offended against him, would beg to be excused if he solicited permission, in the usual form, to present his duty to her, and that he resorted to the expedient of repairing to the palace in the company of his ally the Emperor of Austria; but whatever colouring may be given to this step, there is nevertheless something so revolting in it, whether in respect to form, or to the rules of propriety, as obviously to indicate its real motive.

On mature reflection, it will be found to spring out of the course adopted by the allied sovereigns for the purpose of detaching the nation from the Emperor. It was no doubt imagined that the work would be the more complete if the Empress were lowered in the public estimation, and held up to view as partaking the feelings of those debased minds who

hastened to return their thanks to the enemy for relieving them from the pretended tyranny of her husband. The attempt, however, to impose upon her proved abortive; she was at no loss to discover the motive of the Emperor Alexander's conduct. She was possessed of too much discrimination not to form the only opinion on the subject which she was warranted in entertaining.

A few days after this visit to Rambouillet, the Empress took her departure for Vienna. She passed through Versailles, Vervieres, and Soisy, and stopped the first night at Gros-Bois, the residence of the Prince of Neufchatel. At every place she was waited upon by persons who went to take leave of her.

She travelled under an escort of troops furnished by her father, and took the road through which the allies had proceeded on their march from Bâle to Paris. She passed in a lofty and dignified manner through the departments of a country where, at a like period of time, four years before (she was married to the Emperor on the 8th or 10th of April, 1810), triumphal arches had been erected on her passage, and the road had been strewed with flowers. That country now beheld her departing as the last victim of the enemy who had laid waste its towns, and carrying away the pledge which but a short time before appeared to have bound her to the French by ties which no circumstances could possibly sever. Her heart was a prey to the deepest sorrow during this painful journey: its bitterness was increased at every step. She felt no assuagement until her eyes were relieved from the sight of objects which contributed to nourish her grief. She carried away with her the regret of all those who had enjoyed the happiness of approaching her, and left with us the recollection of her many virtues.

The Emperor's mother had quitted Orleans for Rome, with her brother Cardinal Fesch; King Louis followed his mother; the King of Westphalia repaired to Styria, and

Prince Joseph to Switzerland; the Emperor's sisters likewise withdrew to a foreign country. We must now return to what was taking place in Paris.

CHAPTER XV.

M. de Talleyrand again—Incredible transaction; motives of it—The farmer of the games of Saint-Brice—Arrival of the King at Compiegne—Unbecoming harangue of Berthier—Saint-Ouen; constitution of the senate—Entry of Louis XVIII. into Paris—Severe judgment of the crowd—Unpleasant occurrences—The author writes to the Emperor Alexander—Why he is unable to take leave of the Emperor Napoleon.

SINCE the Emperor's abdication, that is to say, since the 8th of April, the war was naturally at an end, as he was alleged to be the only cause of it: it had accordingly ceased; for the hostile armies had immediately entered into cantonments, and a line of demarcation had been drawn between the portion of territory which they occupied and the country where our troops were distributed. The greater part of the French generals were in Paris; they had even some of their troops quartered in that city. The whole army had moreover acknowledged the provisional government, and paid it every obedience, as well as to its ministers, who were very assiduous in their attentions to the allied sovereigns. All were in expectation of the King's arrival, which could not be long delayed; and as it was in vain to pretend to deceive him by the reports which every one proposed to submit as to the share they respectively claimed in his recall to the throne, all hastened to bind his hands by a constitution rapidly procured from the senate. The dupes alone were caught by such a snare. The senate could no more give a constitution to the French than it could arrogate to itself the right of pronoun-

cing the Emperor's forfeiture. The King was possessed of a mind too far above all those political break-necks to deceive himself respecting the true causes of his return.

That those agents of disturbance, who had at all times deceived the nation by constantly betraying the weaker party for the benefit of the stronger, were far from expecting the return of the Prince, whom they contemplated to persuade of his being indebted to them for the crown, is proved by the fact that they had not even entered into any agreement with him. There can be no doubt that, if they had really intended to replace him upon the throne, and had been actuated by those motives of public interest which they professed, they would have laid down certain bases, and have required some guarantees; otherwise their imprudence would have been altogether unparalleled. This reproach, however, cannot be laid to their charge. The King was brought back by the course of events; and when they found that it was impossible to resist his recall, that their intrigues had only turned to the advantage of the emigrants, they bethought themselves to claim the merit of a work exclusively owing to the force of circumstances, and to consider as their own a result which was brought about in spite of them. The idea occurred to them of originating a constitution, which they felt it of importance to obtain; first, in consideration to their personal safety; and, in the next place, as being a document indispensable to the object of obtaining the support of the French, towards whom they had no other means of persuasion than a proclamation of the King, dated nearly a twelvemonth before. They imagined that such a constitution would protect them from the consequences which they apprehended. Their mistake will soon be made apparent. I am aware, however, that M. de Talleyrand did not indulge in this illusion. He was not deceived as to the result that might attend the return of the house of Bourbon, and had not been unmindful of the object of averting the painful consequences to which it might

lead in a point of view personal to himself. He stood in great need of money, and had lost a yearly income of three hundred thousand francs which he enjoyed under the Emperor's government. He plainly saw that the King would not be able to secure to any one such large emoluments. The following fact will illustrate my assertion: M. de Talleyrand had purchased out of the proceeds of the hotel which he had sold to the Emperor, a country-house, named Saint-Brice, at a short distance from Saint-Denis. The loss of his allowance deprived him of the means of supporting that establishment, which was attended with heavy expense to him; he accordingly endeavoured to dispose of it. No purchaser offered; but he felt at no loss to remedy this disappointment. He sent for the farmer-general of the gaming-houses of Paris, and proposed to him that he should become the purchaser of that property. The latter in vain declined the proposal. It was intimated to him that he had not been sent for that he should meet the offer by a refusal: he must become the purchaser; and if the agreement to that effect was not signed within twenty-four hours, the contract for the gaming-houses would be rescinded, and granted to some one else. The farmer's resistance was unavailing: he had to deal with the head of the provisional government. He accordingly gave way, and asked what was the price demanded for the house. He was told two hundred and fifty thousand francs, which he ordered to be paid the same day, fully determined that the gamesters should reimburse him the money, and that the house should be disposed of to the best of his power.

M. de Talleyrand must have felt some presentiment of uneasiness when he could dispose in this manner of property which he might otherwise find it difficult to realise. Let us return, however, to the position of France in respect to the enemy, who had disclaimed any intention of imposing sacrifices upon her.

The King was expected, a day having been fixed upon for

his arrival. It was easy to discuss the terms of peace at full leisure, since the struggle was at an end, and all effusion of blood had ceased. Nevertheless, a negotiation was entered into in the utmost haste; and the Count d'Artois was made to sign certain preliminaries, which deprived us of all our remaining possessions in countries which had been so long annexed to France. Fleets, arsenals, fortresses, constructions of all kinds; we gave up every thing. Why did we purchase at so high a price an armistice which was in existence by the mere act of the Emperor's abdication? Why did M. de Talleyrand, who was so well acquainted with the value of negotiable objects in transactions of a political nature, begin by depriving France of whatever she possessed? He consented to an immediate restitution of all that she possessed beyond her ancient limits, with the exception of Chambéry, and some broken territory round that city. Tuscany, however, as well as Piedmont, Geneva, Belgium, the Palatinate, the fortresses, with their ammunition and provisions, Antwerp, and her fleet, the arsenal and its stores, all were given up to the enemy; and the Count d'Artois was made to ratify this fatal agreement before he could have a knowledge of what was proposed to him.

Couriers were immediately dispatched to the commandants of all those fortresses with orders to surrender them in their existing condition to the enemy's blockading forces, and to return immediately to France with their respective garrisons. It was pointedly observed that the fortresses thus abandoned contained nearly the whole of the artillery composing the defence of those belonging to our ancient limits. It was urged that the inventory taken on the first occupation of those fortresses by the French was still in existence: it was proposed to restore them agreeably to that inventory, and accordingly to bring back whatever had been supplied from the interior. No attention, however, was paid to these observations by the provisional government, who insisted that the

fortresses should be restored in their existing state. The government extended its liberality so far as to order that the arsenal of Turin, which was exclusively supplied by the old establishment at Valence, as well as articles which had actually been purchased by France, should be unreservedly given up. Nevertheless, it could not be ignorant of what was about to be restored, since there were regular statements in the war-department which might be communicated on being applied for.

It would be doing injustice to M. de Talleyrand to suppose that he was taken by surprise on this occasion by the ministers of foreign powers, or deceived as to the extent of the sacrifice which he allowed to be imposed upon France. He clearly saw that no obstacle stood in the way of peace, and that he was depriving himself of the means of assuming a position between France and the enemy: for what resource was left to him after the loss of what might have been made available to support a demand, however trifling its nature? How could M. de Talleyrand take upon himself to conclude this transaction before the King's arrival? On the one hand, there was no necessity for entering into a treaty; on the other, there existed no rational motive to justify the bases upon which the negotiations were carrying on. M. de Talleyrand knew much better than the Count d'Artois that France could muster more numerous forces than the allies had yet displayed to our view. A mere glance at the statements of the minister of war would be sufficient to prove this fact. No obstacle any longer opposed their being assembled. They might therefore have been made available to the purpose of concluding the negotiation.

On an attentive consideration of the motives which may have induced M. de Talleyrand to open that negotiation, instead of postponing it until the King's arrival, one is reluctantly compelled to attach some credit to the rumours which were circulated, and which connected the conclusion of

the above transaction with interests of a private nature. I was assured, and this assurance was repeated to me in a well-informed quarter, that M. de Talleyrand, having been compelled by circumstances to work for the return of the Bourbons, felt no confidence in the position which he might have it in his power to assume, as he already entertained some presentiment of the feelings which those princes brought back with them, and as, foreseeing no personal advantage in the change, he bent his thoughts to the object of securing to himself an independence which might protect him from the consequences of his falling into disgrace. In a word, he had set his customary engines to work for the purpose of conveying this proposal of an armistice to the foreign powers, who had pledged themselves to acknowledge his services to them. How, indeed, could an act of generosity have been withheld from a man who, by the mere dash of his pen, gave up to foreign sovereigns a *matériel* of artillery and ammunition in such abundance, that the wealthiest power could never have purchased them without a heavy pressure on its finances? However injurious this suspicion may be, it was current at the time. I relate the circumstance such as I heard it from persons who were in the habit of watching and commenting upon M. de Talleyrand's conduct.

What peace could remain unconcluded after the signature of that convention? All that was left to be done was to bring together, with more or less sagacity, certain conditions, which serve no longer, at the present day, as guarantees for the repose of nations. If, as it is probable, M. de Talleyrand entertained any other projects than those in which he had been compelled to participate, he could employ no better means for calming the enthusiasm with which he feared that the King would be received on his return, than to reflect a disgrace upon that period of our history, by a sacrifice such as that which he allowed to be imposed upon the nation, at a moment when she still had it in her power to enforce a

respect for what she had acquired at the cost of so many efforts.

The King made his entry into Paris on the 21st of April. He had landed at Boulogne, and proceeded from thence to Compiegne, to which place the provisional government, the ministers, and the marshals of France had repaired, in order to present him with their homage, and offer him the assurances of their fidelity to his service.' The Emperor was still at Fontainebleau. It was farther reserved for him to witness the desertion of his standards by those men whom he had reared up and enriched, and who were now rushing forward to secure their share of the new prospects opening to them! Will it be believed that the marshals were headed by that very Berthier who has been so often mentioned in the course of these Memoirs? He addressed the King on behalf of the marshals, and said, "that France having groaned for the last twenty-five years under the weight of the misfortunes which oppressed her, had looked forward to the happy day which now shone upon her," although not a week had yet elapsed since he promised the Emperor at Fontainebleau never to desert him. Could Berthier, his companion in arms, the friend whom he had selected to proceed to Vienna and marry the daughter of the Emperor of Austria in his name—could he so far forget himself? Nevertheless, he was really attached to the sovereign he was insulting in this manner: he was paying a tribute to his weakness of character, and to the delirium of that period, without ceasing to cherish and to pity the benefactor whose misfortune he had not the courage to share.

From Compiegne the King proceeded to Saint-Ouen, which is known to be at a distance of only two leagues from Paris. He there received the senate, which brought to him the constitution lately framed, by means of which it flattered itself with having irrevocably settled its destinies. I have heard some of its members assert that they had scarcely re-

tired from this audience when they foresaw what was about to happen.

The *cortége* which was to accompany the King on his entry into Paris was already assembled. He commenced his march, and entered by the suburb of Saint Martin, after having proceeded along the external *boulevards*. Berthier was before the King's carriage, with several of the marshals, as well as the Duke de Feltre, who had asserted in full council, in presence of the Empress, "that so long as there remained a single village where the Emperor's authority was acknowledged, that village would be the capital at which all Frenchmen ought to meet." I stood in the crowd, a mere spectator of the procession. It no doubt brought some recollections to my mind: but the picture was of the most gloomy description. Had the individuals riding about the King's carriage been those who shared the misfortunes of his exile, nothing could have been more natural; but there was something revolting in the sight of men now following in the train of Louis XVIII. who occupied the first places in the Emperor's triumphal marches.

The King would no doubt have felt greater esteem for those new adherents of legitimacy had they pleaded as an excuse for their non-attendance their age, and their fatigues, and condemned themselves to a dignified retirement, rather than be guilty of such gratuitous exposure; for, in short, he had not called them to grace his entry, and could not entertain a very exalted opinion of men who acted so mean a character.

Mankind is a compound of weakness, and is at no time proof against too severe a test. Let it never be urged any longer that the Emperor derived great assistance from his officers. I did not stand in need of this proof to feel surprised at his having performed such extraordinary feats with the assistance of such men. Some, however, were much less blameable than they were entitled to our pity: they only

wanted penetration to discover that they had acted their parts, and that, unless directly called upon, it behoved them to keep at a distance. The people at large, who have a more correct sense of propriety than is generally supposed, were unsparing in their censure of Berthier. I repeatedly heard the crowd cry out to him, "Go to the island of Elba, Berthier! go to Elba!"

It would be an endless work to indulge in all the reflections which might be made respecting the conduct of some of the great personages of the empire. What confidence could they expect the King to entertain in them? What pledges of fidelity did they come to tender? Was it their constancy? the king could form a just estimate of it. Was it a motive of personal interest that brought them to bend the knee to him? they were still more mistaken. Louis XVIII. might easily contrast the favours conferred upon them by the sovereign they had deserted, with the advantages they might expect from the sovereign to whom they came to pledge their fresh allegiance.

The King alighted at Notre Dame, where he felt anxious to return thanks to God for his restoration. The Duchess d'Angoulême sat next to him in a calash drawn by eight horses belonging to the Emperor's stables, and led by men who still bore his livery. From Notre Dame he proceeded to the Tuileries. I pass over the ceremonies customary on such an occasion; they could only be tedious to the reader; added to which, I had no longer an opportunity of indulging in personal observations.

I have mentioned that it was wholly out of my power to take leave of the Emperor previously to his departure for the island of Elba. I have now to explain the facts. Whilst residing at Blois, I received a letter from General Bertrand, and wrote to him in reply how painful it was to witness the downfall of the state, when there existed so many means of saving it, since the fortresses could yet supply a powerful army; I added, that if the Emperor's forces were not yet

adequate to any attempt upon Paris, there should be no hesitation in returning to the banks of the Loire, and ordering the armies of Marshals Soult, Suchet and Augereau to join him in that quarter. I thought we might then be in a condition to try the fortune of war, since a battle fought at the gates of Paris would drive the capital to a state of insurrection, which would never break out as long as the population saw no prospect of the successful issue of such a course. I was far, therefore, from expecting an act of abdication. It unfortunately happened, that the only estafette taken between Orleans and Fontainebleau was the very bearer of my letter. I was ignorant of this circumstance, when, following the example of the other ministers, I took the road back from Orleans to Paris. M. Molé, the high-judge, whose carriage preceded mine, received on the way a notification, transmitted to him from Paris, which he was requested to communicate to me. He was so obliging as to leave one of his servants at the post-house, who handed me the letter on my arrival. It intimated a request that he would advise me not to go to Paris, as the letter which I had written to General Bertrand on the 8th of April had been seized, and communicated to the Emperor of Russia, and to the provisional government, who felt highly incensed against me. There was assuredly nothing reprehensible in the suggestion conveyed by my letter. Nevertheless, I availed myself of the advice, and returned to Orleans, where I remained two days longer; for in the work of revolution two days are of consequence.

On my return to Paris I sent to request that M. de Czernicheff, an aide-de-camp of the Emperor of Russia, would favour me with a call. He did so, and consented to ask of his sovereign in my name, whether I might live at peace in the bosom of my family, and reckon upon his protection, in the event of my being molested for acts antecedent to the period when I had to resign my functions. I told M. de Czernicheff, that the moment had arrived when I stood in need of the

exercise of those friendly intentions which his sovereign had so often professed toward me during my residence at his court. He returned the same night, to intimate to me that the Emperor of Russia would only grant me his protection under the condition of my pledging my word of honour to remain quiet, and not to stir a step out of Paris without his leave. I unhesitating gave the required pledge. M. de Czernicheff added, that, as to the effects of the former friendly sentiments to which I had alluded, I ought no longer to rely upon them, because the Emperor Alexander had completely altered his opinion of me. I replied, that he could not at least refuse to grant me his esteem, which would amply compensate the loss of the other sentiment. I addressed two letters to the Emperor Alexander on this subject, not so much with the view of obtaining any favours from him, as to express my regret at being compelled to acknowledge, that the friendly reception he had so frequently given to me had been much rather owing to my public character than to the private esteem with which I thought myself honoured on quitting him, since he had himself given me the assurance of it. This step on my part proved unavailing; I could not succeed in overcoming his prejudices, and had to be on my guard. I was a prisoner, though, no doubt, with all Paris for a prison; and it behoved me more than any one else to act with the utmost circumspection.

The Emperor Napoleon appeared surprised at my not going to take leave of him; but he was ignorant of my position in Paris, and when M. de Caulaincourt communicated to me the prince's astonishment, I requested he would make known to him the cause of my absence. M. de Caulaincourt rejected my excuse, and even urged me to discharge an act of duty. I was well disposed to do so, and requested he would take advantage of his freedom of access to the Emperor Alexander, in order to obtain the consent of that sovereign to his taking me to Fontainebleau along with him and bring-

ing me back to Paris. I felt unwilling to expose myself, in the event of any disturbance, to the accusation of having gone to Fontainebleau for instructions. I observed to him that I should find it sufficiently difficult to avoid being molested, without adding fresh embarrassments to the irksomeness of my position, exposed as I was to the resentments inseparable from a spirit of re-action which was already working its way in every direction. M. de Caulaincourt, no doubt, assigned a different motive to my refusal; this could not surprise me, when I found him so strongly persuaded that the recall of the house of Bourbon was the work of a party and the result of a conspiracy. Entertaining such an opinion, he could scarcely avoid suspecting the minister of police, either of having had some share in the conspiracy or of not having obstructed its progress. It was accordingly natural for him to suppose that this minister's position with the provisional government was already so far settled as to render it unnecessary for him to give any pledges of circumspection in his conduct. It was moreover natural, under these circumstances, that I should be supposed to have weighty motives for dreading to appear in the Emperor's presence. M. de Caulaincourt went so far as to tell me that a person who, like myself, was loaded with wealth and honours, was always a man of consequence in such a country as France. I attempted in vain to remove his opinions. It was only at a later period that he came to discover the real causes which had brought about the extraordinary catastrophe of the Emperor's downfall.

CHAPTER XVII.

Fouché's arrival in Paris—His regret at the existence of a conspiracy without his having been instrumental to it—Adulations lavished upon the Emperor Alexander—We never beheld the like in Vienna or Berlin—Queen Hortense—Alexander denies his having been the cause of the Emperor's downfall—Division of our spoils—France is treated like the ass in the fable—Political considerations.

M. FOUCHÉ, who had waited in Languedoc and Provence the issue of this lengthened agony, had just arrived in Paris, and felt as much surprise as every one else at the turn which our affairs had taken: this was the first time that any thing was done without him. He moved in every direction, with a view to be employed; but all the parts were filled up: in vain he presented himself to the Emperor of Russia and the Count d'Artois, or endeavoured to come to an accommodation with M. de Talleyrand; it was too late. He pretended, and his political adherents have joined in the cry, that nothing of all this would have happened, had he been in Paris. Dupes may have believed him; but those who knew M. Fouché did justice to his real sentiments, when they said that the only difference in the aspect of events would have been a capitulation more favourable to his own interests.

During the stay of the allied sovereigns in Paris, many entertainments were given to them. An anxious desire to please them was displayed beyond any thing we had ever seen in Vienna or Berlin. Balls were given at M. de Talleyrand's hotel once or twice a week, and were composed of the handsomest women in the high ranks of society. I do not recollect that any means were omitted of displaying to the utmost the state of degradation into which we had fallen.

The Polish ladies had acted very differently when the Austrians entered Warsaw in 1809; and the Emperor of

Russia must have perceived that there was no disposition to set Paris on fire with the view of preventing his entrance into that city. He was fond of pleasure, and never failed to partake of those which were thrown in his way; he displayed much gallantry towards the female sex, and was even particularly attentive to some ladies whom he called to visit. As a necessary consequence of the plan of conduct which he had adopted in Paris, he thought himself called upon to visit the Empress Josephine. He was announced at Malmaison, and met there all the attentions to which the politeness of his proceeding gave him a claim: but he was mistaken if he supposed that in this retired spot the Emperor's misfortunes were not felt. His visit was accordingly a heart-rending one for Josephine, who endeavoured to disguise her feelings in order to give a gracious reception to the man who had just destroyed the peace of her existence. She had Queen Hortense in her company, whose social qualities attracted many people to Malmaison. The Emperor of Russia had heard of this princess, and felt some curiosity to become acquainted with her. He almost led me to suppose that he felt anxious to be reconciled to those whose future prospects he had destroyed: but it was impossible to give him an unfriendly reception, or to refuse appearing before him, since he had assumed the right to lay down the rules of propriety; and when he could feel no reluctance at coming to display the pomp of his triumph in the midst of his victims, he clearly indicated his expectation of receiving a flattering welcome.

The society of Malmaison had so many charms for him that he repeatedly returned to it, and requested at last that he might be treated with that degree of familiarity which never compromises the gravity of sovereigns in their intercourse with the fair sex. As the ladies of Malmaison possessed highly cultivated minds, the conversation occasionally dwelt upon topics of a much more serious nature than those which are usually discussed amongst women. The occur-

rences of the day afforded sufficient matter for discussions, which Queen Hortense was fully competent to keep up.

I had the honour of seeing that princess at a later period, and expressed to her my opinion as to the cause of our misfortunes, which I exclusively attributed to the Emperor of Russia, without whose intervention nothing could have been effected, because, as the chief of that crusade, he had not allowed any thing to be undertaken without his previous approbation. Queen Hortense took his part; she had made the same observation to that monarch, and he had insisted in reply that he had not taken any part in the act of dethroning the Emperor.

"My wish was gratified," he said. "I also had come to Paris; the Emperor was no longer an object of apprehension to me, because an enterprise such as the one to Moscow is never undertaken twice in a man's life;* the effect of his resentment could never have reached me; I had, accordingly, no motive to desire his downfall. This was not the case with my allies, who, being his neighbours, had constantly before their eyes the picture of what had happened to them, and what they dreaded might again come to pass. The Emperor of Austria was particularly apprehensive of seeing Napoleon once more in Vienna: the rest were equally alarmed. I could not refuse assent to their wishes; but as for myself, personally, I wash my hands of what has been done." Queen Hortense appeared convinced of the truth of these assertions, which she was good enough to repeat to me: for my part, I only saw in them an artifice employed to ward off the reproach of a discreditable act, so truly unworthy of a mighty sovereign. These assertions aimed at a further object, that of exciting our hatred against Austria, and of counteracting the interest shown by every one for the fate of the Empress Maria

* He would have been more correct, had he said that there is no reckoning a second time upon such a winter as that of Moscow.

Louisa; an interest which the Emperor Alexander began to notice.

The Emperor Napoleon's downfall was far too indispensable to the execution of the other projects which he meditated, to allow of so favourable an opportunity to escape of destroying the man who might have effectually opposed them. It was consequently of the utmost importance that he should place France at the mercy of England, her most irreconcileable enemy. He consigned to her the task of reducing us to a state of absolute political nullity. Such a course would naturally constitute him the ruler of the whole world. It was easy for the Emperor of Russia to invent whatever he was desirous should be repeated, with the view of guiding public opinion respecting the share he had taken in effecting the Emperor's downfall. By endeavouring to defend his own conduct, he was accusing himself, and already admitting that an act of injustice had been performed, when he laid it to the charge of his brother sovereigns. This, however, was a direct attempt at imposing upon the credulity of the people at large; for it was quite evident that nothing could have been done without him. I am not quite clear, besides, whether the part to which he laid claim was much more honourable than that which he felt desirous of ascribing to others.

Whilst the Emperor of Russia was indulging in the enjoyment of balls, and inhaling the perfume of adulation which was constantly burning before him, the King of Prussia was engaged in retrieving his affairs; and he acted with judgment in doing so. He disposed of the stores and arsenals, and had the baggage-carts of his army loaded with all those articles which we had turned to such little account whilst our very existence was at stake. Muskets, cannons, caissons, every thing was removed to Berlin; and we had richly deserved this mortification. The Museum was not touched, but it was clear that all eyes were casting a longing look at the collection. A sufficient motive for decreeing its doom was to

be found in the circumstance that it attested the splendour of our renown: an opportunity was anxiously hoped for of returning to it. Fortunately, however, the Emperor's shadow still protected that brilliant collection.

France was now reduced to the necessity of relinquishing all she had acquired since 1792, either by right of conquest, or in return for compensations which her enemies had obtained in their dealings with her. France alone bore the sacrifices: the other powers resumed what they had lost, without however giving up the compensations they had previously obtained. This was called a restoration of the equilibrium between the different powers of Europe.

France was so nearly annihilated, that one is at a loss to understand how the government, at whose mercy she was placed by her reverses, could allow matters to be carried to such extremities. Austria was not mistaken in her anticipation of the turn she should give to the general aspect of affairs. It must be acknowledged, that she threw herself in a very unreserved manner into the arms of Russia, without foreseeing the consequences of such blind confidence on her part, or deriving a suitable advantage from the weight which her own power had thrown into the scale: or else, ever since the conferences at Prague, she had acquiesced in all the views of the Emperor's personal enemies against the ascendency of France. Whatever may have been the circumstances which led to the determination adopted by Austria at that period, she will suffer at some future day for the errors of her cabinet; and eventually admit that she merely made an exchange of difficulties, with the additional disadvantage for her of losing all the means she had at command of coming to an accommodation with France, had circumstances or political considerations required it.

The history of all ages is very nearly the same. We are told in the records of the past century, that at a time when neither Russia nor Prussia were yet known, Sweden was

a first-rate power, as well as Poland, and the Ottoman empire in particular. In those days, the Austrian monarchy deemed her existence sufficiently threatened by the call of a grandson of Louis XIV. to the throne of Spain, to justify her in embarking in that protracted war, which only terminated by the peace of Utrecht. An equilibrium was then established between the several powers, by the dismembering of a great portion of the Spanish monarchy. At the present day, France has been placed in a situation far less advantageous than at that period, already too disastrous, when she was at least afforded the means of afterwards connecting herself with Spain and Holland, in order to assert her maritime independence. She could not at present resort to a similar course, since those two countries have, like herself, lost the greater part of their colonies; and yet these are the possessions which constitute a commercial power, and afford the means of keeping up a navy. The English, by bringing about this state of things, have secured for a long time their naval superiority; the true secret of their wealth, and, consequently, of their influence over the rest of the world. It is no doubt certain that America has risen in the scale; but she is also threatened with the danger of acquiring so gigantic a power, that she will probably adopt a policy different from that which she has hitherto pursued ever since the peace of 1783; and France, like other nations, will have to apprehend her spirit of rivalry, after having looked forward to her assistance. The maritime forces of Europe may, at some future day, be inadequate to contend with those of America; a country which, in that respect, possesses local advantages analogous to those wielded by Russia on the continent. However far distant that period may be, it is easy to anticipate its approach; and as the time to which these Memoirs apply has been sufficiently painful to warrant our looking into futurity, we are justified in expressing the opinion that, on the score of naval equilibrium, no principle of equity has presided over the partition

effected. A mere glance at what has taken place will readily enable us to point at that power which has not only directed every thing, but laid down the law with undivided sway.

Ever since the beginning of the seventeenth century, the partitions made at Utrecht had been sanctioned by a consideration for the repose of Europe. If the calamities which have since afflicted mankind had tended to the object of establishing an order of things calculated to secure to the world a long enjoyment of peace, the result would have justified the means. The case, however, was otherwise. It must be admitted, that what has been done appears to be in manifest opposition to so noble an object. There can be no doubt that the changes which have occurred in the partition of Europe within the last century, had also affected its course of policy. Old states had, in fact, disappeared; others had sprung up, and came forward to the work of partition, rounded as they were by the destruction of a variety of nations, for which it never occurred to any power to call them to an account. France alone was made to experience the fate of the ass in the fable of the *Animals afflicted with the plague*. She was condemned by the decision of judges and witnesses, who had to answer for at least an equal degree of guilt. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that a signal error was committed in not laying all resentment aside; and that the more numerous were the powers who aimed at preponderance on the great scene of the world, the more every act required mature attention. This was the moment in fact for keeping all private animosities in check: prudence even enjoined the propriety of stifling the spirit of discord which might again be revived amongst the French, in order to force the whole political weight of France into that direction in which it was desirable to apply it. It is a mistaken notion to suppose that in the dismembering of a country, the portions which are joined to various other states carry the same weight in questions of policy as when they belonged to a powerful people,

and were brought in aid of its views. Whatever has been wrested from France for the purpose of enervating her, has but slightly augmented the power of those states which have acquired possession of her provinces. In like manner neither the provinces possessed by Sweden previously to the fatal treaty of Neustadt, the kingdom of Poland, the Turkish empire in its integrity, the Tartars of Georgia, nor the Persian provinces at the mouths of the Volga, in the enjoyment of their independence, could endanger the repose of Europe, which had, nevertheless, the misfortune to remain indifferent to the fate which successively befell those several countries. Russia, by subjugating them, unwatched by the rest of Europe, has acquired a power infinitely greater than any other which history records in its annals. To this more than gigantic power is combined the unity of action produced by a despotic government extending its sway over more than one fourth of the population of the known world, and exercising a moral influence over half the remainder. Ever since the restoration of the political equilibrium in Europe, a multitude of people unknown to her, those who inhabit the immense surface amongst the polar ices which separate the north of America from Russia, and a line drawn from the mouth of the Vistula across that of the Borysthenes to the mouth of the Volga, besides an extent of country equal to the surface of France, and situated to the westward of those rivers, another still more unknown country on the borders of the Caspian sea—this multitude of people, I say, are immediate vassals of the same government which acknowledges no other law than its will, is at liberty to raise armies, to wage war or conclude a peace at its own option, without any restraint being imposed upon its power by internal institutions. This immense monarchy can therefore keep armies on foot equal to the united forces of the rest of Europe, without the knowledge of the latter, because the intercourse with that country merely exists upon a single point, whilst the relations of Russia with Europe are possessed of

numberless ramifications. Those armies may be transported to Asia, or to the very heart of Europe, before any intimation can reach Paris, London, or Vienna, of the proceedings she is carrying on.

Such is, nevertheless, the position into which we have involved ourselves, by exclusively giving way to feelings of revenge, and sacrificing every consideration to the object of gratifying that passion.

It is urged as an excuse, that the present sovereign of Russia is friendly to peace, and will uphold his own work. He is, however, the same monarch who provoked and kindled the war of 1805, the origin of all subsequent wars. Let us admit for a moment, that ripened by age, which confers experience and philosophy, he should be disposed to keep up a spirit of good harmony between those nations, of whose destinies he has become the arbiter; is he gifted with immortality? In the event of his death, what measures have been adopted to keep a young and warlike successor in check? How is it possible to guard against the effects of his ambition in a country which hitherto reckons as many palace revolutions in its annals as regular accessions of monarchs to the throne? *

We discover in the church of the fortress of St. Petersburg the sepulchral tombs of the nine or ten sovereigns who have hitherto swayed the Russian sceptre; and Catherine II. is almost the only one who died a natural death.

Let us suppose, however, that the present sovereign of Russia should feel desirous of maintaining peace, notwithstanding the operations which are yet enjoined to him, with the view of completing the glory of his reign, and of consolidating a system which he cannot but be aware is already looked upon with a gloomy and restless feeling of uneasiness.

If his successor, who will not have the advantage of the

* This was written in 1816.

same moral power over the nation, should be compelled to undertake fresh incursions, what calamities may not befall the rest of the world? What alliance can it be possible to form with the view of resisting the torrent?

Prussia will be compelled to follow the policy of Russia, in order to maintain her sway over the countries she possesses from Memel to the other side of the Niemen as far as the mouth of the Vistula. She will compel Saxony to imitate her example; and a great portion of the northern states of Germany will follow the same course.

What will Austria, conjointly with Bavaria, have it in her power to effect single-handed? Will she be able to support the Turks, and to defend herself at the same time? It would be unreasonable to expect it. Will she call France and Spain to her assistance? They would arrive too late: besides which, it is to them of little consequence to whose hands might be consigned the sceptre of Bohemia and Hungary. They would both have their own burden to carry. This is the only privilege left to them, in consequence of the defenceless state to which they have been reduced. If they should allow themselves to be borne away by fair promises, they would fall dupes to the snare. Their better course would be to unite for the purpose of taking part in the spoils of the vanquished, rather than thrust themselves forward to the brunt of the conflict: they have losses to repair, and cannot afford to risk any thing.

The more attentively we consider what Austria has tamely submitted to, the less we can account for her extraordinary policy.

If Austria consented, at the conferences of Prague, to the destruction of France and of her ruler, nothing can excuse so egregious an error: and if we are to suppose that the Emperor of Austria himself has given way to a feeling of resentment, which he appeared to have banished ever since the union of his daughter with the Emperor Napoleon, his ca-

binet should not have allowed him to do more than submit to the sacrifice which affected his personal dignity, but never to that which concerned the direct interests of his monarchy.

The monarch whose hopes had been deceived might have given way to his former animosity; but it behoved a cabinet to be the more prudent, as the head of the state was giving a free loose to sentiments which had the effect of obscuring his judgment.

A minister should be inaccessible to every passion; because he holds a responsible office, and must always be prepared to render an account of the motives which regulated his conduct, without urging in excuse that he has been led astray.

If the Austrian minister has subscribed at Prague to the downfall of France, he alone is guilty of the consequences that may flow from such a conduct; because his refusal to act would have compelled the adoption of a different basis, which he would be inexcusable not to have presented of his own accord, and brought under previous discussion.

If the events which followed the entrance of the allies into Paris in the month of March, 1814, have alone imposed upon Austria that character of indifference which she assumed, her cabinet was still more reprehensible; because the course which would have sprung from the dictates of a prudent foresight, previously to her embarking in the coalition, became an imperative duty, when the policy of Russia and of England was developing itself in such a manner as to let Austria discover whether or not she had been led into error, and to make it manifest to her that the hatred of France was again made to turn against her, since her cabinet ought no longer to have doubted of the probable consequences of what was taking place.

CHAPTER XVII.

Continuation of the preceding chapter—What has Russia done—What Austria should have done—Different conduct of the two cabinets—What can the French object—Recapitulation of the conduct of the sovereigns towards France—Project of Pitt and of Alexander—Was it intended to crush France, or the Emperor Napoleon?

HAD the cabinet of Austria protested against the issue of this campaign, she would have again placed every thing in doubt. Austria would have resumed her rank of mediator of the destinies of Europe, by adding to her strength that which was still wielded by France, and which she aimed at combining with the strength to which a protector could lay claim.

Austria might have recovered at that moment the character she ought to have assumed at Prague, that of arbiter of France, and of Italy besides, whose independence she would have acted much more judiciously in protecting, under one or more princes of her house. Since the sovereigns had consented, one after the other, to the ruin of the house of Bourbon, in order to favour their own aggrandisement, it would not have been unreasonable in Austria, under such circumstances, to attempt recovering the equivalent of the power wielded by Charles V. at least in his European dominions.

She incurred no risk, and could only improve her condition, which has been very little benefited by the recovery of her former provinces. They have been too long detached from the mother country to bring back to her any warmth of affection.

By protecting the administrative independence of Italy, Austria would have prevented the aggrandisement of her

other neighbours, whom she has permitted to make acquisitions infinitely more advantageous than a great part of those she has herself recovered; the proof of this will be found in a comparison of the power wielded by France and Italy previously to 1814, with what might be presented at this day by France, Belgium, the countries along the Rhine which have been bestowed upon various princes, and lastly, by Tuscany and Piedmont.

The former kingdom of Italy has scarcely added four regiments to the Austrian army, and it requires eight or ten Austrian regiments to check the spirit of discontent prevailing in that country.

Prussia, and Russia in particular, have made acquisitions which are not attended with similar disadvantages. The latter power whilst compelling other states to fall back into their old tracks, has not applied the same principle to her own conduct; she has, on the contrary, traced out for herself a new road, by which we may yet see her drawing nearer to the sun in the midst of the ruins of more than one crumbling nation, and thus bring in her train fresh elements of confusion, and scatter them on the scene of Europe.

France is the only country against which a fresh crusade would be proclaimed if she merely attempted to recover Landau, or repair the fortifications of Huningen. A mere newspaper paragraph would have been the signal for many battles a few years back; and at the present day the cabinets of Europe are indifferent to every occurrence which is paving the way for the subjugation of the world. It is now asked, where are those statesmen who have been so clamorous in their eagerness to lessen the power of France; and what has been gained towards the repose of Europe, by substituting to that power a much more dangerous one, against which there does not even exist the resource of family alliances calculated to resist her attempts at universal dominion? Russia resorted to such alliances in the outset, with the view of

securing beforehand every advantageous position she could grasp at. We may now contemplate the consequences. On the female side, the Emperor of Russia is one of the pretenders to the crown of Sweden; for if the latter, on the demise of Charles XIII., should fall to the lot of Bernadotte, it will assuredly not be handed down to his son. The Emperor of Russia is, moreover, the brother-in-law of the King of Bavaria, of the Grand-duke of Baden, of the hereditary Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt, of the King of Wurtemberg, besides being nephew to all the princes of the latter house; he is also brother-in-law to the King of the Low-Countries, of the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, of the hereditary Prince of Saxe-Weimar, who, it is well known, is the elder branch of the Saxon family, which was only dispossessed of the electorate of that name, the present kingdom of Saxony, by the power of an emperor of Germany, who placed the elector under the ban of the empire for waging war against him, and had him condemned to resign the electorate to the younger branch of Weimar, with which he was forced to effect an exchange. The Emperor of Russia, in short, is the brother-in-law of the hereditary Prince of Prussia, whose sister has just married a Grand-duke of Russia: he is moreover allied to the house of Saxe-Coburg by the marriage of his brother, the Grand-duke Constantine, with a princess of that house. Was it possible to derive more signal advantages than Russia has done from her means of forming alliances? assuredly not. This attitude on her part crowns the labours of Catherine II. Let it ever be attempted to dethrone any one of those princesses; the power of resistance is at hand.

It is proper to remind the reader in this place that, at the period when Russia was treating with France upon unfavourable bases, no such outrage was offered to the princesses of the Russian blood whose husbands had declared against us, and whose estates might have been rendered available as an indemnity to Prussia in 1807. Austria reckons a greater

number of princesses, and especially of princes, in the two branches of Lorraine and of Este, than Russia herself could lay claim to in other quarters. They are all of an age to wield any power confided to them; and yet she has by no means derived from this source such signal advantages for her glory and her power as she might have done. They principally hold military employments in the government of provinces where they have won the affections of the inhabitants. Generally speaking, however, they live so retired, that if it were not for the virtues which distinguish the Grand-duke of Tuscany, the existence of his brothers might be doubted. On the other hand, we hear of nothing else than the travels of the Grand-dukes of Russia. If they were merely destined to hold governments in Siberia, on the Caucasus, or at Kamschatka, they would not be sent on reconnoitring excursions to Paris, London, Vienna, and Berlin.

Whatever may be the political reasons which influenced the adoption of the course resorted to, it is far more essential to avert its consequences than to seek its origin. It behoves all countries threatened with invasion to anticipate the necessity of forming a common bond of union, and to be ready to afford each other a mutual assistance.

The French have unquestionably not a word to object to the conditions imposed upon them; nor have they reached the extent of the evils which they hoped to avoid by placing themselves at the mercy of their enemies. They will yet have to bear the weight of those powers which have aggrandised their own territories at the expense of France. Such may possibly be the consequence of the error into which they have fallen by throwing the helm overboard in the height of their danger. If such should be the fate reserved for them, if they should yet have to groan under fresh calamities, they will have conferred the right of being told, without the smallest party spirit: How could you entertain any doubt of

the object contemplated by the allied powers? When they waged war against you in 1792, they did not aim at wresting away the conquests you had made. They must therefore have meditated to enslave you; and if, in consequence of the sanguinary conflicts which took place between that period and the treaty of Campo-Formio, you were not forced to bend under the yoke which was attempted to be imposed upon you, your escape is owing to the circumstance that the immortal campaigns of Italy had deprived your enemies of the power of injuring you, and had compelled them to respect the social organisation you had recently adopted. To whom were you indebted for the victories which had procured the acknowledgment of your independence? The trumpet of fame will reply, to the Emperor. When he took his departure for Egypt, from whence his return appeared impossible, how could you mistake the motive which induced your enemies to fly once more to arms? Can you still have any doubt of the projects at that time meditated by them, or of what must have been your fate had it not been for the battle of Zurich, and the defence of Genoa, which afforded time for the First Consul to reorganise the interior of France, and proceed to cull the laurels which awaited him at Marengo? In what condition did he find you on his return from Egypt? Compare it with the condition to which you were restored by him after the treaties of Luneville and Amiens. If you were not made to pass under the yoke at that period, you are indebted for your escape to his having been fortunately brought back to save you a second time from destruction.

When he was exclusively engaged in those occupations which were called for by the expedition preparing at Boulogne for the purpose of bringing our struggle with England to a close, he could not assuredly be accused of ambition. You must have a full recollection of the circumstances attending the aggression of England, and of the wishes uttered by the whole of France for the success of the Emperor, which

it encouraged to the attempt of crossing the Straits, on the other side of which appeared to exist the only obstacle to the attainment of a profound peace.

You can as little have forgotten how he was suddenly compelled to relinquish that project, and proceed in all haste to Germany, for the purpose of opposing the most disgraceful and most unjust aggression ever recorded in the pages of history. Who deserved on this occasion the appellation of ambitious, or at least of agitator of discord, of disturber of the public peace? Was it not this very Emperor Alexander, whom you have been recently extolling as your deliverer? If you were unable to form a correct judgment of the projects of the coalesced powers against you at that period, the facts revealed by the general-in-chief of the Austrian army, who was deserted by fortune in the field of Ulm, and above all, the plans concerted between England and Russia,* for the pur-

* Extract from the official communication made by the government of Great Britain to the Russian ambassador in London, on the 19th of January, 1805.

"The result of the communications made by Prince Czartorinski to his Majesty's ambassador at St. Petersburg has been laid before his Majesty, as well as your Excellency's confidential explanations. His Majesty has seen with inexpressible satisfaction the plan of policy, equally wise, comprehensive and generous, which the Emperor of Russia is disposed to adopt in the disastrous situation of Europe. His Majesty is moreover delighted to perceive that the Emperor's views and sentiments with reference to the deliverance of Europe, and to its future repose and security, are in perfect accordance with his own. The King is accordingly desirous of entering into the most open and frank explanation on every point connected with that important object, and of forming with his Imperial Majesty a union of councils, and the most intimate concert, in order that by their joint influence and efforts they may secure the co-operation and assistance of other continental powers, in a proportion analogous to the magnitude and importance of the enterprise, on the success of which depends the eventual safety of Europe.

"The first step to be adopted in furtherance of this course is to fix as precisely as possible the objects to which such a concert must necessarily tend.

"It appears from the explanation afforded of the Emperor's sentiments, in which his Majesty perfectly coincides, that they relate to three objects; 1st, to withdraw from the dominion of France the countries she has subjugated since the

pose of bringing France back to her limits of 1792, plans manifest to all, and avowed at that very period, ought to have

commencement of the revolution, and to reduce France to her ancient limits, such as they existed previously to that epoch; 2ndly, to make such arrangements in regard to the territories to be wrested from France, as will secure their tranquillity and happiness, and form at the same time a barrier against any projects of future aggrandisement on the part of France; 3rdly, to establish, on the return of peace, a convention or guarantee for the mutual protection and security of the different powers, and to restore to Europe a uniform system of public international law.

"The first and second objects are expressed in general terms, and in language admitting of the widest extension; but neither the one nor the other can be considered in detail, except by attending to the nature and extent of the means by which they may be secured. The first object is assuredly one which his Majesty and the Emperor would desire to see established without any modification or exception whatever; and nothing less could completely satisfy the views entertained by both sovereigns in attention to the deliverance and security of Europe. If it were possible to unite with Great Britain and Russia the other two great military powers of the continent, it seems beyond a doubt that such a combination of forces would enable them to accomplish every thing they might contemplate. If, however, as there is but too much ground for supposing it, it were impossible to bring Prussia into the confederacy, it may be doubted whether there exists a possibility of effecting in every part of Europe the operations so indispensable for the complete success of the contemplated project.

"The second point contains within itself the element of more than one important consideration. The views and sentiments which animate alike his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia, when they endeavour to establish this common concert, are no less pure than they are disinterested.

"Their principal object with regard to the countries which may be wrested from France should be to restore as much as possible their ancient rights, and to lay the foundation for the welfare of their inhabitants; but in attending to this object, they must not lose sight of the general security of Europe, upon which this particular object must mainly depend.

"As a consequence of this principle, it is beyond a doubt, that if some of those countries admit of being restored to their former independence, and placed in a condition to defend it, such an arrangement should be analogous to the policy and sentiments upon which that system is founded. Others, however, will be found, amongst the countries at present under the dominion of France, to which those considerations do not apply, either because the former political relations are so completely destroyed in those countries as to render it impossible to restore them, or because their independence would be merely nominal, and as incompatible with the safety of those very countries as with that of Europe itself. The greater number happily come within the former class. If the allied armies should be so

opened your eyes, and clearly demonstrated to you that your internal political organisation was the real ground of com-

far successful, as to deprive France of all the countries she has acquired since the revolution, it would certainly be their first object to restore the republics of the United Provinces, and of Switzerland, the territories of the King of Sardinia, of Tuscany, of Modena, (under the protection of Austria,) and of Naples: but the territories of Genoa and of the Italian Republic, embracing the three legations, as well as Parma and Placentia, and on the other hand the Austrian Low-Countries, the countries on the left bank of the Rhine which formerly belonged to the German Empire, belong to the second class. With respect to the Italian provinces just named, experience has shown the little inclination felt by some, and the scanty means possessed by the others to resist the aggression or the influence of France. The King of Spain has unquestionably participated too deeply in the system of which a great portion of Europe has been the victim, to justify any consideration of the ancient interests of his family;* and the late conduct of Genoa, and of a few other Italian states, give them no claim to the justice or the generosity of the allies. It is manifest, besides, that all those petty sovereignties could no longer consolidate their political existence, and would only have the effect of weakening and paralysing the moral strength which ought as much as possible to centre in the principal power of Italy.

"It is needless to dwell particularly on the subject of the Low-Countries. The events that have occurred no longer admit of the question whether they should be restored to the house of Austria; it follows that fresh arrangements should be adopted in respect to that country, and it is evident that it can never exist as a separate and independent state. The same considerations nearly apply to the ecclesiastical electorates, and to the other provinces situated on the left bank of the Rhine, those countries having been finally detached from the Empire, and indemnities having been granted to their former possessors. It does not therefore appear contrary to the most sacred principles of justice, and of public morality, to establish in respect to one or other of these countries such arrangements as might be deemed suitable to the general interest; and it is evident that after so much misery and bloodshed, there exists no other means of succeeding in the important object of consolidating anew the repose and safety of Europe upon a solid and permanent basis. It is fortunate that such a plan of arrangement, so essential in itself to the attainment of the object in view, may also contribute in the highest degree to the attainment of the means by which that important aim may be promoted.

* Whilst speaking of the great principles of justice, Pitt, in this place, discovers the leopard's claw. Spain has acknowledged that she had the same maritime interests as France. The princes of its royal house may therefore be plundered in order to gratify the cabinet of London. Such are the principles of justice and legitimacy upheld by that cabinet!!!

plaint against you; and if, instead of the enemy having dictated conditions to you, you have, on the contrary, hurled

"It is unquestionably of the utmost consequence, if not of the most absolute necessity, in furtherance of that object, to secure the vigorous and effectual co-operation of Austria and Prussia; but there is little reason to expect that either one or the other of those powers can be induced to embark in the common cause, unless they be afforded the prospect of obtaining some important acquisitions as the reward of their efforts. In consideration of these motives, which have already been urged, his Majesty conceives that nothing is so calculated to contribute to the common security as an offer to Austria of fresh means of opposing the dangers she has to apprehend from the fortresses of France on the side of Italy, and to Prussia, of being placed in a similar position with respect to the Low-Countries. The relative situation of both powers would naturally render those two countries the points to which they would respectively turn their attention.

"In Italy, sound policy requires that the power or influence of the King of Sardinia should be augmented, and that Austria should resume an attitude which might furnish her the means, in case of attack, of conveying an immediate and prompt assistance to her possessions. *His Majesty perceives with satisfaction, from the secret and confidential communications your Excellency has just transmitted*, that the views of *the court of Austria are in perfect unison with this principle*, and that *the extension aimed at by that court may not only be admitted with safety, but that it may be farther increased in attention to the general welfare.* In other respects, his Majesty entirely adopts the plan of arrangement which his Majesty the Emperor of Russia desires to see carried into effect in that country. His Majesty considers as indispensable to the general safety, that Italy should be withdrawn from the dominion and influence of France, and that no power should be tolerated in that country which would not readily enter into a general system for the support of its independence. It is essential, therefore, that the provinces at present comprising what is called the Italian Republic should be given to other sovereigns. In the distribution of these provinces, it will no doubt be necessary to give an augmentation of power and wealth to the King of Sardinia; and it seems proper that his territory, as well as the duchy of Tuscany, which it is intended to restore to the Grand-duke, should be brought into immediate contact with the possessions of Austria, or within reach of an easy communication with them. Upon this principle, it would appear that the whole territory at present composing the Ligurian republic, might be united to Piedmont.

"Supposing that the efforts of the allies should be crowned with the most complete success, and that the two objects hitherto discussed should be completely secured, his Majesty would nevertheless consider that salutary work as still imperfect, if the restoration of peace were not accompanied by the most effectual measures for securing the solidity and permanence of the system so established. Much will no doubt be obtained towards the future repose of Europe by those

back upon themselves the degradation they intended for you, to what cause are you indebted for your success, if not to the battle of Austerlitz?

It was again the Emperor who, on that occasion, extended his shield over France, after bringing her triumphant out of the struggle by the power of his mighty genius. When, in the following year, he conquered at Jena, and afterwards at Friedland, was it not in his power to give way to the allurements of victory? Had he bent his mind to this act of weakness, what could have prevented his performing the part of an ambitious man? Might not the treaty of Tilsit be opposed to all the reproaches of that description which were levelled at his character? I now come to the enterprise formed against Spain, the only one that public opinion in France has raised her voice to condemn, so far as to ascribe to it all the calamities which have desolated our country. The Emperor's projects on the Spanish peninsula were not more ambitious than those of Louis XIV.; but the projects of the latter monarch were more skilfully managed; for, as to the rights of either upon the country, they consisted in the common interest of the people of both nations, and in the means which both monarchs had at command, in their attempt to conquer the obstacles they could not fail to encounter. If, in consequence

territorial arrangements, which will form a much stronger barrier against the ambition of France than any yet established; but in order to render such security as perfect as possible, it seems indispensable, that, at the period of the general pacification, a treaty should be concluded in which all the principal powers of Europe shall take a part, and which will have the effect of securing upon fixed and acknowledged bases their possessions and respective rights, such as they shall have been established; and those powers should reciprocally pledge themselves to a mutual protection and support against any attempt at infringing that treaty. It would restore to Europe a general system of international law, and aim, as much as possible, at repressing all future enterprises calculated to disturb the general repose, and especially to defeat any projects of aggrandisement and ambition similar to those which have produced all the calamities that have desolated Europe since the unfortunate era of the French revolution."

of the principle which determined Louis XIV. to transfer the crown of Spain to his grandson, the Emperor could be authorised to undertake the same work, must it not be admitted that he had at least seized the most favourable opportunity for carrying his views into effect, by obtaining a sanction to those views from the only power that could oppose him, a power whose weight was sufficient to maintain the peace of Europe? What then must be thought of the circumstance that, in despite of the engagements recently entered into with him, the repose pledged to him was allowed to be disturbed, and he was compelled again to resist, in haste, the aggression to which his allies had already fallen victims in the summer of 1809? Is it reasonable to admit that the enemy, who attacked him without any previous declaration, were more authorised to feel apprehensions for their own safety, than he was justified in the conclusion, of their having undertaken this new war merely because they expected that the distance of his army would afford them every facility for revising all their preceding transactions with him? If this be not an unreasonable supposition, it will be still less so to point out what would probably have happened, as a consequence of the enemy's success, if the campaign of 1809 had terminated in their favour. Now, what is the event of that scientific campaign, which again bereft them of the power of injuring us? The battle of Wagram.

It was again the Emperor who, on that occasion, preserved France from all the disastrous results which would have attended a reverse of fortune. He concluded peace in 1809, because the indifference of the Russians, who had guarantied to him the repose of the north, clearly indicated that he ought not to rely upon them. He was the more justified in drawing this conclusion, when that power showed a repugnance to cement her alliance with him. Was it then unreasonable in him to form a closer connexion with Austria, who willingly, and even anxiously, offered the Archduchess

Maria Louisa in marriage? Once united to that power, was it a mad enterprise to attempt, in his turn, to open a new account with the Russians? It must assuredly be allowed that he could not possibly adopt greater precautions towards securing his eventual success. All Europe, excepting England, was marching under his banners; and, in all probability, had he delayed another year the formation of that crusade, more than one power would have rejected the proposal of taking part in it.

A single winter destroyed every thing, and hurled back upon the Emperor the storm which he had brought upon his enemies. It was beyond his power to foresee this misfortune; but, by incredible efforts of genius, he recovered his superiority at Lutzen. There again he upheld the edifice, which was perhaps on the point of crumbling to ruins. It is possible that at Prague sufficient efforts were not made to detach Austria from the coalition; but that coalition was in arms, and united in one solid mass; it did every thing to elude a peace. The battle of Dresden took place: unfortunately, that noble feat of arms was followed by a series of reverses which presaged our decline, and the downfall of the hero who had hitherto supported us. I will not resume a long recital of those events, and shall confine myself to a few reflections. The enemies pretended to wage war against the Emperor only. It is true that they entertained a feeling of bitter animosity against him: this was quite natural. Experience had told them that he alone was capable of opposing the execution of the projects they had constantly aimed at since 1792. They endeavoured to detach the French from their sovereign. Laying out of consideration the differences of opinion which still broke their unanimity, and all the reproaches which they deemed themselves warranted in directing against their sovereign, the French overlooked the circumstance that they had placed the revolution, and their own interests, at all hazards, under his protection; and that by deserting him in the

midst of a danger which threatened them no less than himself, they placed him under the necessity of becoming bankrupt to them: this is what actually came to pass. The Emperor once overthrown, all the circumstances attendant upon that event followed as a natural consequence; and whatever complaints the French may attempt to indulge in, it will always be replied to them—Trust to Punic faith!

The men who have thus led astray the nation, which retains all its goodness and integrity of character unsullied, are the same who took the lead in all the serious disorders which occurred since 1789 until that disastrous period, and who have, on each occasion, exhibited themselves in features of still greater depravity. What do they now reply to that very nation, who is clamorous in her demands for a restitution of the price of the efforts she had made during a period of twenty years, and of the blood which her children have lost in her defence? Will they send her to the King, or the Princes of the house of Bourbon? But the King cannot be accountable for what he never received. The provisional government of M. de Talleyrand, in making a traffic of the armistice which preceded the King's entry into Paris, has placed the monarch under the impossibility of claiming those rights of conquest which the nation had it in her power to assert. The provisional government has alone accomplished her ruin, and has perhaps scattered over the country the elements of fresh disorders. The French will, in short, be addressed in these words:—If the Austrians had abandoned their monarch on the two occasions of your obtaining possession of Vienna, the Austrian monarchy would have been lost. If the Prussians had been faithless to their king after the misfortunes which afflicted their country, their political existence was at an end. If the Russians had likewise abandoned the Emperor Alexander because we were masters of Moscow, that vast monarchy would have been dismembered. Those three nations have patiently borne the infliction of

lengthened calamities, and have obtained the reward of their perseverance. As to you, Frenchmen, you have shut your eyes to the fact, that if you were not brought under the yoke fifteen years before, the cause was to be found in your having the Emperor at your head. You will now have an opportunity of satisfying yourselves that if the enemy bear you down with all the weight of their resentment, it is because they no longer fear the prince who protected you; and no obstacle opposes their carrying into effect the decree pronounced against France in 1792.

Would it have cost you as much, had you afforded him the means of defending you, as it has cost you since you have separated from him? Suffer, therefore, with patience, and beware of complaining; but, above all things, avoid fresh disorders, which would accomplish the destruction of the political existence still remaining to you. Recollect that you still reckon twenty-four millions of men, with uniformity of laws and of language: this resource, wielded by the counsels of prudence, is yet incalculable.

CHAPTER XVIII.

State of public opinion—Composition of the ministry of Louis XVIII.—Intriguers again place their irons in the fire—M. Fouché—Strange confidential communication of the Duke Dalberg—Designs meditated against the person of the Emperor—The King rejects them—M. de Talleyrand—His measures previously to his departure for Vienna—Projects of general massacre—What happens to the author.

I SHALL run rapidly over all that took place in the interval between the King's arrival and the return from the island of Elba. I was no longer placed in a situation that afforded me the means of forming a correct opinion. I shall only relate the precise facts, and prefer falling into omissions

rather than narrate any circumstance the truth of which might perhaps be contested.

The forfeiture once proclaimed, every one made up his mind, and the house of Bourbon acquired on its return to France a moral power of opinion which might be compared to the power wielded by the Emperor against the Directory on his arrival from Egypt. It needed but very trifling efforts to secure a peaceful reign to the King. If the events which had restored him to the throne had not been turned into a revolution, which usually brings on another; had he come to take his seat in the Tuileries without effecting any other alteration than in his domestic mode of life, there is no doubt that the administration would have proceeded without meeting any obstruction in its course. Many reasons would have contributed to this repose; the management of public affairs was in the hands of men of talents, who had long been accustomed to direct them. In the second place, there is generally felt in France a want of a steady government: every one is accordingly disposed to obey as soon as the measures adopted are founded in reason. With the exception of the two administrations of the police and of foreign affairs, which should always be entrusted to men possessing the private confidence of the monarch, the King could not adopt a more judicious choice than what had already been made by the Emperor.

Such an arrangement, however, did not answer the purpose of those intriguers who had grouped round the provisional government. The latter endeavoured to keep the King in check, and to assume a position sufficiently commanding to enable them to remove all those who might have been disposed to draw the prince's attention to their conduct.

These gentlemen had not, in fact, compromised with foreigners, and overthrown the Emperor, for the purpose of remaining in their former obscurity. They had merely sold

themselves to the enemy with the view of obtaining the first places in the state; they had no notion of being disappointed; they accordingly neglected no means of persuading that they ought to be suitably provided for.

The King was not acquainted with any of them. He could not avoid trusting to those who presented themselves in the character of men who had risked every thing to procure his return. He accordingly confirmed, with a few exceptions, the selection made by the provisional government. The consequence was, that the majority in the council remained devoted to M. de Talleyrand.

This observation is not unimportant, owing to the inferences about to be drawn from it.

Talleyrand was minister for foreign affairs:

The Abbé de Montesquiou, minister of the interior:

The Abbé Louis, a friend of Talleyrand since 1789, minister of finance:

General Dupont, a dependant of Talleyrand, minister of war:

Malouet, who was much attached to the King, but a dupe of Talleyrand, was minister of the marine:

M. de Vitrolles, minister secretary of state.

The police of Paris, as well as of the kingdom, was in the hands of M. Beugnot, who was too upright a man not to be the dupe of M. de Talleyrand. At first only one director-general of police was appointed, owing to a circumstance which I shall presently explain.

The national guard was confided to General Dessoles, and the ex-imperial guard to Marshal Oudinot.

The Duke Dalberg and Beurnonville were ministers of state. How could the King, thus surrounded, have stirred a step without M. de Talleyrand? Matters accordingly went on indifferently well for the space of two months. The King could not acquire in a shorter time a knowledge of the men with whom he was brought into contact.

The Chamber of Deputies was convoked. A call was made for the chamber which had been adjourned by the Emperor in the preceding month of January. They hastened to meet, with minds thirsting for revenge. The return of the Bourbons was supposed to have been brought about and prepared long beforehand, and consequently accompanied with every guarantee to public freedom so ardently expected; all fancied they had reached the happy goal, and were as unsparing of praises to the new comers as of insults to the Emperor.

It is impossible to abstain from indulging in gloomy reflections on the national character, or comparing the invectives uttered in the tribune with the adulations which had so often resounded from it; so true it is that conquest alone can keep alive the spirit of enthusiasm; and that the successful issue of a contest constitutes the claim to glory, and not the nature of the interests which it is attempted to defend.

The more violent were the speeches uttered, the greater freedom was enjoyed by the public press, the more the King felt on the one hand the moral force which he possessed, and on the other the obligation of assuming a different position from what had been created for him by the provisional government.

The same consideration made the latter sensible of the necessity of reinforcing its own party; and this circumstance afforded me reasons for anticipating the projects meditated by M. de Talleyrand. It was indispensable for their execution that the foreigners should have previously retired from our territory; he accordingly accelerated this measure, and we were not long in getting rid of them.

This object being accomplished, he endeavoured to swell the numbers of his partisans, and had recourse to the men commonly denominated Jacobins. They had long ceased to exist as a body; but it was necessary to create them, and the following means were resorted to for the purpose. The re-

port was spread that they existed in considerable strength, and that they already showed signs of agitation. This was brought under the King's notice, in order to find an opportunity of mentioning the name of M. Fouché, for whom it was wished to procure the appointment of minister of police. The Duke d'Otranto was pointed out to him as the only man that France could produce at all calculated by his talents for properly discharging the duties of that office, as alone capable of keeping the Jacobins in check, who were the more to be dreaded as they carried on an intercourse with the *illuminés* of Germany.

It was with the view of procuring for him the portfolio of the ministry of police that a mere director-general was at first appointed to that department, as the latter could not have felt offended at a cabinet minister being placed over his head.

Had M. Fouché been made acceptable to the King, the party of the Jacobins might easily have been re-organised, under the semblance of his opposing and keeping them in check. Those demagogues would have been raised to official and elective functions. In this manner would have been laid the foundation of the project which it had been felt necessary to abandon when the allied sovereigns had declared for the Bourbons.

The King obstinately refused to accept of M. Fouché; and thus unsuspectingly defeated the meditated project. I was told the following anecdote on the subject by the Duke Dalberg himself:

The King had been already a fortnight in Paris, when all those who had received honorary titles from the Emperor were admitted to the distinction of being presented. The dukes amongst others, were invited, through the columns of the *Moniteur*, to make their appearance. There was no end to the insults lavished upon me; I was assailed in pamphlets, and cried down in the newspapers: all this sufficiently indicated

on what footing I stood at the palace; and I took care not to present myself.

I waited for a second invitation; it appeared in the *Moniteur*. I made up my mind accordingly, and went to present my respects to the head of the government. Meeting the Duke Dalberg in the saloon of the throne, I entered into conversation with him until mass was over.

He asked me what I intended to do; I replied that I had no plan in view, and merely desired to live in peace, and at a distance from the turmoil of public affairs. I know not where he took up the impression that I was ambitious of serving; but he advised me to renounce all attempts of courting the favours of fortune: adding, that I was a worthy man, but wholly incapable of filling any first-rate office. The statesman had pronounced, and had even acknowledged that there never had been any other skilful man than M. Fouché in the administration of the police department. He informed me that it had been proposed to the King to take him back; but that it was found impossible to conquer the prince's repugnance to employing a man who had voted for his brother's death. M. Dalberg thought this an extraordinary prejudice; and said that it was a great misfortune for France, as M. Fouché was the only man capable of directing it under existing circumstances, and that sad work would soon take place unless a decided course were adopted against the restless minds which kept France and Germany in a state of agitation.

I could not help remarking to him, that entertaining as he did such an opinion, I felt at a loss to account for his having concurred in the destruction of a work which offered so strong a guarantee against the propagation of principles which he appeared to hold in so much dread.

He replied, that it was found impossible to control the tide of events; and no resource was left but to adopt a course

which there existed no means of repelling. "We were greatly alarmed one night," he added; "and if so much hurry had not been evinced in accepting of these, (speaking of the princes of the house of Bourbon,) it was not unlikely that we should have again beheld the Emperor. Had it not been for Marmont, it is not yet quite certain that he would have been dethroned.

"What could we do? we had no time to arrange any thing before their return. We are only now on the point of giving our attention to business. But if we do not succeed in instilling into the minds of these princes a determination to reign in harmony with the liberal ideas, the country will be untenable; every one will have to effect his escape."

Such was the language of M. Dalberg some twenty days after the King's arrival. This afforded me a clue to the object contemplated in the attempt to place M. Fouché in the ministry of the police. An endeavour was already made to secure the direction of the posts, in order to set about the subversion of a government as yet scarcely established.

During the three first months which followed the return of the Bourbons, the public mind was satisfied. Nevertheless, it had already been discovered that no guarantee was taken against the projects which Louis XVIII. might meditate for the future, with the view of bringing matters back to the point at which they existed previously to the revolution of 1789. The immediate attendants upon the King soon became possessed of the confidence to which they were entitled by the position in which they had lived, in consequence of the misfortunes the prince himself had experienced during a quarter of a century.

These attendants chiefly consisted of old men who were no longer acquainted with France. They had retained all the spleen which the events of the revolution had instilled into their minds, and had learned nothing ever since they had been driven to fly for shelter to a foreign soil.

The Chamber of Deputies, on the contrary, was composed of

men who were scarcely acquainted with what the former were unwilling to forget; I mean the minute observances of the old *régime*. The deputies loudly professed all the political principles which had been consecrated by the revolution. It was, therefore, easy to discover that a state of concord could not be of long duration; and that either the old men would have to reform their ways, an unlikely circumstance, or that the men reared up in the spirit of the revolution must retrograde in their notions, and abjure all the sentiments they had professed with the tenacity of dogmas, or followed from pure habit for the last twenty years.

The summer of 1814 passed off in this manner. Towards the month of September, indications were afforded of all that yet remained to be done, in order to obtain what was so long called for; and that much more would in all probability be demanded, without any prospect of a right understanding.

It must be supposed that notwithstanding the swarm of productions of all kinds which were published on the subject of constitutions and of governments, no clear suggestions were ever presented to the public mind; otherwise, it must needs be acknowledged that a great want of sagacity was displayed in overlooking them. We have now been fighting nearly thirty years for a constitution; and by dint of aiming at perfection in the concoction of one, we have ended by having none at all.

Whilst discussions were going on respecting the rights of man and individual liberty, we beheld the proscription of citizens entitled to respect on the score of their long services, and the nation enslaved by being deprived of the first of prerogatives. Whilst plans of finance were under discussion, and the national prosperity engaged the attention of government, we further witnessed the destruction of the public wealth, and the submission to all those disastrous arrangements which have placed every thing, the territory itself, under mortgage, for the fulfilment of engagements entered into with the enemy.

A constitution is no doubt a very necessary object; but it

is equally indispensable to place at the helm of the state men whose intentions are pure, and whose conduct is no less honourable.

The same men who had attributed to their influence those events which brought about the return of the house of Bourbon, were particularly attentive in watching the contrast existing between the sentiments entertained by the attendants about the King's person, and those which animated the majority of Frenchmen.

Experience has sufficiently demonstrated the eventual issue of internal disunion, when the nation is at variance with the governing power. On the present occasion, it was already foreseen that a fresh catastrophe would be the consequence of this state of things, which had, nevertheless, so recently unfolded itself to our view. But when there exists a misunderstanding upon principles, it equally exists in respect to the consequences to which it necessarily leads. The opinions of all parties silently harmonised with each other: societies were soon observed to form on all sides, in which the government, and every act of its administration, were freely censured.

From that moment, M. de Talleyrand and his colleagues bethought themselves of the task of preparing an order of things which might be substituted to the established one, in case they could succeed in effecting its downfall.

In the mean while, the King appointed this diplomatist as his ambassador at the congress assembled in Vienna. M. de Talleyrand repaired to that capital in the company of the Duke Dalberg, for whom he procured a diplomatic character. Nevertheless, he adopted the precaution of organising his correspondence with Paris upon a safe basis, in order to acquire correct information of whatever might occur.*

* M. de Talleyrand wrote several letters to Madame Aimée de Coigny, who was one of his female correspondents, and intimated to her that nothing better could be done at present than to cling to the constitution.

He procured the temporary appointment to the ministry of foreign affairs for M. de Jaucourt, his dependant; and afterwards took his departure for Vienna.

On quitting Paris, M. de Talleyrand was fully convinced that a fresh revolution was unavoidable. He had accordingly endeavoured to find out on which side the majority might be induced to lean. The Duke of Orleans had already been spoken of. But this idea was soon dismissed; because that prince did not offer adequate securities against the disadvantages, which were found to be insurmountable in respect to the attendants of the princes of the elder branch: in other words, the Duke of Orleans would not have sufficiently estranged himself from the emigrants, and all those who are generally included under that common denomination. As no desire was felt for a republic, or an elective government, it was considered that the most rational course of proceeding would be to adhere to a regency. In furtherance of this object, however, it was necessary to adopt some course against the Emperor, who might abandon his island, and reach Paris with the rapidity of an arrow. The authors of the act of forfeiture had set to work. They had associated in their views all disturbers of the public tranquillity, and had formed the project of compassing the assassination of the Emperor. It occurred to them to connect the public authority with this criminal attempt: the assassin was prepared to strike the blow; it was only necessary to obtain the King's consent. M. de Blacas was applied to. He was prevailed on to submit the project to the sovereign, who refused to listen to it. Nevertheless, the political agitators, to whom his sentiments were made known in terms of reprehension, continued to persist in the guilty determination they had formed.

Another consideration, which determined the adoption of a regency, was the circumstance that the armies had returned to France, after having successively evacuated all the points which they still occupied beyond the frontiers.

The prisoners of war had returned from England, as well as from other countries. They saw all prospects of promotion closed against them, owing to the creation of a company of noblemen, appointed for the purpose of guarding the King's person. Some measures of this kind had afforded pretences to those who were restless and discontented, to vent their inward spleen.

Matters had proceeded at a rapid rate. Already, in the month of October, ten persons were found disposed to arm against the King, for every one who was resolved to defend him.

Other considerations, purely personal to M. de Talleyrand, compelled him also not to lose a moment in endeavouring to alter his position, which he had rightly considered to be of an unfavourable nature, and incompatible with the principles which appeared to constitute the chief basis of the King's government.

His determination was formed when he quitted Paris; but he was undecided as to the most proper means to be adopted, or as to the authority to be substituted to the existing government after its downfall. As he justly foresaw that the majority of the nation and the whole army would be more favourable to a regency than to the Duke of Orleans, who was scarcely better known than the elder branch, he only thought of securing himself against any danger to which he might be exposed, by the return of a government which he had himself overthrown. Accordingly, the main object of his attention at Vienna was the abduction of the Emperor, whom he represented as a weight upon France, and as feeding the hopes of all restless minds. In this respect he was right.

The subject of the Emperor engrossed the attention of all parties. The more consideration was bestowed upon the details of the events which had occasioned his downfall, the greater was the interest felt for him.

Talleyrand had present to his mind the example of the

return from Egypt. He dreaded a second representation of that event. It had so often been asserted that the tranquillity of Europe depended upon the repose of France, that it was easy to perceive that the abduction of the Emperor was necessary to the general welfare. M. de Talleyrand, therefore, succeeded in securing the adoption of this course. The Emperor of Russia alone showed great difficulty in assenting to the proposal; but he at last tacitly consented to it.

It has been asserted that the King of France had given such an instruction to his plenipotentiary. I can only relate what was told to me on the subject; but is it to be believed that M. de Talleyrand would have taken upon himself to open such a negotiation, if it had not been in accordance with his instructions? It was not however an unreasonable wish on the King's part; but it must be allowed, in that case, that he conferred upon the Emperor the right of defending himself, and of forestalling him, as he actually did.

It had never been agreed on that he was not to attack the King of France, still less that he was not to defend himself against the King's aggression. It is unfair to attribute to the Emperor only the afflicting results which attended his enterprise. At some time or other, this question will again come under discussion, though such an occurrence will be much to be deplored.

The congress of Vienna had been but a short time opened, when a change occurred in the administration in Paris, by the death of M. Malouet, who was the minister of marine. This occurrence deprived M. de Talleyrand of one of his votes.

M. Malouet was replaced by M. Beugnot, who has always been a perfect stranger to the marine department. On the other hand, the ministry of police was assigned to M. d'André; a worthy and independent man, who could not be ranked in the class of those who acted under M. de Talleyrand's influence. Finally, the King having discovered certain malpractices in the expenses of the war ministry, withdrew the

portfolio from General Dupont, and conferred it on Marshal Soult, who was still less disposed to place himself under the protection of the diplomatist.

The latter thus found himself deprived of much of his power since his departure from Paris: a circumstance which greatly contributed to induce his bringing the second part of his plan to an earlier termination than he had originally intended.

The imaginations of weak minds were tortured in Paris by pretended projects of proscription: lists were purposely circulated, upon which were inscribed the names of those who appeared to have been the first victims of the work of reaction. The intrigue was carried so far as to have urged the attendants about the King's person into every species of measure most calculated to render him unpopular. This means was probably resorted to with the view of accelerating his downfall.

This state of things could not fail to become the matter of a correspondence between Paris and Vienna, in which M. de Talleyrand was correctly informed of whatever might interest him. Towards the months of November and December, the political horizon around Paris was so deeply obscured even for those who inhabited the capital, that it was difficult not to form a still worse opinion of it, when the state of affairs was only considered through the medium of an epistolary correspondence.

At this period the royal family were beginning to decline in public opinion. So far from recovering their former footing, they daily lost more ground: a twofold circumstance will account for the change.

In the first place, there existed a decided opposition to the political views they were supposed to entertain. The restoration of national property, and other objections of the same nature, had sufficed to detach the people from their cause.

In the second place, there was exercised at this period an

active agency, which allowed no feature to escape that was at all calculated to render the house of Bourbon unpopular. A skilful recourse was had to the arm of ridicule, which in France is so powerful a weapon; and in this crisis it was wielded in every form and shape. An affectation was displayed of despising that dangerous engine; but it inflicted deep wounds. The royal family soon appeared quite isolated in the midst of the French nation.

I had formerly been too much engaged in public affairs not to seek for the causes of what was now so palpably apparent, and so general, that in the country, where I lived in a state of retirement, the country people told me to wait with patience, that the crisis could not last.

Nevertheless, it was not until some time afterwards that I ascertained the origin of the symptoms which I had discovered from my place of banishment. I will mention the circumstance just as I received it; but I must first relate an anecdote personal to myself, as it comes in support of the opinion which it was attempted to countenance respecting the formation of lists of proscription.

I always imagined that the order given to me to quit Paris was to be ascribed to some conspirer of fresh revolutions. However reluctant I felt to obey the order, I was compelled to give way; as I was not in so secure a situation as to warrant my braving the spirit of malice, which was unrelenting in its persecution of me. It was besides so easy a matter for the intriguers of new plots to ascribe their words and deeds to a man who had been minister of the police, that I was bound to act with circumspection. Matters had come to such a pass, that my most trifling movements gave rise to suspicions. The following fact will attest the truth of my assertion.

I had given myself up to agricultural pursuits: the potato crop had failed, and I was compelled to order the purchase of two or three hundred sacks of that root at the dif-

ferent markets in the neighbourhood of Paris; from whence, after having been stored in one of the coach-houses of my hotel, they were brought to my estate, at the distance of ten leagues from the capital. Would it be believed that so trivial a circumstance should have become a state matter; and that some one had the boldness to address charges against me to princes of the blood for having hoarded up provisions, and meditated the design of starving the city of Paris? An order was given to the commissary of the district to certify the existence and the quantity of those potatoes, and to receive my declaration as to the use I intended to make of them. That ridiculous visit was carried on with the utmost rigidity. I am bound to acknowledge that the agents of police were ashamed of their task; but they were compelled to obey.

Being forced to quit Paris, I retired to my estate, where I resided alone; my wife and children having remained in possession of my hotel.

We had reached the month of November. A man decorated with honours presented himself at my residence, and requested to speak with me. I admitted him. He stated that he was under obligations to me; and gratitude made it a law for him to communicate a plot which was hatching against me. "Do not remain here, Monsieur le Duc," said he; "do not remain here. I cannot sufficiently recommend your returning to Paris, which you have not been made to quit without a motive. You were to have been called upon the day before yesterday: the visit did not take place; but it is only delayed. In a few days your house will be entered by fourteen persons, under the guidance of D . . . ,* who must be

* This D . . . had been an inferior officer of the army of Condé during the revolution: he is now in Alsace. On the disbanding of the corps of Condé, he returned to France; and I had sent him to Germany as a spy during the campaign of 1805. He had fulfilled two or three missions with sufficient dexterity; and after the affairs of Ulm, I sent him to the army of the Archduke Charles in Italy.

known to you: the others are men of the same stamp (he named them all). They will come to demand your money: this will be the pretence assumed for the purpose of originating a quarrel, in which you are to be assassinated. They are assured of impunity: the report of the expected adventure has already been drawn up for insertion in the newspapers. It is worded in such a manner as to lead to the inference that you had been visited with a view to obtain money from you, and to propose a challenge, which you were to refuse; but compelled by the men of honourable character with whom you were brought into contact, you had been under the necessity of accepting it. And as the story was invented of your wounding some one in your defence, it was further reported, that in the course of this duelling you had wounded a first,

He was to return with information of the breaking up of that army on its way back to Vienna, as soon as this movement should take place.

As he had to pass through that capital, I had intrusted him with a letter for a private individual residing there, who was to hand it over to a third person, for whom it contained notes payable on demand.

D . . . broke the seal of the letter, perused its contents, took out the notes of hand, and, to prevent any claim on the part of the individual for whom they were intended, he denounced him to the Austrian government, who procured his arrest: and D . . . , instead of repairing to the army of the Archduke Charles, proceeded to Bohemia, from whence he came up to the vicinity of Ratisbon; and occasionally crossing over from one bank of the Danube to the other, assuming the character of a Bavarian commissioner when on the Austrian bank, and of an Austrian commissioner when on the Bavarian bank, he levied contributions upon both.

He was arrested whilst engaged in this traffic; and would have been infallibly shot, had not peace been concluded. He was sent back to Paris, in order to be placed in confinement, until we could succeed in procuring the enlargement of the person whom he caused to be arrested by denouncing him to the enemy: and as this could not be effected for some time, D . . . underwent in France the sufferings which he had been the means of inflicting upon his brother spy in Austria.

I was greatly surprised at afterwards finding that this man was made a knight of Saint Louis, door-keeper to the King's apartments, and eventually chief of a squadron in the corps of gendarmerie.

then a second person; all those, in short, who were to pretend their having received wounds; but that you had at last fallen in your turn.

"I can tell you no more without endangering my own safety; but let no consideration keep you at home: for I could not call a second time to put you on your guard."

This worthy man withdrew; and, as may well be supposed, I sent to the minister of police a copy of his declaration, acquainting him at the same time with the names indicated to me. The parties could easily be found out: since this .... was a knight of Saint Louis, and door-keeper to the King's apartments. I caused a communication to be made of his project to his captain, M. de Mortemart; and heard no more of the matter.

Notwithstanding this precaution, I deemed it prudent to return to Paris, and to remain there for some days, in order that the plan of assassinating me at my country-house might be relinquished. It was during this short stay in the capital that I discovered indications of the impending revolution. Its ramifications, however, were only known to me after the return from Elba. I shall record them in this place.

CHAPTER XX.

The project of carrying off the Emperor is determined upon—To what use M. Dalberg was applied—Metternich places himself in communication with Fouché—Questions laid before this diplomatist—Intrigues of Fouché—He is compelled to associate colleagues to his views—They deceive him—Awkward conduct of the court—Various anecdotes—The author sends an emissary to the island of Elba—M. d'André—The author's conversation with that minister.

BEING informed of what was taking place in Paris, and entertaining no doubt that the Emperor would be carried off

from the island of Elba, M. de Talleyrand was wholly bent on accelerating this operation, which was said at the time to have been intrusted to the English admiral, Sir Sydney Smith, whose ostensible mission was to be the command of an expedition against the Barbary states in the Mediterranean.

I only learned this circumstance from what was publicly reported in Paris, where a variety of letters received from London communicated details respecting the congress, towards which all eyes were then turned. The English newspapers also reported that the Emperor was to be removed to Saint Helena; and the report was repeated in the German papers, which the Emperor regularly received at Elba.

No doubt was entertained that this operation would be carried into effect. How was it possible, besides, to refuse credit to the assertion, when the following circumstances are considered, which were communicated to me by M. Fouché himself in the month of May, 1815?

We must call to mind that M. de Talleyrand had the Duke Dalberg in his train. The latter was married to the daughter of Madame de Brignole, who had accompanied the Empress Maria Louisa to Vienna. M. de Talleyrand had thus a natural means of negotiating his personal position with the regent, after ascribing to instructions from the King of France the act of causing the Emperor to be carried off to Saint Helena: a course, however, which was at least as useful to his own views as it could be to the King's interests.

Whilst engaged in an official negotiation on this point, he made use of the Duke Dalberg for the purpose of circulating amongst the foreign ministers the report that there would soon be a necessity in France of breaking off from the house of Bourbon, who could not succeed in winning over to their cause any of the parties into which the nation was divided. He had it insinuated that it was an act of prudence on his part to foresee such an emergency, and be in readiness to substitute any other order of things to the existing one,

unless it were wished that the country should be again thrown into convulsion.

Having presented this emergency as the result of an anticipated foresight of what might come to pass, he was quite sure of being listened to, and of exciting a sufficient degree of attention to create an inquiry into the truth of his assertion, which could not fail to be borne out by all the facts conveyed through the medium of the correspondence from Paris.

Fouché told me that the Duke Dalberg wrote to him at that period, with the view of obtaining from himself certain data on the subject: no doubt intending to turn it in Vienna to his own account. But as Fouché knew the correspondent he had to deal with, he replied that he would not interfere in any thing until he should have received a letter from the Austrian minister. He added, that at this period, and in all probability upon the representations of M. Dalberg, M. de Metternich, intending no doubt to judge of the degree of confidence to be given to the language held at Vienna by the mere deputy of a diplomatist, addressed a letter to him, and that he had sent a reply to it.

He further said, that this first letter of M. de Metternich was followed by four more letters. Feeling thus assured of the intentions of Austria, he set himself to work: until that moment, however, according to his own assertion, he had repelled every entreaty made to him.

"I preserve," added Fouché, "all those letters of M. de Metternich, to be made use of in proper time. They are five in number: he must have as many from myself. One of them was written for the purpose of consulting me on a question which he had laid down under the three following heads:—

"In case the Emperor should re-appear in France, what might be the result of such an event?

"Should the King of Rome be brought to the frontier,

and supported by a corps of Austrian troops, what might this lead to?

"And, in short, if neither occurrence should take place, and if the movement springing from the population should assume a national character, what direction would it take?"

M. Fouché told me that he replied to each question in the following manner:—

"If the Emperor re-appeared on the frontier, all would depend upon the conduct of the first regiment sent against him: should it go over to his side, the whole army would follow its example.

"If the King of Rome presented himself at the frontier under the protection of an Austrian corps, all parties would instantly join him.

"If neither of these occurrences took place, and the revolutionary movement proceeded from the interior, it would be effected on behalf of the Duke of Orleans."

He set himself to work in consequence of these communications.

Fouché and Dalberg are both afflicted with the mania of fancying that they possess the gift of persuasion. They are unwilling to perceive that they are seen through; and that on this occasion more than on any other it was found, that they only aimed at another convulsion, because their personal hopes had been frustrated in consequence of the principles adopted by the princes of the house of Bourbon. They desired nothing more than the first places in the state, and were quite indifferent to the national honour, &c. Such, however, was not the calculation made by the foreigners: it mattered little to them whether MM. Fouché and Dalberg had the first or last places; all they wished was to take advantage of the underhand plots which those two men had it in their power to hatch.

I know not if they were deceived in this case: I am neither justified in doubting or believing it: certain, however, am I that they were both too well known to have it in their power to dupe any one. They thought otherwise: for it is the peculiar characteristic of vanity to be blind to self-defects.

Nevertheless, M. Fouché could not fail to perceive that the house of Bourbon was daily losing ground in Paris, and that a revolution was the more probable, as it was not obstructed by any difficulties. He had had communications with Vienna, and only dreamed of taking advantage of a first convulsion to create a personal position productive of greater advantages to himself.

He accordingly began by sounding the opinions of some young generals amongst those who had been retained on full service, and were in command of troops. He took care to select the officers who were most susceptible of enthusiastic feelings, to portray the misfortunes which oppressed the country, and point out to them that such gallant men as they would never be treated with proper consideration by a government surrounded by none but the old nobility; that, in short, they might expect to be soon discharged from active service.

M. Fouché was not sufficiently known by those to whom he held this language, to enable them to form a correct judgment of his projects. They considered him in only one point of view, and that very superficially: they accordingly fell into the course towards which he intended to lead them.

The affair of General Excelmans occurred in Paris about this time. This officer was employed in the first military division. The minister, after placing him upon half-pay, in consequence of a letter written by him to the King of Naples, under whom he had served as his aide-de-camp, attempted to order him away from Paris. Excelmans refused to submit to his decision, and invoked the clauses of the constitutional

charter. As the public mind was disaffected towards the government, every one took part with Excelmans, and this was considered a favourable opportunity for breaking out.

The minister of war ordered the general to be arrested. The latter took to flight, and demanded a council of war. He was sent before the council sitting at Lille, to which place he repaired. The officers of the garrison went out to meet him in due ceremony, conducted him to the hall where the council was held, and brought him back to his house in the midst of public acclamations after the sentence of acquittal was pronounced. This decision, which was so important from its very nature, assumed a much more serious character owing to the state of the public mind.

M. Fouché availed himself of this circumstance, and, whilst commenting upon it for the purpose of exciting the passions, he caused a communication to be entered into with the generals who commanded the troops out of Paris. He immediately opened an intercourse with some of those who were stationed in the northern garrisons, and soon succeeded in seducing them. He then applied himself to the national guard.

He had a ready access to them by means of M. Tourton. General Dessoles besides, who commanded it, was no novice in revolutions.

He had likewise succeeded in bringing over to his views General Lallemand, who commanded a brigade of dragoons in the environs of Laon and Soissons. He had therefore sufficient means at his command: the only difficulty was to set the whole in motion: for it is no trifling matter to resolve upon breaking down the limits of duty for the purpose of gratuitously embarking in a criminal attempt. None were so sensible of this truth as Fouché himself. He accordingly avoided implicating his name in any proceedings, and kept in reserve the means of effecting his retreat in case of need.

Some street occurrences also took place, which were eagerly laid hold of, and turned against the court.

Mademoiselle Raucourt, the celebrated actress, died. The members of the Theâtre Français, accompanied by those of the other theatres of the capital, paid the last duties to her remains, and formed a very splendid *cortége* on the occasion. They brought the deceased to the church of Saint Roche. The priest refused admittance, and closed the door of his church, where he remained whilst the *cortége* was raising a clamour in the Rue Saint Honoré. A crowd was soon drawn to the spot to witness the sight. They at first contented themselves with laughing at the occurrence: at last they muttered threats against the priest, who persisted in refusing admittance into his church. This state of confusion had already lasted some time when an order came from the Tuileries, where the report had been spread of what was taking place. This order directed the doors of the church of Saint Roche to be opened, and the body of the decoased to be admitted. Malevolence treasured up this fact, and indulged in the most sarcastic jokes on the occasion.

About the same period of time the bodies of King Louis XVI. and of the Queen Marie Antoinette were disinterred, and removed with much pomp on the 21st of January, 1815, from the burial-ground of the Madelaine, in the Rue d'Anjou, to the church of Saint-Denys.

The public mind was so ill disposed, that this circumstance was laid hold of as a signal for breaking out into discontent. The troops had been placed under arms at an early hour. They lined the road from the burial-ground to the gate through which the *cortége* was to proceed on its way to Saint-Denys.

The mortal remains of King Louis XVI. and of Queen Marie Antoinette consisted of a handful of earth, of a whitish appearance, which had been found at the place where they had been buried in quick-lime. It will readily be be-

lieved that they had long ago been consumed: nevertheless, it was asserted that the Queen's cranium, and even one of her garters, had been found. So much the better if this was the case.

These trifling remains had been placed on a funeral car of so disproportioned an elevation, that it was unable to pass under the reflecting lights suspended from the centre of the street. This circumstance had been overlooked, and no precaution had been adopted beforehand for drawing up the lights.

The *cortége* began to move: the funeral car got entangled with the lights: it was repeatedly found necessary to stop in order to remove the impediment. The weather was unfavourable: this circumstance, and the neglect of the administration of public ceremonies, soon had the effect of setting every one in good humour. The people broke out in sarcasms upon the funeral pomp. Some voices even, taking advantage of the moment when the ornaments of the car had got entangled with the lights, uttered the cry *à la lanterne!* It seemed as if the court was purposely led into every act most calculated to afford matter for raillery.

I had not yet grown to manhood when the revolution broke out; but I have heard it repeated by all those who were present at the opening of the drama, that it was by means of trifles of this nature that the leading characters had succeeded in shaking the colossus whose almost immemorial existence appeared to have secured it against the ravages of time.

The greater were the errors committed by the court, the greater the anxiety to take advantage of them. All intriguers were at work. M. Fouché's communications had grown more active; and from the very beginning of February every thing portended an explosion.

The different branches of the King's administration must have laid in an almost dormant state, since, according to a

vulgar saying, *conspiracies were hatching along the hedges, at the street corners.* None but the ministry were ignorant of what was going forward.

Before I proceed any farther, I shall offer a reflection in this place.

I am not writing for party purposes. I merely bring my recollections together, and am not bound to secrecy towards those who not only have not confided any to me, but who have had the baseness to place my name on a list of proscription, where their own names should have stood foremost, because they were the only men really implicated.

I have no desire to denounce any one; but in writing the events of the period in question, I will mention names as often as they may be connected with my narrative.

If I am mistaken in quoting facts, I am ready to be corrected; but as for insults and recriminations, I must decline beforehand noticing them.

I can do no harm to those who have so seriously injured me; besides which, I owe them no more consideration than they have shown to myself, whether on the return from the island of Elba, or on the occasion of the Emperor's last departure. I am tired of being the scape-goat of those disturbers of public tranquillity, and am anxious to restore to them what they have laid to my account. They have the less danger to encounter, as their skill in the work of revolution has already protected them from the consequences they had to apprehend.

M. Fouché considered the King's downfall as certain. His only doubt was as to the form of government which might be substituted to that of the prince. A man who has had the credit of possessing so much talent, was unable to bring two ideas together. That unsteadiness of mind and levity of character so natural to him, had procured the name of cleverness to what was no more than a long series of duplicity. The slightest reflection will suffice to show, that if M. Fouché

had possessed any nobleness of soul, and had frankly served the party which he espoused, he must have long since perished in the struggle. He only kept himself erect in the midst of the revolutionary storms by successively betraying those to whom he had bound himself.

Few persons are better able to judge him than I am, because, having succeeded to his office, I have seen what he had neglected to do, and what he had allowed to be done. From that period I altered the opinion I had formed of him previously to becoming acquainted with his administration. His vacillating conduct at all times has greatly contributed to prevent the public mind from adhering to a principle which had been adopted as the basis of the public tranquillity.

This man, who had held during a period of fifteen years the administrative situation which affords the means of estimating all others, knew not how he should act the day after effecting the King's downfall; for, in short, after destroying, it is necessary to reconstruct, and to do so with that rapidity which is alone calculated to fix the opinions of irresolute minds without allowing the adverse party any time to recover from its astonishment.

He required one person to assist him in the military branch, another in the civil branch. It became necessary for him to associate colleagues to his views. He endeavoured to open an intercourse with two men, who had given proofs of their experience in matters of this nature. They were both well acquainted with the personage with whom they had to deal: they both despised his versatility of character, and felt the greatest aversion for him; but the law of necessity reconciles enemies which it appears impossible to bring to a friendly understanding. The auxiliaries Fouché was desirous of acquiring listened to all he had to say, without, however, committing themselves.

They were possessed of too much experience to become his

dupes. They required, as a preliminary measure, that Fouché should make known to them the means which he had at his command. He did so. I cannot pretend to say whether he told them what he had slightly touched upon with Metternich; but I am inclined to believe it, because an enterprise undertaken with the view of altering the government during the meeting of the congress of Vienna would be a pure act of folly, unless some understanding had taken place with one of the great foreign powers. M. Fouché took care not to be silent on the subject of the objections that may have been made to him; he probably communicated his correspondence with the Duke Dalberg and the foreign ministers. After the communication of such documents, no one could doubt that the enterprise held out a promise of a favourable result. The two colleagues whom Fouché had associated to his work were greatly attached to the Emperor, and incapable of taking part in any plan which had not his interest in view. The Duke, who knew them well, took care to assert that he agreed in opinion with them; but that if he had uttered a single word at Vienna respecting the Emperor, he would not have been listened to; and that, in short, the only means of bringing him back was to begin by recalling his son, because it was natural to restore a father to his child. He persuaded those gentlemen that he had worked for the Emperor; and I have seen them both under the impression that he had really acted in furtherance of the Emperor's interests.

Fouché was deceiving them, as he deceived the generals I have mentioned, with the exception of one or two, in whom he discovered a character well calculated to promote conspiracies. They all imagined that they were set in motion for the Emperor's advantage; but the auxiliaries so often mentioned were thoroughly acquainted with M. Fouché: they only half trusted him, and bethought themselves of leading into a direction in accordance with their own views, all those whom he contemplated to turn in another direction.

Setting to work in this way, they completely succeeded in baffling Fouché's projects.

It cannot fail to be remarked, that every person engaged in this enterprise was playing a double game, and speaking a double language. Will this be called cleverness? if so, I shall soon have an opportunity of drawing the most painful consequences from such versatility of conduct.

The following is a description of our internal condition in the month of February: M. Fouché was, according to his own assertion, in direct intercourse with the members of the congress: there is no doubt, however, of his being so with the Duke Dalberg; that is to say, with Talleyrand, who was endeavouring to clear the ground before him by taking measures for causing the Emperor to be carried off. He was too deeply interested in bringing this enterprise to a successful issue, to allow of any other being undertaken until the first had been accomplished.

Fouché kept up an intercourse in Paris with MM. . . . . and . . . . ., whom he endeavoured to deceive as much as they were attempting to impose upon him. He was moreover in communication with General . . . . and General Lallemand: to some he confided the hatred which he bore the Emperor; with others he deplored his loss. He knew that this was a sure means of bringing them over to him, and he was unsparing in the use he made of it.

Every thing appeared arranged in such a manner as to answer the expectations of the authors of those projects. It was alleged that the breaking out of the revolution was only delayed until the arrival of a courier from Vienna; but a very different occurrence took place.

How could the police of France be ignorant of all these proceedings? It was not for want of confidants, for they were to be found in all directions.

It appears, however, that there was as little secrecy observed in Vienna as in Paris. This will presently be seen.

In the early part of February, a young merchant of the island of Elba arrived in Paris, bringing various commissions from the Emperor's mother for her agent, and charged with the further commission of visiting a relation she had in Paris. He requested to see me; but as I habitually resided in the country, I took advantage of the circumstance to decline the visit, and had no intercourse with him.

I ascertained, at a later period, not only that he performed the commissions intrusted to his care, but that a high functionary having heard of his desire to see me, conceived the idea that I was about to open a communication with the Emperor. He accordingly employed the means at his disposal to suspend the return of this young merchant, in order to give the start to a messenger he was dispatching to the island of Elba. He felt anxious to show that he was always the most zealous in serving, and the most capable of doing so with effect. This was all time lost; as the reader will have recently discovered.

When informed of all the acts of low cunning I have just described, I could not disguise from myself what was about to happen; and I determined to send a messenger to the Emperor, requesting he would place no reliance on any insinuation thrown out to him, as I felt no doubt that it was nothing more than a cloak to some snare, to which he would fall a victim. I considered that M.... was the dupe of M. Fouché, whom I persisted in viewing as the mortal enemy of Napoleon.

My exertions were all in vain: the gauntlet was already thrown down. My messenger learned on the road the fact of the Emperor's landing, and deemed it unnecessary to join him. He returned direct to Paris.

I was at a loss to discover who could have advised the Emperor to adopt that resolution, which I bitterly lamented on his account. It was only some time after his arrival that I was informed of the considerations which had influenced his conduct.

Previously to relating them, I must mention an anecdote personal to myself. I was in Paris towards the end of February, 1815, when I received the unexpected visit of M. d'André, the King's minister of police: this, his first visit to me, happened on the 27th or 28th of February. I could not account for the motive of it, when he informed me of its having been reported to him that I should be glad to see the King, and of his calling in person to ascertain if I would object to acquaint him with what I might know of the impending events.

Should M. d'André read these Memoirs, he will have an opportunity of judging whether I give a faithful account of our conversation.

I was much pleased to see him, because he had acted towards me the part of a conscientious magistrate; and had the courage to defend me against the spirit of re-action, which was unsparing of my character.

"I never expressed the desire of seeing the King, I told him, because I have adopted a course of life which renders me perfectly indifferent to whatever takes place in the world.

"Had I been called to the performance of public duties, I should have served the King as I have served the Emperor, or else I should have tendered my resignation; but so far from its having been intended to employ me, I have been loaded with the bitterest insults; every odious epithet has been lavished upon me. You must acknowledge that unless I were bereft of all feeling, I could not connect myself with a government which has treated me in this manner; I therefore consider myself as perfectly free. I look on, I listen, and I treasure up the fruit of my observations.

"What could I do at court in the position in which I have been placed? The least that could be thought of my conduct would be, that I voluntarily disgraced myself by acting the base part of an informer."

M. d'André here interrupted me, and said:

"By no means, M. le Duc, you are not made to be an informer; but having long filled the station of minister of police, you cannot but be well acquainted with the political atmosphere of Paris, and have formed some opinion on what is taking place. Could you possibly fear opening your mind to the King? It is even your interest to do so, as in case of disturbances you would be one of the first to suffer from them, if there existed any doubt of your fidelity."

"In case of disturbances," I resumed, "I have nothing to fear; I shall be at no loss to place myself under shelter. If it be your wish, however, to know my opinion, I am willing to state it, although you are aware that for nearly eight months past I reside out of Paris; necessarily, therefore, my ordinary sources of information must have altogether ceased. What I perceive in the capital is a key to what I noticed in the country: it proves to me that all minds are a prey to a spirit of restlessness, which is carried so far that fresh disorders appear on the point of breaking out before many days shall have elapsed.

"To what can this be ascribed? Paris alone can explain the cause. You have passed through the revolution, and have seen that Paris gave the impulse to the provinces: at a still more recent period, Paris decided the catastrophe of the Emperor's downfall. Paris itself is guided, in this case, by a regulator; which is no other than the palace of the Tuileries. Look at what is going forward there, and you will then discover the cause of the unfavourable change in public opinion with respect to the court.

"Compare the sentiments with which the court is at present viewed, with the greetings with which it was welcomed on its first arrival, and you will then be compelled to acknowledge that there has been a want of skill in the management of a political machine which might otherwise work its way unassisted, owing to the necessity it is under of continuing its movement.

"Every one is persuaded at the present day that it cannot any longer proceed in its usual course, and all are already preparing for the events they deem to be near at hand.

"Nevertheless, I am of opinion that by prudent management the machine of government may be carried on during the King's life; because, generally speaking, he is greatly esteemed, and it is believed that he opposed with all his might every measure of re-action; but I cannot dissemble my opinion, that the chiming of his *de profundis* will sound as a tocsin against his successor. It would occupy too much time to tell you my reasons for this opinion: you cannot but have noticed what is taking place. Public opinion and public confidence are directed into another channel.

"I cannot say whether there exist any intriguers who excite and fret the public mind. I have given no attention to the subject, feeling perfectly indifferent about it. I desire for myself no better position than my present one. This is not your case; you stand upon a volcano which will shortly explode. I know not who will benefit by it; but of this I am quite sure, that no party is at work for the Emperor; because the promoters of disturbance are apprehensive of his return.

"Such, sir, is my mode of thinking respecting the situation of affairs. You will have a particular opportunity of experiencing that the power of the police is very slender, when all the props of the public administration are giving way at one and the same time. The King appears to rely upon some of his marshals for the purpose of keeping the troops in check. He will see what those gentlemen will do, when an opportunity shall be afforded them of choosing between him and their private interests."

When I was holding this language to M. d'André, it was quite unknown to me that a messenger had been sent to the island of Elba; I only learned it on the Emperor's return.

M. d'André withdrew; and when he will have learned, five

days after our conversation, that the Emperor had landed on the coast of Provence, he will probably have imagined that I was aware of the meditated landing, and had concealed it from his knowledge: the fact, however, is, that I was perfectly ignorant of it.

CHAPTER XXI.

Motives which induce the Emperor to attempt recovering possession of the throne —Accidents of his navigation—The Prince of Monaco—The Emperor presents himself alone in front of the troops—Dialogue with a chief of battalion—Entrance into Grenoble—Capture of Lyons—Marshal Ney—He is the only one of whom the Emperor stands in dread—Notification which he causes to be made to him—M. de Bourmont.

I RESUME my narrative at the point where I broke off; and will first relate the Emperor's motives for quitting the island of Elba. This determination was not adopted in consequence of the report of the young merchant, since he had not yet found time to join him. Neither was it owing to the report of the emissary sent to him; since, on his arrival in the island, the Emperor's preparations were in readiness. Nothing more remained to be done, except to embark the troops.

He was informed in the following manner of the dangers which threatened him. I have already stated that the secret of the fate reserved for him was not better kept in Vienna, than they were silent in Paris respecting the revolution contemplated.

The Congress had drawn to Vienna a great number of foreigners: amongst them were to be found many military officers who had served under our standards. One of them who had been attached to the Emperor's household, was informed by a person of rank of the plot meditated by

the French plenipotentiary against this prince. He redoubled his inquiries with all the means already at his disposal, and soon acquired a knowledge of the fact which he had at heart to probe to the bottom.

That officer, who had been one of the Emperor's high administrators, immediately departed from Vienna, and proceeded through Italy to join the prince at the island of Elba. He informed him of all that had been planned against his liberty; adding certain details which carried conviction to the Emperor's mind: for, on the one hand, these data coincided with the projects of the return of the regency, which he was already apprised of; and on the other, he entertained the highest confidence in the nobleness of character of the foreign officer, who exposed himself to so many dangers for the purpose of putting him on his guard.

The Emperor had hitherto received no other information than what the public papers communicated to him. He had no other intelligence from France; but these were sufficient to guide him. He judged of the state of public opinion from the acts of the ministry, as he had done in Egypt through the newspapers with which the English had supplied him.

In this emergency, he formed the plan of returning to France, as he had done on the former occasion. No alternative was left to him. He knew that it was intended to violate his asylum; in which he had no means of defending himself for any length of time, and where it was now even impossible for him to subsist without the allowance guarantied, but not paid to him.

The season of long nights was nearly over: there remained but a few days available to the object of surmounting the difficulties inseparable from a sudden departure with such a numerous attendance. The Emperor determined to brave them; and without communicating his project to any one, he caused the few vessels at his disposal to be got in readiness, so as to be able to transport, all at once, his handful of men.

His fleet consisted of a brig of war and three or four smaller vessels: with this little squadron he came to conquer the kingdom of France.

His arrangements were made; and he only waited a favourable opportunity to depart, when it suddenly offered.

The English had placed Colonel Campbell as a watch over him. Chance would have it that this colonel should fall in love with a woman living at Leghorn. He was often absent, and for a long interval of time. The Emperor took advantage of it. He embarked all his people, and set sail in the direction of the French coast. His departure took place towards the close of February.

On the second or third day of navigation, he was met by a French brig of war, cruising in those quarters with instructions to watch the island of Elba. The captain of this brig was intimately acquainted with the officer who commanded the Emperor's brig: it was to be feared that they might be recognised. This difficulty was overcome; the soldiers were ordered to lie flat on deck; and the brig continued her course without awakening suspicion. Nevertheless, the French brig opened an intercourse with the Emperor's brig, and wished her a happy voyage; so far was it from suspecting what the latter conveyed. They separated, and the squadron proceeded to cast anchor in the Gulf of Juan, on the 1st of March, nearly at the same place where the Emperor had made land on his return from Egypt. He thus disembarked with the whole of his troop, and took up a position on the high road leading to Monaco.

On the very night of his landing, the Prince of Monaco, who was returning from Paris to his principality, fell amongst his advanced posts. He had been aide-de-camp to the Grand-duke of Berg. The Emperor desired to see the prince; and allowed him to proceed on his journey, after having conversed with him.

He began his march without loss of time; and cutting across the mountains, he reached Grenoble in five days.

The garrison of that town consisted of two regiments of infantry, the 5th and 7th of the line, and a regiment of artillery. The whole corps was commanded by the general of division Marchand.

This general had sent a battalion of the 5th regiment to defend a pass two or three leagues in advance of the town, on the road by which the Emperor was arriving.

The column of the island of Elba was no sooner in sight, than the soldiers approached for the purpose of having a view of their former chief. They soon recognised him, by the grey surtout which he always carried over his coat: every soldier in the army had repeatedly seen him in that costume.

The Emperor approached: the battalion observed a deep silence. Its commanding officer ordered them to present: he was obeyed. Had he directed them to fire, there is no knowing what might have happened.

The Emperor allowed him no time to do so. He addressed himself to the soldiers—"Well," said he, in his usual style, "how are you all in the 5th regiment?" The soldiers replied—"Quite well, sire."—"I come again to see you," resumed the Emperor: "are there any amongst you who would wish to kill me?"—"Certainly not," exclaimed the soldiers. The Emperor then passed them in review, according to his wonted practice. Thus it was he became master of this battalion of the 5th regiment.

The chief of battalion appeared dissatisfied. The Emperor asked him how long he had been in the service: the latter named the period of his first enlisting in the ranks.

"Who made you an officer?" continued the Emperor.—"You, sire."—"Lieutenant?"—"You, sire."—"Captain?"—"You, sire."—"And chief of battalion?"—"You, sire."—"I had a right therefore to expect a return of gratitude;

nevertheless, I ask none of you. Give your epaulets to the first captain of the battalion, and retire." The officer obeyed.

This was no sooner done than the Emperor stationed this battalion of the 5th regiment at the head of his column, and marched upon Grenoble, where the report of his first success had preceded his arrival.

General Marchand had ordered the garrison to arms, and the gates of the town to be closed. He had even directed the artillery on the ramparts to be loaded. His order was obeyed, but the shot was placed before the powder.

The spirit of insurrection had spread among the troops. The 7th regiment of the line, commanded by Colonel Labedoyère, marched out of the town with drums beating, and with its eagles, which the regiment had preserved, proceeded to meet the Emperor, and joined him shortly after the battalion of the 5th regiment.

When the Emperor presented himself before Grenoble, he had already one half of the garrison in his favour. The sappers, who were at the head of his column, began to cut away the gates. The cries of *Long live the Emperor* were resounding through the town: the public mind was thrown into a state of high excitement: those who were inside joined their efforts with those who were attempting to enter it. The gates at last gave way, and the Emperor entered Grenoble in the midst of general acclamations. The town was spontaneously illuminated, and the whole night was passed in the intoxication of joy.

Party spirit has endeavoured to present the Emperor's return as the result of a conspiracy. This opinion can only be entertained by those who have not witnessed the embraces of the soldiers when they met. Conspiracies assume a very different character from that which was exhibited by the meeting of the troops coming from the island of Elba with those who went to oppose them.

The example presented by the garrison of Grenoble was

soon known at Toulon, where Marshal Massena was in command. This city had a strong garrison; and if it did not immediately declare itself, the delay is merely to be ascribed to the circumstance that the Emperor did not travel in that direction.

The landing of the Emperor was only known in Paris five days after that event; that is to say, when this prince was about to enter Grenoble. Marshal Macdonald was sent to assume the command of the troops at Lyons, and Marshal Ney to place himself at the head of those at Besançon. Count d'Artois and the Duke of Orleans also repaired to Lyons. As, however, the Emperor did not stop at Grenoble, and had brought the garrison away with him, amongst others, the regiment of artillery with its field-pieces, he reached Lyons nearly at the same time.

The intelligence of his march had already spread from one extremity of France to the other. The general officers had been sent back to their respective governments. The limits of the country were no longer at so great a distance as formerly. The troops were informed nearly at the same moment of the Emperor's arrival in France; they all felt anxious to join him.

At Lyons, the bridge of La Guillotière had been barricadoed with beams, and troops had been placed in order of battle along the quay. The Emperor arrived in person at the head of his column, and proceeded along the bridge as if the troops on the other side were belonging to him. He was not mistaken; they no sooner perceived him at work removing the barricade than they hastened to assist in throwing into the Rhone the beams which separated the respective columns; this obstacle removed, the soldiers rushed into each other's arms. The Emperor entered Lyons, and went immediately to visit the regiments which were under arms; they received him with acclamations of *Long live the Emperor!*

The Count d'Artois, the Duke of Orleans, and Marshal

Macdonald were compelled to fly in all haste, and returned to Paris.

We now behold the Emperor in possession of Lyons and at the head of a body of troops sufficiently numerous to enable him to organise the war in that quarter, if any necessity had existed for such a course. He since told me that the rapidity of his march had for object to enable him to come up with the troops: his only fear was that, instead of their being sent against him, they might have been withdrawn to such a distance as to prevent his overtaking them; so much did he rely upon the soldiers' affections.

Whilst the Emperor was at Lyons, Marshal Ney, who had assembled the troops of his own government, had approached as far as Lons-le-Saulnier. The Emperor stood more in dread of him than of any other of the marshals. He felt apprehensive that he would seek an opportunity of attacking him, and resolutely embark in the struggle. He was not content therefore with sending him the proclamation which was circulated in all directions. This course was too much worn out in France to deceive the marshal. The Emperor ordered General Bertrand to intimate to him by letter that he should take care of what he was about; he made him responsible for the smallest effusion of blood. He apprised him that his return to France was not a mere boyish expedition. He was certain of success, whatever he, Marshal Ney, might do to obstruct his views. This letter of General Bertrand was delivered to Marshal Ney at Lons-le-Saulnier, where he was attended by Generals Lecourbe and Bourmont. None of them were proof against this injunction. They imagined that the Emperor acted in concert with some power, and that there would be madness in attempting to resist him. The two generals were the first to advise the marshal not to oppose a torrent which was too powerful for any resistance he could bring against it.

The troops, besides, were already apprised of what had occurred at Grenoble and Lyons. They would have consented

to nothing short of joining the Emperor. Ney assembled them, and read the Emperor's proclamation, adding another to it which he had caused to be drawn up by one of his secretaries;* for all those who have been acquainted with him are aware that he was perfectly incapable of composing proclamations.

It is certainly impossible to approve of his conduct. It behoved him to imitate Macdonald and to withdraw. This could not have altered the course of events; and he would have saved appearances, and avoided compromising himself.

It must, however, be added, that MM. Lecourbe and Bourmont were with him when he consented to be led astray. There can be no doubt of his having followed the advice of those two generals.

After committing this error, Marshal Ney fell into a still greater one. He acknowledged the letter which General Bertrand had addressed to him, and also wrote to the Emperor for the purpose of acquainting him with what he had done, announcing to him, at the same time, that he was about to proceed to Auxerre, where he expected the honour of seeing him. He carried this intention into effect.

Generals Lecourbe and Bourmont had recommended him to adopt this course, in order to avoid a civil war, in which they had no desire of involving themselves. General Bourmont, especially, had still fresh in his recollection all the fatigues and dangers he had encountered as a consequence of our internal discord. He was the person who observed to Marshal Ney that every one would desert him if he resorted to the alternative of a civil war. He told him that he would do much better to take advantage of his position in order to reinstate himself in the Emperor's favour, and not to lose the reward of his past services by a fruitless adherence to the King's cause, which was irretrievably lost.

* I have since met with a highly respectable officer, who assured me that he had seen M. de Bourmont employed at Lons-le-Saulnier, in Marshal Ney's quarters, drawing up the proclamation which the latter ordered to be read to the troops.

CHAPTER XXII.

The Emperor gathers all the troops which he meets on his way—Marshal Oudinot—His prudent foresight—Fouché is at a loss what to augur of the Emperor's return—Course which he adopts—Astonishment of the troops—Interview between Fouché and the Count d'Artois—Departure of the King—Arrival of the Emperor—It might have been supposed that he had merely returned from a journey.

I RETURN to the effect produced on public opinion by the Emperor's approach. All those who took part with the court flattered themselves that his advance would ultimately be impeded; but that, in any case, it would bring about a civil war. The King had sent the Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême to the south, and the Duke of Bourbon to La Vendée. All the means were adopted which suggested themselves as calculated to stop the Emperor's progress; nevertheless, he hastened to every spot where he knew that troops had been stationed. His influence upon them operated with talismanic effect: they no sooner beheld than they immediately joined him.

The imperial foot-guard was at Metz, under Marshal Oudinot's orders. On ascertaining what had taken place at Lyons, and at Lons-le-Saulnier, they did not hesitate a moment in making up their minds. The marshal did the same; and consulted his interest by steering a middle course between the allegiance he owed to the King and the reproaches he apprehended from the Emperor. A species of insurrection broke out among the troops at a given signal: violence had been resorted to: the defection of the corps could not be imputed to him. Nevertheless, he remained at Metz; but a discreet aide-de-camp was sent, on his part, to take the Emperor's orders. He sent his son to Ghent at the same time; and directed him to renew to the King the assurance of his fidelity.

After adopting these contradictory measures, he repaired to

Paris, whither he had been summoned by the minister. The cause of the Bourbons appeared irretrievably lost: the hopes held out no longer appeared to him in any other light than mere chimeras. He furnished all the details in his power respecting the court at Ghent.

Whilst the events I have just related were taking place at Grenoble, Lyons, and other places, the intriguers of Paris were seriously reflecting upon the consequences that might attend the Emperor's return. Fouché did not indulge in the flights of illusion: he knew full well that the whole of France would declare for the Emperor. He was still ignorant of his entrance into Grenoble and Lyons; and as he could not account for so unexpected a return, the first idea which occurred to him was, that M. de Talleyrand had imposed upon him, by affording information to the Emperor of every thing which had been agreed upon, in order, by this means, of creating for himself a favourable position in respect to him. Fouché was the more persuaded of it, as he expected from Vienna the signal which was to have been given to enable him to take a decisive part against the King.

What is still more extraordinary is, that Talleyrand, on the other hand, fancied Fouché to have deceived him, by giving timely intimation to the Emperor; so that they became reciprocally mistrustful and apprehensive of each other. Fouché immediately sought to assume a political attitude, and came to the following resolution.

He determined to serve the Emperor, supposing the latter had received information from Talleyrand; and if his return was his own spontaneous work, in that case to prepare every means of resisting his views.

He was far from supposing that the Emperor would so soon reach Paris, even admitting that no other obstacle had impeded him than the length of the journey. Fouché thought that the distance would afford him the delay requisite for giving maturity to his plan.

He sent for General Lallemand in the evening of the 5th of March, and spoke to him of the necessity of inducing General Drouet to come to a decision, in order, as he said, to oppose the arbitrary measures which the court was preparing against all suspected persons; and after much circumlocution, he concluded by saying that General Drouet ought immediately to set all his troops in motion for Paris, in order to hasten the King's departure.

Fouché aimed at a twofold object. He thought that Drouet would not fail to come to Paris, and that he would do so in time to enable him to assemble the Chamber of Deputies, the members of which were in the capital, and to support it by the national guard. He trusted that, under favour of those measures, he might proclaim any kind of government, and oppose the Emperor's entrance by means of the national guard and of the troops of General Drouet, which he also hoped to compromise. By adopting this course he expected to place himself in harmony with Vienna, and to find time for probing the mystery of the Emperor's return.

General Lallemand accordingly left Paris on the 6th of March, and repaired to Lille, where he stopped until the troops began to move. They partly consisted of the horse grenadiers, as well as the horse chasseurs of the old guard. Lallemand commanded the dragoons stationed in the department of the Aisne, near Soissons. They all broke up, and marched, for several days, on the road to Paris. The court was apprised of this circumstance, and sent Marshal Mortier, in all haste, to Lille, in order to bring these troops back to their garrison. This was the less difficult, as the colonels were not in the confidence of the movements carrying on: they all imagined they were marching in consequence of instructions from the minister of war. When they learned that they had been imposed upon, they raised the less objection to returning to their respective quarters, as they were not ignorant of the Emperor's arrival. They accordingly deemed

it superfluous to take the lead in events which were hastening to claim their participation. The horse grenadiers returned to Arras, after three or four useless marches.

The horse chasseurs alone advanced as far as Compiegne with the dragoons of General Lallemand. They had attempted, on passing through La Fere, to carry off the regiment of artillery which garrisoned that place. It refused to follow them; a circumstance which awakened the suspicions of the chasseurs. "There must be something under all this," said they to each other: "either the gunners are scoundrels, and should be cut to pieces, or we are deceived, and are involved in business of a dubious nature."

On arriving at Compiegne, an attempt was made to prevail upon the 6th regiment of chasseurs to follow the same movement; but it refused compliance. Upon this the officers of chasseurs of the guard assembled, and deliberated on the situation into which they had been involved. They determined to return to their quarters at Cambray; signified this intention to their colonel, General Lefebvre-Desnouettes, and prevailed upon him to fly: he did so, as well as General Lallemand.

The officers of the regiment of chasseurs sent a deputation to the King to renew the assurance of their fidelity; and M. Fouché missed his aim. Had his enterprise proved successful, there is no doubt he would have declared for the Duke of Orleans; because the Emperor being no longer in danger of being seized, as was the case in the island of Elba, Fouché could not have consented to the regency, which would naturally bring the Emperor back. That form of government could only be acceptable to him in the event of the Emperor's death, or of his removal to St. Helena. He was too shrewd to desire the regency so long as the Emperor remained in the enjoyment of his liberty.

General Lallemand was arrested by the gendarmerie. He would have been infallibly shot, had not the Emperor reached Paris with such extraordinary rapidity.

Fouché himself might have been lost, had it not been for the Emperor's prompt arrival. He was informed, on the 10th of March, of the unfavourable issue of his attempt: the events of Grenoble were already known, and those of Lyons fully expected. He applied himself to the object of warding off the suspicion which might eventually attach to him, by soliciting of the Count d'Artois the honour of a private interview: it was granted, and took place at the residence of the Princess de Vaudemont. The ex-minister advised the Prince to appoint the Duke of Orleans regent of the kingdom. He told him that it would otherwise be impossible to prevent the Emperor's arrival in Paris; that his assurance might however be taken, when he promised that Napoleon should not remain there three months. It will readily be believed that he cautiously remained silent respecting the part he had taken in the movement of troops in Flanders, or the correspondence he was keeping up with Dalberg.

It is necessary to observe that Fouché was informed of whatever occurred at the King's council.

I have stated that M. de Vitrolles was named minister secretary of state. In that capacity he acted as secretary to the council. It has been seen that he was intimate with M. Dalberg, and especially with the Princess of Vaudemont, to whom he communicated what it was necessary for Fouché to be made acquainted with. This, I believe, was the manner in which the latter had been informed of the necessity he was under of seeing the Count d'Artois, in order that, happen what might, he should have the benefit of the interview in case of need.

The movement of troops in Flanders had caused the liveliest alarm at court. It was supposed to have been excited by the Emperor's influence; whilst, on the contrary, it would have been directed against him, if affairs had taken the turn which M. Fouché anticipated.

The successive defection of all the troops raised a suspi-

cion in the King's mind that the minister of war, at that time Marshal Soult, was not altogether a stranger to so complete a desertion. This suspicion had perhaps been suggested to him; at any rate, it was a calumny. Marshal Soult had nothing to do with the recent occurrences. Nevertheless, the King displaced him, and substituted in his stead the Duke de Feltre, who had been minister of war under the Emperor.

The Duke de Feltre accepted the appointment, though the game was nearly lost. I have heard many reflections on this subject, which it is superfluous to repeat; for my part, I had not seen the duke since the journey to Blois; and I no longer inquired into the means which each one had it in his power to wield.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that there was a manifest proof of attachment to the King in his acceptance of the war ministry in this emergency; the more so, as the Emperor's absence from Paris could not be delayed beyond ten days.

It was also at this critical moment that the King revived the office of the prefecture of police of Paris, to which he appointed M. de Bourienne. The adoption of these measures came too late: the Emperor was travelling post-haste: the population rushed forward to greet him on his way: all the troops sent against him took the shortest road to join his standards. The catastrophe was impending: a corps was assembled at Villejuif; but the same state of uneasiness continued to prevail, and the King had to make up his mind to quit Paris.

He had repaired to the chamber of deputies for the purpose of inducing it to adopt energetic measures. The Emperor was approaching: the King received nothing more than assurances.

An attempt was made to form volunteer corps: very few persons, however, presented themselves.

At last the Emperor reached Fontainebleau in the evening

of the 19th of March. He was scarcely attended by more than twenty officers.

The King was still in Paris, as well as the Count d'Artois, and the Duke de Berry; but every thing was prepared for their departure. An insurrection was even apprehended; for some artillery was made to bivouac in the court-yard of the palace of the Tuileries.

At one o'clock in the morning of the 20th of March all the King's household troops were assembled in the court-yard of the palace, and on the Place du Carousel. The King entered his carriage, and drove off with the Count d'Artois and the Duke de Berry, who was at the head of the cavalry of the King's household troops.

The body of troops which had been assembled at Villejuif, under the orders of General Rapp, went to station itself at St. Denys as soon as the King had quitted the capital. The utmost calm and silence prevailed in the vicinity of the palace until eight o'clock in the morning.

The King's *cortége* passed along the boulevard, took the road to Beauvais, and from thence to Montreuil-sur-Mer. This led to the belief that the King was proceeding for the second time to England. From Montreuil, however, he repaired to Lille, through Bethune, and Saint-Omer.

The whole cavalry of the King's household troops, forming perhaps a body of two thousand men, was assembled at Bethune. (Berthier, Marmont and Lauriston were there with their respective companies.) The Count d'Artois passed it in review; and after addressing to this corps a few expressions of regret, he announced that the King thanked it for its services, and that each one was at liberty to return home. The greater part accordingly returned to Paris.

The whole day of the 20th of March was employed in insignificant movements. Each one was anxious to take part in the event which was to happen before the close of day. The streets were placarded with proclamations of the Emperor,

which had already been a full week in Paris. Possession was taken of the public treasure; the barracks were visited; and at the same time emissaries were sent to St. Denys to hasten the defection of the troops commanded by General Rapp.

No difficulty was encountered, because the King had taken his departure; and the only object of every one's attention was to secure a position with the ruler who came to replace him. It happened in this case as it has done in every revolution; the name of conspiracy was given to an occurrence which was only the result of the King's leaving Paris. Had he remained, and surrounded himself with all those who were willing to defend him, the problem would probably have been much less easy of solution. The report was spread that Louis XVIII. had been guided by the decision of the council in taking his departure. If he assembled it, we can readily account for this resolution; it is in perfect analogy with the course which the regent was made to adopt in the month of March of the preceding year.

The King, moreover, was surrounded by men who were already at work calculating their private interests, and who, considering the game as lost, were preparing to give it up, and to come to an understanding with the chief they had formerly abandoned. Now, in thus changing sides, it was clearly for their advantage that they should take credit to themselves for having contributed to the King's departure.

I saw on the 23rd or 24th of March, in the hands of a general officer well known to the army, a letter which Berthier had written to him previously to crossing the frontier, wherein he repeated what he had stated at Fontainebleau less than a twelvemonth before, "that he was not the King's man, but a man for the army; above all things, a French heart beat within him; his wish was to serve his country, and not to emigrate. In short, he was already throwing himself upon the Emperor's generosity."

A few days afterwards, he wrote to the Emperor, who

replied to his letter; but it was too late; Berthier had already crossed the frontier when the reply came to his hands. He removed to Bamberg, and endeavoured to return to France: having however been stopped by the allies, he was forced to retrace his steps, and soon came to an unhappy end.

The Emperor reached Paris in the afternoon at the hour of seven. Every thing had already resumed its former aspect, and each one his former post at the palace. The Emperor dined there, and found his apartment ready prepared: it seemed as if he had merely returned from a journey. The officers performing honorary duties, persons in every description of employment, had again taken up their respective functions: the establishment was complete in all its parts. Certain ill-constructed minds have pretended to discover the consequences of a conspiracy in the resumption of the old routine; whilst no one had done more than what he had seen performed by the persons employed at the court of Versailles, on the occasion of the King's return. Some had been upwards of twenty years buried in obscurity; whereas scarcely a twelvemonth had elapsed since the others were discharged.

There was only one battalion of the national guard in the court-yard of the palace at the moment of the Emperor's arrival; but with this battalion were to be seen several thousand officers of all services, who had been put upon half-pay.

A multitude of people had gone to meet the Emperor on the road to Fontainebleau. He came to Paris attended by a crowd of general officers on horseback; passed along the new boulevard, according to his custom whenever he returned from Fontainebleau, crossed the bridge of La Concorde, and entered the Tuileries by the postern adjoining the quay.

His carriage was surrounded by persons on horseback belonging to every corps in the service, who amounted in numbers to a full cavalry regiment. They exhibited an im-

posing aspect of disorder, and deafened the air with cries of *Long live the Emperor!* When he entered the court-yard of the palace, the postilions found it impossible to drive the carriage up to the entrance where the Emperor was to alight. The crowd was such, that the horses were unable to advance. A rush was made towards the carriage; the door was forced open, and the Emperor removed from it. In vain did he attempt to walk either in the court-yard, the staircase, or the apartments. He was fairly lifted up, and carried from arm to arm to his very closet.

He instantly sent for his former ministers, and ordered each one to resume his portfolio. The only fresh promotion was that of M. Fouché, who was placed in charge of the police. It may not be superfluous to relate the following trifling anecdote on this subject: it will prove that the spirit of intrigue was already at work; that is to say, that more attention was bestowed to the object of keeping those persons off who were dreaded from feelings of a personal nature, than of assisting the Emperor by placing near his person all those who were calculated to be of service to him.

I had gone, in the course of the morning, to pay a visit to the arch-chancellor, whom I had not seen for a twelvemonth. I presumed that the Emperor would send for him immediately upon his arrival, as it was his custom to do whenever he returned from a journey, and went therefore to request he would do me the favour to tell the Emperor, if circumstances should render it necessary, that I felt a wish to live in peaceful retirement; and that if he absolutely insisted upon employing me, no consideration should induce me to accept of the ministry of police. I assured him that those functions were altogether repugnant to my feelings, and said that, foreseeing as I did, how the spirit of intrigue would set itself to work in every form and shape, I was not at all disposed to live in the atmosphere of those passions which it was about to bring into play.

The arch-chancellor was, to say the least of it, quite as much wearied of public affairs as I was. He declared to me, that unless the Emperor should authoritatively insist upon it, he also would refuse to accept of any functions.

What I had foreseen actually came to pass. The arch-chancellor was the first high functionary summoned to the Emperor's presence. The ministers, who had likewise been sent for, only appeared one after the other in regular succession. It was an extraordinary spectacle to behold matters returning so quickly to their former state. All met in the same saloon where they had separated a year before, without having scarcely ever come into contact since that period.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Composition of the ministry—M. Fouché placed in charge of the police—What are the considerations which induce his friends to recommend him to the Emperor—What was the object of his ambition—The King does not consider himself safe at Lille.

THE Emperor's dinner was not yet over when an officer arrived from Soissons to report to him that the two brothers Lallemand, who were confined in that city, were in the most imminent danger, and that the sub-prefect refused to set them at liberty. He sent for the minister of police, without specially designating whom he meant; and as there was some hesitation in introducing the minister, he called out my name, and desired me to write to the sub-prefect, and command him to release the two brothers Lallemand from confinement. I complied with his wishes.

Several persons were present when the Emperor gave me this order, and all imagined that I was on the point of being re-instated into the ministry of police. They were ignorant

of my private sentiments, and hastened to oppose by all the means in their power the intentions just manifested by the Emperor.

After conversing with the arch-chancellor, he sent for M. de Bassano, who was more anxious than any one that I should be kept out of the ministry, and who no doubt did not recommend that I should be retained in that office. He already contemplated the idea of placing the Emperor in a dark lantern, and was preparing to place all his friends about his person, to the exclusion of every one else.

When M. de Bassano had retired, the Emperor gave audience to Marshal Davout; and I was next admitted to an audience.

After a short desultory conversation, he asked me if he was to give implicit credit to what the arch-chancellor had stated to him in the morning. I replied in the affirmative. He desired to know the motives of my determination, which I did not conceal from him. I gave him a detail of all the vexations to which I had been subjected during his absence, and confessed that they had removed all relish on my part for public affairs. "Besides which," I added, "if your Majesty should receive a faithful report of all that has taken place in Paris for the last two or three months, you will find that more than one project has been thwarted by your return. Had you delayed a little longer, a very different order of things would assuredly have met your view."

The Emperor smiled, and said to me, "You have therefore made up your mind, and will not accept of the ministry?"—"No, Sire," was my reply.

He was silent respecting the insinuations which M. de Bassano must have thrown out for the purpose of dissuading him from a choice so much dreaded by that minister. He left me the merit of a refusal, although I might not have been appointed. He then endeavoured to compel my ac-

ceptance of the command of Paris, which I declined with still greater obstinacy than I had done with respect to the ministry of police. I even told him that I felt no desire to hold any situation whatever. He replied that this was quite out of the question: it behoved me to exert myself in his service; and he insisted upon my taking the charge of the gendarmerie, since he was compelled to restore the portfolio of the police to Fouché, against whom I had always proved his best safeguard. I had no plausible objection to make, and merely expressed my astonishment at his bestowing his confidence to a man on whom it was so unsafe for him to depend. He then told me of his having been assured that Fouché had laboured in his cause by setting in motion the troops stationed in Flanders. I could not help smiling at the observation, so indignant I felt at his being made to believe this impudent falsehood. What can those men ever allege in their own justification, who, in order to keep out of the ministry an individual whose scrutinising character was an object of terror to them, have not feared to become guarantees for a traitor, who boasted of having been the life and soul of every conspiracy set on foot against the Emperor?

After dismissing me from this audience, the Emperor admitted M. Fouché to his presence. It was a singular sight to behold the spirit of intrigue stationing itself at the very door of the Emperor's closet, and eagerly urging forward a man who had betrayed all parties, and had already decreed the downfall of the sovereign to whom he came to make a tender of his services. The judgment of all was so obscured, that a person of the highest rank felt no hesitation in exclaiming, when the cameleon appeared, "Make way immediately for M. Fouché; he is the man whom it is most essential for the Emperor to see at this moment." That worthy person laments his error even at the present day.

Fouché was accordingly ushered into the Emperor's closet, and without uttering a word of his previous intercourse with

Vienna, he congratulated him on his fortunate arrival. "I felt apprehensive," he added, "lest your Majesty should meet with difficulties on the road. I had accordingly procured the marching of troops, in order to compel the King's departure. If any obstacles had occurred, it was my intention to have proceeded to meet your Majesty."

Such was the language held by Fouché to the Emperor the very night of his arrival. Backed as this man was by his new friends, it was difficult for the Emperor to refuse placing confidence in him. He accordingly named him minister of police. The Duke of Otranto was not pleased with this appointment. He told me so himself on retiring from the audience. The department of foreign affairs was the object of his wishes, and not the ministry of police. The Emperor had compelled his acceptance of the latter, and he had yielded obedience.

It was easy to perceive the motive of this preference: there would have been much less difficulty for him in conspiring, had he held the first station in the politics of the state.

Marshal Davout was appointed to the war department. The other ministers resumed their functions, with the exception of M. Molé, who had held the situation of high-judge previously to the revolution of 1814.

The arch-chancellor held for a short time the ministry of justice; and M. de Montalivet was replaced by M. Carnot.

All these nominations were signed on the morning of the 21st of March. Each of the new functionaries proceeded to take possession of their respective offices.

The Emperor was therefore placed at Fouché's mercy from the very night of his arrival. From what motive, I must ask, was he kept in ignorance of all the underhand practices carried on previously to his return? I am willing to believe that every one was deceived: but was not Fouché's character notorious to all? If none were the dupes of his intrigues, they must have been desirous of associating

themselves with that personage, and of preserving his friendship by supplying him with the means of bringing more effectually into play the spirit of intrigue, in which he was well known to be acting the most conspicuous part. Where was the inconvenience of acquainting the Emperor with all that had been done before his return, with the view of overthrowing the King's government? Such a confidential communication could only have had the effect of placing him on his guard.

This course was not adopted, because an apprehension was felt of becoming involved in a disagreeable position, if the Emperor should not succeed in consolidating his power, and if the King should be again restored to the throne, as it actually came to pass. On the other hand, should the Emperor triumph over his difficulties, great advantage would accrue to all from persuading him that every possible means had been resorted to for the purpose of removing the obstacles to his return. It was considered a master-stroke of policy to have secured Fouché's assistance: for a spirit of vanity has constantly displayed itself in its worst colours.

It will soon be seen how Fouché's plans, after having been disturbed by the Emperor's return, fell again into their former track; and how great is the guilt of those who have contributed to misdirect the Emperor's confidence, by inducing him to recall a man of that stamp to his service.

History affords no example of the maddening joy excited by the success of so extraordinary an enterprise as the return from the island of Elba. It was not promoted by foreign armies, nor suggested by any party. The vanquished have insisted that the Emperor was recalled by intriguers. This was not the case. A single observation will suffice to carry conviction on the subject.

If the Emperor was only supported by a party, how was his triumph accomplished? He returned with six hundred men. As many might have been collected to oppose his pro-

gress. Whereas, on no occasion was it found necessary to load the soldiers' muskets. It is moreover to be observed, that he proceeded almost alone in a travelling-carriage. How happens it that he was never stopped?

The population hastened to meet him. The towns were spontaneously lighted up on his way. It is related by all those who accompanied him, that upwards of a million of people sallied forth to see him pass. The Emperor himself said that he was indebted to no one for his return: that he had no other party in France than the *Moniteur*, which had warned him of the moment at which it behoved him to quit the island of Elba.

All those who have served him in the days of his highest prosperity must acknowledge, that at no period of his existence was he greeted with so complete a triumph as that which was bestowed upon him by the national enthusiasm. It was a pure expression of the public feeling: for unquestionably no administrative measures had been adopted to give excitement to the prevailing joy.

The battalion of the guard which had followed the Emperor to the island of Elba arrived in Paris on the day following the return of the Emperor to the Tuileries. The curiosity of the crowd was changed into admiration. When the battalion entered the court-yard of the palace, where the Emperor was passing the troops of the garrison in review, hurrahs burst forth from one extremity of the line to the other.

It is a circumstance worthy of notice, that every soldier in the army had preserved his three-coloured cockade, and the eagle of his bonnet. It was altogether needless to order their being resumed. This had been done on the first intelligence of the Emperor's arrival in France.

During the first days of his installation at the Tuileries, the Emperor received the constituted authorities. A language was spoken to him on this occasion very different

from that which had been held to the King some months before.

It was not known in Paris until the 24th or 25th of March, that the King, after retiring to Lille, had finally quitted France, and withdrawn to Belgium.* The fact of the disbanding of his household troops at Bethune had already got into circulation: and as Lille is the place of residence of a prefect, and contained a numerous garrison, commanded by Marshal Mortier, it was thought that some unpleasant intelligence must have been received in that city, since the King did not deem himself safe in it, and had taken his departure. He was probably told that the Emperor's emissaries were already at Lille, and exciting the garrison to rise. I readily believe it, because every one was anxious to see him off, in order to have it in their power to return to Paris, and to make a display of the greater or less share they had had in exaggerating to the King the dangers which had occasioned his determination to depart.

Marshal Mortier arrived in Paris, and presented himself at the Emperor's levy on the following morning. He not only was silent towards any one who might prevent his soliciting employment, but he immediately accepted service, as well as many officers of the King's household, who had been in the army previously to their being attached to the King's person. The utmost parade of zeal for the Emperor's service was displayed in every quarter. On his part, he gave no indication of resentment against any one.

* At the same time that the news was brought of the King's departure from Lille, it became known that an individual residing in that city had spoken as follows to the Duke of Orleans, who accompanied the King:—"There is an end of the elder branch. Bonaparte will be soon worn out. You will naturally be the next called in. Beware of joining the armies which are about to wage war against France. Quietly retire to England; and let time do the rest."

This conversation was reported in Paris by a person who pretended to have heard it.

He received the senators, and abstained from all reproaches. He only spoke in general terms of the disgraceful act by which that body had pronounced his forfeiture of the throne; adding the following words—"I leave that for history to relate; for my part, I forget all past occurrences."

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS.

TO THE DUKE OF RAGUSA.

Paris, 4th of July, 1822.

Monsieur le Duc,

I HAVE received the letter you did me the honour of writing to me, and lose no time in replying to it. What you have been told on the subject of my mission is nearly akin to the truth: nevertheless, many facts are inaccurate, and it is right I should correct them.

I quitted the Emperor at the bridge of Doulancourt, near Vandœuvre, on the evening of the 29th. He ordered me to proceed to Paris, and to announce that he was on the point of repairing with his army to that capital. I had no precise instructions. I was to act according to circumstances, to use my endeavours to obtain the postponement of any determination, until the Emperor's arrival; and make known that the negotiations were opened anew with the allies, and with Austria in particular. Accordingly, on my arrival in Paris, on the 30th at noon, I mounted a horse, and proceeded to Montmartre. King Joseph had just left that spot. I overtook him in the Bois de Boulogne. He was with Prince Jerome, and with the ministers Daru, Clarke, and several other persons. I communicated to him the Emperor's orders, and urged his returning to Paris. He replied that it was impossible to hold out any longer; that some of the enemy's corps were moving towards Versailles, and the retreat might be cut off. He was unwilling that a brother of the Emperor should be given up as an hostage, and he had left his instructions with Marshals Marmont and Mortier. I parted from King Joseph, and overtook Marshal Mortier at the foot of Montmartre. He was still in ignorance of the King's departure, which I communicated to him, as well as the orders intrusted to me. He received, a moment afterwards, a note from

King Joseph, couched, as far as I recollect, in the following terms:—"If Marshals Marmont and Mortier can no longer defend Paris, they are authorised to open a negotiation. They will retreat towards the Loire."

In consequence of this note, and of what I had told to Marshal Mortier, he determined to write to Prince Schwartzenberg; not with a view of treating for a capitulation, but of proposing an armistice, founded upon the circumstance that negotiations were re-opened, and that peace was perhaps signed at that very moment with the Emperor of Austria. Meanwhile, the enemy was still advancing; and Marshal Mortier received soon afterwards a very cold reply from Prince Schwartzenberg, who informed him that the allies did not enter into any separate peace, and that Paris must be given up. Nearly at the same moment a general officer arrived, General Mestadier, I believe. He came to announce to Marshal Mortier that the Duke of Ragusa, whom I had not yet seen, had, in consequence of King Joseph's note, just entered into a negotiation for the surrender of Paris, and that hostilities were about to cease.

This is all I can state to you, Monsieur le Duc, respecting the occurrences of that day. I was not the bearer of any order to capitulate; and I believe such an idea never entered the Emperor's mind. It even appears that General Girardin, who arrived after the signature of the capitulation, had orders to make Paris hold out under any circumstances; and the Emperor, who was closely following him, was in expectation of arriving in time.

Accept, M. le Duc, the assurance of my distinguished consideration.

(Signed) COUNT DEJEAN.

TO PRINCE METTERNICH.

Châtillon, 9th of February, 1814.

Prince,

It is my intention to inquire of the plenipotentiaries of the allied courts, whether an armistice will be immediately granted to France on my consenting to her falling back to her ancient limits, agreeably to their demands. If by such a sacrifice an armistice may at once be obtained, I am ready to submit to it. I shall, moreover, be prepared, in this hypothesis, to make an immediate surrender of part of the fortified places which that sacrifice will necessarily require of us.

I am ignorant whether the plenipotentiaries of the allied courts are authorised to reply to that question in the affirmative, and have any powers to conclude the armistice. If they are not furnished with such powers, your Excellency is better able than any one else to contribute to their being provided with them. The motives which induce me to urge this request are not so exclusively personal to

France as to interest her only. I beseech your Excellency will lay my letter before the father of the Empress. Let him know the extent of the sacrifices we are prepared to submit to, and decide accordingly.

Accept, &c.

(Signed) CAULAINCOURT, DUKE OF VICENZA.

TO THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

Châtillon, 5th March, 1814.

Sire,

I deem it particularly incumbent upon me to express to your Majesty the bitter regret I feel at discovering that my zeal is not duly appreciated. Your Majesty is displeased with me: you avow your displeasure, and order it to be communicated to me. My frankness is unpalatable to your Majesty; and you style me harsh and rude in the expression of it. Your Majesty reproaches me with seeing nothing before me but the Bourbons, whom I feel a repugnance, perhaps a mistaken one, to mention. Your Majesty forgets that you were the first to allude to them in the letters you have written and dictated. To anticipate with your Majesty the chances which may be held out to the Bourbons by the workings of contending passions in some of the allies, or excited by disastrous events, as well as the interest which might be felt in this country for their exalted misfortunes, if the presence of a prince and the existence of a party were to revive those old recollections in a moment of political crisis, could certainly not be an act devoid of reason, if matters came to extremities. In the present situation of the public mind, in the feverish state into which Europe is thrown, in the state of lassitude and uneasiness prevalent in France, a comprehensive foresight embraces every thing, and is nothing short of true wisdom. I can well understand that your Majesty wishes to infuse your strength of mind, and the elevation of your high character, in those who are in your service, and communicate your energy to all. But, Sire, your minister has no occasion to be thus spurred on. Adversity kindles his courage, instead of depressing it; and if he constantly rings the word of peace in your ears, it is because he deems it to be of indispensable and immediate necessity, in order to avoid a total wreck of your affairs. He speaks the language of frankness when there is no third party to the intercourse. Your very strength, Sire, compels him to appear weak in your sight, or at least more disposed to give way than he would otherwise prove to be. No one can feel a greater desire or anxiety than I do to console your Majesty, to soften down the bitterness you must feel at the existing circumstances, and at the sacrifices they will require of you. But the interests of France, of your dynasty, demand that I should first

of all be prudent and sincere. From one moment to another, all may be compromised by those reservations which occasion the postponement of determinations imperiously demanded by the important and critical circumstances in which we are placed. Is it my fault if I am the only one to hold this language of pure zeal to your Majesty? if those who surround you, and who think as I do, yet fearing to displease, and anxious to spare your feelings, at a moment when you have so many causes of vexation, are apprehensive of repeating what it is my duty to tell you? What pride, what advantage can I derive from preaching up this language, from even signing such a peace, if it be still possible to attain it? Will not that peace, or rather those sacrifices, be a perpetual cause of complaint on the part of your Majesty against your plenipotentiary? Will not many people in France, who are now fully sensible of the necessity of obtaining it, make that peace a ground of reproach to me six months after it shall have kept your throne from falling to ruins? As I no more deceive myself respecting my own position than I do respecting that in which your Majesty is placed, you may implicitly confide in my representations. I see things as they are, and the consequences of things as they may become. Fear has created a bond of union between the sovereigns. Discontent has rallied all Germany under a common standard: the compact is too strongly riveted to be broken asunder. In accepting the ministry under the critical circumstances in which it has been confided to me, in afterwards undertaking the management of this negotiation, I have devoted myself to the object of serving your Majesty, and saving my country; I was actuated by no other. That object was in itself sufficiently splendid and elevated to counterbalance in my mind all personal sacrifices. Situated as I was, I had none but sacrifices to make; and upon this circumstance my resolution was grounded. Your Majesty may say of me all the harm you think proper; in the bottom of your heart you cannot think any, and will be compelled to do me at all times the justice of considering me one of your most faithful subjects, and one of the best citizens of that France which I can never be suspected of an intention to degrade, prepared as I am to give up my life were it only for the preservation of one of its villages.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CAULAINCOURT, DUKE OF VICENZA.

SITTING OF THE 7th OF FEBRUARY, 1814.

The protocols of the sitting of the 5th having been copied in *duplicate*, and compared in the course of yesterday, the plenipotentiaries, on the opening of the present sitting, have affixed their signatures to those copies, noticing the alternative between the plenipotentiary of France on the one side, and the plenipoten-

tiaries of the allied courts on the other, the latter having carried on that transaction among themselves, and adopted a *pell-mell* course, without affecting any right of precedence.

This formality having been gone through, the plenipotentiaries of the allied courts record the following in the protocol:—

"The plenipotentiaries of the allied courts, combining the object of the future security and independence of Europe with the wish of seeing France in a state of possession analogous to the rank it has always occupied in the political system, and considering the situation in which Europe is placed with respect to France, in consequence of the successes obtained by their arms, the plenipotentiaries of the allied courts are accordingly instructed to demand:—

"That France shall return to the limits she occupied before the revolution, barring any arrangements of reciprocal convenience respecting portions of territory beyond the limits on both sides, or the restitutions which England is disposed to make for the general interest of Europe, as a set-off against the retrocessions above required of France, which restitutions will be taken from the conquests made by England during the war: that France shall in consequence abandon all direct influence beyond her future limits; and that a renunciation of all titles emanating from the relations of sovereignty and protectorship over Italy, Germany, and Switzerland, shall be an immediate effect of this arrangement."

After the Duke of Vicenza heard the reading of this proposal, a conversation was opened between the plenipotentiaries on both sides, explanatory of the object in view; subsequently to which, his Excellency the French plenipotentiary observes, that as the proposal was of too great importance to be susceptible of an immediate reply, he accordingly wishes that the sitting may be suspended.

The plenipotentiaries of the allied courts have no hesitation in yielding to his wish; and it is agreed that the sitting shall be continued at eight o'clock at night.

The plenipotentiaries resume their sitting at the hour agreed upon. The Duke of Vicenza makes the following declaration:—

"The plenipotentiary of France reiterates the engagement already taken by his court to make *the greatest sacrifices* towards the attainment of peace: however far removed be the demand made in the sitting of this day in the name of the allied powers from the *bases proposed by them at Frankfort*, and founded upon what the *allies themselves* have designated as the *natural limits* of France; however far removed from the declarations made by all the courts in the face of Europe; however far removed be their proposal, moreover, from the state of possession analogous to the rank which France has always occupied in the political system, these being the bases again brought forward by the plenipotentiaries of the allied powers in their proposal of this day; whatever, in short, may be the result of this proposal, whether to apply to France alone a principle which the allied powers do not express their intention of applying to themselves, although it can have no just application, unless it be reciprocal, and bear the stamp of impar-

tiality, the French plenipotentiary would not hesitate a moment in explaining himself in the most positive manner respecting that demand, if each sacrifice that may be made, and the degree in which it may be made, did not necessarily depend upon the nature and extent of what may be called for, just as the total amount of sacrifices is also necessarily dependent upon the amount of *compensations*. All the questions of a negotiation of this nature are so interwoven and connected with each other, that no determination can be adopted upon one until the whole are made known. It cannot be indifferent to him of whom *sacrifices* are demanded that he should know *for whose profit* he makes them, and to what use they are to be applied; if, in short, by making them, the calamities of war will be brought to an immediate end. This object would be attained by a project that might develope the views of the allies in their combined form.

"The plenipotentiary accordingly renews in the most earnest manner his demand that the plenipotentiaries of the allied courts will be pleased to *afford an explanation of a positive nature respecting the foregoing points*."

After perusing what has just been inserted in the protocol, on the part of the plenipotentiary of France, the plenipotentiaries of the allied courts declare that they admit his reply *ad referendum*.

(Signed) CAULAINCOURT, DUKE OF VICENZA.

(Signed) COUNT DE STADION; ABERDEEN; HUMBOLDT; COUNT RAZOUMOWSKI; CATHCART; CHARLES STEWART.

Châtillon-sur-Seine, 7th of February, 1814.

SITTING OF THE 10th OF MARCH, 1814.

The plenipotentiary of France opens the conference by recording in the protocol as follows:—

"The plenipotentiary of France had hoped, in consequence of the representations which he had occasion to address to the plenipotentiaries of the allied courts, and of the manner in which their Excellencies had been pleased to receive them, that orders would be issued to facilitate the unobstructed and prompt arrival of his couriers. Nevertheless, the last courier that reached him was not only detained a long time by the Russian officers and generals, but he was even *compelled to give up his dispatches, which were only restored to him at Chaumont thirty-six hours afterwards*. The plenipotentiary of France is therefore reluctantly compelled again to call the attention of the plenipotentiaries of the allied courts to this point, and to appeal the more earnestly against a conduct in opposition to the acknowledged usages, and to the prerogatives which the law of na-

tions secures to ministers entrusted with a negotiation, as it actually creates delays which are productive of obstructions to its progress."

The plenipotentiaries of the allied courts possessing no information respecting that fact, they promise to lay this appeal before their respective courts.

The plenipotentiary of France afterwards communicates for perusal the following document, of which he demands the insertion in the protocol, as well as of the documents annexed to it, and numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

The plenipotentiary of France has received instructions from his court to add to the protocol the following observations:—

"The allied sovereigns, *in their Declaration of Frankfort*, which is known to all Europe, and their Excellencies the plenipotentiaries, in their proposition of the 7th of February, have laid down the principle that France ought to retain, by the effect of a peace, the same relative power she possessed previously to the wars which that peace is to bring to a conclusion; for what, in the preamble of their proposition, the plenipotentiaries have said of the desire of the allied powers to see France in a state of possession analogous to the rank she has always held in the political system, neither has, nor can have, any other meaning. The allied sovereigns had demanded, in consequence, that France should confine herself within the limits formed by the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Rhine; and France had acquiesced in the demand. The plenipotentiaries, on the contrary, have, as well by their note of the 7th, as by the project of articles which they handed in on the 17th, demanded that she should fall back to her ancient limits. How was it possible, whilst continuing to appeal to the same principle, that they should pass, in so short a time, from one of those demands to the other? What has occurred since the first demand, which could afford a motive for the second?

"It was not possible on the 7th, neither was it possible on the 17th, still less could it be so at this day, to rest that demand upon the confidential offer made by the plenipotentiary of France to the cabinet minister of one of the allied courts; for the letter containing it was only written on the 9th; and it necessarily called for an immediate reply, since the offer was made under the *absolute condition of an immediate armistice*, in order to stop all farther effusion of blood, and to avoid a battle which the allies were desirous of fighting; instead of which, at the mere will of the allies, and without any motive being alleged, the conferences were suspended from the 10th to the 17th, on which latter day the proposed condition was even formally rejected. No advantage ought therefore to have been taken, or should now be taken, of an offer which was dependent upon that condition. Was it not the wish of the allied sovereigns, three months ago, to establish a fair equilibrium in Europe? Do they not, at this day, announce such to be still their intention? France has no other desire than to maintain the same relative power she has always possessed. *But Europe no longer resembles what it was twenty years ago*: at that period, the kingdom of Poland, already torn asunder, disappeared altogether: the immense territory of Russia was increased by the accession of vast and wealthy provinces. Six millions of people were added to a population

already greater than that of any European state. Nine millions fell to the share of Austria and Prussia. Germany soon assumed another aspect. The ecclesiastical states and the majority of the Germanic free towns were divided between secular princes. Austria and Prussia acquired for their share the better portion of them. The ancient republic of Venice became a province of the Austrian monarchy. Two millions of subjects, with fresh territories and fresh resources, have been farther added to Russia by the treaties of Tilsit, of Vienna, of Yassi, and of Abo. England, on her part, and within the same space of time, has not only acquired by the treaty of Amiens the Dutch possession of Ceylon, and the island of Trinidad, but she has doubled her possessions in India, and raised them into an empire scarcely equalled in power by two of the greatest monarchies of Europe. If the population of that empire cannot be viewed as an increase to the British population, does not England, on the other hand, derive from her sovereignty over, and her commerce with it, an immense increase to her wealth, that second element of power? Russia and England have preserved whatever they have acquired. Austria and Prussia have, no doubt, suffered some losses; but do they renounce all *idea* of repairing them; and are they satisfied, at this day, with the state of possession in which the present war has found them? Nevertheless, that state differs very little from what it was twenty years ago.

"It is not for her interest only that France should be anxious to preserve the same relative power which she formerly possessed. A perusal of the Declaration of Frankfort will show that the allied sovereigns have been themselves convinced that such was also *the interest of Europe.* Now, when every thing has undergone a change around France, how could she *preserve the same relative power by being reinstated in her former condition?*—And if reinstated in that condition, *she would not even possess the same degree of absolute power as she then held;* for her transmarine possessions were unquestionably one of the elements of her power; and the most important of them, that which, by its intrinsic value, equalled or surpassed all the others together, has been wrested from her: it matters not owing to *what* cause; it is enough that it should no longer belong to her, and that it is not in the power of the allies to restore it.

"In order to estimate the relative power of states, it is not sufficient to compare their absolute strength: the calculation ought also to contemplate the use which their geographical position compels or allows them to make of such strength.

"England is an essentially maritime power, which can set all her strength afloat. Austria has an extent of coast too much circumscribed ever to become such. Russia and Prussia have no need of being so, since they have no possessions beyond the seas: they are essentially continental powers. France, on the contrary, is at once essentially maritime, owing to the extent of her coast, and of her colonies, and essentially continental. England can only be attacked by means of fleets. Russia, reaching the pole of the earth, and bordered on almost every side by seas, or vast solitudes, cannot, since her acquisition of Finland, be attacked on more than one side. *France may be so on every point of her circumference; on*

the land side, where she is bordered in all quarters by warlike nations, and on the sea-side, as well as in her distant possessions.

"In order therefore to restore a proper equilibrium, her relative power should be viewed under two distinct aspects: to form a just estimate of this, she should be considered in a twofold light; and a comparison should be drawn between her absolute strength and that of other continental states, after deducting that portion of it which she is called upon to employ at sea; or between her strength and that of maritime states, after deducting the portion of such strength which it is necessary for her to employ on the continent.

"The plenipotentiary of France requests their excellencies the plenipotentiaries of the allied courts to weigh attentively the above considerations, so perfectly in accordance with truth, and to judge whether the acquisitions which France has made beyond the Alps and the Rhine, and which the treaties of Luneville and of Amiens had secured to her, would ever be sufficient to restore between her and the principal powers of Europe that equilibrium which the changes brought about in the state of possession of those powers have destroyed.

"The plainest calculation evidently demonstrates that those acquisitions, added to all that France possessed in 1792, would still be *far* from giving her the same degree of relative power she then held, and had constantly possessed in former times; and yet it is demanded of her, not only that she should relinquish a part, but the whole of them, although in their Declaration of Frankfort the allied sovereigns had announced to Europe that *they were ready to allow to France a greater extent of territory than she possessed under her kings.*

"The actual forces of a state are not the only element of its relative power, in the composition of which are, moreover, to be introduced the bonds which unite it to other states; bonds generally stronger and more durable between states governed by princes of the same blood. The Emperor of the French possesses, independently of his empire, a kingdom which his adopted son is appointed to inherit. Other princes of the French dynasty were in possession of foreign crowns or sovereignties. Their rights had been consecrated by treaties, and the continent had acknowledged them. The project drawn up by the allied courts preserves in respect to them a silence which the questions so naturally and fairly put by the French plenipotentiary have not succeeded in breaking. Nevertheless, by renouncing the rights of those princes and the portion of relative power resulting to her from those rights, as well as what she has acquired beyond the Alps and the Rhine, France would find herself bereft of her ancient relative power in a commercial as well as in a continental point of view, in precisely the same ratio as the power of other great states has already increased, or will become augmented through a peace, by their respective acquisitions. The restitution of her colonies, which would in that case have no other effect than to replace her in her former condition of absolute grandeur, (an object which the situation of St. Domingo would not allow of being completely accomplished,) would not, and could not, be a compensation for her losses. Those losses would only be lessened in extent;

and this is undoubtedly the least she could have a claim to expect: nevertheless, what does she derive in that point of view from the project of the allied courts?

"Of the French colonies which have fallen into the enemy's power (and the continental wars have deprived her of the whole of them), there are three which their importance, in many respects, places out of the range of any comparison with all the rest; these are Guadaloupe, Guyana, and the Isle of France.

"Instead of a restitution of the two first, the project of the allied courts only offers their good offices towards obtaining such restitution; and it would thence appear that those two colonies are in the hands of powers unconnected with the present negotiation, which cannot be comprehended in the contemplated peace. On the other hand, the powers which have possession of them are amongst those in whose name and on whose behalf the allied courts have declared that they were authorised to treat. Are they therefore so authorised only for such clauses as are onerous to France? Do they cease to be so as soon as any clauses to her advantage are in question? If this were the case, it would become indispensable that all the states engaged in the present war should immediately take part in the negotiation, and should each send plenipotentiaries to the congress.

"It is moreover to be remarked that Guadaloupe, having only been transferred from the power of England by an act which is disowned by the law of nations, England is still the country which, with reference to France, is considered to retain possession of it, and that the restitution of that island can only be demanded of England.

"England wishes to reserve to herself the islands of France and of La Réunion, without which the other possessions of France eastward of the Cape of Good Hope lose all their value; the Saints, without which the possession of Guadaloupe would be precarious; the island of Tobago, under pretence that France was not in possession of it in 1792, and the others, notwithstanding that France occupied them time immemorial; thus laying down a rule which is of rigorous enforcement for France alone, which only admits of exceptions when levelled at France, and thus becomes a two-edged sword against her.

"An island of a certain extent, but which has lost its former fertility, two or three others considerably smaller in size, and a few factories, which the loss of the Isle of France would make it necessary to abandon—such are the important restitutions which England promised to make. Are these the restitutions she made at Amiens, where she consented to restore Malta, which she now insists upon retaining, and which is no longer contested to her? What less could she have offered, if France had had no cession to make to any power but England? The restitutions which she promised had been announced as an equivalent for the sacrifices that were to be made to the continent. It was under this condition that France intimated her readiness to consent to great sacrifices. Such restitutions ought to be the measure of her sacrifices. Nothing could be more unexpected than a project by which the continent demands every thing, by which England hardly restores any thing, and the result of which is, in substance, that all the great powers

of Europe are to preserve what they have acquired, to repair the losses they may have suffered, and make acquisitions besides; and, that France alone is not to retain any part of her many acquisitions, and is only to recover the smallest and the least valuable portion of what she has lost?

"*After so many sacrifices demanded of France, nothing more was wanting than that she should be called upon to yield up her honour!*

"The tendency of the project is to *take from her the right of intervening in behalf of ancient, but unfortunate, allies.* The plenipotentiary of France having demanded whether the King of Saxony would be restored to his dominions, he has not even succeeded in obtaining an answer.

"Cessions and renunciations are demanded of France; and it is required that, in the surrenders which she makes, she is not to know to whom, under what titles, and in what proportions her cessions are to be bestowed! *It is insisted upon that she shall not be told who are to be her nearest neighbours.* It is pretended to regulate, without her intervention, the fate of countries which she will have renounced, and the mode of existence of those with whom her sovereign was connected by private ties. It is pretended to make, *without her intervention*, the arrangements which are to regulate the general system of possession and of equilibrium in Europe. It is pretended that she should remain a stranger to the arrangement of a whole, of which she forms an important and a necessary part. It is pretended, in short, that, by subscribing to such conditions, she should, in a measure, exclude herself from the political society of Europe.

"Her commercial establishments on the Indian continent are restored to her, but under the condition of holding as a dependent and a subject what she formerly possessed in full sovereignty.

"Rules of conduct, in short, are dictated to her for the internal system of her colonies, and towards populations which no intercourse of subjection or of dependence binds in any manner to the governments of Europe, and in respect of which, no right of patronage can be allowed to be vested in those governments.

"Such propositions could assuredly not have been expected from the language of the allied sovereigns or of the Prince Regent of England, when he said to the British parliament that no disposition, on his part, to demand of France any sacrifice incompatible with her interests as a nation, or with her honour, should be an obstacle in the way of peace.

"Attacked, at one and the same time, by all the powers united against her, the French nation feels more than any other the necessity of peace, and is accordingly foremost in desiring it: *but every nation, as well as every noble-minded man, places honour in the first rank, before existence itself.*

"It cannot, assuredly, have entered into the views of the allied sovereigns to *degrade her*; and although the French plenipotentiary is at a loss to account for the want of conformity between the project of articles which had been handed to him, and the sentiments which they have manifested so repeatedly and in such explicit language; nevertheless, he is not deterred from confiding to the judgment

of the allied courts themselves, and of the plenipotentiaries, those observations which are dictated by the general interest of Europe no less than by the particular interest of France, and which are in strict conformity with the declarations of the allied sovereigns and the language of the Prince Regent to the English parliament."

The plenipotentiaries of the allied courts reply, that the observations just read to them do not contain a distinct and explicit declaration of the French government on the project presented by them in the sitting of the 17th of February, and consequently do not meet the demand formed by the plenipotentiaries of the allied courts in the conference of the 28th of February; which demand consists in calling for a distinct and explicit reply within the term of ten days, which had been mutually agreed upon between them and the French plenipotentiary.

The plenipotentiaries of the allied courts being thereupon prepared to break up the sitting, the French plenipotentiary verbally declared that the Emperor of the French is ready—

To renounce, by the treaty about to be concluded, all titles expressive of any connexion of sovereignty, supremacy, constitutional protection, or influence over countries beyond the limits of France;

And to acknowledge—

The independence of Spain, in her ancient limits, under the sovereignty of Ferdinand VII:

The independence of Italy; the independence of Switzerland, under the guarantee of the great powers:

The independence of Germany:

And the independence of Holland, under the sovereignty of the Prince of Orange.

He farther declares that, if, in order to remove all causes of misunderstanding, to bind more closely the ties of amity and render the peace more durable between France and England, any cessions on the part of France beyond the seas should be deemed necessary, France will be prepared to make them, provided she receive a reasonable equivalent.

Whereupon the sitting was broken up.

(Signed) CAULAINCOURT, DUKE OF VICENZA, ABERDEEN; A. COUNT DE RAZOUMOWSKI; CATHCART; COUNT DE STADION; CH. STEWART, Lieutenant-general.

SITTING OF THE 13th OF MARCH, 1814.

The plenipotentiaries of the allied courts declare in the protocol as follows:

"The plenipotentiaries of the allied courts have taken into consideration the re-

presentation handed in by the Duke of Vicenza, at the sitting of the 10th of March, and the verbal declaration dictated by him to the protocol of the same sitting. They have deemed the first of these documents to be of a nature not to be brought into discussion without impeding the progress of the negotiation.

"The verbal declaration of the plenipotentiary only contains the acceptance of certain points of the project of a treaty handed in by the plenipotentiaries of the allied courts in the sitting of the 17th of February. It neither replies to that project in the mass, nor to the greater part of its articles, and can still less be viewed as a counter-project, embracing the substance of proposals made by the allied powers.

"The plenipotentiaries of the allied courts are therefore compelled to request the Duke of Vicenza will declare whether he intends to accept or reject the project of a treaty presented by the allied courts, or to hand in a counter-project."

The plenipotentiary of France, in reply to this declaration of the plenipotentiaries of the allied courts, as well as to their observations on the same subject, stated:

"That a document, such as the one which he handed in on the 10th, in which the articles of the project of the allied courts, which are susceptible of modifications, were examined and discussed in detail, so far from obstructing the progress of the negotiation, could only tend to accelerate it, since it would clear up every question under the double aspect of the interests of Europe and of France respectively:

"That after having announced, in so positive a manner as he has done in his verbal notification of the same day, that France was prepared to renounce, by the future treaty, all sovereignty over territories beyond the Alps and the Rhine, comprising upwards of seven millions of inhabitants, and all influence over twenty millions more, a sacrifice forming at least the six-sevenths of those that are demanded by the project of the allies; he cannot be charged with an omission to reply in a distinct and explicit manner:

"That the counter-project demanded of him by the plenipotentiaries of the allied courts, is to be found in substance in his verbal declaration of the 10th, with respect to the objects to which France may consent without any discussion. And that, with respect to the remainder, which are all susceptible of modification, the observations are an answer to them; but that he is, nevertheless, prepared immediately to discuss them."

The plenipotentiaries of the allied courts reply in this place:

"That the two documents handed in by the plenipotentiary at the sitting of the 10th of March, had not so immediate a reference to each other as to justify the remark that one of them embraced the points to which the French government assented without discussion, and the other those points upon which it is desirous of resting the negotiation; but that, on the contrary, the one merely contains general observations leading to no conclusion, and the other does not lay down in a more clear or precise manner what the French plenipotentiary has just stated, since, adverting only to the two following points, it does not explain what is understood

by the limits of France, and only speaks in general terms of the independence of Italy. The plenipotentiaries further add, that those two documents having been laid before their courts, they have received the positive, precise, and strict injunction to declare, as they have accordingly done, that those two documents have been deemed insufficient, and to insist upon another declaration on the part of the French plenipotentiary, which might contain either an acceptance or a refusal of their project of a treaty, as proposed in the conference of the 17th of February, or else a counter-project. They accordingly invite anew the plenipotentiary of France to furnish them with such a declaration."

The plenipotentiary of France renews his entreaties for the opening of the discussion, observing that the plenipotentiaries of the allied courts, by spontaneously declaring, in the sitting of the 28th of February, that they were ready to discuss any modifications which might be proposed, had proved, by this very circumstance, that their project was not an *ultimatum*; that, in order to come to a proper understanding and to an eventual result, a discussion was indispensable; and, that there could really exist no negotiation in the absence of all discussion, &c.

The plenipotentiaries of the allied courts reply, that they have sufficiently proved their desire not to exclude all discussion, since they have demanded a counter-project; but, that it is their intention not to admit of any discussion except upon such propositions as might actually lead to the contemplated object.

Having, in consequence, insisted anew upon a categorical declaration, and invited the French plenipotentiary to give in such declaration, he has expressed the desire that the sitting should be suspended, and resumed at nine o'clock the same night.

After having consulted amongst themselves, the plenipotentiaries of the allied courts told the plenipotentiary of France that the better to enable him to prepare his reply for this night, they wished to intimate to him, at once, that (after he shall have declared his intention this night as to whether he consents to deliver in his acceptance or refusal of their project, or else a counter-project) they, in consequence of their instructions, will have to invite him to fulfil that engagement within the term of twenty-four hours, which has been peremptorily fixed by their courts.

Whereupon the sitting is postponed to nine o'clock at night.

CONTINUATION OF THE SITTING.

The plenipotentiaries of the allied courts having renewed in the most positive terms the declaration with which they had closed the first part of the sitting, the French plenipotentiary declares that he will hand in the required counter-project at nine o'clock to-morrow night; he has nevertheless observed that, not being certain of terminating at that hour the necessary labour, he demanded beforehand that the conference should in that case be postponed until the morning of the 15th.

The plenipotentiaries of the allied courts have insisted that the conference

should remain fixed to to-morrow night, and should only be put off to after to-morrow morning, if there should be an absolute necessity for the delay; to which the French plenipotentiary has consented.

(Signed) CAULAINCOURT, DUKE OF VICENZA; (Signed) ABERDEEN; COUNT DE RAZOUMOWSKI; HUMBOLDT; CATHCART; COUNT DE STADION; CH. STEWART, Lieutenant-general.

Chatillon-Sur-seine, the 13th of March, 1814.

SITTING OF THE 15th OF MARCH, 1814.

The plenipotentiary of France opens the sitting by reading the following project of a treaty:

PROJECT OF A DEFINITIVE TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE ALLIES.

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, protector of the confederation of the Rhine, and mediator of the Swiss confederacy on the one hand; His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great-Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, these powers stipulating each for itself, and for all conjointly, as well as for the several powers engaged with them in the present war on the other hand—

Having at heart to put a stop as soon as possible to the effusion of human blood, and to the calamities of nations, they have appointed for their plenipotentiaries, namely:

The said plenipotentiaries have agreed upon the following articles:

Article I.—Reckoning from the present day, there shall be peace, sincere amity, and friendly understanding, between His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, and mediator of the Swiss confederacy on the one hand, and His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great-Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the King of Prussia, and their allies on the other hand, their heirs and successors for ever.

The high contracting parties engage to bestow all their care to the maintenance, in attention to the future happiness of Europe, of the good harmony so happily restored between them.

Art. II.—His Majesty the Emperor of the French renounces for himself and his successors all titles whatever, excepting those derived from possessions, which in

consequence of the present treaty of peace shall remain subjected to his sovereignty.

Art. III.—His Majesty the Emperor of the French renounces for himself and his successors all rights of sovereignty and possession over the *Illyrian provinces*, and the territories forming the French departments *beyond the Alps, with the exception of the island of Elba*, and over the French departments beyond the Rhine.

Art. IV.—His Majesty the Emperor of the French, as King of Italy, renounces the crown of Italy in favour of his appointed heir, Prince Eugene Napoleon, and his descendants for ever.

The Adige shall form the limit between the Kingdom of Italy and the Austrian Empire.

Art. V.—The high contracting parties solemnly acknowledge, in the most formal manner, the absolute independence and full sovereignty of all the states of Europe within the limits assigned to them in consequence of the present treaty, or in consequence of the arrangements pointed out in Article 16, hereafter laid down.

Art. VI.—His Majesty the Emperor of the French acknowledges :—

1st. The independence of Holland, under the sovereignty of the house of Orange.

Holland shall receive an augmentation of territory.

The title and exercise of the sovereignty in Holland shall not, in any case, belong to a prince either swaying, or called to sway a foreign sceptre :—

2ndly. The independence of Germany, and of each of its states, which can never be united together in any federative bond :—

3rdly. The independence of Switzerland, governed by her own laws, under the guarantee of all the great powers :—

4thly. The independence of Italy, and of each of the princes amongst whom it is or may hereafter be divided :—

5thly. The independence and integrity of Spain, under the dominion of Ferdinand VII.

Art. VII.—The Pope shall be immediately restored to the possession of his states, such as they existed in consequence of the treaty of Tolentino, with the exception of the Duchy of Benevento.

Art. VIII.—Her Imperial Highness Princess Eliza shall retain for herself and her descendents Lucca and Piombino in full property and sovereignty.

Art. IX.—The principality of *Neufchâtel* shall remain in full property and sovereignty to the prince who is in possession of it, and to his descendants.

Art. X.—His Majesty the King of Saxony shall be reinstated in the full and complete possession of his Grand-Duchy.

Art. XI.—His Royal Highness the Grand-Duke of Berg shall also be restored to the possession of his Grand-Duchy.

Art. XII.—The towns of Bremen, Hamburg, Lubeck, Dantzic, and Ragusa, shall be free towns.

Art. XIII.—The Ionian islands shall belong in full sovereignty to the Kingdom of Italy.

Art. XIV.—The island of Malta and its dependencies shall belong in full sovereignty and property to His Britannic Majesty.

Art. XV.—The colonies, fisheries, establishments, and factories of which France was in possession previous to the present war, on the seas or continents of America, Africa, and Asia, and which have fallen into the hands of the English or her allies, shall be restored to her, to be held by her on the same titles as before the war, and with the rights and privileges which were secured to her, with respect to commerce and the fisheries, by anterior treaties, and amongst others by the treaty of Amiens; but at the same time France engages to consent, for a reasonable equivalent, to the cession of such of the above-mentioned colonies, as England has expressed the wish of retaining, with the exception of the Saints, which are a necessary appendage of Guadaloupe.

Art. XVI.—The distribution to be made of the territories which His Majesty the Emperor of the French renounces, and which are not disposed of by the present treaty, shall be effected; the indemnities to be given to kings and princes dispossessed by the existing war shall be determined; and all the arrangements that are to fix the general system of possession and of equilibrium in Europe, shall be regulated in a special Congress which will meet at .... within the .... days following the ratification of the present treaty.

Art. XVII.—In all the territories, towns, and places which France renounces, the ammunition, the stores, arsenals, ships and vessels armed or unarmed, and generally all articles which she has placed there, belong and are to be preserved to her.

Art. XVIII.—The debts of the countries annexed to France, and which she renounces by the present treaty, shall fall as a charge upon those countries and their future possessors.

Art. XIX. In all the countries which are now or hereafter to change hands, whether in virtue of the present treaty, or of the arrangements to be made in consequence of the above Article 16, there shall be granted to the native inhabitants, or to strangers, whatever may be their condition or their parent country, a period of six years, reckoning from the exchange of the ratifications, to dispose of the property they may have acquired, whether before or after the commencement of the existing war, and to withdraw to whatever country they think proper.

Art. XX.—The property, goods, or revenues of any kind, which the subjects of any of the states engaged in the existing war possess, under whatever title, in the countries which are at present placed in the power of any other of those states, or may hereafter be so in virtue of Article 16, shall continue to belong to them without obstruction or hindrance, under no other clauses or conditions than such as were previously attached to the possession of them, and with full liberty of enjoying or disposing of them, as well as of removing the revenue, or, in case of sale, the value of the same.

Art. XXI.—The high contracting parties being personally desirous of throwing into absolute oblivion the divisions which have agitated Europe, and of contributing also to that object, they declare and promise that in the countries under their respective sway, no individual, whatever may be his class or condition, shall be molested in his person, his property, income, pensions, or revenues, in his rank, grade or dignities, nor be any ways vexed or pursued, for any part he may or might have taken in any manner whatever, in the events which have either brought about the present war, or been the consequence of it.

Art. XXII.—As soon as intelligence of the signature of the present treaty shall have reached the respective head-quarters, there shall immediately be dispatched orders to put a stop to hostilities by land and sea, as quickly as the distances will permit; the high contracting powers binding themselves frankly to send off these orders with the utmost rapidity; and on both sides there shall be granted passports, whether for the officers or the ships that may be the bearers of them.

Art. XXIII.—With the view to prevent all causes of complaint or dispute that might arise on the occasion of any captures made at sea after the signature of the present treaty, it is reciprocally agreed that the vessels and property that might be taken in the Channel or in the North Seas, after the space of twelve days, reckoning from the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, shall on both sides be restored, that the term shall be extended to a month from the Channel and the North Seas to the Canary islands inclusively, either in the Atlantic Ocean or in the Mediterranean: to two months from the said Canary islands to the Equator: and lastly, to five months in all other parts of the world, without any exception or more special distinction of time or place.

Art. XXIV.—The allied troops shall evacuate the French territory; and the towns ceded or being to be restored by France in virtue of the present peace, shall be delivered up to them in the following delay. On the third day after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, the allied troops at the greatest distance from, and on the fifth day after the said exchange, the allied troops nearest to, the frontiers shall commence their retreat, proceeding in the direction of the frontier nearest to the place where they may be stationed, and marching at the rate of thirty leagues every ten days, so that the evacuation may be uninterrupted, and be carried into effect in regular succession, and that within the term of forty days at farthest it may be fully accomplished.

There shall be furnished to them, until their exit from the French territory, the necessary provisions and means of transport. But from the day of the signature of the present treaty, they shall no longer be at liberty to levy any contributions, nor require any supply whatever, beyond the provisions above indicated. Immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, the towns of Custrin, Glogau, Palma-Nova, and Venice, shall be given up to the allies; and those which the French troops occupy in Spain shall be given up to the Spaniards. The towns of Hamburg and Magdeburg, the citadels of Erfurt and Wurtzburg, shall be surrendered when one half of the French territory shall have been evacuated.

All the other towns of ceded countries shall be delivered up when the whole of that territory shall have been evacuated.

The countries which the garrisons of the said towns will have to pass through shall furnish the requisite provisions and means of transport for returning to France, and for bringing back whatever may be French property, in virtue of the above Art. 17.

Art. XXV.—The restitutions which, in virtue of the Art. 15., already noticed, are to be made to France by England or her allies, shall take place for the continent and seas of America and Africa within the three months, and for Asia within the six months, following the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

Art. XXVI.—The ambassadors, envoys extraordinary, ministers, residents, and agents of each of the high contracting powers, shall hold in the courts of other powers the same ranks, prerogatives, and privileges as before the war, the same etiquette being maintained.

Art. XXVII.—All the respective prisoners shall immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty be restored without ransom, payment being made on both sides for the private debts they may have contracted.

Art. XXVIII.—The four allied courts bind themselves to give up to France within a delay of . . . . an act of adhesion to the present treaty on the part of each of the states on behalf of which they stipulate.

Art. XXIX.—The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged within the delay of five days, or sooner, if possible.

[Here follow the signatures.]

Châtillon-sur-Seine, the 15th of March, 1814.

PROTOCOL OF THE SITTING OF THE 18th OF MARCH, 1814, AND OF THE CONTINUATION OF THAT SITTING ON THE 10th OF MARCH.

The plenipotentiaries of the allied courts, in the name and by order of their sovereigns, declare as follows:—

"The plenipotentiaries of the allied courts declared on the 28th of February last, in consequence of the fruitless expectation of a reply to the project of a treaty furnished by them on the 17th of the same month, that, firmly adhering to the substance of the demands contained in the conditions of the project of a treaty, conditions which they deemed no less essential to the security of Europe, than indispensable to the establishment of a general peace, they could only interpret any farther delay of a reply to their propositions in the light of a refusal on the part of the French government.

"The term of the 10th of March having been by common accord fixed by the respective plenipotentiaries as imperatively binding for the delivery of a reply of the plenipotentiary of France, his Excellency the Duke of Vicenza presented on that day a paper which, without admitting or rejecting the bases laid down at

Châtillon in the name of the great European alliance, would have only offered pretexts for interminable delays in the negotiation, if it had been admitted by the plenipotentiaries of the allied courts as a proper subject for discussion. Some points of detail, which do not in the least affect the ground of the main questions connected with the arrangement of a peace, were verbally added by the Duke of Vicenza in the same sitting. The plenipotentiaries of the allied courts announced in consequence, on the 13th of March, that if within a short delay the French plenipotentiary did not notify either the acceptance or the refusal of the propositions of the allied powers, or present a counter-project comprising the substance of the conditions proposed by them, they would be under the necessity of considering the negotiations as brought to an end by the act of the French government. His Excellency the Duke of Vicenza bound himself to deliver the French counter-project in the course of the 15th. This document has been submitted by the plenipotentiaries of the allied courts to their cabinets; and they have just received an order to record in the protocol the following declaration :—

"Europe, allied against the government of France, only aims at the re-establishment of a general peace, a continental and maritime one. Such a peace can *alone* secure to the world a state of repose, of which it finds itself deprived for so long a series of years; but it can have no existence without a just distribution of strength between the several powers.

"No views of ambition or of conquest have dictated the terms of the project of a treaty, delivered in the name of the allied powers at the sitting of the 17th of February last. How could it be possible to admit of such views in the relations established by the whole of Europe, in a project of arrangement presented to France by the union of all the powers of which it consists? France, in returning to the dimensions which she possessed previously to 1792, finds herself, by her centrical position, her population, the richness of her soil, the nature of her frontiers, the number and distribution of her fortresses, as it were naturally placed on the line of the strongest continental powers: the other great political bodies, by aiming at their reconstruction on a scale of proportion conformable to the establishment of a just equilibrium, whilst they afford to intermediate states a security for their independent existence, prove by the evidence of facts the principles which animate them. Nevertheless, it was still necessary to regulate a condition essential to the welfare of France. The extent of her coasts give to that country a right to enjoy all the benefits of a maritime commerce. England restores her colonies to her, and with them her commerce and her navy. England does more than this: far from pretending to an exclusive dominion of the seas, which is incompatible with a system of political equilibrium, she resigns the greater part of the conquests she acquired in consequence of the policy pursued for so many years by the French government. Animated by a spirit of justice and liberality worthy of a great people, England places in the balance of Europe those possessions the retention of which would secure to her for a long time to come that exclusive dominion. In restoring to France her colonies; in submitting to heavy sacrifices for the reconstruction of Holland, which

the national enthusiasm of its inhabitants renders worthy of resuming its place amongst the powers of Europe, she only affixes one condition to those sacrifices: she will only divest herself of so many pledges in favour of the re-establishment of a true system of political equilibrium, on condition that Europe shall really acquire a perfect pacification; that the political state of the continent shall offer a guarantee to her that she is not making those important cessions in vain; and that her sacrifices shall not be turned against Europe and against herself.

"Such are the principles which have presided over the councils of the allied sovereigns at a period when they foresaw the possibility of undertaking the great work of the political reconstruction of Europe: those principles have received their full developement; and the powers of Europe have openly manifested them as soon as the success of their arms allowed of their accomplishment; as soon as England had it in her power to define the sacrifices which she places in the balance of peace.

"The counter-project presented by the French plenipotentiary proceeds from considerations diametrically opposite. France, according to his conditions, would retain a territorial power infinitely greater than is consistent with the equilibrium of Europe: she would preserve offensive positions, and points of attack, by means of which her government has already effected much political disturbance: the cessions she would make would be merely apparent. The principles announced in the face of Europe by the present Sovereign of France, and the experience of many years, have proved that intermediate states, under the dominion of members of the family reigning in France, are only independent in name. By deviating from the spirit which dictated the bases of the treaty of the 17th of February, the coalesced powers would not have accomplished any thing towards the safety of Europe. The efforts of so many nations united for one and the same cause would have been thrown away: the weakness of the cabinets would turn against them, and against their subjects. Europe, and France herself, would soon become the victims of fresh commotions. Europe would not obtain a peace, but would lay down her arms.

"The allied courts, considering that the counter-project presented by the plenipotentiary of France is not only far removed from the bases of peace proposed by them, but is essentially opposed to their spirit; and that, accordingly, it fails to meet any of the conditions required by those courts for the prolongation of the negotiations of Châtillon; they can only discover, in the course pursued by the French government, a desire of *protracting* negotiations, as useless as they are compromising:—useless, because *the explanations of France are opposed to the conditions which the coalesced powers conceive to be indispensable* to the reconstruction of the social edifice, to which object they apply all the strength confided to them by Providence;—compromising, because the prolongation of fruitless negotiations could only have the effect of creating deception, of exciting in the nations of Europe the vain hope of a peace which has become their first want.

"The plenipotentiaries of the allied courts are, accordingly, instructed to declare that, faithful to their principles, and in conformity with their anterior declarations,

the allied powers consider the negotiations opened at Chatillon as *brought to an end by the act of the French government.* They are directed to add to this declaration, that the allied powers being indissolubly united for the accomplishment of the great object which, with the help of God, they hope to attain, *they do not wage war against France*: they consider the just dimensions of that empire as one of the first conditions of a state of political equilibrium; but they will not lay down their arms until their principles shall have been acknowledged and admitted by its government.

DECLARATION OF THE COALESCED POWERS.

The coalesced powers owe it to themselves, to their subjects, and to France, publicly to announce, at the moment of the rupture of the conferences of Chatillon, the motives which led them to open a negotiation with the French government, and the causes of the rupture of that negotiation. Military events, such as history will scarcely have to record at any other time, overthrew, in the month of October last, the monstrous edifice comprised under the denomination of the French empire; a political edifice founded upon the ruin of states formerly independent, aggrandised by provinces torn from ancient monarchies, kept up at the price of the blood, the fortunes, the welfare of a whole generation. Led by victory to the borders of the Rhine, the allied sovereigns deemed it incumbent upon them to renew in the face of Europe the expression of the principles which form the basis of their alliance, their hopes, and their determinations. Strangers to all views of conquest, animated only by the desire of seeing Europe reconstructed upon a just scale of proportion between the several powers, resolved not to lay down their arms until they had secured the noble object of their efforts, they manifested by a public act the perseverance of their intentions, and felt no hesitation in explaining themselves towards the hostile government in a language in accordance with their inflexible resolution. The French government availed itself of the candid declaration of the allied courts to manifest pacific intentions. It stood, no doubt, in need of assuming the semblance of them in order to justify in the eyes of its subjects the fresh efforts which it unceasingly demanded of them. Nevertheless, every thing afforded to the allied cabinets an indication that it only aimed at taking advantage of an apparent negotiation in order to turn public opinion in its favour, and that the peace of Europe was far from its contemplation. Penetrating its secret views, the allied powers determined to conquer in the territory of France that long-wished for peace. Numerous armies passed the Rhine: they had scarcely crossed the first limits when the French minister for foreign affairs presented himself at the advanced posts.

From that moment, every proceeding of the French government was directed to the exclusive object of deceiving public opinion, of fascinating the sight of the French people, and of endeavouring to fix upon the allies the odium of the calamities of this war of invasion.

The progress of events had given to the allied courts, at that period, the consciousness of their wielding the whole strength of the European league. The principles which presided over the councils of the coalesced sovereigns ever since their first union for the general safety, had received their full development. NOTHING COULD ANY LONGER OBSTRUCT THEIR EXPRESSING THE CONDITIONS INDISPENSABLE TOWARDS THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE EDIFICE. Those conditions, after such a series of victories, could no longer form any obstacle to the peace. England, the only power called upon to place compensations in the balance for the benefit of France, could specify in detail the sacrifices she was prepared to make towards the general pacification. The allied sovereigns might hope at last that the experience of later times would have had its influence over a conqueror exposed to the reproaches of a great nation, and witness for the first time, in his capital, of the evils he *has* entailed upon France. Such experience might have led him to the conclusion, *that the preservation of thrones is essentially connected with moderation and justice.* Nevertheless, the allied sovereigns, feeling convinced that the attempt they should make ought not to compromise the progress of military operations, agreed that those operations should continue during the negotiations. The history of the past, and fatal recollections, had demonstratively proved the necessity of such a course. The plenipotentiaries met the minister appointed by the French government.

The victorious armies soon advanced to the very gates of the capital. The government was wholly bent from that moment on the object of saving it from a hostile occupation. The plenipotentiary of France received orders to propose an armistice founded upon bases in accordance with those which the allied courts themselves deemed necessary to the re-establishment of a general peace. He offered the immediate surrender of the fortified towns of those countries which France would give up, but clogged with the condition of a suspension of military operations. Convinced by the experience of twenty years, that in treating with the French cabinet, appearances should be carefully distinguished from positive intentions, * the allies substituted to that offer the proposal of immediately signing the propositions for a peace. Such signature had for France all the advantages of a peace, without exposing the allies to the dangers of a suspension of arms. Nevertheless, a few partial successes had just marked the first progress of an army formed, under the walls of Paris, from the choicest part of the present generation, the last hope of France, and from the residue of a million of gallant men who had perished on the field of battle, or had been abandoned on the high roads from Lisbon to Moscow; thus sacrificed to interests altogether foreign to France. The conferences of Châtillon immediately assumed a change of character. The French plenipotentiary remained without instructions, and was unable to reply to the proposals of the allied courts. The projects of

* True to this principle, the coalesced powers have in fact at all times distinguished *their intentions from the outward appearances* which they set forth in their manifestoes.

the French government were then clearly made manifest to them. They accordingly determined upon a decisive course of proceeding, the only one worthy of their power, and of the rectitude of their intentions. They charged their plenipotentiaries to deliver a project of preliminary treaty, embracing all the bases which they deemed necessary for the restoration of the political equilibrium, and which had been offered a few days before by the French government itself, at a moment when it no doubt considered its existence compromised. The principles of the political reconstruction of Europe were laid down in that project.

Restored to dimensions which ages of prosperity and glory had secured to her under the dominion of her kings, France was to share in common with Europe the benefits of its liberty, of the national independence, and of peace. It only depended upon her government to set a term, by a single word, to the sufferings of the nation; to restore to her, with the blessings of peace, her colonies, her commerce, and the free exercise of her industry. Could she pretend to more? The powers had offered to discuss, in a spirit of conciliation, her wishes respecting many objects of possession equally desirable to both, which would exceed the limits of France previously to the war of the revolution? Fifteen days elapsed without any reply on the part of the French government. The plenipotentiaries of the allies insisted upon a peremptory term for the acceptance or refusal of the conditions of peace. The French plenipotentiary was allowed the latitude of presenting a counter-project, provided such counter-project corresponded with the spirit and substance of the conditions proposed by the allied courts. The term of the 10th of March was fixed by mutual consent. The French plenipotentiary, at the expiration of that term, presented documents, the discussion of which, so far from leading to the contemplated object, would have only prolonged fruitless negotiations. At the request of the French plenipotentiary, a fresh delay was granted for a few days. At last, on the 15th of March, that plenipotentiary delivered a counter-project which left no longer any doubt that the misfortunes of France had not yet altered the views of her government. Recalling what it had proposed of its own accord, the French government demanded in a new project, that nations with feelings altogether foreign from the French, nations which ages of dominion could never blend with the French people, should continue to form part of it. France was to preserve dimensions wholly incompatible with the establishment of a system of equilibrium, and out of all proportion with the other great political bodies of Europe; she pretended to retain offensive points and positions by means of which her government, for the misfortune of Europe and of France, had occasioned the downfall of so many thrones, and effected so many convulsions. Members of the family reigning in France were to be replaced upon foreign thrones. The French government in short, that government which, during so many years, has sought to reign over Europe, no less by discord than by the force of arms, was to remain the arbiter of the internal relations, and of the fate of the powers of Europe.

By continuing the negotiations under such auspices, the allied courts would have been wanting in all they owed to themselves; they would from that moment have renounced the glorious object they contemplate to attain; their efforts would

thenceforth have turned exclusively against their own subjects. By signing a treaty on the basis of the French counter-project, the coalesced powers would have deposited their arms in the hands of the common enemy; they would have deceived the hopes of nations and the confidence of their allies.

It is at a moment so decisive for the safety of the world, that the allied sovereigns renew the solemn engagement that they will not lay down their arms until they have attained the great object of their alliance. France can only reproach her own government with the evils which press upon her.* Peace alone can heal the wounds inflicted upon her by a spirit of dominion altogether unexampled in the annals of the world. It is high time, at last, that princes should, without the intervention of any foreign influence, watch over the happiness of their subjects; that nations should respect their reciprocal independence; that social institutions should be protected from daily convulsions, that property should be secured, and commerce free.

The whole of Europe forms but one wish, that of giving a participation in the benefits of peace to France, which the allied powers themselves neither desire, contemplate, nor will permit to be dismembered. The good faith of their promises is to be found in the principles they are struggling to assert. Nevertheless, *how are the sovereigns to judge whether France is willing to share those principles, which are to establish the happiness of the world, so long as they find that the same ambition which has spread so many evils over Europe is still the only spring of its government; that, lavish of French blood, and copiously shedding it, an interest of a personal nature sacrifices the public welfare to its views? In such an aspect of things, where would be found a guarantee for the future, if so destructive a system did not meet a check in the will of the nation at large?* From that moment, the peace of Europe would be secured, and nothing could in future disturb it. †

PROCLAMATION OF SCHWARTZENBERG.

Inhabitants of Paris,

The allied armies are before Paris. The object of their march towards the capital of France is founded upon the hope of effecting a sincere and durable reconciliation with her. For the last twenty years Europe is deluged in blood and tears: the attempts made to put a stop to all her misfortunes have been unavailing, because there exists in the very power that oppresses you an insurmountable

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* The German publications of this document state as follows: "France can only reproach herself, &c."

† The German editions do not contain this appeal to revolt; they conclude as follows: "The whole of Europe forms but one wish; and that wish is the expression of the universal want of all nations. All have united for the maintenance of one and the same cause; that cause cannot fail to triumph over the only obstacle it has yet to overcome."

obstacle to peace. What Frenchman is not convinced of this truth? The allied sovereigns frankly seek in France for a wholesome authority, which may cement the union of all nations and all governments with her.

It particularly behoves the city of Paris, under existing circumstances, to accelerate the peace of the world: the expression of its wish is expected with that anxious interest necessarily excited by so great a result: *let it pronounce*, and from that moment the army before its walls will become the support of its decisions.

Parisians, you know the situation of your country; *the conduct of Bordeaux; the friendly occupation of Lyons;* the evils brought upon France; and the real wishes of your fellow-countrymen.

You will find in those examples the term of the foreign war and of civil discord: you could no longer seek it elsewhere. The preservation and tranquillity of your city shall be the object of the cares and of the measures which the allies offer to adopt in concert with the authorities and the notables who enjoy the greatest share of public esteem.

No military billet shall be inflicted upon the capital.

These are the sentiments in which you are addressed by Europe in arms before your walls. Hasten to correspond to the confidence which she places in your love of country, and your wisdom.

Head-quarters at Bondy, the 29th of March, 1814.

CAPITULATION OF PARIS.

Article I.—The corps of the Marshals Dukes of Treviso and Ragusa shall evacuate the city of Paris on the 31st of March, at seven o'clock in the morning.

Art. II.—They shall remove the *matériel* of their army.

Art. III.—Hostilities can only recommence two hours after the evacuation of Paris; that is to say, on the 31st of March, at nine o'clock in the morning.

Art. IV.—All the arsenals, workshops, military buildings, and magazines, shall remain in the state in which they existed previously to the present capitulation.

Art. V.—The national, or urbane guard, is wholly distinct from the troops of the line: it shall be preserved, disarmed, or disbanded, according as the allied sovereigns may deem it necessary.

Art. VI.—The corps of municipal gendarmerie shall share, in all respects, the fate of the national guard.

Art. VII.—The wounded and marauders who, after seven o'clock, shall be still in Paris, shall be prisoners of war.

Art. VIII.—The city of Paris is recommended to the generosity of the high allied powers.

(Signed) Colonel Fabvier, Colonel Denys, Colonel Orloff, Count Paar.

Done at Paris, the 31st of March, at two o'clock in the morning.

END OF PART I.

PART II.

MEMOIRS

OF

THE DUKE OF ROVIGO.

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

The Emperor wishes again to derive his authority from the nation—Champ-de-Mai—Nullity of his abdication—Considerations on the Declaration of the Congress—The Duchess d'Angoulême, at Bordeaux—The Duke d'Angoulême made prisoner—Telegraphic dispatch—Situation of the Emperor.

THE Emperor's first administrative measure was to convene the electoral colleges in each department, for the election of members to compose a new Chamber of Deputies.

He determined that his election should be again submitted to the national voice, not wishing to take advantage of his success, to prop an authority which could only be established by the wish of the nation freely expressed.

When he again submitted this question to discussion, the Council of State had already deliberated on the act of abdication extorted at Fontainebleau, and declared it null.

The Emperor nevertheless wished that his return to power should be sanctioned by the national will.*

* Extract from the Journals of the Council of State.

"*Sitting of the 25th of March*, 1815.

"The Council of State, in resuming its functions, feels bound to make known the principles which form the rule of its opinions and its conduct.

"The sovereignty resides in the people. They are the only source of legitimate power.

"In 1789, the nation re-conquered its rights, which had for a long time been usurped or disregarded.

"The National Assembly abolished the feudal monarchy, and established a constitutional monarchy and representative government.

"The resistance of the Bourbons to the wishes of the French people terminated in their downfall, and their banishment from the French territory.

"The people twice sanctioned by their votes the new form of government established by their representatives.

"In the year VIII. Bonaparte, already crowned by victory, was raised to the government by national assent; a constitution created the Consular magistracy.

"The Senatus-Consultum of the 16th Thermidor, year X. appointed Bonaparte Consul for life.

"The Senatus-Consultum of the 28th Floréal, year XII. conferred on Napoleon the imperial dignity, and made it hereditary in his family.

"These three solemn acts were submitted to the approval of the nation, which sanctioned them by nearly four millions of votes.

"Thus had the Bourbons, during twenty-two years, ceased to reign in France; they were forgotten by their contemporaries. Strangers to our laws, to our institutions, to our manners, to our glory, the present generation knew them not, but by the remembrance of the foreign war which they had excited against the country, and the intestine dissensions which they stirred up.

"In 1814, foreign armies invaded France, and occupied her capital.

"The foreigners set up a pretended provisional government. They assembled the minority of the senators, and forced them, in opposition to their trust, and their wish, to set aside the existing constitutions, to subvert the imperial throne, and to recall the Bourbon family.

"The Senate, which had been instituted only to maintain the constitution of the empire, recognised the want of power to change it.

"That body however decreed that the plan of the constitution, which it had prepared, should be submitted to the approbation of the people, and that Louis-Stanislas-Xavier should be proclaimed King of the French, as soon as he had accepted the constitution, and sworn to observe it, and cause it to be observed.

"The abdication of the Emperor Napoleon was merely the consequence of the

It was also at this period that he convoked the meeting of the Champ-de-Mai, at which the deputies to the chamber, and

unfortunate situation to which France and the Emperor were reduced by the events of the war, by treason, and by the occupation of the capital; the abdication had for its object only the prevention of civil war, and the effusion of French blood. This act, which was not confirmed by the will of the people, could not destroy the solemn contract which had been formed between the nation and the Emperor; and even if Napoleon might personally abdicate the crown, he could not sacrifice the rights of his son, appointed to reign after him.

"However, a Bourbon was named Lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and took possession of the reins of government.

Louis-Stanislas-Xavier arrived in France; he made his entry into the capital: he took possession of the throne according to the order established in the ancient feudal monarchy.

"He did not accept the constitution decreed by the Senate; he did not swear to observe it, and to cause it to be observed: it had not been submitted to the acceptance of the people; and the people, overawed by the presence of the foreign armies, could not freely and validly declare the national wish.

"Under the protection of those armies, after having thanked a foreign prince for having enabled him to ascend the throne, Louis-Stanislas-Xavier dated the first act of his authority in the 19th year of his reign, thereby declaring that the acts which had emanated from the will of the people were merely the offspring of a long rebellion. He granted of his own accord, and by the free exercise of his royal authority, a constitutional charter, called an Ordinance of Reform; and, as its sole sanction, he merely caused it to be read in presence of a new body which he had created, and of a meeting of deputies, who were not free, who did not accept it, who had no authority to consent to the change, and two fifths of whom did not even possess the character of representatives.

"All these acts are therefore illegal; done in the presence of hostile armies, and under foreign control, they are merely the work of violence: they are essentially null, and are outrages on the honour, the liberty, and the rights of the people.

"The declarations of adherence to the said acts made by individuals, and public functionaries without delegated authority, could neither annihilate nor supply the consent of the people expressed by votes, solemnly demanded, and legally given.

"But if declarations of adherence and oaths ever were obligatory on the parties who made them, they ceased to be so, when the government which received them ceased to exist.

"The conduct of the citizens who under that government served the state cannot be blamed; praise indeed is due to those who have availed themselves of their situation to defend the national interests, and to oppose the spirit of re-action and counter-revolution which threatened to desolate France.

the members of the electoral colleges of each department were expected to be present. In the assembly of the Champ-

"The Bourbons themselves uniformly violated their promises. They favoured the pretensions of the old feudal nobility; they disturbed the security of the sales of national estates of every class; they were smoothing the way for the re-establishment of feudal rights and tithes; they menaced every thing that exists in a new form; they declared war against all liberal opinions; they attacked all the institutions which France had acquired at the expense of her blood. Choosing rather to humiliate the nation than to unite themselves to its glory, they despoiled the Legion of Honour of its endowments, and of its political rights; they lavished the decoration only to render it contemptible; they robbed the army, the brave soldiers of their pay, their rank and their honours, to give them to emigrants, to leaders of rebellion: finally, they wished to govern and oppress the people by means of the emigrants.

"Profoundly affected by its humiliation and misfortunes, all the wishes of France were directed to her national government, to the dynasty connected with her new interests and her new institutions.

"When the Emperor approached the capital, the Bourbons wished in vain, by hasty laws, and reluctant oaths to their constitutional charter, to make atonement, for the outrages committed against the nation and the army. But the time of delusion was past, and confidence was for ever alienated. No arm was raised in their defence; the nation and the army flew to meet their deliverer.

"On re-ascending the throne to which the people had raised him, the Emperor therefore only re-established the most sacred rights of the nation. He did no more than bring again into action the decrees of the representative assemblies, which had been sanctioned by the people; he returned to reign by the only principle of legitimacy which France had recognised and sanctioned during twenty-five years, and to which all the authorities had bound themselves by oaths from which the will of the people could alone release them.

"The Emperor is called upon to guaranty anew (and he has engaged so to do by his proclamations to the nation and the army) all liberal principles—individual liberty, the equality of rights, the liberty of the press, with the abolition of the censorship; the freedom of worship, the imposition of taxes and the enactment of laws by the representatives of the nation legally elected; the national property of every description, the independence and irremoveability of the judges, and the responsibility of ministers and of all agents of the government.

"In order to consecrate more solemnly the rights and the duties of the people and the monarch, the national constitutions are to be revised in a great assembly of representatives, which is already announced by the Emperor.

"Until the meeting of this great representative assembly, the Emperor must exercise, and cause to be exercised conformably to the constitutions and the existing laws, the power which they have delegated to him, which could not be

de-Mai it was intended to declare the state of the votes of the communes, and to proclaim the Emperor anew: but a combination of circumstances, which retarded the meeting of the electoral colleges of many departments, prevented the Champ-de-Mai from taking place till June. Intrigue was not inactive during this interval, as may be seen from what follows.

An account was received in Paris of the declaration made at Vienna by the allied Sovereigns, almost at the same time that we were informed of the King's departure from Lille. It was also known that, as a consequence of this Declaration, the treaty of alliance of Chaumont had been renewed.

These transactions could not be concealed from the public. The documents which proved them, were circulated in profusion. It became then evident that the Emperor's return had not been concerted with any power; and indeed, so far from such being the fact, that all the powers were preparing to make war upon us. This conviction somewhat abated the enthusiasm, and threatened to become a source of much disquietude. But the Declaration of the allies was so outrageous! its appeal to murder was so revolting, that there appeared no reason to despair of rousing the public feeling, and making the nation assume that spirited attitude which it had at first exhibited. The act of proscription pronounced against the Sovereign whom we had once again elevated on our shields, was submitted to the Council of State, which body soon pronounced a plain and unreserved opinion upon it. The report of the committee of the council to which the document was referred, was couched in the following terms :—

1.—In pursuance of the reference made to it, the Committee, composed of the presidents of the several sections of

taken from him, which he could not abdicate without the consent of the nation, and which the wish and the general interest of the French people make it his duty to re-assume."

the Council of State has examined the Declaration of the 15th of March, the report of the minister of general police, and the documents thereto annexed.

2.—The Declaration is of so unusual a form, conceived in terms so extraordinary, and expresses ideas so anti-social, that the Committee was at first inclined to regard it as one of those fabrications by which worthless men endeavour to seduce the national mind, and to give a false direction to public opinion.

3.—But the authentications of the minutes taken at Metz, and of the interrogatories of the couriers, leave no doubt of the fact that this declaration was forwarded by the members of the French legation at Vienna; and it must therefore be considered as signed and adopted by them.

4.—It is under this preliminary point of view that the Committee considers it proper to commence the examination of a production which is without example in the annals of diplomacy, and in which Frenchmen—men invested with a public character of the most respectable nature—commence by a kind of outlawry, or, to speak with more precision, by an incentive to the assassination of the Emperor Napoleon.

5.—We say, with the minister of the police, that this Declaration is the work of the French plenipotentiaries; because those of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England, could not sign an act which the sovereigns and nations they represent would not fail to disavow.

6.—In the first place these plenipotentiaries, having for the most part co-operated in the treaty of Paris, knew that Napoleon was therein recognised as retaining the title of Emperor, and as sovereign of the island of Elba. They should therefore have described him by those titles, and ought not to have deviated, either in substance or in form, from the respectful courtesy due to such distinctions.

7.—They should have felt that, according to the law of

nations, the least powerful prince as to the extent and population of his territories, enjoys, in his civil and political character, the rights belonging to every sovereign prince equally with the most powerful monarch; and that Napoleon, having been recognised under the title of Emperor, and as sovereign prince, by all the powers, was not more than any other sovereign subject to the jurisdiction of the Congress of Vienna.

8.—A disregard of those principles, which it is impossible to suppose on the part of plenipotentiaries who consider the rights of nations with calmness, wisdom, and mature deliberation, is not astonishing, when manifested by French ministers who experience the reproaches of conscience for more than one treason,—in whom fear has produced rashness, and whose judgment is distracted by remorse.

9.—By men such as these, the fabrication and publication of a document like the pretended Declaration of the 13th of March might be hazarded, in the hope of arresting the progress of Napoleon, and of deceiving the French people as to the real sentiments of foreign powers.

10.—But it is not for them to judge, as that Declaration does, of the merits of a nation which they have misrepresented, betrayed, and exposed to foreign aggression.

11.—This brave and generous nation revolts at whatever bears the character of baseness and oppression. The ardour of its affection is heightened, when their object is menaced or attacked by great injustice; but the assassination to which the Declaration of the 13th of March incites, will find no arm to perpetrate it among the twenty-five millions of French, the majority of whom followed, guarded and protected Napoleon from the Mediterranean to the capital,—nor among the eighteen millions of Italians, the six millions of Belgians, or the inhabitants of the banks of the Rhine, and the numerous people of Germany, who, in this solemn conjuncture, never pronounce his name but with respectful recollection,—nor in the bosom of the indignant English nation, whose honourable

sentiments disavow the language that has audaciously been attributed to the Sovereigns.

12.—The people of Europe are enlightened. They judge of the rights of Napoleon, the rights of the allied Princes, and those of the Bourbons.

13.—They know that the Convention of Fontainebleau is a treaty between sovereigns. Its violation, the entrance of Napoleon on the French territory, like every infraction of a diplomatic act, like every hostile invasion, can only give occasion to a war of the ordinary kind; the result of which, as to personal consequences merely, is to conquer, or be conquered—to be free, or a prisoner; as to possessions, to preserve them or to lose them, to increase them or to diminish them; and any design, any menace, any attempt against the life of a prince at war with another, is a thing unheard of in the history of the nations and cabinets of Europe.

14.—In the violence, in the fury, in the disregard of principles which characterise the Declaration of the 13th of March, may be recognised the envoys of the same Prince, the instruments of the same council, which, by the ordinance of the 9th of March, in like manner placed Napoleon out of the pale of the law, which in like manner invited assassins to turn their poignards against him, and which in like manner offered a reward for his head.

15.—And yet, what has Napoleon done? He has honoured with his protection the men of all nations, whom the infamous commission proposed to them had so grossly insulted; he has been moderate, generous, and a protector even to those who had devoted him to death.

16.—When he spoke to General Excelmans, marching towards the column which closely followed Louis Stanislas Xavier; to General Count d'Erlon, who was to receive him at Lille; to General Clausel, who went to Bordeaux, where the Duchess of Angoulême was; to General Grouchy, on his departure to repress the civil troubles excited by the Duke

d'Angoulême; in short, on every occasion orders were given by the Emperor, that persons should be respected and secured against any attack, danger, or violence, during their passage through the French territory, and at the moment of their leaving it.

17.—Nations and posterity will judge on which side has been exhibited, during this great crisis, respect for the rights of the people and of sovereigns, for the laws of war, the principles of civilization, and the maxims of civil and religious legislation. They will decide between Napoleon and the house of Bourbon.

18.—If, after examining the pretended Declaration of Congress under the first point of view, we consider it in reference to the diplomatic conventions, to the Treaty of Fontainebleau of the 11th of April, ratified by the French government, it will be found that the violation of that convention is solely imputable to the very persons who reproach Napoleon for not observing it.

19.—The Treaty of Fontainebleau has been violated by the allied powers and by the house of Bourbon, in what regards the Emperor Napoleon and his family, and in what regards the interests and the rights of the French nation.

20. (I.)—The Empress Maria Louisa and her son were to have been furnished with passports and an escort to proceed to the Emperor; yet, far from fulfilling this engagement, the wife was violently separated from her husband, the son from the father; and this under the most painful circumstances, when the possessor of the strongest mind must be driven to seek consolation and support in the bosom of his family, and in domestic affections.

21. (II.)—The safety of Napoleon, of the Imperial family, and of their suite, was guarantied (Art. 14. of the treaty) by all the powers; and yet bands of assassins were organised in France under the eyes of the French government, and even

under its orders, (as the solemn proceeding against the Sieur de Maubreuil will soon prove,) to destroy not only the Emperor, but his brothers and their wives. Failing of the success which was hoped from this first branch of the conspiracy, a commotion was prepared at Orgon, on the Emperor's route, where an attempt was to have been made on his life by the hands of some brigands. The Sieur Brulart, one of Georges's cut-throats, known in Brittany, in Anjou, in Normandy, in La Vendée, and even throughout England, for the blood which he has shed, was raised to the rank of camp-marshal, and sent to Corsica as governor, for the express purpose of preconcerting the crime, and insuring its execution; and in fact several single assassins successively attempted, in the island of Elba, to gain by the murder of Napoleon the guilty and disgraceful reward promised them.

22. (III.)—The full and entire property of the duchies of Parma and Placentia was ceded to Maria Louisa for herself, her son, and his descendants; but, after a long refusal to give her possession, the final injustice was consummated by an absolute spoliation, under the illusory pretext of an exchange made without valuation, without due equivalent, without conveying sovereignty, and without consent;—and documents existing in the office for foreign affairs, which we have caused to be laid before us, prove that it was on the application, on the urgent solicitations of the Prince of Benevento, that Maria Louisa and her son were despoiled.

23. (IV.)—There was to have been given to Prince Eugene, the adopted son of Napoleon, who has honoured France, which gave him birth, and who has won the affection of Italy, which adopted him, a suitable establishment out of France;—and he has obtained nothing.

24. (V.)—The Emperor stipulated (Art. 9. of the treaty) in favour of the brave soldiers of his army the preservation of their pensions on the Monte-Napoleon. He had reserved from

the extraordinary domain, and from the funds remaining out of his civil list, the means of recompensing his servants, and paying the soldiers who united themselves to his destiny. All, however, was taken from him, and withheld by the ministers of the Bourbons. M. Bresson, agent of the French soldiers, in vain proceeded to Vienna to claim for them a property of the most sacred description—the reward of their courage and their blood.

25. (VI.)—The preservation of the goods, moveable and immoveable, of the Emperor's family, was stipulated by the same treaty (Art. 6.); and it has been taken from many of them by force of arms; to wit, in France by commissioned brigands; in Italy by the violence of military chiefs; and in both countries by sequestrations and seizures solemnly decreed.

26. (VII.)—The Emperor Napoleon was to receive two millions, and his family two hundred and fifty thousand francs per annum, according to the arrangement established by Art. 6. of the treaty; and the French government constantly refused to fulfil this engagement; and Napoleon would soon have been reduced to the necessity of disbanding his faithful guard, for want of the means of securing their pay, if he had not found, in the grateful remembrance of the bankers and merchants of Genoa and Italy, the honourable resource of a loan of twelve millions, which was offered to him.

27. (VIII.)—Finally, it was not without motive that it was wished to separate Napoleon from those companions of his glory, those models of attachment and constancy, the unshaken guarantees of his safety and his life. The island of Elba was secured to him in full right, (Art. 3. of the treaty); and the resolution of depriving him of it, which was desired by the Bourbons and solicited by their agents, was adopted by the Congress.

28. And if Providence had not in its justice provided against it, Europe would have witnessed an aggression on the person and liberty of Napoleon, delivered thenceforward to the mercy of his enemies, far from his family, and separated from his domestics, either at St. Lucie or at St. Helena, one of which was assigned to him for a prison.

29. And when the allied Powers, yielding to imprudent desires, to the cruel suggestions of the house of Bourbon, condescended to violate the solemn contract on the faith of which Napoleon released the French nation from its oaths; when himself and all the members of his family were menaced, attacked in their persons and property, in their affections, in all the rights stipulated in their favour as princes, in those even secured by the laws to simple citizens, what could Napoleon do?

30. Ought he, after enduring so many offences, submitting to so much injustice, to have consented to the complete violation of the engagements entered into with him; and, resigning himself personally to the fate which was prepared for him, to have abandoned likewise his wife, his son, his family, and his faithful followers to their dreadful destiny?

31. Such a resolution appears beyond human fortitude; and yet Napoleon would have taken it, had the peace, the happiness of France been the price of this new sacrifice. He would once more have devoted himself for the French people; from whom, as he was pleased to declare to Europe, he made it his glory to hold every thing; to whom he wished to restore every thing; before whom only he stood responsible for his actions, and for whom he was ready to lay down his life.

32. It was for the sake of France alone, and to save it from the evils of intestine war, that he abdicated the crown in 1814. He gave back to the French people the rights which he held from them; he left them free to choose a new mo-

narch, and to establish liberty and happiness on institutions capable of protecting both.

33. He hoped that the French nation would preserve all that it had acquired by twenty-five years of combats and glory; that it would enjoy the exercise of its sovereignty in the choice of a dynasty, and in stipulating the conditions according to which that dynasty should be called upon to govern.

34. He expected from the new government respect for the glory of the armies, for the rights of the brave; a guarantee for all the new interests—for those interests which, being the offspring of our political and civil rights, were created and maintained during the last quarter of a century, are identified with the manners, the habits, and the wants of the nation, and were observed and revered throughout the whole of that period.

35. Far from this, all idea of the sovereignty of the people has been discarded.

36. The principle which has formed the basis of all political and civil legislation since the revolution, has also been discarded.

37. France has been treated by the Bourbons as a rebellious country, reconquered by the arms of its ancient masters, and subjugated anew to a feudal government.

38. Louis Stanislas Xavier has disregarded the treaty which alone transferred to him the vacant throne of France, and has misunderstood the abdication, which alone permitted him to ascend that throne.

39. He pretended to have reigned nineteen years; thereby insulting at once the governments established during that period, the people which had consecrated them by their suffrages, the army which defended them, and even the sovereigns who had recognised them in numerous treaties.

40. A charter drawn up, imperfect as it was, by the Senate, has been entirely disowned.

41. A pretended constitutional law, (as easy to elude as to revoke,) in the form of a simple royal ordinance, was imposed on France, without consulting the nation, without reference even to those bodies which had become illegal, but which still were the phantoms of national representation.

42. And as the Bourbons decreed without right, and promised without giving security, they have evaded without regard to good faith, and executed without fidelity.

43. The violation of this pretended charter has been restrained only by the timidity of the government: the extent of the abuse of authority has been limited only by its weakness.

44. The breaking up of the army, the dispersion of its officers, the exile of many; the degradation of the soldiers, the suppression of their endowed funds, the withholding of their pay or retiring pensions; the reduction of the allowances of the legionary corps, the deprivation of military honours; the pre-eminence given to the decorations of the feudal monarchy; the contempt displayed towards the citizens, again described by the term "third estate;" the robbery planned and already commenced of the holders of national property, the consequent depreciation of the value of that which the owners found it necessary to sell; the return of the feudal system in its titles, its privileges, its profitable exactions; the re-establishment of Ultramontane principles; the abolition of the liberties of the Gallican church, the suppression of the Concordate, the re-imposition of tithes; the growing intolerance of the exclusive religious establishment, the domination of a handful of nobles over a people accustomed to equality—such is what the Bourbons were doing, and wished to do for France.

45. It was under those circumstances that Napoleon quitted the island of Elba. They formed the motive of the resolution he adopted, and not the consideration of his personal interests, so weak in his estimation when compared

with the interests of the nation to which he has devoted his existence.

46. He has not brought war into the bosom of France; he has, on the contrary, extinguished the war which the proprietors of national property, forming four-fifths of the French land-owners, would have been compelled to wage against their spoliators; the war which the citizens, oppressed, debased, and humiliated by the nobles, would have been forced to declare against their oppressors; the war which the Protestants, the Jews, and men of different religious persuasions, would have been driven to maintain against their persecutors.

47. He came to deliver France, and as a deliverer he has been received.

48. He arrived almost alone: he traversed two hundred and twenty leagues of the country without meeting an obstacle, without a combat; and he repossessed himself, without resistance, in the midst of the capital and of the acclamations of the immense majority of the citizens, of the throne deserted by the Bourbons, who, in the army, in their household, amongst the national guards, or amongst the people, could not find one arm willing to attempt to maintain them upon that throne.

49. And now, replaced at the head of the nation which had already chosen him three times, and has just nominated him a fourth time by the reception given him during his march, and his rapid and triumphant arrival—of this nation, by which, and for the interest of which he alone would reign, what does Napoleon desire?

50. That which the French people desire—the independence of France, internal peace, peace with all nations, the execution of the treaty of Paris of the 30th of May, 1814.

51. What, then, is changed as to the future in the state of Europe, and in the hope of the repose which was promised

it? What voice is raised to demand that assistance which, according to the Declaration, ought not to be granted unless when called for?

52. Nothing is changed, if the allied powers revert, as may be expected of them, to just and moderate sentiments: if they recognise that the existence of France in a respectable and independent state, as distant from conquering as from being conquered, from dictating as from being subjugated, is as necessary to the balance of the great powers as to the security of the smaller states.

53. Nothing is changed, if, respecting the rights of a great nation which wishes to respect those of all other nations, which, proud and generous, has been humbled, but can never be degraded, France be allowed to rechoose a monarch, and give herself a constitution and laws adapted to her manners, her interests, her habits, and her new wants.

54. Nothing is changed, if, abstaining from seeking to compel France to resume, with a dynasty which she can no longer endure, the feudal chains which she has broken, the seignorial and ecclesiastical exactions from which she has freed herself, no attempt be made to dictate laws to her, to interfere in her internal affairs, to assign to her a form of government, and to give her masters according to the caprice, the interests, or the passions of her neighbours.

55. Nothing is changed, if, when France is occupied in preparing the new social compact which is to secure the liberty of her citizens, the triumph of generous ideas which prevail in Europe, and which can no longer be stifled, she be not forced, by being obliged to engage in warfare, to turn aside from these pacific views, and from the resources of internal prosperity, to the cultivation of which the people and their chief wish, with a happy accordance, to devote themselves.

56. Nothing is changed, if, when the French nation asks only to remain at peace with the whole of Europe, an unjust

coalition do not compel her to defend, as in 1792, her will, her rights, her independence, and the sovereign of her choice.

(Signed) COUNT DEFERMON,
Minister of state, president of the finance department.
COUNT REGNAULT DE ST. JEAN D'ANGELY,
Minister of state, president of the home department.
COUNT BOULAY,
President of the legislative department.
COUNT ANDREOSSI,
The president of the war department.
(A true copy)
DUKE DE BASSANO,
Minister secretary of state.

This document produced its effect. The indignation of the nation was roused on learning that unworthy Frenchmen had solicited and provoked the proscription of their ancient chief, and that the assembled sovereigns had sanctioned so base a suggestion.

It was not so with Fouché. He had hitherto remained a silent observer, because he was persuaded that Austria would support the Emperor in his enterprise. He had done his best to direct to the advantage of the Emperor the burst of popular feeling, in which some difficulties presented themselves in the south, namely, at Bordeaux, Toulouse, and Marseilles. The Duchess of Angoulême was in the first of those towns trying to rouse her party. The Duke of Angoulême had been at Toulouse, and left M. de Vitrolles there preparing means of defence, whilst he continued his route to Marseilles. He succeeded in collecting some troops and leading them on the road to Lyons as far as Montelimart; but all these efforts were of no avail.

The Emperor sent Clausel to Bordeaux, with the magistrates of which town he entered into negotiations. The

regiment of infantry which occupied the town had refused to do what was required of it; and General Decaen, who commanded in the town, was obliged to request the Duchess of Angoulême to depart, because he could not answer for the subordination of the garrison. On this occasion the Duchess exhibited uncommon courage: she employed every means to interest generous spirits in her favour. She went to the barracks, and harangued the soldiers. They gathered round her carriage, declared their regard for her, and vindicated themselves from the supposition of a want of respect towards her, but refused to arm in her favour. Some swore they would not suffer any harm to happen to her. She interrupted them, saying—"No, no; no more oaths; let us have deeds—now is the time."

She could not prevail on them to change their purpose, and embarked on board an English sloop of war which had entered the Gironde.

At Toulouse, General de Laborde caused M. de Vitrolles to be arrested, and he was conducted to Paris.

The Emperor sent General Grouchy to take the command of the troops in the environs of Lyons. The general reinforced them with the national guards of the neighbouring departments, and marched against the Duke of Angoulême.

He came up with the Duke, dispersed his troops, and made him prisoner.

The Emperor, who did not wish to abuse the favours of fortune, allowed the Duke to retire whither he thought fit. He passed into Spain. *

* Men are never better known than after a revolution. I here insert a note, on the authority of a person who had the best opportunity of any man in France to know the fact to which it relates.

There was at first, between the Duke of Angoulême and Marshal Grouchy, a sort of capitulation, by which the prince was allowed to retire into Spain. The

The Duke of Bourbon had been sent by the King to La Vendée; he was even accompanied by Count de Cessac, who had so well perfected the execution of the system of conscription under the Emperor. The object of the Duke of Bourbon's journey was to raise an army in La Vendée; but when he learned the real state of things in Paris, as well as in the south, he adopted the resolution of embarking for England. All who had accompanied him returned to Paris to proffer their submission to the Emperor.

This was the moment when all France might be regarded as united under the same banners. Unfortunately it was not so long.

Although the Emperor's return had excited as much enthusiasm as wonder, it was nevertheless remarked that the triumph of modern over ancient ideas had a very great share in producing this effect. That such was the case was soon perceived by the cries for a constitution, which were heard on all sides. The Emperor was liked; he was preferred to any other sovereign; but there was no disposition to listen to any modification of the limits within which it was resolved to confine his power; and the people would have proceeded to extremities, had they not hoped that he himself would restrict his authority, so as to afford perfect security against the re-

Marshal transmitted a notice of the fact by the telegraph. The Emperor replied, in the same way, that he approved of what was done.

Shortly after, a second telegraphic despatch brought the intelligence that during the armistice which preceded and followed the capitulation, a circumstance had occurred which gave reason to suspect the good faith of the royalist party: that in consequence recourse had been had to arms, and that the Duke of Angoulême was taken prisoner.

This second despatch was submitted to the Emperor, who ordered M. de Bassano (who was then at the head of the telegraphic department) to transmit to Marshal Grouchy a despatch, stating that he had done well. The first answer was already transmitted; but M. de Bassano delayed the transmission of the second until the first had had time to arrive and be acted on. In fact, when the second notification arrived, Grouchy caused the Duke of Angoulême to be pursued; but it was too late; he had already passed the frontiers.

turn of the evils of which they had so fresh a recollection. In a word, it appears that he was accepted only as the lever which had displaced the house of Bourbon: it was wished to make use of him in case of war; but it was intended to keep the bridle on him in every other respect.

CHAPTER II.

Metternich sends an embassy to Fouché—The Emperor obtains possession of the tokens of recognition, and intercepts the communications of the two ministers—What he learns—For a moment he is inclined to arrest Fouché—Talleyrand for the highest offer and last bidder—Murat declares himself unseasonably—General Béliard—Mysterious conduct of Fouché.

THE individuals of the royalist party who remained in Paris observed the tendency of the public mind. They encouraged it, because, in causing constitutional principles to triumph, they added to the security of their situation by protecting themselves against inquiries which might have been made into their conduct.

Fouché, who had other designs, had still better observed the bent of public opinion: he already knew the course he was to take on the return of the Emperor.

He had sent to Vienna to ascertain what was the intention there, suspecting that some agent must have been sent from that capital to the island of Elba to arrange with the Emperor, and to advise him respecting his enterprise.*

* I saw on his return the person whom Fouché had sent to M. de Talleyrand. The Emperor likewise wished to see him, and sent for him as soon as he arrived.

Had this man a double commission? I know not. I was however assured that, on his departure from Paris, he had a letter from the Emperor for M. de Talleyrand; and I have some reason to believe it. He told us that that diplomatist presided, as it were, at the decisions of the allied sovereigns. He saw the Emperor of Russia at Talleyrand's; and information being sought respecting the Emperor's

The same idea prevailed at Vienna, from whence a letter was sent to Fouché requesting explanations as to what could have brought about the Emperor's return. He was informed that the determination which had been taken not to recognise the Emperor, was in no respect changed; but that any other government that France might wish for would be granted, were it even the republic.

This letter, written by the Austrian minister, was brought to Paris by a young merchant of Vienna, who, not knowing how to get at Fouché, applied to some persons who soon relieved him from his difficulty. Metternich requested the Duke of Otranto to send a messenger to Bâle, and to furnish him with the tokens of recognition, which the young merchant would communicate to him. These private signs would serve to introduce Fouché's messenger to an Austrian agent,

return, he related the extreme enthusiasm which he had witnessed. He added every thing calculated to show that the movement was national.'

The envoy assured us that M. de Talleyrand loaded him with all sorts of obliging messages, particularly for me. He declared to him that he would not go to Ghent, but would proceed to Switzerland, where he would await the result of events. Such was his first resolution.

Ill luck, however, would have it, that the next morning, or the day after, the Moniteur arrived at Vienna, in which was published the first measure which had been adopted with regard to those who were considered the authors of the events of the month of April, 1814; and at the head of the list stood M. de Talleyrand.

He sent for the envoy who had been despatched to him from Paris, and showed him the Moniteur, saying, "Either you are made a fool of, in being sent here, or you would make a fool of me, by telling me that no measures of vengeance were to be resorted to, since you see they have already commenced." From that moment M. de Talleyrand spoke no more of retiring into Switzerland, and embraced the opposite party.

The fear of not being accurate prevents me from saying more; but this much may well afford ground for many reflections. It is not easy to perceive any necessity for threatening with rigorous measures men who could not be reached in a foreign country; and if the threat was merely feigned, the parties ought to have been apprised of it; but terror had already begun to operate on some men, and their measures partook of its influence.

who was already at Bâle, for the purpose of entering into more detailed explanations.

The endeavours which the young merchant had made to find out Fouché became known. The Emperor was informed of them. He caused him to be sought after, and interrogated him himself. The young man concealed nothing. He mentioned the day on which he delivered the letter of which he was the be rer to Fouché.

The Emperor, astonished that Fouché had not spoken to him on the subject, began to entertain suspicions. He judged, however, that there would still be time to interpose some trusty person between Fouché and the Austrian agent. Consequently, he imparted to a confidential officer the signs of communication brought by the German merchant; he added particular instructions, for the execution of which he invested him with very extensive powers, and took measures to intercept any agent whom Fouché might have sent to Bâle, as his arrival at his destination would have made the project miscarry.

This plan succeeded completely. The Emperor's agent presented himself to Metternich's emissary, who, not suspecting the snare, frankly declared the whole object of his mission.

The Emperor, after dispatching his agent, sent for Fouché. Several days had already elapsed since he received the letter brought by Metternich's messenger from Vienna, and yet he had never mentioned the circumstance.

The Emperor at first put some indifferent questions to him, and then leading the conversation to the subject of public affairs, he gave Fouché to understand that he had heard some unfavourable reports respecting him; and that, if they had any foundation, it would be much more honourable in him to retire at once from a situation which did not, perhaps, suit him, than to act unfaithfully towards a party whom

he professed to serve. "If you have scruples," said he, "resign."

Fouché affected not to understand what the Emperor meant. He knew that the young negotiator from Vienna had been arrested by the police. Nevertheless, he tried to waive the subject, and feigned to ascribe the Emperor's apprehensions to malicious reports and intrigue. He did not, however, blind himself as to the consequences: he knew too well the sovereign he had to deal with, to suppose that his treason would be forgotten. Henceforward he applied himself to repress the national spirit which it was desirable to rouse, and to thwart, by every means in his power, the Emperor's success.

It would have been the right course, perhaps, to have brought him to trial, and to have punished him at once for all the perfidious acts he had committed during the last five and twenty years; but the state of public affairs was at the moment too serious to admit of engaging in such a proceeding; and besides, it was thought advisable to await the return of the agent, who had been despatched to Bâle, in order to learn the nature of the communications which Fouché had opened there.

This agent at length returned, after completely deceiving the Vienna emissary, and inducing him to give a full and detailed explanation of every thing which was expected to be accomplished by the assistance of Fouché.

It was proposed to betray the Emperor. Every thing would be readily settled provided that prince was delivered up, and there appeared to be no individual in France so capable as Fouché to execute the enterprise.

When the Emperor saw that this correspondence involved no plot against his life, he looked upon the matter as a mere piece of intrigue; and he had such an opinion of the clearness and rectitude of Fouché's mind, as to believe that he himself would at once be convinced that such propositions, inde-

pendently of their infamous character, evidently proved that the allies were not so confident of success as their partisans represented them to be. It appeared, therefore, that it was only necessary to oppose them with courage. He believed even, that when Fouché came to look at the business in a proper light, he would see that he might be able to induce them to deviate from a policy which was not the policy of all the powers, by threatening to divulge overtures, the first consequence of which would be to make the whole nation fly to arms.

There certainly were many advantages which might have been derived from the propositions the Emperor's agent had brought from Bâle.

The Emperor lost no time in coming to an explanation with Fouché. He was the more readily induced to do so because his agent, before he left Bâle, had prevailed on the Austrian agent to agree to wait for him, by promising that he would return with all speed, and bring a positive answer.

Fouché, thus taken by surprise, was obliged to give the Emperor's agent a letter for the Austrian emissary. The letter was, however, couched in terms so equivocal, that nothing could be drawn from it except that the bearer was in reality the agent of Fouché.

This was all that was necessary, the bearer being clever enough for all else that was requisite. It was agreed that he should make the dread of arrest the excuse for the ambiguity of Fouché's letter, as that circumstance would entitle him to still greater confidence.

The second message was no less successful than the first. The Emperor's agent went and returned even a third time; but the Austrian, who had gone to Vienna, did not keep his appointment on the last occasion. What was the reason of this? Was it because the campaign was about to open? or was it because Fouché had found means to advise him of the trick, by the way of Bâle, or Vienna, or by Brussels, where he was in communication with the Duke of Wellington? I pro-

fess not to know. The Emperor's first impulse was to order Fouché's arrest: he altered his resolution, however, from the reflection that there would be time enough when he was more firmly established; and that should such an adjustment of his affairs not take place, the punishment of Fouché would be a useless act of severity.

Since his arrival in Paris he had availed himself of every resource for re-constituting the army, which had suffered considerable reductions. The declaration of the allies could not fail of being quickly followed by hostile movements, and the forces with which they menaced us were vastly more numerous than any we could bring into the field to oppose them. The opinion was universal, that inasmuch as the Emperor had been overcome at a time when he was at the head of a greater number of troops than he could now possibly bring together, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for him to obtain any advantage. This idea was a source of uneasiness; but hope was still retained. Generally speaking, the Emperor's return gave great satisfaction, because, under his government, every individual could look forward to public employment; whereas, under the Bourbons, all offices had become the property of a few families, as was the case before the revolution of 1789. Thus the success of the Emperor was sincerely wished; but nobody could be blind to the difficulties he had to encounter.

The Emperor replaced on the army list all the men who had been dismissed. Troops were assembled, clothed, and equipped with an astonishing activity; but too many things were to do at once, and there was too little time to do them. Besides, it became necessary to order, on ministerial authority, the execution of measures which ought to have previously received the sanction of the Legislative Body, which was not yet assembled.

The office for the affairs of the interior had likewise a vast deal of business to transact. Among other things, the votes of

the communes for the Emperor's re-election, and the preparatory measures for assembling the Champ-de-Mai, occupied the attention of that department. The minister of the police bestirred himself too; but as his influence was exerted only among men formerly distinguished for the violence of their principles, he worked as much against the Emperor as against the house of Bourbon.

Fouché's only care was to place himself in an attitude which would render him necessary to the government which might succeed the Emperor, whatever that government might be. With that view he suggested the idea of departmental federations, according to the practice of the first years of the revolution. In some instances these federations succeeded; but a series of accidents occurred to damp the ardour at first displayed, and to hasten their dissolution.

The Emperor, seeing the necessity of again appealing to arms, ordered all the troops to be assembled in Flanders. He left but a few regiments in the south. He formed a corps at Lyons, which he placed under the orders of Marshal Suchet. There was another under the command of General Lecourbe in the environs of Befort; and a third at Strasburg, under General Rapp. General Gérard collected a fourth corps at Metz, while the remainder of the army, forming the principal mass, assembled at Lille and Valenciennes.

This preliminary distribution of the only force which, after all her triumphs, still remained to France, obliged the Emperor to withdraw from the western departments some regiments which had been stationed there. They were no sooner removed than an insurrection broke out, and partially paralysed a resource on which success mainly depended; namely, the levies of men, which were by this event interrupted in that quarter. But this was not all the evil; it was necessary to detach troops from the army to stop the progress of the revolt. This unlooked-for affair occurred at a very unfortunate juncture, while the elections for the Legislative Body were in

progress. It produced no change in public opinion, but it increased the embarrassments of the government.

The Emperor was not a little vexed at the occurrence of this sort of new civil war. He directed that military operations should be vigorously prosecuted, and that, at the same time, communications should be opened with the principal Vendean chiefs, who were found not to be inaccessible to the propositions made to them, especially after Larochejaquelin, who headed the insurrection on the left of the Loire, had fallen.

Larochejaquelin was the instigator of the civil troubles in La Vendée. He went to England to solicit arms and ammunition, and had succeeded in obtaining both. On his return with this supply, his partizans took courage; but he soon fell a victim to his enterprise.

In an affair on the coast, after he had received a second cargo of arms, he was struck by a musket-shot, which stretched him lifeless on the shore. His successor was a man of less determined character.

He accepted the terms offered by the minister of police, and the work of pacification was advancing, when new events arose again to fix the destinies of France.

The King of Naples, after he had abandoned his alliance with France, began to perceive, though a little too late, that he had been the dupe of the promises on which he had relied. He had been informed that, at the congress of Vienna, his as well as the Emperor's destruction was contemplated.* Ac-

* Since the writing of these Memoirs, I have been informed, in the most positive manner, that Murat had engaged Talleyrand to support his interests at the congress, in order to procure for him the same securities as Bernadotte had obtained. As this was not the first time that Murat had had dealings with Talleyrand, he commenced by transmitting to that diplomatist 300,000 ducats, which were readily accepted.

Talleyrand also received an equal consideration from Murat's competitor. He decided for Ferdinand, who, in acknowledgment, secured to him his principality of Benevento, and besides bestowed on his nephew the duchy of Dino.

cordingly he had for some time back been taking measures for his own security, and had spared no effort to create a numerous army. He had thus far succeeded when he heard of the Emperor's departure from Elba; an event which he conceived afforded him a suitable opportunity for carrying his design into execution. He now perceived that there was no safety for him except by alliance with France, and that had he made but one year sooner the efforts he was then making, he might, with the aid of the Viceroy's army, have produced a diversion, the advantage of which he would have experienced. But at the period when he attempted the conquest of Italy, there was no more chance of success for him than there existed in favour of the Viceroy when he was placed under the necessity of attacking the united Austrian and Neapolitan armies.

When the Emperor arrived at Paris, the King of Naples thought he had found the favourable moment for his meditated attack on Italy, which he knew was teeming with discontent. He reckoned on an insurrection, which he expected would be the immediate result of his appearance, and he believed that he would thus give so much employment to the Austrian army, that the Emperor would have sufficient leisure and opportunity to make his weight be again felt in the affairs of Europe. The limited nature of his understanding did not permit him to perceive, that by attacking Austria, he would probably prevent a reconciliation between the Emperor and that power, if any disposition to approximation existed on the part of Austria; but this was what Murat could not comprehend.*

* The line of conduct pursued by the King of Naples was exactly calculated to render suspicious whatever propositions the Emperor might make to Austria.

That Prince was, the year before, the principal cause of the loss of Italy, in consequence of deserting the Emperor, and opening the Alps to the enemy by separating his forces from those of Prince Eugene; and, now, he prevented the Emperor from contracting the only alliance he could expect to form had Austria been ever so well inclined to a reconciliation.

Full of the idea he had cherished, the King of Naples advanced into Italy. The Emperor viewed with displeasure this imprudent step, and being aware of the rash, wavering character of Murat, despatched General Béliard in all haste with instructions for his guidance.

Béliard embarked at Toulon in a frigate which conveyed him to Naples; but all was lost before he got there.

The King of Naples, placing himself at the head of his army, advanced with the velocity of a rocket to the Po, and was there extinguished.

On the banks of that river he came up with the enemy, who, after several unsuccessful engagements on his part, obliged him to retreat. The Austrians pursued him, and managed so well, that all his troops disbanded. Such was the extent of the disaster, that on the day General Béliard joined him he was deserted by eighteen thousand men.

Fate had pronounced his doom. He returned to Naples in order to embark for France. The Queen remained in that capital with her children, and having secured by negotiation a retreat for herself and her family, they took refuge on board of an English frigate.

The country, thus deserted, received the conquerors in the usual way, and, with them, such government as they chose to establish.

General Béliard was very fortunate in being able to re-embark, and make good his return to Paris with the sad intelligence. The Emperor had not yet set out to place himself at the head of the army which was destined to act in Flanders.

Had the King of Naples deferred the commencement of his campaign but for six weeks, he might have been re-inforced on the Po by the troops Marshal Suchet was collecting at Lyons. The appearance of this corps would without doubt have brought about the defection of the Piedmontese army. The position of the King of Naples would have been com-

manding, and Italy would have declared for him. Had all hope of making terms with Austria failed, he could still have left his fortune to the chance of arms, and then the great problem involved in the return of Napoleon might have obtained a very different solution from that which it experienced.

The destruction of the army of the King of Naples rendered it necessary for the Emperor to leave Marshal Suchet in Savoy to guard the passes of the Alps. His force was not, however, strong enough, and he could no longer defend them, when, after occupying Naples, the Austrians re-appeared on those mountains.

In the mean time the King of Naples arrived at Frejus; and, taking up his abode in a small maritime town on the coast of Provence, awaited the course of events.

The agent whom Fouché had despatched to Vienna to open a correspondence with M. Talleyrand and M. Dalberg had now returned. The account he gave Fouché of the resolutions adopted by the allied sovereigns determined him as to the steps he should take. He henceforward applied himself more to serve their designs than the interests of the Emperor.

I am persuaded that the offer of the allies, to agree to any form of government wished for by France, if Napoleon were discarded, was made to Fouché for the sole purpose of inducing him to betray the Emperor. That minister, whose ability was so much vaunted, fell into the snare. His vanity was so flattered by the importance attributed to him, that he could not perceive the motive of such adulation. He was perfectly satisfied that he was able to direct the allied sovereigns as he pleased; but they, when they had no farther need of him, cast him off without ceremony.

M. de Talleyrand took care to send to Paris, from time to time, individuals belonging to the department of foreign affairs, who made it their business to confirm Fouché in no-

tions he had adopted. I once observed with him a person who, I believe, was one of these agents, and whom I afterwards saw acting zealously against the Emperor, and in favour of his son.

Fouché had despatched throughout all France agents devoted to himself; who, under the pretext of hostility to the Bourbons, were actually working for the restoration of the republic and against the Emperor. The least evil consequence of the expectations he thus sought to excite, was the preparing men's minds for some new political scenes.

It necessarily followed that free scope was given to malevolent representations, because whatever rendered the Emperor unpopular served the designs of Fouché. There was consequently much delay in recruiting the army; the police made no efforts to rouse the public spirit, but did more than enough to stifle it. Every thing was said, and encouraged to be said against the house of Bourbon, because that served the minister's plans.

The time passed away, and the ranks of our battalions still remained thin. The Emperor received advices from Germany that the Russian and Austrian forces would not be prepared to commence operations on the French frontier before the beginning of July. This was not the case, however, with regard to the English and Prussian armies, which already presented a menacing attitude in Belgium.

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CHAPTER III.

Champ-de-Mai—The Emperor again proclaimed chief of the state—The additional Act—The Genevese publicists—Madame de Staël's opinion—Reports circulated by the police—Fouché opens a correspondence with the Duke of Wellington—He prepares himself for every contingency.

It was now the end of May. The deputies from the departments, both for the Champ-de-Mai and for the Legislative Body, had arrived in Paris. The holding of that numerous assembly was delayed until the votes on the Emperor's re-election could be collected. That business was tedious, and was not terminated before the latter end of May. The holding of the Champ-de-Mai, therefore, did not take place till the 3rd of June.

The commencement of another epoch in our history, not less brilliant than those which had preceded it, seemed to be announced by that day.

The immense space included between the peristyle of the Tuileries and that of the military school was filled by a prodigious crowd, passing along the great avenue of the Champs Elysées to the bridge of Jena, and thence across the Champ-de-Mars. The multitude was beyond all calculation; and the terraces around the Champ-de-Mars were as crowded as ever they had been on any of the greatest festivals of the revolution.

The retinue by which the Emperor was accompanied was as splendid as it used formerly to be on the celebration of important ceremonies. The immense multitude through which he passed welcomed him with cheers; and assuredly, had not the prospect of war checked the hopes in which the public wished to indulge, nothing would have been wanting to com-

plete that happiness which all appeared to derive from this extraordinary event.

All the details of this assembly were carefully prepared, and every thing was done to impress upon it a grand character of freedom. Deputations attended it from every part of France; and never was there an occasion on which all the elements of the power, and all the branches of the administration of the country were taught to speak at once so intelligibly to the eye and the understanding. The Emperor was in his robe of ceremony. It was observed, with some reason, that he would have done better had he retained his ordinary dress, which was a military uniform, though he was usually robed when he took part in ceremonies of the nature of the present. He arrived at the Champ-de-Mars in a state-coach, accompanied by all the marshals on horseback.

The whole of the national guard of Paris, and a considerable number of other troops, were under arms. The procession came along the bridge of Jena, and, proceeding by a circuit purposely made, drew up in the first court of the military school, after the persons who occupied the carriages had alighted at the peristyle of that edifice.

At the first-floor windows of the middle front of the military school a balcony was erected. Stairs were constructed, which led by an easy descent from the balcony into the semicircular enclosure facing it, within which were the seats appropriated to the ten or twelve thousand deputies who composed the assembly of the Champ-de-Mai.

The persons who came in the train of the Emperor assembled in the rooms of the first story of the military school. They then proceeded into the balcony, which was on a level with the floor of the apartments. Every one took the station previously assigned to him; and the Emperor, who was in the rear of the procession, seated himself in a chair prepared for his reception.

After some preliminary ceremonies, the arch-chancellor,

advancing to the middle of the balcony, read in the face of the assembly the minutes of the scrutiny of the votes taken in the communes for the re-election of the Emperor to the imperial dignity; and declared that the number of votes in the affirmative exceeded by a million those in the negative.

Thus did the Emperor again become the head of the nation; and his election can neither be attributed to foreign bayonets, nor to the votes of communes given in the midst of hostile armies.

It cannot be pretended that a substitute was found in the influence of military menaces; for, at that time, the troops were either already assembled upon, or on their march to the frontier, so that the means of violating the freedom of election were in no way possessed by the government.

It will doubtless be remarked by some, that France, having a king, had no right to elect another chief. Upon this point I shall confine myself to a single reflection; the question would otherwise carry me too far.

In the month of April, 1814, the senate, which was assembled in the midst of hostile armies, pronounced the deposition of the Emperor, at the very time when he was at the head of the national army at Fontainebleau.

That assembly, then, delivered France up to foreign sovereigns, who were at least guided by a policy inimical to our power, if they were not, besides, influenced by Frenchmen who had abandoned their country and honour.

Shall such a proceeding be called a national act? What commune voted for the deposition of the Emperor, and the recall of the King?

What article of the constitution authorised the senate to annul an act fortified by the individual assent of nearly thirty millions of citizens, who had invested the Emperor with supreme power?

Which is the more national, and, consequently, the more legal, of these two acts?

But the Emperor had abdicated! He certainly had; but when, and how? Abdication is, besides, a case provided for by the law. The constitution had determined who should be the heir to the throne. Had a sufficient motive existed for setting aside that heir, then ought the nation to have been consulted with regard to the choice of a successor to the crown; otherwise, to subvert again all interests, and to put an end to all legal order, nothing more would be wanting than a second invasion; than that an enemy's army should collect together a few wretched outcasts from all parties. But even upon this supposition, the Emperor had a better right than any other person to the throne, inasmuch as he had just conquered France with his six hundred men, and without firing a single shot.

In vain will it be pretended that advantage was taken of the astonishment of the communes to carry the election by surprise. The Emperor was too well known to allow of his election being an affair of surprise: besides, in submitting himself to the decision of a ballot, he afforded every individual time for reflection, and sufficient leisure to consider whether he ought to reject or choose him. It was not therefore surprise, but renewal of affection, of which this election gave proof. On the contrary, in the act of forfeiture pronounced by the senate, there was evidence both of surprise and constraint. So certainly was this the case, that not one senator could be found who did not, in his individual capacity, regret what he had done.

Besides, if the act of forfeiture was valid, why was the Emperor asked to abdicate?

But if that act of forfeiture was extorted at the same time that it was beyond the competency of the senate, what becomes of the abdication of the Emperor, even supposing it unconnected with all the circumstances by which it was accompanied? As the abdication was not in favour of his son, it was void; or, if not, then all the abdications of Bayonne

would be valid, as the Spanish throne then wanted heirs as little as did that of France when the Emperor was forced to abdicate.

The public, it is said, could no longer endure to see the fortune of the country continually compromised. Was that a reason for throwing all away at once? It was wished to see an end to the revolution. But is a new subversion of all the interests of the country the way to close the revolution? It was necessary to revert to the legitimate princes! Very good! Yet this sudden want of legitimacy was the cause of many illegitimate acts. Besides, in what species of legitimacy was the Emperor wanting? The general admiration had decreed him the crown; victory had restored it to him; and yet he would not resume it without the national assent—without the assent of the whole people, expressed by every citizen individually, and with full freedom.

A series of brilliant successes seemed to have firmly settled it upon his head, when a great reverse suddenly loosened all the ties of political sympathy and affection, and substituted neglect and desertion for those sentiments of grateful attachment, which but a short time before seemed imperishable.

An effort of courage, unexampled in ancient or modern times, restored him to that power which he had been asked to abandon for the benefit of the nation; and the first use he made of it was to leave to every individual the liberty of re-electing him or not, by allowing full time for reflection to correct the effect of the admiration excited by his bold enterprise.

He now received at this assembly of the Champ-de-Mai the manifestation of the esteem and confidence with which France again entrusted to him the care of her destiny.

After the Emperor had been for the second time proclaimed head of the government, he addressed the assembly in a discourse at once energetic and noble; in the course of

his speech he replied to the Declaration of the 13th of March, in which the allied sovereigns stated that it was against him alone that they waged war, and that it was solely to divest him of power that they had again united their efforts. The Emperor told the assembly that he would willingly sacrifice his existence, if he were assured that that was the sole cause of the resentment of their enemies. But he advised them not to be deceived by such pretences; informed them that the real object of the new armament of the allies was to obtain possession of our fortresses, and the dismemberment of some of the fairest provinces of our territory, by the partition of which they hoped to smooth the differences which, in spite of their coalition, still existed among them.

In conclusion, he remarked that the danger was great, and strongly enforced the conviction that a nation loses every thing when it loses its independence.

These observations appeared to make a deep impression upon the assembly, and nothing seemed to indicate that he, to whose hands the reins of government were now for the second time committed, would so soon be abandoned.

Having finished this speech, the Emperor stepped into the middle of the Champ-de-Mars, where he caused to be assembled all the officers of every rank belonging to the national guard and the other troops which were in Paris, and addressed them in a similar bold and energetic manner. The cries of *Vive l'Empereur* filled the air. If at any time enthusiasm might be relied on, was there ever an occasion on which more was manifested than on this?

The scene which this day presented will never be effaced from the memory of those who witnessed it; and no one could fail to remark, that never did the French people, at any period of the revolution, seem more disposed to defend their liberty and their independence.

The Emperor himself left the Champ-de-Mars confident that he might rely on the sentiments then manifested towards

him; and from that moment his only care was to prepare to meet the storm which was forming in Belgium.

The nominations to the peerage were made, and time was now pressing. The Emperor opened the session of the Legislative Body with the usual forms and ceremonies. When in the hall, he was received with the loudest acclamations; and after the oaths were taken by the members of both chambers, he addressed them, in a speech pointing out the dangers with which the country was threatened. He implored them to adopt measures calculated to preserve the country from the invasion by which it was threatened on every side—to postpone, until the storm was over, all abstract discussions; and not to imitate the example of the Greeks of the Lower Empire, who only made speeches, while the battering-ram of the enemy was beating down their walls!

The Chamber of Deputies were well satisfied with this speech, as it gave a full explanation upon all the points which had formed subject of misunderstanding in 1814. There was then reason to anticipate some firm and decided measures from an assembly which declared itself satisfied.

A few days after the Emperor's arrival at Paris, he was so much pressed to settle the constitution of the country, that he found it impossible to wait for the meeting of the Legislature, in order to submit that matter to the deliberation of the deputies.

The public mind was indeed so much agitated on this question, that there was reason to apprehend resistance in matters of the greatest importance, unless immediate satisfaction were given.

In consequence of this state of the public feeling, the Emperor directed MM. Benjamin Constant, Bédoc, and some other members of the late Chamber of Deputies, to meet together for the purpose of compiling and digesting whatever had been done or said in the different national assemblies, with reference to the constitutions which France had, at

various times, adopted; and to draw up a summary capable of satisfying the public impatience.

Unfortunately the materials to be compiled were too considerable, and the time too short, to admit of the revision of all the anterior constitutions, and the composing therefrom the plan of a constitution suited to the wants of the moment. No other title was therefore given to the result of those gentlemen's labours than that of "*Additional Act to the constitutions of the state.*" The articles of this document were found to be extremely liberal.

The publicists were satisfied with it. Even Madame de Staël applauded the provisions which the act contained. In a letter to the Prince of ... she says, "the additional articles are all that is wanted for France; nothing less, and nothing more, than what she wants." And as if it seemed that something of self must always find its way into whatever appears most disinterested, she adds, "the return of the Emperor is prodigious, and surpasses all imagination.—I recommend my son to you." The suffrage of Madame de Staël was no doubt of some value, as was also that of the cohort of Genevese publicists, who followed her in the same tone of approbation; but no respect was paid to the lucubrations of these foreigners. The work was attacked in its very title. It was censured out of all reason, and out of all measure, even by those who had not taken the trouble to read it. Malevolence, which unfortunately is always sure to find abundance of echos in France, was evidently at work. Eight days were spent in vituperation; at last the angry feeling subsided to such a degree, that when the chamber assembled no discussion took place on the additional Act, which was then very generally approved.

Several persons have expressed the opinion that the Emperor ought to have abdicated at the Champ-de-Mai, leaving it to the Chamber of Deputies to govern and save the state, either by negotiation with the enemy, or by rousing the national energy to triumph over the disappointment, if nego-

tiation should not prove successful. They alleged that, as the enemy had, by the Declaration of the 13th of March, stated that war was made against the Emperor alone, it became that prince to detach himself entirely from the question, in order that it might be clearly seen whether the allied sovereigns were insincere in the sentiments they manifested. In that case, the chamber would have appointed for the government an executive committee, composed of members of high character, and out of the reach of all suspicion of being influenced by the enemy. This committee would have transferred its authority to the Emperor, upon finding that the declaration was only a deception, contrived to paralyse the efforts of the nation. On the contrary, if the allies granted what the nation required, then a provision would have been made for the Emperor suitable to the dignity of the country, and the gratitude due to its deliverer from dangers, the recollection of which could not easily be forgotten.

It was Fouché who gave currency to these ideas; and he had his reasons for so doing. An abdication would have afforded him the opportunity of more easily resuming the projects in which he was engaged before the Emperor's return from Elba. He would have been master of the field, and would have made arrangements with foreigners to his own advantage. Another consideration had also its weight with him. He was aware that his conduct had awakened suspicion. It is very evident that the first sacrifice which the traitor would have proposed that the nation should make to the allies, would have been to deliver up the Emperor; a measure which he could, when placed at the head of the government, have easily carried into execution. The truth of this opinion will appear less questionable when it is considered that his future security required the sacrifice of the Emperor at all hazards; for it is worthy of remark, that the parties at Vienna refused to undertake any thing until that prince should previously be removed from the isle of Elba.

Fouché took good care not to avow the reports which all his industry was exerted in propagating. He had too much sense to suppose that the Emperor had come to expel the Bourbons for the purpose of afterwards transferring France into the hands of a few intriguers, and too much sagacity to flatter himself that he could long conceal the object of his machinations. I sincerely believe, however, that if he had, on the arrival of that prince, explained to him the state of his negotiations with the allies, and been able to prove to him that, had it not been for his return, he would have succeeded, the Emperor would not have wished a drop of blood to be shed for that which could be obtained without him. If Fouché was as fully assured of success as he has pretended he was, nothing can excuse him for not having confided his secret to the Emperor. He is the more blameable as the acknowledgment, far from injuring him, might even have been the means of raising his credit with the Emperor, at the same time that it would have assured his popularity with the nation.

May it not then be concluded that the cause of his silence on this delicate subject was, that he distrusted the promises transmitted to him from Vienna, and that he therefore felt it necessary to attach himself to the Emperor? On the other hand, he must have perceived, that if he divulged the project in which he was engaged before the return from Elba, and the Emperor failed to maintain himself, he would then stand in a disadvantageous situation with respect to the new government, which would not fail to call upon him for an account of his conduct.

The Emperor had heard of Fouché's negotiation; and the letter seized on the courier from Vienna had afforded him some materials for reflection; but as the minister did not speak to him on the subject, he could not regard the affair otherwise than as an intrigue, on the success of which its promoters themselves did not much rely. There was no motive

for making a mystery of an affair which it was perfectly natural to avow; for the Emperor, who had not communicated his intention to return to any individual, could not be displeased to find that attempts were making by others to throw off a yoke of which all complained.

Fouché was fully persuaded that the destiny of France depended on the resolutions of the Congress; but the campaign being about to open in Flanders, he considered that if we experienced a reverse in that quarter, the English armies would arrive first at Paris, and that the fate of that capital would then depend more on the English general than on the commanders of the other armies which were still beyond the Rhine. He felt therefore that he had no time to spare, and immediately opened a communication with the Duke of Wellington. By this precaution he was prepared for all events. If the Emperor triumphed, he reserved for him the embarrassments which he was creating in the Chamber of Deputies, and among the men who had taken part in the movements of the revolution. There is no doubt that he would have hampered and retarded the measures of the government, by extinguishing the hope of its consolidation. Finally, he had a last resource, the death of the Emperor: that crime would not have been difficult of accomplishment; for the assassin might have relied on impunity, as he could not have been secured if the police minister wished him to escape.

I have conversed with many persons who had been acquainted with Fouché for twenty years, and they fully concurred in my opinion.

To such a degree did Fouché carry his dissimulation that, when I met him a few days after the Emperor's departure for Flanders, he said to me—"It is impossible to preserve attachment to the Emperor; for no one is safe with him: he suspects every body of betraying him." This was his language after he had written to the Duke of Wellington.

It is impossible to repress astonishment at the Emperor having again employed this man. An error of such magnitude proves how completely ignorant he was of the plots which had been hatching at Paris before his return.

CHAPTER IV.

The Emperor's departure for the army—Distribution of our force—Lord Castlereagh's boasting—His confidence assumed—Anecdote from Smyrna—What the Emperor might have done, had fortune favoured him—What did not the perfidy of Fouché deserve!

THE Emperor left Paris to take the command of the army on the 10th or 11th of June.

He proceeded first to Avesnes, and assembled the troops on the banks of the Sambre, between Maubeuge and Charleroi. I was not with the army, and shall therefore only briefly sketch the events of this unfortunate campaign.

The Emperor's army was not very numerous, but it was in good condition, and animated by the best spirit. It was inferior in cavalry to the enemy's army, which it however surpassed in the quality of its infantry, and more particularly in its artillery.

The time which remained for placing the frontier in security by a decisive blow was limited.

The Emperor had to expect the arrival of the Russian and Austrian armies on the Rhine in the month of July. It was therefore necessary that he should be on that river at the same period.

The corps of Suchet at Lyons, and that of General Lecourbe at Befort were feeble; but they were daily reinforced by the new levies, which being called out as the only means of saving the country, were actively forwarded. That the Emperor did not sooner put them in motion was, because he

considered it more advantageous to wait until they were completed, in order to avail himself of them in the second part of his operations.

The Bavarian army, which was twenty-five thousand strong, occupied the territory of Deux-Ponts; and was marching to form a junction with the Anglo-Prussian army. The Emperor, who had reason to reckon on the favourable sentiments of these troops, who had been sounded a month before, wished to engage the Anglo-Prussian army before the Bavarians could take part in its operations; because, on the day after a successful battle, they would have declared for him, either from the revival of their former attachment, or from the necessity in which the fortune of war would have placed them.

The Bavarians advanced by forced marches to join the Anglo-Prussians; and the nearer they approached the Lower Meuse, the more they would have got involved in the snares we had laid for them, had fortune favoured us at Waterloo.

The corps which was in Lorraine, and which was daily augmenting, followed along the frontier the movement which the Bavarians were making beyond it. The Emperor concentrated this corps in the neighbourhood of Thionville: his reason for doing so will speedily be seen.

All the frontier fortresses from the sea to the Rhine were garrisoned with national guards. They could not certainly be considered good troops in the field of battle; but we could have employed them usefully in a thousand ways in those operations which become easy after a battle has been gained.

Whenever an event fails to realise the hopes previously formed respecting it, the plans which have had an unfavourable issue are sure to be blamed. The tactics of the leader are criticised, his combinations censured, and only what he has not done is pronounced to be right. This is precisely what happened to the Emperor. He was treated without mercy. Officers, previously unknown, were suddenly trans-

formed into great military chiefs. To hear them talk, it was only necessary to have given them the command, and the destruction of the enemy's army was certain.

It is very true that all was lost by the battle of Waterloo; but was the battle itself lost through the manœuvres which led to it, and the improvidence of him who directed them? or did we fail through a combination of unfortunate circumstances and unlooked-for accidents? This I will endeavour to explain.

With the exception of General Rapp's corps, the Emperor had taken all his disposable troops to the principal theatre of operations, so that they might be ready to be employed when wanted.

He certainly did not give the enemy battle with the prospect of being defeated, and he had more chances of success than of reverse. The disaster was doubtless great—greater, perhaps, than is imagined; for it is only by comparing it with the brilliant advantages which victory would have secured, that we can measure the depth of the abyss into which we were plunged. Every patriotic Frenchman must shed bitter tears when he reflects on what a few generous efforts more might have effected. For my part, I have never tasted happiness since I learnt with positive certainty how nearly we had consolidated for ever the edifice of glory which we had been twenty years in raising.

The prime minister of England communicated a long detail to the parliament on the operations of the different combined armies during this short campaign. Some months before he said, to induce parliament to take part in the war which he had rekindled on the Emperor's return, that there could be no doubt of success, and that the operations would not last six weeks.

The result verified the assertion of the English minister, though there is good reason to believe that he himself did not expect so speedy and so advantageous a fulfilment of his

prediction. However, the probability is that he had learned his lesson two ways, and was prepared for any thing that might ensue.

We are even justified in believing that he deceived parliament, when, in detailing the events which annihilated France, he assured the House of Commons that, even had the result of the battle of Waterloo been the reverse of what it was, the success of the allies was, nevertheless, certain, because the Emperor Alexander would have arrived with such strong masses of troops that he must speedily have secured the victory, and repaired any reverses which the Anglo-Prussian army might have sustained.

This opinion, with whatever confidence it might be expressed, does not very well accord with the following fact, which is strictly true.

On the Emperor's return from the isle of Elba, the French had in the Levant, under the command of M. de Sessieux, a division consisting of a frigate, a corvette, two brigs, and two goëlettes.

As soon as war was declared, the English despatched in pursuit of this division a squadron consisting of two frigates of the same force as the French frigate; to which were added a corvette and two brigs, one of which was very large. Thus the chances were entirely in their favour.

The English commodore began to look out for the French division, and sailed to Smyrna, where he hoped to fall in with it; but in spite of all his diligence, he did not arrive there until after the departure of M. de Sessieux for Toulon, whither he had received orders to proceed.

The English commodore remained at Smyrna, and he was there when intelligence reached that city of the disasters of Waterloo, and the abdication which they occasioned. The English officers evinced their mortification at an event which frustrated their hopes of promotion. "Console yourselves," said the commodore; "for even had we fallen in with the

French squadron, we could not have attacked it. My orders were merely to observe it, and, until I received fresh instructions, I should not have fired a single gun, even though the tri-coloured flag had been hoisted."

Now, however well assured Lord Castlereagh might have been of the issue of the military operations, even in the event of the battle of Waterloo being lost, still it may be asked why was the English navy prevented from contributing to a success in which England was so deeply interested?

It may certainly be presumed, that Lord Castlereagh was not really so confident of success as he pretended to be; and that in case of a reverse, which might be reasonably apprehended, he was prepared to treat independently with France. For doing so, he would have pleaded as his excuse with the allies, the disasters which the English army must inevitably have suffered, had two battles been lost; and perhaps he would even have complained of the tardiness with which the combined powers had come forward to support the Duke of Wellington.

If the prime minister of England did not form this plan of extricating himself from his difficulties, we must necessarily suppose that he intended to abandon the Coalition in case the war had been protracted, instead of terminating as speedily as he declared it would when he applied for the assistance of parliament. It was probably with this last view that he gave eventual orders to the officers of the navy, wishing to avoid the embarrassment of complicated questions, when the convenient moment should arrive for treating with the Emperor. This, moreover, proves that he perceived before his departure from Vienna a disposition to such an adjustment.

But fate, which rules the destiny of states, decided otherwise; and there is nothing more to be said upon the subject. However, in spite of the invectives which the prime minister of England lavished on the great man who was doomed to expiate errors which he could not foresee, it is nevertheless

certain that the confidence that minister affected to possess, was not really felt by him.

Lord Castlereagh was, no doubt, a clever politician; but the subject here in question is military probabilities; and surely those whose whole lives have been devoted to the profession of war are not bound to adopt all his views.

I will here venture to make an observation on the probable success which the Russian and Austrian armies might have obtained.

Both advanced on the Rhine; the Russians by the way of Bamberg, and the Austrians by Bavaria. To all appearance, these forces would have directed their march towards the Upper Rhine. This is the more probable, as we were no longer in possession of the bridge of Mentz. They would, besides, have taken this course to avoid our fortresses, to penetrate into France by a road with which they were acquainted, and, if necessary, to communicate through Switzerland with the armies in Italy. If they did not again advance by the way of Bâle, they would have left a still better game in the hands of the Emperor, who might have taken an intermediate position, whence he could have manœuvred successively on the one or the other. But on whatever point of the Rhine they should have presented themselves, the following might have been the Emperor's operations after gaining the battle of Waterloo. I even believe that what I am about to state by supposition, really was his plan.

In the first place it may be remarked, that had that great event taken place according to the way in which it was planned, the English army would have been completely destroyed; a fate from which it indeed narrowly escaped.

The Prussians would have experienced nearly a similar fate, and probably on the following day; for, in the position in which the affair would have been decided, the French army would have had a shorter march, in descending the Meuse to prevent Blucher from repassing that river, than

that general would have had to reach any point of it where he could have possessed himself of the advantage of a bridge. Thus, a day sooner or later, when fairly separated from the English army, his destructoin was inevitable. He had already been so separated, and it was only necessary to prevent him from forming a new junction.

After such success, what could have prevented the Emperor from passing the Meuse at Liége? and in that case what would have become of the Bavarian corps? It would have been the more readily intercepted, as it was marching to join the Anglo-Prussians. The Bavarians would then have done what they did in 1813; they would have ranged themselves on the side favoured by fortune.

From Liége, what would have prevented the Emperor from effecting a passage across the Moselle, down the right bank of which he would have brought the corps he had assembled in the neighbourhood of Thionville?

From any point of the Moselle to the Rhine, of what consideration would be the distance to a victorious army! The battle of Waterloo was fought on the 18th of June, and it is not therefore unreasonable to presume that the Emperor might on the 10th of July have arrived on some point of the Lower Rhine, below Strasburg. On reaching the river, he would have had his choice of three different points for crossing it, viz. the bridge of Strasburg, or between that city and the Necker, or between the Necker and the Mein; and whichever passage he chose, he would still have found himself with the whole of his victorious army at the extremity of one of the wings of the enemy's grand army, and threatening its line of operations, particularly if its march was already taken in the direction of Bâle.

According to the hypothesis here submitted, the fate of this prodigious coalition must have been decided by a great event, after a few combinations of marches and manœuvres, such as the Emperor well knew how to execute. If he had

happened to begin on the right of this Austro-Russian army, fine scenes would have occurred. All those pretended geniuses, for whom a series of base treacheries has procured the title of great captains, would have shown themselves still only so many school-boys, and would for the tenth time have taken to their heels, after receiving a sound whipping.

In such case, what would the Emperor of Austria and the confederated princes have done? They would not certainly have exposed themselves to pay all the charges of war, merely for the sake of the Russians. They would have treated with him, whom fortune had crowned, and whom she had again brought to their gates.

Had this taken place, how would the Russian army have been situated? By what route could it have avoided the Emperor's army, which would then have been reinforced, at least, by the corps of General Lecourbe, as well as by the garrisons of our fortresses, which would no longer have stood in need of defenders?

The Emperor would have been on ground with the topography of which he was familiar; and had Alexander been disposed to try his hand at the chances of battle, he would have paid a score which would never have allowed him to forget the game at which he had played. The more numerous his troops, the greater would have been his loss. He was not capable of manœuvring with the rapidity of the Emperor, who had a perfect command of the mechanism of masses.

This is a point of view under which, it would appear, Lord Castlereagh did not look at the question, when he asserted in parliament that had the battle of Waterloo been lost, the issue of the contest would have been only postponed; but it is more probable that it was because he had considered it in all its bearings, that he reserved for himself the means of treating with the Emperor, and that it was in consequence of that determination that he gave to the officers of

English ships of war those eventual orders to which I have alluded.

What can Frenchmen think, when they learn on what the destiny of their country depended? Must they not admit that if the battle had been gained, and the English army had sustained such loss as to render negotiations with the Emperor necessary, the letter which M. Fouché acknowledges he wrote, on the 15th of June, to the Duke of Wellington, would have sufficed to revive the hopes of that general? Hence, however great the defeat, he would have had no reason to consider his game as decidedly lost, since he had in his interest the very man whose duty it was to watch over the safety of the Emperor.—What ought to be the reward of such perfidy?

Let us now see what were the operations of the Emperor's army, and by what series of unfortunate occurrences the battle of Waterloo was lost.

CHAPTER V.

The army passes the Sambre—The Emperor's operations founded on the character of the enemy's generals—Battle of Fleurus—Movements of the first corps—Its consequences—Inaction of Marshal Ney—The Emperor marches against the English—The Prussians are not vigorously pursued—Grouchy's despatches—Observations on the letter of which he availed himself—M. de Bourmont—Details on the Emperor's manner of fighting a battle.

THE Emperor struck the first blow in the commencement of the campaign, and had the good fortune to surprise the enemy, while preparing to concentrate his force. This was a great advantage, which he proposed to follow up vigorously.

His plan of attack was settled. He knew the character of

the generals opposed to him. He considered that Blucher, governed by his ardent and enthusiastic temperament, would boldly draw the sword the moment he heard of our approach; and that if he had but two battalions with him, he would, with a patriotic spirit of self-denial, instantly face us, and endeavour to retard the advance of our masses, in order to allow the English time to concentrate. Not so the Duke of Wellington. Methodical and circumspect, it was certain that he would not hazard an engagement until the whole of his forces were concentrated. The Emperor was guided by these considerations in directing his operations. He opened the campaign with from one hundred and ten thousand to one hundred and thirteen thousand men. Of these he composed two masses; the principal of which, consisting of about sixty thousand men, he directed on Fleurus, at which place he knew the Prussian army was assembling. He ordered Marshal Ney to advance with the other on the road to Brussels, and to make himself master of the position of Quatre-Bras, to hinder the English from supporting their allies.

The Emperor conjectured rightly. Blucher was already in position at Fleurus. A force of ninety thousand men, covered by a steep ravine, were posted between Saint Amand and Sombref. Every thing indicated a sanguinary action.

This disposition of his army served however to betray the motives which had influenced the enemy's general. It was evident he hoped to overawe the French army, and that he would only hazard an engagement with a view to give the rest of the allied troops time to come into line. Marshal Ney had been detached to Quatre-Bras. He was, as I have already observed, to prevent the Prussians from receiving the aid they expected. The event then could not have been doubtful. The action began. Vandamme directed his march against Saint Amand; Gérard advanced upon Ligny; Grouchy upon Sombref. In a moment, from left to right, all the corps were engaged. The resistance was as obstinate as the attack was

sudden. The efforts of the enemy began, however, to relax, and General Gérard was on the point of carrying Ligny, when a numerous column was observed debouching on our left. The imperial guard, which was to have supported Gérard, suspended its movement, in order to meet the supposed hostile masses. It was soon, however, discovered that a false alarm had been raised; the troops, whose approach had occasioned so much apprehension, being no other than the first corps, which had come up on hearing the firing. The guard resumed its movement; Ligny was carried; and the Prussians compelled to retire from the field. We lost, however, two hours in consequence of the unexpected appearance of Count Erlon's corps; and the shade of night soon covered the retreat of the vanquished. But this was not all. The false movement of the first corps, which may be said to have nullified the results of this action, or, at the best, to have converted into an ordinary affair a battle which should have been decisive, had another consequence, not less unfortunate. Marshal Ney, who was to have taken possession of Quatre-Bras, was anticipated, and the position was covered by the enemy's troops when he arrived to occupy it. He had left the second corps at Frasne, and had with him but from seventeen to eighteen thousand men. He nevertheless paused not a moment, but advancing on the masses opposed to him, broke them, and was preparing to pursue them, when two divisions of fresh troops arrived to their succour. Pressed by this increase of force, he called up the troops of the first corps. But they were then distant, executing that movement which had so fatal an effect on the Emperor's plans. As evening set in they countermarched, and about nine o'clock re-entered Frasne. But all was then over; and the corps which both at Quatre-Bras and at Fleurus might have completed the destruction of the enemy, contributed to save him. Such was the decree of fate.

The efforts of the Marshal were not, however, useless; for

it was afterwards ascertained that the Prussians would not have fought the battle, had they not been assured of support. Wellington, who hastened to their head-quarters before the action commenced, informed them that his army would be assembled at two o'clock at Quatre-Bras, and at four would debouch on Saint-Amand. His intention was to attack our flank, to force in our left wing, and sweep it away. His columns accordingly began to march. The Marshal himself advanced to meet them: he gave them a severe shock, which checked them, and prevented them uniting their efforts to those of the Prussians.

Blucher was retreating, and the Emperor prepared to march upon the English. The rout of Fleurus had obliged them to evacuate the position which they had so obstinately defended. He determined to pursue them with all speed, and to march on Brussels in two columns. One, composed of Gérard's and Vandamme's corps, and the cavalry of Excelmans, under the command of Grouchy, was directed to pursue the Prussian army. The other column, of which the Emperor himself took the command, marched directly on Quatre-Bras. The Emperor joined the Marshal, whom he directed to pursue the enemy's rear-guard, which threw itself into the forest of Soignies. The whole of the English army was there; but the night coming on, it was too late to begin an attack, and the Emperor took up a position. Unfortunately the right column had not made near so much progress as the left. The latter had traversed a distance of about six leagues; the former had halted at Gembloux, which is not more than two leagues from the field of battle.

Notwithstanding this unfortunate circumstance, Wellington was not yet perhaps determined on coming to an engagement. But Blucher, whom his adversary allowed quietly to rally his scattered columns, resumed courage, and wished to try the chances of another action. He generously intimated to the English general, that if he would consent to

fight a battle, he would not march with merely two corps, as had been required, but would support him with his whole army. To this he attached but one condition, which was, that if the French did not attack on the 18th, the assembled allied forces should next day march to meet them. Old Blucher's courage inspired his ally with confidence, and the battle was determined on.

While the allies were concerting together, our left column still remained inactive, and was wasting time in watching and reconnoitring the movements of the Prussian army. The population was devoted to us: the country contained a host of individuals who had served in our ranks, and afforded, in every respect, far greater facilities for obtaining intelligence than were to be found in the countries where we had long carried on war, such as Germany and Poland. Yet to Grouchy, manœuvres which he ought to have defeated, remained a secret; and he announced, in the middle of the night, that he was still at Gembloux, ignorant whether the Prussians had retired on Brussels or on Liége. He further declared his intention of manœuvring in such a manner as to prevent them from gaining the first of these towns, or forming a junction with Wellington.*

* Gembloux, June 17, 1815, ten o'clock at night.

Sire,

I have the honour to inform you that I occupy Gembloux, and that my cavalry is at Sauvenieres. The enemy, about thirty thousand strong, continues his retreating movement. We have seized here a park with four hundred horned cattle, magazines, and baggage.

It would appear, from all the reports which have been received, that on arriving at Sauvenieres, the Prussians divided themselves into two columns, one of which must have taken the road to Wavres, by the way of Sar-à-Valain, whilst the other seems to be moving on Perwisse.

It may perhaps be inferred that one portion is desirous of joining Wellington, and that the rest, which is Blucher's army, is falling back on Liége; another column, with the artillery, having directed its retreat on Namur.

General Excelmans has orders to push forward this evening six squadrons on Sar-à-Valain, and three on Perwisse.

According to their report, *if the main body of the Prussians retire on Wavres, I*

The Emperor, although satisfied with this determination, was nevertheless much astonished at the tardiness of the Marshal's pursuit. He expected more activity; and at the moment when he believed the greatest diligence was exerted, he learned that Grouchy was still at Gembloux. In the evening the Emperor had informed him that a great battle would be fought next day, and had ordered him, whatever might be the movements of the Prussians, to endeavour to outflank the left of the English army, and to support our right, if it were only by detachments. What Grouchy had resolved to do, accorded in part with these instructions. The Emperor, however, a second time, sent him orders to pass the Dyle, and to direct his march on St. Lambert.

But the Marshal had sent another dispatch to the Major-general, in which he stated that he was again in the track of the Prussians, who were retiring on Wavres, and that he was about to pursue them in that direction. Why, after such positive assurances, did the Marshal delay his march? Why did he not seek to regain the time which he had lost? Why was he not before Wavres in the morning, instead of not arriving there till the evening? Why, at least, did he not avail himself of the bridges with which the Sambre is covered, to maintain a communication with the Emperor? Why, with so many means of intelligence, did he allow himself to be

will follow in that direction, in order that it may not reach Brussels; and I will endeavour to separate it from Wellington. If, on the contrary, my intelligence prove that the principal Prussian force has marched on Perwisse, I will proceed to that town in pursuit of the enemy.

Generals Thielman and Borstel formed part of the army that your Majesty defeated yesterday. They were still here at ten o'clock this morning, and estimated their loss at twenty thousand men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners. On departing they inquired the distances of Wavres, Perwisse, and Hanut.

Blucher has been slightly wounded in the arm, which, after having it dressed, has not prevented him from continuing in command. He did not pass through Gembloux.

I am, &c. &c.

ignorant of the manœuvres of the enemy? Why did he not endeavour to outmanœuvre the enemy, instead of stopping to fight a useless battle before Wavres? I know that he refers to a dispatch of the Major-general, in defence of his inactivity:* but that document is far from justifying him; for it even recommends him not to isolate himself, to manœuvre in the direction of the grand army, and to maintain a communication with it.

I doubtless may be wrong in my supposition, but it seems to me that there is a hiatus—that there has been omitted, of course by inadvertence, the completion of the sentence in which the Emperor commands the Marshal to manœuvre "towards us." The remainder of the sentence might be something to this effect: "to approximate to us as quickly as possible, and to prevent the enemy from penetrating between your corps and our right." I submit my doubts to the Marshal, for I am far from suspecting his integrity. I make them known to him the more readily, because the letter bears marks of alteration; for who can believe that a battle commenced at noon was gained at one o'clock? Who can suspect Marshal Soult of writing such an absurdity? Who can imagine that the Major-general would thus attempt to deceive

* Field of the battle of Waterloo, June 18, one o'clock, P. M.

M. le Maréchal,

You wrote this morning at two o'clock to the Emperor, that you would march on Sar-à-Valain. Your plan then was to proceed to Corbaix or to Wavres. This movement is conformable to his Majesty's instructions, which have been communicated to you.

However the Emperor commands me to inform you, that you must constantly manœuvre towards us.

It is for you to observe at what point the army may be, to regulate your movements thereby, and to maintain the communication between us; and also to be always prepared to attack and destroy any of the enemy's troops that may be employed in harassing our right. At this moment the battle is *gained* on the line of Waterloo. The enemy's left is at Mont St. Jean: manœuvre, therefore, to join our right.

(Signed) THE DUKE OF DALMATIA.

a man of Marshal Grouchy's great experience? There has evidently been a substitution of words in this place: the word should not be *gagnée* (gained), but *engagée* (commenced); for how could the centre of the English, if they were beaten at Waterloo, be still at Mont St. Jean, which was between us and that village?

I return to the Emperor's arrangements. The English army had the forest of Soignies in its rear. Ours was in front of Planchenois. Grouchy was following the Prussians at a distance, which allowed of his being called into the field of battle. Every thing presaged a decided victory. Some circumstances, however, diminished our chances. Several deserters, who passed over to the enemy in the morning, carried him information which he ought not to have possessed. General Bourmont had already given him, some days before, details respecting the force at the Emperor's disposal. The disproportion between the means of attack and defence were thus made known, and the enemy had therefore become more enterprising.

It is a remarkable circumstance that a sort of instinct seemed to have forewarned the Emperor of the treason which Bourmont consummated. He had for a long time repulsed that officer, and even refused him with marks of displeasure the command of a division which he solicited.

The general, in despair at remaining unemployed, had recourse at first to Count de Lobau. Repelled by him, he addressed himself to General Gérard, and solicited the support of Marshal Ney. He pledged his word of honour that he might be relied upon. They had the weakness to believe him, and seconded his application. The petitioner, besides, took great care to insist on the share he attributed to himself in determining the resolution of one of his protectors. He never ceased repeating that it was he who had, at Lons-le-Saulnier, influenced the decision of the Prince of Moskwa to join the Emperor. This service had its weight. It seemed

a pledge for the sentiments of him who had performed it. The Emperor yielded;—the consequences are known.

The attack commenced on the left. The English troops, with the forest of Soignies in their rear, were spread out to the right and left of the high road which crosses it. If forced on this point, they could not concentrate their wings without the greatest difficulty, and consequently ran the risk of being entirely defeated. The Emperor made his dispositions accordingly: he resolved to attack the enemy vigorously on his wings, to distract him, to make him waste his strength, and then, suddenly falling on his centre, to break it, and cut off his communications.

I will not undertake to describe the different phases of the battle. General Gourgaud, an officer whose ability to take a comprehensive view of military operations the Emperor justly valued, has executed this troublesome task. I will not attempt to retouch the picture which he has traced.

I will content myself with saying, according to my experience of the manner in which the Emperor conducted an action, that on every occasion when he was obliged to give battle with a force inferior to the enemy's, he was careful in the commencement to husband the efforts and the spirit of his troops by not engaging them too rapidly. He expended his strength only in proportion as the hours marked the approach of night.

He thus divided a great battle into several periods. He managed so as to make the conflict become gradually more warm, but always reserved his great effort, his final blow, until an hour or two before night. When the moment arrived, he brought all his resources into action at once, directed them himself, and did not spare the exertions of his cavalry; because when once disorder is introduced into the enemy's lines, it cannot be remedied on the approach of night, and he usually got a good account next day of what remained in the field.

He proposed to follow a similar course at Waterloo; and that was the reason he did not bring into action all his resources of artillery. Another circumstance also prevented him. He learnt from the prisoners that the Duke of Wellington expected the Prussian army, which was on its march to rejoin him.

This account tallied with the idea the Emperor had formed of the enemy's plan on seeing that the English remained in their position of Mont St. Jean, where they could not hope to withstand him without the assistance of their allies.

He therefore sent officer after officer to Marshal Grouchy; and as he could not suppose these orders would fail of effect, he did not hesitate to increase the briskness of the attack by engaging more troops, because the loss which the English thus sustained would have sufficed to enable him to finish by one vigorous effort on Marshal Grouchy's arrival. He knew the marshal too well to doubt his punctuality.

If the Emperor had contented himself with merely observing the English army, and waiting for Grouchy's corps nothing would have prevented the English from commencing a retreat on seeing Grouchy debouch. He wished to guard against this result, and therefore caused the English army to be pressed so closely as to render a retrograde movement, if not impossible, at least very dangerous.

The attack soon grew warm, and unfortunately the Emperor suffered much from an indisposition which is common to men who, like him, undergo great fatigue. Riding on horseback had this day become extremely painful to him. He therefore could not multiply himself as, it may be said, he had been accustomed to do on the field of battle, where his presence always prompted to vigour and emulation. Sometimes he looked at his watch, and, doubtless, expected Marshal Grouchy, at least as impatiently as the Duke of Wellington did Blucher. The fire was animated and murderous: however, in a battle it is necessary to keep it up, to augment it

even, for the advantage remains with him who has the last weight to throw into the scale.

The guard was still in reserve. The moment for striking the decisive blow had arrived, and Grouchy did not appear. The Emperor began to feel uneasy; for he calculated every moment, and knew that the Marshal had had sufficient time to receive the order directing him to come up, and to execute it, and he could not understand why the heads of the columns were not yet seen.

It was under these circumstances intelligence was brought to the Emperor that columns were seen debouching on his right. He believed they were the Marshal's, and went himself to meet them. He soon discovered, however, the mistake, and that, instead of the succour he expected, the Prussians were advancing against him. From that moment he no longer deceived himself as to the result which the battle would have.

If Grouchy had joined the Emperor at the same time that Blucher came up to Wellington, the battle would have taken another character. It would, doubtless, have become general; but it cannot be thought that it would have been decisive, because the superiority in numbers would still have been on the enemy's side. It is pretty certain, however, that the Emperor would not have been defeated, and that the misfortunes which followed would not have occurred.

In order that matters should have happened according to the Emperor's plan, it was necessary for Marshal Grouchy's corps to have been on the field of battle at least an hour before Blucher; because the English army would, undoubtedly, have been then so cut up that the Prussians would have arrived only to augment the confusion, and probably to experience another check themselves. Instead of which, the Prussians arrived to the assistance of the English, and Grouchy never appeared.

When the Emperor saw that he could not reckon on the

Marshal, he formed his resolution. He tried to execute, by his reserve, the shock which should have been effected by the Marshal.

It has been contended that the Emperor could have retreated. It might be so; I was not on the ground, and I cannot judge whether the dispersion of the troops, as well as the manner in which they were disposed on the different points of attack, would have allowed the Emperor to concentrate them and to effect his retreat before he would have been overwhelmed by the united efforts of the Prussians and the English; for, if he could not avoid the enemy, he seized on the only chance of success which fortune had left him, by making a vigorous effort with his reserve. Had he, even then, broken the English army before its complete junction with the Prussians, there would have been no defeat; because the time which must have been occupied, on each side, in manœuvring would have afforded equal time for Grouchy to arrive.

These, doubtless, were the reasons why the Emperor, after having recognised the Prussians, brought into action his reserve, which was composed of the guard. That corps presented itself to the enemy as it had been accustomed to do. Not only, however, did it obtain no success, but it was repulsed with loss. In the moment of its vacillation the enemy's squadrons debouched. A general charge took place. All the Prussian cavalry attacked the reserve on its right flank, and completed the disorder of our ranks.

There remained neither time nor means to arrest the disaster. Every person who has been present at battles, lost or won, cannot but admit that there was nothing extraordinary in the consequences of this charge. They were indeed inevitable. It was the repetition of what always happens when fresh cavalry charge troops exhausted by fatigue and thinned by cannon and musketry. They rarely resist the shock; the squadrons penetrate into the intervals which separate the

lines, wheel round, and destroy all order in the ranks by intersecting them at all points. In the hottest battles, the moment of the charge is that in which the troop which executes it has the least occasion for the cool courage which the infantry and artillery display in their murderous attacks. For the cavalry nothing is necessary but rapidity: terror precedes them, and success follows them.

There was not on the plain of Waterloo any obstacle to oppose cavalry. They were free to act, as long as their horses had strength to carry them.

They took therefore whatever they pleased. One thing only is matter of astonishment, and that is that any of the wreck of the army escaped them.

In this general disorder the state of every thing was the inverse of what it ought to have been. This is not surprising. All things had been arranged for attack, and therefore all necessarily embarrassed such a retreat.

Each scattered fragment of a corps took some direction or other according to the knowledge individuals happened to possess of the localities: some fled across the fields; others kept to the high road, and succeeded in repassing the Sambre.

Such was the result of the battle of Waterloo, which was more fatal to France than Agincourt or Poictiers. That the Emperor was not taken himself was because fortune would not have it so.

In preceding wars such an event would have had less fatal consequences. The disaster would have been repaired before the news reached Paris; but at this conjuncture the details of our misfortune may be said to have even preceded the account of the loss of the battle. I will state the effect which this disaster produced at Paris.

Without success the most brilliant conceptions do not secure approbation. Wherever there is reverse, censure follows. The number of persons who had not suffered any

illusions to mislead them as to the result of the contest was very considerable, and to their criticism the Emperor could not fail to be exposed. On the other hand, those who had not hesitated to tempt fortune once more in his cause, endured with pain the loss of the illusions they had cherished. In proportion as hope was disappointed, the reproaches were the more bitter.

The military plan of the campaign was blamed, and the manner in which it was executed was depreciated. Some went so far as to accuse the Emperor of having shown a want of personal courage on this occasion. Assuredly those who dared thus to defame him, knew him not: it must be presumed that they never were in the habit of following him to the field of battle. With all their courage, and they no doubt have much, would they venture to conquer France with less than eight hundred men? But time has done justice on these base imputations, and they now serve to confound those by whom they were propagated.

At Waterloo the situation of the Emperor resembled that in which he was placed at Marengo; but in the latter battle he was better served.

It may be recollected that after passing the Po near Pavia he marched to reconnoitre the Austrian army, in the hope that he might oblige it to raise the siege of Genoa; and that, to prevent it from impeding his passage of the Po at Turin, where it held the citadel, or at Placentia, which was also occupied by the Austrians, he detached corps of observation on these places, while he himself directed his march with the main body of his army towards Tortona and Alexandria, and thus menaced the great communication of the Genoese territory with Piedmont. It was on the day after he passed the Po that an officer arrived from Massena with the capitulation of Genoa, and that he learned that the Austrian army was returning on Alexandria.

The Emperor had taken that direction, and occupied a

position in front of the Bormida, to observe the Austrian army. So much did he fear that the enemy would escape him, that he ordered General Dessaix, who commanded the reserve on his left, to march on Novi to intercept the route, and prevent the enemy from reaching Placentia.

At day-break General Dessaix left his position at Rivalta, and was marching on Novi when he heard the vigorous cannonade of Marengo. He immediately halted, and ordered his advanced guard of hussars to push forward on Novi. The hussars penetrated into the town, and returned at full gallop with information that there was no force there. I was then his first aide-de-camp, and he sent me to the Emperor to report what had occurred, and to inform him that he had taken it upon himself to stop his movement.

I was crossing the country in the direction of the cannonade, when I fell in with an officer sent by the Emperor to bring up General Dessaix and his troops to the field of battle. It was fortunate that they had not advanced farther in the direction of Novi; for when they arrived at the scene of action, which they also reached by marching across the fields, affairs could not be going on worse.

General Dessaix had barely time to form his troops. The Emperor immediately ordered him to charge a column of the enemy, which was penetrating into the centre of the field of battle, where there was not sufficient remaining force to withstand it. The movement of General Dessaix, and the charge which the First Consul also ordered General Kellerman to execute, secured the victory. But had General Dessaix procrastinated, and been an hour later in arriving, we should perhaps have been driven to the Po. In fine, had not that general halted on his own responsibility—had he continued his march, as his instructions directed, on Novi, he would not have arrived in time on the field of battle, where he fell the victim

of his patriotic zeal. But the times of such promptitude were gone by, and we were doomed to drain the cup of misfortune to the dregs.

CHAPTER VI.

The Emperor utters no complaint—General Gourgaud and Colonel Grouchy—Discussion—Allegations of Marshal Grouchy.

Two years had elapsed after the conclusion of these Memoirs when I read in London the account of the battle of Waterloo, which was published by General Gourgaud on his return from St. Helena, and also Marshal Grouchy's reply.

I had likewise heard all the reproaches which were cast upon the Marshal on that occasion, but not by the Emperor Napoleon; for I can bear witness that no complaint against any individual escaped him in the painful circumstances in which he was placed during the interval between the fatal battle and his departure for St. Helena. I must now confess, that on a perusal of the work published by the son of Marshal Grouchy from materials furnished by his father, I do not find any justification of the reproaches of which he complains.

I reply to M. de Grouchy himself, and I take him on his own statements.

In the battle of the 16th, which lasted until night, he commanded all the cavalry on the field, about five thousand strong.

The Prussian army retired during the night, and the Emperor himself returned to Fleurus.

Next day, the 17th, Marshal Grouchy repaired to Fleurus to receive orders.

If, instead of going to Fleurus, M. de Grouchy had

mounted his cavalry, and ordered it forward, he would have better ascertained the direction taken by the Prussians; and there is no doubt that if he had sent positive information obtained by himself of the point where he was certain of finding Blucher's rear-guard, the Emperor Napoleon would have been infinitely better able to give him the orders which he complains of not having received until noon on the 17th.

What business had he at Fleurus on the morning of the 17th, were it not to communicate to the Emperor the result of the reconnoissance of his cavalry?

Was the Emperor to divine what Blucher had done during the night?

Marshal Grouchy pretends that it was too late when the Emperor detached him, and that the order for marching against the English army was also given too late. This is a strange reproach!

The Emperor's orders could be dictated only by the reports of the reconnoissances which he expected to receive, if not in the night, at least early in the morning: now Marshal Ney, who ought to have been on the 16th at the position of Quatre-Bras (which was occupied throughout the day only by a brigade of the Duke of Wellington's army), not only failed to be there on the 16th, but was still at Frasnes on the morning of the 17th. In this state of things, the Emperor was obliged to send a reconnoitring party selected from the troops about him to Quatre-Bras. It was then discovered that the enemy was there.

If then the morning of the 17th was lost, the blame must rest with those who left the Emperor in a state of uncertainty respecting the movements of the enemy, instead of enabling him to make the most of his time. In the situation in which France then stood, the hours were numbered; and all that happened on this occasion proves that every one, according to custom, relied implicitly on the Emperor's foresight and activity. In these circumstances of inaction, how

can M. de Grouchy be astonished that the soldiers should have employed the time in cleaning their arms and preparing their soup? Was it for the Emperor to prevent them?

About ten o'clock on the morning of the 17th the Emperor reconnoitred the field on which the battle of the 16th had been fought: it was only then that he learned the apparent direction of Blucher's retreat on Namur. At the same time he received information of the presence of the Anglo-Belgian force at Quatre-Bras.

He took his measures accordingly; marched in person upon the English; and as he could not himself conduct two operations which were to be executed on so extended a space, he renounced his intention of acting against the Prussians, and ordered Marshal Grouchy to pursue them with thirty-six thousand men, the command of whom he consigned to him.

It may here be remarked, that according to Marshal Grouchy's statement, he observed to the Emperor that he would thus be very far removed from him; (for it was still supposed that the Prussians were retiring by the Namur road, on which some artillery had been taken;) and that since he was going to give battle to the English, it would be better to take him, Grouchy, with him, and to send off only a small corps in pursuit of Blucher. These suggestions, he adds, were ill received.

Marshal Grouchy says, that probably the Emperor did not believe that Wellington would fight a battle in the position which he had taken up; for he had formed too high an opinion of that general's talent by calculating what he would himself have done in similar circumstances, &c. (See page 18 of Grouchy's publication.)

He moreover says, that of all the determinations which Blucher might have formed, the most probable, that of manœuvring to join the English, was precisely that which the Emperor thought least about.

If these reflections did not occur to M. de Grouchy until

after the event, they are not worthy of a reply; but if they occurred to him before, I am at a still greater loss to understand the course he took after setting out in pursuit of Blucher.

At page 40, I also find a censure of the manner in which the army was disposed in its plan of offensive operation, which is not less out of place. After the event, it is easy to blame. Indeed fault *is sometimes* found after a victory.

M. de Grouchy *justly* observes, that at the opening of the campaign it was probable that there would be only the Prussians to contend with; for the Anglo-Belgians were still in their cantonments, while the Prussians were assembled. But does the Marshal believe that if the whole force of our army had been marched against the Prussians, the latter would have waited for it? Besides, was this the course to be taken?

Does M. de Grouchy not perceive that Marshal Ney's detachment in the direction of Quatre-Bras being numerically inferior to Blucher's force, was the circumstance which mainly contributed to induce the Prussian general to hazard the giving battle on the 16th?

Had the whole army been acting in the same direction, Blucher would immediately have effected his retreat upon the English by the shortest road; and there was less chance of success in engaging the united mass of the Anglo-Prussians than there was in dividing them and manœuvring so as to defeat each alternately by directing against it the principal part of our force. It was the conducting of the detachment which Marshal Ney commanded in the direction of Quatre-Bras that caused Blucher to abandon the idea of forming his junction with Wellington by that road, and induced him to adopt the plan of getting the start of the corps which was about to pursue him, in order to steal a flank march, which, by bringing him in contact with the English, would have replaced things on the footing on which they would have stood at the opening of the campaign had it not been for the Em-

peror's plan of operations. Blucher's manœuvre placed the French in a position the inverse of that in which they stood on the evening of the 15th. His success was not owing to his numerical superiority over Grouchy; for the two generals did not meet before the junction. Blucher's celerity constituted his real superiority.

M. de Grouchy réfers only to the Anglo-Prussian army which was in Belgium: but the Emperor's calculations embraced the Russian and Austrian armies which were expected on the Rhine in the course of July. There was no time to be lost in forcing the Anglo-Prussians to fight separate, and consequently disadvantageous battles, so that we might be enabled to bring affairs entirely to a close in Belgium, and return upon the Rhine.

But enough of the opinions and censures of Marshal Grouchy. We will now judge this general by what he did, and what he ought to have done.

He had already had his share in the unfortunate circumstances which occasioned the loss of the morning of the 17th. He wasted his time in the Emperor's anti-chamber, as if he expected there to obtain information of the course of the enemy's retreat, instead of employing himself at the head of his reconnoissances in discovering the track of the Prussians: for to whom but the commander of the cavalry of an army does that duty belong?

He justly regarded loss of time as an affair of serious importance.

He knew that the Emperor was going to attack the Anglo-Belgian army.

He was of opinion that Blucher would manœuvre to aid the Anglo-Belgians, and to obtain support from them in his turn.

Now let us see what he did.

In the first place, he complains of the vagueness of the instructions which he received from the Emperor, without con-

sidering that the Emperor gave those instructions when he was himself destitute of all information respecting the direction the Prussians had taken. But even had the Emperor said nothing when he detached him, the duty of Marshal Grouchy was not the less specific. It surely never could enter the head of a French marshal to ask his general-in-chief for particular directions respecting the course he was to take, when he himself was dispatched for the express purpose of ascertaining the march of the enemy, and was left unrestricted as to his movement.

Besides, Marshal Grouchy's instructions were not so very indefinite on the point under consideration. He had precise orders to follow the Prussians, and to maintain communication with the Emperor. Had this last point been observed, all might have been well; because all would have been foreseen. Besides, the more indefinite his instructions, the greater latitude was left for the exercise of his own judgment; and if it be true that the Emperor sent him no order on the 18th, that only proves his confident reliance on him: for the troops confided to Grouchy were so valuable at that decisive moment, that the Emperor could not feel indifferent as to the manner in which they were employed.

Marshal Grouchy observes, that at two o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th, when he left the field of Ligny, Blucher was already seventeen hours march in advance of him. This was unfortunate, no doubt; but what was done could not be undone.—The only way of mending the matter was to march speedily in the right direction, which it was the Marshal's business to find out.

That there was no impossibility in doing so is evident from Marshal Grouchy's own acknowledgment: for he says that his troops rested on the night of the 16th, and till two o'clock on the morning of the 17th; that is to say, during those very seventeen hours in which the Prussian army gained its march upon him.

The Prussian army fought on the 16th, and marched the whole of the same night, in order to form behind Wavres, which it did at three in the afternoon of the 17th; and yet it was more numerous and more embarrassed in its march than the force by which it was pursued.

Marshal Grouchy, instead of endeavouring to regain the time, of which he deplores the loss, marched by the way of Gembloux, where he passed the night of the 17th.

From thence he wrote at two o'clock in the morning of the 18th to the Emperor, who answered him on the same day at ten o'clock,* and who ordered another letter to be written to him at one in the afternoon of the same day from the field of Waterloo. Grouchy acknowledges having received these two letters; in both of which the order for maintaining communication with the Emperor was repeated.†

* First Order to Marshal Grouchy.

Before the Farm of Caillon, June 18th, ten A. M.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

The Emperor has received your last report, dated Gembloux. You make mention of only two Prussian columns which have passed through Sauvenieres and Sart-à-Valhain; whereas other reports state that a third column, tolerably strong, has passed through Géry and Gentines, proceeding towards Wavres.

The Emperor directs me to inform you that he is at this moment on the point of attacking the English army, which has taken up its position at Waterloo, near the forest of Soignies. His Majesty, therefore, desires that you should direct your movements upon Wavres, so as to approximate to us, to place yourself in connexion with the operations, and to unite the communications, driving before you such Prussian corps as have taken that direction, and may have halted at Wavres, where you must arrive as speedily as possible. You must pursue the enemy's columns, which have taken the road on your right, by *some light corps*, so as to observe their movements, and collect their stragglers. Send me immediate information of your arrangements and your march, as well as any intelligence you may obtain of the enemy, *and do not neglect to establish your communications with us.* The Emperor desires that he may hear from you frequently.

THE DUKE DE DALMATIA.

† Second Order to Marshal Grouchy.

Field of Waterloo, June 18th, one P. M.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

At two o'clock this morning you wrote to inform the Emperor that you were

He himself could therefore judge better than the Emperor, whether he was sufficiently in communication with the grand army at the moment when he received the letter which announced the approaching engagement, and that which informed him of our success.

He thinks himself justified, because the Emperor in his reply does not disapprove of his march on Gembloux. But even though he had marched on Namur instead of Gembloux, the Emperor could have expressed no disapproval, because he supposed that, in conformity with his instructions, he was following the traces of the Prussian army, which he had been ordered to pursue vigorously.

If M. de Grouchy had added in his letter, that far from gaining any thing upon the seventeen hours march of the Prussians, he had not even ascertained their point of retreat, the Emperor would no doubt have expressed his astonishment that, being assured as he was of his inability to overtake the enemy, he did not execute the second part of his instructions, which enjoined him to maintain communication with the principal army. Reason dictated this course, and there was nothing to prevent its adoption. M. de Grouchy imagines he exculpates himself, by observing that the Emperor commenced the attack on the English army too late. Certainly,

marching on Sart-à-Valhain: your plan, therefore, is to proceed to Corbaix or Wavres. This movement is conformable to his Majesty's instructions, which have been communicated to you.

However, the Emperor orders me to inform you that you must always manœuvre towards us . . . It is for you to observe the point where we are, to take your measures accordingly, and to connect our communications. You must also hold yourself prepared to attack and destroy any of the enemy's troops who may seek to harass our right. At this moment the battle has commenced on the line of Waterloo; therefore, manœuvre to join our right.

The Duke de Dalmatia.

P. S. A letter which has just been intercepted states that General Bulow is to attack our flank. We think we perceive his corps on the heights of Saint-Lambert: therefore, lose not a moment. Advance to join us, and overwhelm Bulow, whom you will catch in the very act.

had the Emperor supposed that M. de Grouchy would have suffered the Prussians to arrive at Waterloo without going there himself, he would have ordered the attack much sooner. The delay which the Marshal condemns was intended to afford him time to advance, and to take part in the conclusion of the battle. The postscript of the Duke of Dalmatia's letter dated from the field of Waterloo at one o'clock on the afternoon of the 18th, must be presumed to refer to an intercepted letter of the enemy, which, by informing the Emperor of the position and march of the Prussians, made him resolve to run the risk of a general effort against the English, before the junction should be effected.

About eight o'clock on the 18th the Emperor received the letter which Marshal Grouchy wrote to him from Gembloux, on the same day at two in the morning, and in which he states his intention to march on Sart-à-Valhain and Wavres, because he supposed that the Prussians would retire on Brussels or Louvain.

The Emperor being then enabled by this letter to guess where Grouchy was at the moment of the arrival of the intercepted dispatch, announcing the enemy's march on Saint-Lambert, must at last have concluded that there was no reliance to be placed on the Marshal, and that it was useless to wait for him. The Emperor can be reproached only for having relied upon him for a single moment; but he did so because he had given him orders to maintain communication with the main army.

Marshal Grouchy's conduct may be judged of by comparing the length of his march with the distance which Blucher accomplished in the same space of time.

Blucher, who had been defeated on the 16th, was obliged to seek, by the way of Wavres, his point of junction with the English. He set out from Ligny at ten on the night of the 16th, and at one or two o'clock on the afternoon of the 17th he arrived at Wavres. There he allowed his troops to re-

pose until two o'clock on the morning of the 18th, when he again resumed his march, and led those same troops to the field of Waterloo. They decided the victory, and pursued our army on the road to Charleroi beyond the point whence they themselves had commenced their retiring movement at ten on the night of the 16th. On the 18th they cannonaded our rear-guard under the walls of Charleroi. Thus, in less than forty-eight hours, they moved round nearly the whole circumference of the circle of which Marshal Grouchy occupied the centre, and described the complete area while he was tracing its diameter, or even only a radius.

How does it happen that the Marshal, who censures the dispositions which were made for the opening of the campaign, and who, at the moment of his departure from Ligny, thought that the Emperor did not attach sufficient importance to the conjecture that Blucher was manœuvring to join the English, nevertheless did not, after he had left Ligny, take measures to secure his communication with our right, which he supposed was threatened?

At page 50 he says, by way of justifying his march by Gembloux, that General Pajol's brigade took a worse direction, viz. the road to Namur, and that, too, by order of the Emperor.

But that wrong direction would not have been taken if Marshal Grouchy, when he came to Fleurus on the morning of the 17th, had brought the Emperor the report of the reconnoissances of his cavalry, as he ought to have done. Besides, when he himself ascertained that the Prussians were not retiring on Namur, and when he could no longer doubt that they were going to form a junction with the English, it was his duty to ascertain by how many roads this manœuvre could be effected. Then he should have lost not a moment in approximating to the Emperor's right, for that was the point at which he was sure of meeting the Prussians. On reading

page 50 of his publication, his march on Gembloux becomes inexplicable, especially considering the opinions entertained by different individuals, which he takes care to state.

General Gérard, who served in Grouchy's corps, called his attention to the circumstance, that all the reports of the country people agreed in stating that Blucher had left a small corps marching on Wavres, for the purpose of drawing off our attention; and that in the mean while the whole army was effecting its junction with the English. That General accordingly urged him to make a bold attack upon the artillery, whilst the remainder of the troops should continue its movement upon Wavres. It is said that Grouchy felt offended at the advice, and told Gérard in an angry tone that he ambitioned a marshal's staff. Gérard took no notice of the uncourteous remark, and proposed that he should join the corps moving upon Wavres, whilst the Marshal should proceed to overtake the Emperor. Grouchy again refused compliance: he was unwilling, he said, to compromise his fame, or the glory of twenty-five years of faithful services, by a formal disobedience of his instructions.

If Marshal Grouchy, whose cavalry amounted to nearly five thousand men, had merely sent five hundred men to the distance of a few leagues towards his left on the 17th, or ordered them to proceed beyond the river running from Tilly to Wavres, instructing them to retreat in the direction of the Emperor in the event of their finding the enemy before them, that detachment would have infallibly got wind of the march of the Prussians, who had quitted Wavres on the 18th before day-break, for the purpose of joining the English army. The Emperor, and the Marshal himself, would have had earlier intimation of what was going forward; but the idea never occurred to Grouchy's mind. He quitted Gembloux on the 18th at sun-rise, as if with the intention of garrisoning Wavres; arrived before that town at one o'clock in the after-

noon, and learned that the Prussians, after resting there for twelve hours, had left six hours before his arrival, with the view of forming a junction with the English.

All those who have known Marshal Grouchy will be fully satisfied that no person in the whole army could be more disappointed than himself when he received that intelligence. This feeling was the more natural in him, as he was fully alive to the consequences that would attend a junction which could no longer be obstructed, especially when he compared the distance which the Prussian army had to perform in order to effect that object, with the advance they had gained upon us. I am therefore well satisfied that all the movements executed by Marshal Grouchy in the afternoon of the 18th, after hearing the cannon of Waterloo, were considered by himself as wholly superfluous; and that they were only intended as an excuse for his conduct, in case the turn of events should expose him to the necessity of rendering an account of the manner in which he had carried his orders into effect.

His attack of the 19th upon Wavres, notwithstanding his uneasiness at receiving no intelligence from the Emperor ever since the letter written at one in the afternoon of the 18th, would be altogether inexcusable, if he had not read, as he asserts, that the battle was not only engaged, but actually won. Admitting this version to be the true one, Grouchy might suppose the Emperor to be in possession of Brussels. From that moment it was reasonable in him to endeavour to open a communication with the Emperor by the road leading from Wavres to that city, although the knowledge he had of the detachment of Prussians should have led him into a train of reflections as to the probability of such an event.

There is no doubt that if the battle of Waterloo had been won, Blucher's detachment could not fail to be greatly compromised, as it must have been unable to reach the road by which the English army would have been pursued, or to re-

sume the road of which Grouchy would have secured the possession. These circumstances are more than sufficient to justify the attack upon Wavres even so late as the 19th.

Had matters taken a favourable turn, Marshal Grouchy would have found himself posted in such a manner as to have an immense advantage in respect to any ulterior offensive movements which he might determine to undertake. I doubt much whether in that case he would have censured the measures adopted by the Emperor in reference to the opening of the campaign.

The following, however, are the circumstances which, in my opinion, expose Marshal Grouchy's conduct to merited censure.

After ascribing the slowness of his march to his generals, his troops, the bad roads, and the want of guides, (guides for Frenchmen in Belgium!) he says that the intelligence of the disasters of the preceding day were not brought to him until the 19th, at eleven or twelve o'clock in the morning, by an officer sent by the major-general, after he had actually passed Wavres.

He commenced his retreat on the 19th between the hours of one and two; returned by the same road; took the direction from Temploux to Namur, and from Namur to Dinant, where he arrived on the 20th, and from whence he addressed on that day his report to the Emperor: a circumstance leading to the inference that he had already reached Namur on the night from the 19th to the 20th. His marching spirit must therefore have revived on a sudden; for there is twice the distance from Ligny to Wavres, and three times the distance to Dinant.

Had he marched with equal celerity on the 17th, he would have reached Wavres in the night; and there is no knowing what might have been the consequence of his so doing. When we contrast the tardiness of the march with the rapidity of the retreat, we cannot but suspect that the Marshal

was not over-anxious to approach the Prussian army, which he estimates at three times his own strength (see pages 6 and 7 of his pamphlet).

Nevertheless, had Marshal Davout counted numbers at Auerstadt, he would not have ventured upon attacking: his career would exhibit one splendid feat of arms less; and the question, instead of being decided at a blow, would have required fresh efforts previously to its eventual termination. Davout rushed headlong upon the Prussians: fortune crowned his daring courage, and the campaign was irretrievably decided.

If, moreover, Marshal Grouchy found himself too far inferior in numerical strength, this was an additional motive for keeping within reach of the Emperor. He must have considered that his services would be required, and have endeavoured to take part in a battle which was likely, if not to fix our destinies, at least to have a powerful influence over subsequent operations; for there is no ground for entertaining the opinion that he felt desirous of escaping from the danger, or of shrinking from the efforts that were expected from him.

When we inquire into the motive of Marshal Grouchy's precipitate retreat, we immediately perceive his anxiety to provide for his personal safety. The events which had just taken place, those of the month of March, and of Montelimart, showed him the obverse of the medal; and it must be acknowledged that, in respect to himself in particular, they were not calculated to inspire confidence.

I should have concluded in this place my remarks on Marshal Grouchy's answer to General Gourgaud, if he had confined himself to observations of a military character. This, however, has not been the case: not content with ascribing to the Emperor those passages which offended him in a pamphlet having its author's signature affixed to it, and bearing no direct connexion with a name which no one should be allowed to use with too much freedom, he has thought proper to dis-

cover the reproaches of the sovereign in the censure of his aide-de-camp, and has basely insulted him. He was no doubt lavish of his abuse, by way of compensation for the homage he had formerly paid him. I felt my blood boiling with indignation when I perused what the Marshal states in page 25 of his replies to General Gourgaud: nevertheless, whilst transcribing these paragraphs, I would fain hope to learn, at a future day, that they do not emanate from himself, but from the pen of a stranger to him, who hoped to abridge the term of the Marshal's misfortunes at the price of his glory.

"I ought perhaps to overlook," says the Marshal,* "certain pamphlets that have appeared in Europe, wherein I have been attacked in a manner as foreign from justice as it is unmeasured in its expressions; for a calm and rational discussion, and the language of truth, could never be attended to by the authors of those productions, who appear, for the most part, to feel a personal interest in proclaiming the infallibility of Napoleon, and never to admit that he may have erred in the adoption of his arrangements.

"There never, besides, existed any friendly intercourse, any fraternal bonds, between the veterans of the revolution and of the army, and some men of the Imperial *régime*, who chiefly owed their rapid elevation to a pliancy of character, which rendered them valuable instruments of despotism; men whose astonishing good-fortune was the result of a ready disposition on their part to mix up the country with the chief of the government, to imagine that they were serving the former when blindly devoting themselves to the caprices, the passions, and the ambitious views of the latter: it was owing to their pernicious advice, and their idolatrous worship, that Napoleon was led into the fatal course which he adopted. Driven to a foreign land by the storms that have burst over France, I can certainly expect neither justice nor impartiality from them; but if their animosity, which was directed against me whilst I trod

* Pages, 24 to 26.

my native land, was often my best title to the public esteem, this is also the case in the United States, where I can be as little affected by them as by the attacks of those military courtiers, who alone are of opinion that the splendour of a great man, by spreading, for a moment, the light of its brilliancy, has transformed them into infallible authorities, and who do not perceive that a borrowed splendour, which does not reflect its rays upon any celebrated feat of arms, or upon any eminent service, only tends to display in more vivid colours the presumptuous ignorance of the judgments they venture to pronounce.

"I shall therefore disdain to notice," &c. &c.

He then proceeds as follows:—

"Residing, moreover, in a country where, for the last three years, I have received so many proofs of friendly interest in my fate, I deem myself called upon to show that the honourable testimonials of kindness bestowed upon me were legitimate in their object, by justifying, in the eyes of the citizens of that adopted country all the actions of my military career. Devoted for twenty-five years to the service of the country where I drew breath, it was not possible that, in times of civil discord, my life should escape the bitter efforts of prejudice on the one hand, or of envious malevolence on the other. When fortune no longer smiles upon the enterprises in which we are engaged, we are assailed with reproaches from all quarters: nevertheless, the justification of such conduct could only be found in the circumstance of our having ambitioned public employments, our having voluntarily embarked in public events, as gifted with those talents which command success; our having disowned the obligations which our duties imposed upon us. If, however, so far from soliciting any functions, I have more than once refused to hold exalted posts;*

* "In 1795 I refused the chief command of the army on the coast of Brest; that of the cavalry before the campaign of Leipsic; and, in 1814, of the army which was to be collected in Piedmont."

if, lavish of my blood in defence of my native country, &c. &c. it becomes a duty for me to dispel the clouds with which a hostile hand has endeavoured to obscure a career which has at least been honourable and undefiled, if it has not been altogether brilliant and fortunate in its course."

Turning to page 53 of Marshal Grouchy's answers to General Gourgaud, I read as follows :—

"By what fatality did he forget, on quitting the field of battle of Waterloo, that he had an unbroken army left to him, at the head of which he should have placed himself, rather than abandon the remains of that which fortune had betrayed; rather, also, than be the harbinger of his own disasters? Could he be ignorant that his troops looked upon him as the only chief competent to rally them, and to preserve the country *from* the spoliations of foreigners? Should he, for a moment, have confided the destinies of France, and of the gallant soldiers whom the fate of battles had spared, to those men whom he considered as having lost all energy, and having no other object in view than to protect their private interests? How great was the illusion of expecting that his presence in Paris would avert the effects of the fatal blow given to public opinion, and to his party, by the reverse of Waterloo; of failing to discover that the revolt of the Chambers (to use General Gourgaud's expression), would never take place so long as they should know him to be at the head of the army!

"We must acknowledge that the last acts of his political life, as well as of his military career, bore no longer that stamp of energy, of *à-propos* and foresight, which had so long marked his brilliant destiny.

"In the political arena, as well as on the field of battle, the determinations which decide the fate of empires, or command success, have their proper periods of action, which escape with the rapidity of lightning, never again to return. Napoleon knew not how to take advantage of them during the hundred days, when there appeared no longer any trace

of those brilliant features in the character of that extraordinary man, who astonished all Europe when, rushing into Italy from the summit of the Apennines, he united, whilst conquering it, its scattered remains, out of which he raised a powerful state, and thereby laid the foundations of that colossal reputation which was soon to level before him all the roads to supreme power. During the campaign of 1815, he no longer appeared to the beholder as that great captain who, in 1814, with a firmness of resolution which was always on the increase, notwithstanding the magnitude of the dangers and the numbers of his enemies, and which multiplied his scanty resources by the rapidity and boldness of the most skilful movements, and by developing a genius of a superior stamp, had so long succeeded in preserving the capital from foreign invasion. Nevertheless, he was seconded at that period by the same men who are at present accused in his name: but his actions were no longer influenced by the workings of the same mighty genius."

I am at a loss to account for the fact that a marshal of France, promoted to that rank during the hundred days, (and wholly for his conduct at Montelimart,) should venture to hold this language in presence of so many witnesses of his private life and his military career.

By analysing both, the reader will form an estimate of Marshal Grouchy, who pretends that he is not to blame if he has been torn away from his humble retreat, and been entrusted with important commands. It is no proof of excessive modesty that he should compare himself to a new Achilles, whom the Greeks come to solicit that he would again enter the lists against the Trojans, or to a Rinaldo, whom Godfrey sends to force away from the arms of Armida. Nevertheless, whilst I am censuring Marshal Grouchy, I may safely declare that previously to his publishing that untoward document, no sooner was a helmet placed in his view than he was the first to set the example of courage.

Marshal Grouchy, who only reckons twenty-five years of service, was, under Louis XVI., and previously to the revolution, second colonel of the regiment of Condé dragoons. Independently of the circumstance that such promotion was sufficiently rapid for a beardless youth, I think it needless to remark, that as no military occurrence ever took place in the saloons of Versailles, his rapid advance could not be owing to any very signal feat of arms; but if it rested upon any brilliant services, we are entitled to inquire into the nature of them.

The revolution broke out in 1789: in 1790, and 1791, the greater part of the military officers emigrated. As M. de Grouchy did not adopt this course, he was promoted on a sudden to the rank of maréchal-de-camp, without having, as it were, seen any army, at least any hostile one.

The greater part of the general officers having also emigrated, the Marquis de Grouchy found himself nearly at the top of the list of the army, without having had any other duty to perform than that of wishing a pleasant journey to his companions, and of abstaining to follow their example.

The war broke out in April, 1792. I cannot take upon myself to say on what part of our then frontiers the Marquis de Grouchy commenced his career. But no one can have lost the recollection of the period of 1793 and 1794. Let M. de Grouchy consider with us how many officers like himself were to be found in our ranks. Was it not during those dreadful years that we beheld MM. de Biron, Alexander Beauharnois, Victor de Broglie, De Custine, and a crowd of other personages of the same quality, perishing in succession, because they, like M. de Grouchy, had ventured to connect themselves with men who made their elevated birth a ground of crime against them.

M. de Grouchy tells us that at that period he refused the command of the army on the coast of Brest. I believe him, though I doubt his having done so through pure modesty;

but rather, on the contrary, out of motives of prudence. He had before his eyes the experience of what had happened to his predecessors, and what would have assuredly befallen MM. de Lafayette and Dumouriez had they not adopted the course of going over to the enemy.

The Marquis de Grouchy saw the snare, and avoided it; but he must have a perfect recollection of what the committee of public safety and the Directory did with marquises whom they went in search of, when the latter allowed themselves to be taken or persuaded by soft words.

The Marquis de Grouchy, it must be observed, has not been too roughly handled: we have, on the contrary, seen him serving under General Hoche in La Vendée, I even think in the capacity of his chief of the staff. After the affair of Quiberon, we find him embarking as a general of division in the squadron which sallied from Brest to attempt an invasion of Ireland.

Let the Marquis de Grouchy allow us to remind him that, amongst all the generals of note who were formed by the revolution, few could be compared to Hoche for enthusiasm and violence of opinions. A marquis, therefore, stood in especial need of a strong dose of republicanism in his composition, or of great skilfulness; but above all, of a rare pliancy of character, to have inspired confidence in an old serjeant in the French guards, * and to have even acquired his friendship.

What were the eminent services rendered, or the glorious deeds performed on that desolate scene? It was the blood of our fellow-countrymen that flowed; the field of Quiberon was strewed with their dead bodies.

What were the signal services which protected the Marquis de Grouchy from the severest inquiry in consequence of his having remained for several days in Bantry Bay, on the coast of Ireland, without effecting a landing? What deeds

* Hoche had been a serjeant in the French guards before the revolution.

of military prowess saved him from a council of war, to which he ought to have been made amenable, for having returned to Brest with the whole expedition without waiting for General Hoche, who had been separated from his fleet by a storm, and who no longer found any one when he arrived at the place of rendez-vous? Many others so situated would have forfeited their lives for such conduct, under a government which viewed every act in the light of a crime. If M. de Grouchy was indebted to his services for his escape at that period, of what nature were those services?

It appears that he had lost the recollection of having seen, in one of the apartments of the palace of Chantilly, France represented as a female tearing from the history of the great Condé the pages which related to the battles of Lens, of the Downs, and of the lines of Arras. I have never known any French general-officers who, although they had no claim to the title of marquis, did not deeply lament the services they had been compelled to render in the war of the western departments.

Whilst the Emperor was in Egypt, the war again broke out in Europe. Every Frenchman ambitioned to serve in Italy, fancying that he had only to take the place of the conqueror of Arcola to acquire possession of his military knowledge also; or that, to admire his laurels on the spot where he had won them, could not fail to procure a share in his glory. Disastrous events soon followed; and M. de Grouchy, who commanded a division in the army of Italy, where he had succeeded in procuring employment, was wounded and taken prisoner. He was not restored to liberty until after the battle of Marengo. We have seen him immediately afterwards linking his fortune to that of General Murat, who, at that period, was only brother-in-law to the First Consul.

M. de Grouchy courted his favour, and valued himself upon possessing it during the remainder of his career; and yet he now presumes to assert, "that there never existed

any friendly intercourse between him and those men of the Imperial *régime*, who owed their rapid elevation to a pliancy of character, which rendered them valuable instruments of despotism."

Did there ever exist a more rapid elevation than that of Murat, who from a quarter-master of horse chasseurs in 1792 became King of Naples, and was recognised as such by the whole of Europe in 1808, that is to say, after a lapse of sixteen years? If it were wished to exhibit this instance in a still more forcible light, it might be stated that Murat was a general of brigade and an aide-de-camp of the First Consul in the year 1800, a marshal of France and Grand-duke of Berg in 1805, and King of Naples in 1808. This was, I conceive, a personage of sufficient note amongst those whose elevation appears to have excited the spleen of the Marquis de Grouchy and his envious feelings.

Without pretending to bring Marshal de Grouchy's career under review, I may be allowed to observe that he himself, in his elevation to the rank from which he began to measure the course performed by the officers about the Emperor's person, had not assuredly encountered as many perils as they had met with in their progress.

What officers has he seen near the Emperor, except those who from their first entrance into the service had lived with him on fields of battle, followed him to Italy and Egypt, and up to the very last moment of his political career? I apprehend that merit of this nature was in no manner inferior to that which was derived from a few places at court. If the ancient nobility are vain of the honours which they have derived from the inheritance of their ancestors, I cannot understand why we should blush at the honours which our services had secured to us, any more than at the privilege of transmitting them to our posterity. There is unquestionably as much glory in being the founder of a family ennobled by

deeds of arms, as there can possibly be in merely inheriting a glory derived from ancestors.

Would the Marquis de Grouchy insinuate that a species of glory was to be acquired near the Emperor wholly foreign from what was obtained by sharing in the dangers of the field of battle, and reserved for those who resorted to means unworthy of the public approbation and esteem? Let him but explain his meaning: I take upon myself to furnish a reply. I have served the Emperor longer than he has done; and I have no recollection of his having ever employed any officer in another capacity than in military duties.

The Marquis de Grouchy appears to have adopted the method of those who heap insults upon the Emperor as a compensation for the homage they were wont to bestow upon him. He thus raises his head since the downfall of his sovereign. He calls him a despot. Nevertheless, did any one solicit his services? Was the Emperor under the necessity of recurring to despotic measures in order to compel M. de Grouchy's acceptance of honours, of donations, and of one of the first honorary distinctions in the army, that of colonel-general of horse chasseurs?

Who called M. de Grouchy to the Tuileries, where he was the first to present himself on the return from the island of Elba? Were any coercive means employed to compel him to march against the Duke of Angoulême? Was any violence offered to him to force his acceptance of the staff of marshal of France, after he had taken that prince a prisoner?

How can he find so great a distance as he pretends between the man who rushed into Italy from the summit of the Apennines (he no doubt meant the Alps), and him who with eight hundred men conquered France without their having even loaded their muskets, and reached Paris from Fréjus in the space of twenty-two days? Why did not M. de Grouchy perform as rapid a march on the 17th of June, 1815, since he

had soldiers of the same stamp? Let him say what he will, the Emperor had not changed; but M. de Grouchy was no longer the same.

With the view of justifying himself, M. de Grouchy appeals to the decree issued by the Chamber, when he arrived under the walls of Paris, which declares *that he had deserved well of the country;* but he does not tell us in what manner, and for what reason that decree was issued: nevertheless, the case was of sufficient importance to claim some explanation.

I doubt whether Marshal Grouchy's language respecting the Emperor is likely to secure to him the esteem of the United States of America, where he has found an asylum. With regard to myself, who, like him, have been thrown upon a foreign shore, I did not fail to discover, especially amongst the English, that the surest way to lose public esteem was to be wanting in a proper consideration for the Emperor's position, and above all in a sense of gratitude towards a benefactor.

CHAPTER VII.

The Emperor's return to Paris—Feelings of the Chamber of Deputies—Fouché adopts measures with the view of inducing it to rise against the Emperor—M. de Lafayette—The Chamber declares its sittings to be permanent—The author returns to the Emperor—Observations which he submits to him—Thy are backed by M. Benjamin Constant—Deputation from the Chamber of Deputies—The Emperor's reply.

HAVING sufficiently refuted the various allegations brought forward by the Marquis de Grouchy, I now turn to the consequences of the battle of Waterloo.

Hurried away to Philippeville by the fugitives, the Emperor

entrusted to Marshal Soult the duty of rallying them. He felt it incumbent upon him to return to the capital, calm its apprehensions, and demand of the chambers the means of repairing the disaster he had just experienced: he accordingly took the road to Paris. Many persons have blamed this determination. Their censure would be merited, had the Emperor been a mere general; but as the chief of the government, he had conspiracies to defeat, and intrigues to keep in check. It was necessary for him to rouse the patriotism of the Chambers, to stir up and guide the national enthusiasm, and bring back that spirit of energy which saved us in 1793 from the horrors of an invasion. His return had been greeted with a joy bordering upon frenzy. Even ten days before the present moment, he received every protestation of unbounded attachment. It was both a natural and a simple course for him to invoke an enthusiasm which appeared to cling to his person.

The danger was besides quite manifest; the hostile armies were advancing. There was no medium for the nation between rushing to arms and resigning itself to all the calamities attendant upon a defeat. Common sense indicated that there existed no other alternative. The Emperor could not but suppose that every deputy was convinced of this truth; that no one could be so deficient in penetration as to trust to the feigned moderation of the enemy. He was mistaken: the following was the state of affairs when he returned to the capital.

During his absence, which had lasted only ten days, the Chamber of Deputies had measured its strength in several discussions that had occupied the time of its sittings. Many of its members had not only displayed very superior talents, but a full determination of being refractory or otherwise, according as attempts might be made to influence their deliberations, or to allow them a free range of action.

It was manifestly seen that the first warlike occurrence

would determine the course which that assembly should assume: had it been of a fortunate complexion, there is no doubt that the young deputies, composing a portion of it, would have warmly proposed every measure calculated to save France. It proved unsuccessful; and their want of experience in revolutions threw them at the mercy of public agitators, who, not content with having desolated their native country for a period of twenty-five years, eagerly seized this fresh opportunity of pursuing their political experiments, even at the risk of falling a defenceless prey to foreign aggression.

This disposition of the chamber had not escaped Fouché's penetration. He had neglected no means of procuring the nomination to it of such revolutionary veterans as himself, and of gaining over to his side such of the young deputies as had already brought themselves into notice by their superiority of talents and their powerful eloquence.

It might well be supposed that he would exert the influence he was endeavouring to acquire over that assembly to the exclusive object of promoting the interests of the man whose service he appeared to have espoused with such ardent attachment, according to his own assertions. I spoke to him one day of the trouble the Chamber would not fail to give, in the event of a battle being lost. "I am very much afraid," I said, "that it would be as much disposed to crush the vanquished, as to volunteer its assistance to the conqueror."

"You are mistaken," he replied; "assemblies are never to be feared, because their political opinions, as well as their determinations, are influenced by a handful of boisterous orators, whom it merely requires some talent to bring over and control. If the Emperor will leave me at liberty to act, I can be answerable to him for the assembly."

Such was Fouché's language, even after the Emperor's departure for the army. There was nothing to justify the idea that he spoke in opposition to his real sentiments; for no one

was in the secret of his private engagements: all were even ignorant of what he afterwards took care to divulge, that he kept up an intercourse with the Duke of Wellington ever since the 15th of June. He might have mentioned an earlier date; but what he does admit, is sufficiently disgraceful to make it superfluous that we should lay any stress upon dates. Those who are unacquainted with Fouché, may suppose that he is a statesman possessed of comprehensive views, and of a tried courage in political matters: they are mistaken. His guilty practices were not the result of a penetrating foresight, but the mere effect of the confusion of his ideas, and of the weakness of his intellect.

He considered that such a step could not be productive of any inconvenience; because if the battle of Waterloo had been won, his letter would be nothing more than an act of indiscretion, the consequences of which would have been averted by the Emperor's success over the difficulties it would have raised against us. If, on the contrary, the battle were lost, he reaped all the advantages of his treacherous practices. This had been his uniform course of conduct for the last twenty years: a conduct which had imposed upon every one the conviction of his possessing consummate abilities. His manœuvre, in fact, completely answered his purpose. He has escaped the dangers of revolutions at the expense of every one, and fortune has crowned his political career. He has nothing more to apprehend, except from a revisioning tribunal, which would not have occasion to look very far back for just grounds to pass sentence of death upon him.*

He wrote to the Duke of Wellington with the afterthought of deceiving him, if success should favour the Emperor's arms. The coin in which he had intended to pay others, was forced back upon himself: he was caught in his own snare.

* It will readily be perceived that this was written before his death.

So early as the 19th of June, the intelligence of the disaster of Waterloo had been received in Paris. The inhabitants refused to give credit to the news, and ascribed it to the workings of malevolence: fresh details were, however, springing up at every moment which confirmed the truth of the fatal event, respecting which the public mind was desirous to indulge in farther illusion. The Emperor made his appearance: the veil which obscured the truth was instantly rent asunder.

Fouché eagerly laid hold of a circumstance which was so much calculated to favour the execution of his projects: he immediately set himself to work, stirred up the influential members of the assembly to the highest pitch of excitement, and told them that, had it not been for the fatal return from the island of Elba, the Bourbons would have been driven from the throne, and every thing would have been arranged to general satisfaction. He laid so much stress upon his correspondence with Vienna, that every one believed the allied powers were acting in concert with him, and had merely renewed the war on account of their hostility to the Emperor. These assertions were believed with the same eager credulity as the reports spread on the occasion of the return from the island of Elba, that the Emperor had a private understanding with Austria.

The natural consequence to be drawn from such assertions was, that peace might be obtained by the mere act of sacrificing the Emperor. Fouché himself was perhaps sincere in this opinion: he was far from suspecting that he was an instrument in the enemy's hands. At the same time that he excited the minds of the assembly, he caused the most alarming reports to be spread amongst its members, as well as the national guards, respecting the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, which he affirmed to be alone competent to save France. This was no more than the truth; but it was not

by separating the nation from its chief that any additional strength could be imparted to the assembly.

The minister rekindled those feelings of animosity which it was his duty to extinguish. He went so far as to assert that it was fortunate the event of Waterloo had rendered it impossible for the Emperor to consolidate his power; for that he would no sooner have acquired a firm footing, than he would have investigated the conduct of each individual in the various circumstances which had preceded and followed his first abdication. He held this language before those persons whose conscience more particularly reproached them with the conduct they had held on that occasion.

He had for a long time been in the habit of employing M. Tourton, who readily imbibed every opinion he wished him to adopt. He held the situation of chief of the staff of the national guard, and exercised a daily influence over the officers of that corps. He accordingly possessed every means of knowing them, and of selecting such as were most calculated to promote the execution of Fouché's projects.

This impulse was given as soon as intelligence was received of the defeat of Waterloo; and it was not possible for the English to be more effectually served than they were by Fouché on the occasion.

The Emperor had written from Avesne to his brother Joseph, who presided at the council of ministers in Paris. They had been called together by Joseph, aided by his brother Lucien, who had come from Rome to link his destiny to that of the head of his family.

Joseph communicated to them the Emperor's letter, which did not disguise the extent of the evil, but recommended that no means should be neglected for preparing the public mind for a vigorous defence, and for sacrifices commensurate with the wants created by the recent defeat.

Lanjuinais, president of the Chamber of Deputies, at-

tended as well as Fouché at this council of ministers. Each one promised to afford his personal aid under these trying circumstances; and the council broke up.

The Emperor arrived at an early hour the next morning. He sent for me almost immediately afterwards. I did not conceal from him any of the indications I had discovered of the unfavourable disposition which every one had been made to imbibe in respect to him, any more than the consequences I anticipated from such a spirit.

"Well, then," said the Emperor, "those people are about to relapse into the same error as last year. They are unwilling to discover that I am merely made the pretext for the war, and that France is the real object of it. If she has not been wholly destroyed by the last treaty, this is to be ascribed to a remnant of human respect which has arrested the arm of the invaders, who were still apprehensive of my return. None but madmen are blind to this fact. After they shall have abandoned my cause, their reception of me will be imputed to them as a crime: it will then be too late to indulge in ineffectual regrets!"

He put various other questions to me, to which I replied; and he sent for several persons after I had taken leave.

The Chamber of Deputies had met at eight o'clock in the morning, according to custom. The report of the Emperor's sudden arrival was quickly communicated from one to another; and as his return had neither been accompanied nor preceded by any communication, the spirit of malevolence had a free scope for giving it whatever interpretation was most calculated to favour its views.

The most unbecoming expressions were industriously circulated amongst the deputies. They were told, that feeling apprehensive of their declaring against him, the Emperor had returned with such extraordinary precipitancy for no other purpose than to dissolve them; that if they did not quickly

adopt a firm resolution, they would infallibly be forestalled. No means were left untried that were calculated to create excitement in the public mind, already ill-disposed in consequence of the event which was commented upon in every direction. Nevertheless, that feeling of irritation was inadequate to the contemplated object. The tocsin of alarm could only be sounded by a man of ardent and thoughtless mind, who was possessed of some power over public opinion, and incapable of measuring the consequences of what he was about to undertake. Fouché directed his attention to Lafayette. He had received his offers of embarking in the work of disorganization at the period of the *Champ-de-Mai*. He kept the neophyte in reserve, and merely watched the moment to let him loose. False friends were detached to sound him. He was made to believe that every thing was prepared; the chamber was on the verge of being dissolved; the imperial *cortége* was about to commence its march; not a moment was to be lost. He believed every thing; hurried to the tribune, and exciting the enthusiasm of the chamber by an energetic speech, he prevailed upon it to declare itself permanent; and as his mind was always preoccupied with the fears he had been made to imbibe, he demanded and succeeded in obtaining the declaration that every one should be considered "as a traitor to his country who should attempt to dissolve the chamber by coercive means."

This resolution was instantly communicated by a message to the Chamber of Peers.

I was in attendance at its sitting when the message was brought to it. The discussion was opened on the object of the message. No one raised the slightest objection to so illegal a measure, and the resolution of the lower house was adopted.

None but the wilfully blind could fail to point out the individual against whom these measures were directed, any more than that a position was now taken up with the express

view of assailing the man to whom an oath of fidelity had been taken a week before, and that the constitution was trodden upon which gave him the right of dissolving the chambers whenever he deemed it proper to do so in attention to the public welfare.

Thus it was that all the oaths of fidelity and obedience taken to the constitution and to the Emperor had, in the course of ten days, experienced the fate of the multitude of oaths that had been taken since the year 1789.

What could the Emperor do? He possessed no power, nor means of acquiring any, since the chambers had just risen in an attitude of insurrection against him.

He should have attempted another 18th Brumaire. Fouché, however, was fully sensible that nothing more was wanting than to throw obstacles to the progressive course of government, in order to afford to impending events sufficient time to bring about the catastrophe which his intrigues were accelerating.

The resolution of the chambers did not deceive any one of penetrating judgment; but there were many dupes who imagined that those chambers would infallibly save the country from ruin. These good people were not fully initiated in the secret: they were especially very far from supposing that Fouché laboured to acquire a position in order to treat afterwards for his own interests on a firmer ground than that upon which his previous conduct had necessarily placed him.

I was not one of the last to discover this truth. I had passed a great part of the day at the Chamber of Peers, and observed that no other object was attended to beyond that of securing a firm footing in a new order of things, without any attention to the Emperor, who had not yet been wholly sacrificed, but from whom all parties pretended to detach themselves with a view to the general welfare. The men of experience who had seats in that chamber understood each

other in broken sentences, and they were unanimous in their tacit opinions.

All parties deeply regretted what had happened; but all frankly believed that they would escape farther danger by separating themselves from the Emperor.

I went to apprise him of whatever had come under my notice. He was in his garden at the palace of the Elysée, with M. Benjamin Constant, who was conversing with him respecting the unavoidable consequences of that unanimous disposition of the two chambers. He told him that all efforts to bring them back would be in vain, because angry feelings would be mixed up in the discussions, and acts of violence would naturally follow.

I coincided in opinion with M. Benjamin Constant, and told the Emperor "that it was useless to disguise from oneself the object actually aimed at. In twenty-four hours matters might come to such extremities, that it might then be deemed necessary to urge him to take flight, because the faction which was at work had a particular object in view; and the impending warlike events would probably compel it to disgrace France by the commission of a crime, in order not to lose the benefits which some wretches were expecting from their base intrigues." I added, "that in the existing state of our affairs, he stood in need of gigantic means to repair them; but that the chamber would refuse to afford them, because it fondly indulged the idea of saving itself without him. To endeavour to persuade it of the contrary would be as vain as the attempt to make rivers flow back to their sources. I did not think there was any thing else to be done except to abandon those boisterous orators to their hopes, since they wished exclusively to rely upon their own means of action."

"But this is quite unreasonable," said the Emperor to me.—"No doubt it is so," I replied; "but if they neither grant you a soldier, nor a horse, nor a single crown-piece, what are you to do alone?"

"And this is what cannot fail to happen," added M. Benjamin Constant in this place.

"If I am abandoned," replied the Emperor, "I cannot help it. You are then of opinion ——"—"that they should be allowed to tear each other to pieces," I resumed, "and be wholly left to themselves, since they refuse to be saved in conjunction with you. In a word, you should drive them to the wall, and abdicate, if you cannot get them to understand you.

"*It is possible* that the proposal may be suggested to you of dissolving their sittings; but this is no longer practicable, because they have foreseen the blow, and begun by taking possession of power. At the present day, you would hardly find any one willing to march against them. If ever they supposed you meditated such a project, they would find many wretches willing to lay violent hands upon you. Your Majesty would, besides, have no sooner succeeded in dissolving them, and securing possession of the field, than you would be at a loss what to do. You would not have one battalion more at command; and all the consequences of those events, which it would no longer be in your power to prevent, would be imputed to you. Since those bewildered and enthusiastic minds deem themselves so sure of doing better by following their own views, they should be taken at their word, and left to shift for themselves. Besides which," I added, "all minds are in such a state of excitement this evening, that something new will infallibly happen to-morrow. I should not be surprised if, by way of a preliminary measure, they should send to propose your abdicating your authority."

Many persons came to join us at this moment, and the conversation dropped. We had only reached the evening of the 21st of June, and the Emperor's enemies had already made rapid strides against him.

The chambers had caused it to be intimated to him that they had declared themselves permanent; as if they had aimed

at braving his pretended projects of dissolving them, and preparing him, at the same time, for the consequences that would necessarily flow from the influence to which they had yielded obedience.

The sitting of the afternoon of the 21st had been of a stormy character, and the discussion so animated, that some event would necessarily take place on the 22nd.

I had attended the Emperor's levee, which took place at nine o'clock in the morning. He dismissed every one, except M. de Caulaincourt, La Vallette and myself. He again spoke to us on public affairs, and said it was the prevailing idea that every thing would be saved by his downfall; but it would be seen how such an idea was founded in error.

We were all three unanimous in opinion that he should renounce a power which the chambers were much more disposed to dispute to him than they were to arm the nation for the common defence. He then repeated to us what he had said to me on the preceding day:—"I can do nothing single-handed. If I am allowed to fall, the consequences are inevitable. For my part, my determination is taken: I have caused communications to be made to the chamber: I am awaiting its reply."

He had transmitted to the chamber certain details which had recently been communicated to him. Compelled to return in all haste, in order to reach Paris before the news of his defeat, he had but a confused idea of the condition in which the army was placed. The army, on its part, was ignorant of what had become of its chief. It was at a loss to discover whether he was still alive, or whether he had been slain. In this cruel state of uncertainty, Jerome dispatched M. de Vatry, one of his aides-de-camp, whom he directed to repair to the Chamber of Peers, for reasons which it is impossible to explain. This officer had just passed through the remains of our army: he might afford a sketch of the resources we had still at command. The Emperor sent for him, and put

several questions respecting the number of troops we still had it in our power to bring into line. The officer's replies were of a most discouraging nature. He did not estimate at more than twenty-five thousand men the number of troops capable of resisting the enemy. This estimate was below the mark; but the aide-de-camp persisted, and the Emperor directed him to write down what he had seen. This distressing report was read to the ministers, and immediately transmitted to the chambers. The Emperor must unquestionably have reckoned himself as of very little consequence in the question under debate, when he could make such communications. He was aware of the sentiments of the assembly: he knew the projects which it had formed against his power; but the welfare of France was the question at issue. He did not feel any apprehension at revealing the full extent of the evil at the moment when it was most important for him to exaggerate his resources, in order to overawe his enemies.

The 22nd of June was a day fixed upon for a council of ministers. It usually met at the hour of one in the afternoon. The Chamber of Deputies was assembled ever since eight or nine o'clock in the morning. Already, at the very opening of its sittings, a very unfavourable disposition had manifested itself amongst the deputies. The agents of Fouché were observed to move about in every direction, exciting the members of the chamber to depose the Emperor.

A fresh communication made by the Emperor to the assembly operated as a signal for a general rising; and I believe that some act of violence would have been committed if a few well-disposed minds had not succeeded in calming the excitement. They proposed to send a deputation to the Emperor, in order to submit to his consideration that the state of war in which France was again involved affected much less the nation than himself; and that the assembly had the means at command of putting an end to it, if he would act so

disinterested a part as to restore to it the faculty of action, according as circumstances might dictate its adoption.

Accordingly, the deputation entrusted with this message came to fulfil its commission towards the Emperor. It added, however, that the chamber deeply deplored being under the necessity of imposing upon itself so painful a separation; but felt compelled to request of him that he would once more sacrifice himself to save, by means of negotiations, what there existed no longer any means of defending by a recourse to arms.

The Emperor graciously received this deputation; spoke to it in very commendable terms; and said that, when he returned to France, his main object had been to restore the nation to its freedom. If the assembly had the means of securing that object, it was far from his intention to obstruct the execution of it; but he wished to know in what consisted those means. In any case, he should reply to the message which they had been commissioned to convey to him.

The deputation withdrew, and carried to the Chamber of Deputies the reply which it had received from the Emperor. So ill-disposed, however, was that assembly, that the members grew offended at the delay which the Emperor would probably suffer to elapse before he should communicate his reply, which they were desirous of knowing previously to their attending to any other object. It was anxiously expected; and the assembly was lost in conjectures as to its purport. Some asserted that he would abdicate; others, on the contrary, insisted that he would dissolve the chamber; and they added, that a prompt and categorical answer should be demanded of him, and a term be fixed for his reply, after which they should take their own course. Impatience increased with the delay in breaking up the sitting. A number of groups had formed in the chamber, and added to their mutual excitement. M. de Lafayette forgot all consideration for the

man who had extricated him from the prison at Olmutz, and proposed the Emperor's deportation, unless he should immediately abdicate his power.

The agents of malevolence who, without being members of the chamber, had access to it as long as the sitting remained suspended, neglected no means of spreading every kind of alarm, and of urging the members to pronounce the Emperor's forfeiture of the crown.

In the meanwhile, an occurrence took place which ought to be related with strict adherence to truth, and without comment. The reader will form his own opinion as to the previous circumstances which must have brought it about.

CHAPTER VIII.

M. Tourton again—One of the legions of the national guard proceeds to the palace of the Legislative Body—The author hastens to apprise the Emperor of the fact—Abdication of this prince—Formation of the commission of government—Napoleon II. is proclaimed—The Emperor withdraws to Malmaison—He names the author to accompany him—Fouché eludes a reply on the subject of the frigates—Difficulties respecting the passports.

The deputation of the chamber had come to fulfil its message to the Emperor between the hours of twelve and one o'clock.

The rumours of dissolution which had been spread in the assembly had served as a pretence for M. Tourton to exhibit himself to view in all the tribunes of the hall, from whence he told the deputies to be under no apprehension: it was intended to dissolve them; but he was ready to take their defence. He had adopted measures for placing the national guard under arms at a short notice. Accordingly, whilst M. Tourton was acting the part of a political agitator,

a rather extraordinary circumstance was taking place in one of the twelve legions composing the national guard of Paris. The commander, without any orders from his chief, took upon himself the responsibility of bringing together by beat of drum the citizens who composed the troop confided to his charge. Ignorant of the motive for which they were assembled, they repaired to the usual place of meeting. The commander there told them that the national representation was threatened, and that he had been called upon to march to its assistance. The legion was so far from suspecting any imposition, that it imagined all the other legions had received the same order, and were also proceeding to carry it into effect.

The promoters of this incipient insurrection were well versed in revolutionary movements. They knew it to be sufficient for any one legion of the national guard to set the example of a spontaneous recourse to arms, for all the rest to tread in its steps; and once they were united, they had the means of overawing the Chamber of Deputies, and even of giving effect to any decisions they might compel it to adopt.

The commander in question, an excellent citizen, but a determined character, repaired accordingly with his troop to the palace of the Legislative Body. The other legions adopted a more prudent course, and took no part in the disorder. M. Tourton was in the hall of the sittings whilst these occurrences were taking place. He told me himself the next day, or the day following, that he knew the people he employed, and he had made choice of the commander in question because he placed the utmost reliance upon him.

I was in the square of the Champs-Elysées when the legion adverted to passed through it on its way to the palace of the Legislative Body. I soon learned the object it had in view, and proceeded in all haste to the palace of the Elysée to acquaint the Emperor with what was going forward.

I had remained the whole morning in that square, where reports were brought to me every quarter of an hour of the proceedings in the assembly. On reaching the Emperor's residence, I was informed that he was at the council of ministers.

It was not customary to announce any one during the sittings of the council; but the saloon in which it was held had three broad windows which opened into the garden, and served the purpose of doors to it. They happened to be open at that moment. I made my way through a passage leading into the garden, and stationed myself so as to be seen by the Emperor, whose attention was engaged by the reading of the reply to the message from the chamber, which he had caused to be drawn up in full council. I affected to thrust myself forward, and to withdraw with signs of impatience. The Emperor understood that I had something to communicate to him, and came into the garden, where I gave him an account of what was taking place in the Chamber of Deputies, as well as of the movement of the legion towards that assembly.

The Emperor returned to the council, saying, "There is now something new;" and he called me in to report what I had just told him.

He sent to intimate to the president of the Chamber of Deputies that he would immediately transmit his reply to the message which he had addressed to him in the morning, and requested he would apprise the chamber of his intention.

The Emperor then addressed the council, and Fouché in particular. This minister had not given the least intimation of the agitated state of the chamber, nor of the conduct adopted by the legion of the national guard. Nevertheless, he had been in communication with M. Tourton the whole morning, and was assuredly no stranger to what was going forward.

"Gentlemen," said the Emperor, "I can do nothing un-

assisted. The public mind is led astray by the efforts made to detach it from me. I had called the assembly together in order that it might impart strength to my measures; whereas its disunion deprives me of the scanty resources I might otherwise have still had at command. The nation has been made to believe that I was the only obstacle to the conclusion of the arrangements which it is fruitlessly led to expect. The time is too short to enable me to enlighten its judgment: its looks are now directed to another quarter. It requires of me that I should sacrifice myself. I am willing to do so; for I have not come to France for the purpose of kindling domestic feuds.

"Time, which analyses every thing, will prove what are the intentions of those who accomplish the destruction of our remaining resources."

He dictated his answer to the message of the Chamber of Deputies, which was worded as follows:—

"When I began the war for the purpose of upholding the national independence, I relied upon the union of all efforts and of all wills, and upon the concurrence of every national constituted body. I was justified in anticipating the success of my endeavours. I had braved the declarations of all the powers against my person.

"Circumstances appear to be no longer the same. I offer myself in sacrifice to the hatred of the enemies of France. I trust they are sincere, and only wage war against me! My political life is closed. I proclaim my son Emperor of the French, under the title of Napoleon II.

"The present ministers shall provisionally form the council of government. The affection I bear to my son induces me to recommend that the chamber will immediately enact a law for the organization of a regency.

"Unite together with a view to the general safety, and to securing your national independence.

"NAPOLEON.

"At the palace of the Elysee, the 22nd of June, 1815."

This answer was conveyed to the Chamber of Deputies, who received it with sentiments of joy and admiration.

The council of ministers broke up, and the palace of the Elysée soon became deserted.

This abdication of the Emperor was communicated to the Chamber of Peers, and made public. Fouché's faction had already accomplished the first part of his projects. We shall now see how it proceeded to attain the remainder.

The Chamber of Deputies met in the afternoon for the purpose of selecting the members of the commission of government. They were to be five in number; that is to say, three were to be appointed by the Chamber of Deputies, and two by the Chamber of Peers.

The first balloting in the Chamber of Deputies brought out the names of Fouché and Carnot, although they were members of the Chamber of Peers. General Grenier appeared in the next balloting, together with several other persons, Marshal Macdonald amongst the rest. But Grenier was appointed, having been elected on the third balloting.

The Peers named Caulaincourt and Quinette, who were both members of their chamber.

Previously to this election there had been a stormy discussion in the Chamber of Peers respecting the character of the Emperor's abdication.

They fell into an error of judgment, which it was found very difficult to get over. Some of the members of that chamber indulged it with long speeches, almost unintelligible for those who had not the experience requisite for discerning the truth through the maze of metaphysical considerations and circumlocutions of language, by means of which it was attempted to conciliate both parties.

The act of abdication was attacked; and it was insisted that it should be plain and unreserved in its language. It was again wished, no doubt, to claim the right of nominating a government.

This was the first time that I was a member of that assem-

bly. I then understood how easy had been the work of leading astray the numerous assemblies which have acquired such unhappy celebrity during the latter period of our revolution.

The character of the Emperor's abdication was the subject of the most absurd comments; for it is clear that he could only abdicate in a manner conformable to the constitutions which had foreseen the case, and pointed out his successor. Any act on his part, that should have infringed this provision, would have been null and void. The chambers which nominated the persons in whom the exercise of power was to be vested had only claimed that right agreeably to the terms of the Emperor's abdication. They were not at liberty to censure such abdication, any more than to alter its character, since the Emperor himself was at hand, and might, from one moment to another, explain, in the most definite language, what had been his intention in abdicating the crown.

A few members raised their voices for the purpose of pointing out that the slightest alteration made to the act of abdication would necessarily recoil upon and affect the constitution. They observed, that if the principle were once admitted, the consequence which would fairly spring out of it would be the dissolution of the chamber, which had only been appointed in conformity with an act of convocation emanating from the Emperor, in virtue of the powers which he derived from the constitution itself.

This question was the subject of a warm discussion in the Chamber of Peers, and was already giving rise to angry feelings, when a message was brought to them, intimating that, after a short debate, the Chamber of Deputies had acknowledged and proclaimed Napoleon II.

The discussion immediately dropped. The Chamber of Peers followed the example of the Chamber of Deputies, less, however, through a conviction of the rights of the young prince, than an anxiety not to separate their cause from that of the Chamber of Deputies.

It was hardly possible to refrain from the most painful re-

flections on considering the manner in which the short time which would intervene before the approach of the allies was suffered to elapse. Nothing could be more distressing than the blindness of those orators, who, instead of attending to the means of opposing to the coalition the efforts of their united sentiments, were engaged in domestic strife, as if they felt apprehensive that the allies might be at a loss for a pretext to compel our acceptance of whatever terms they might think proper to propose to us.

The allies could not fail to be soon informed of this state of disunion; and it must be owned that no means were omitted which were calculated to place us at their mercy.

In the evening of the 22nd the Emperor's son was acknowledged by the two chambers, and the commission of government installed at the Tuileries.

Fouché came again that evening to the palace of the Elysée. I happened to be there when he made his appearance. The Emperor spoke to him in these words: "Place not your confidence in the enemy: prepare every means of resistance in your power. You would betray France by adopting a different course."

The Emperor sent a message the same night to the minister of marine, requesting he would place at his disposal the two frigates which were in the roadstead of Rochefort. They were the only two ships on the eve of sailing.

The minister sent for answer that he would proceed to take the commands of the provisional government; in other words, the orders of Fouché; and as soon as he should receive them, would hasten to give this last proof of attachment to the Emperor.

On the following day, 23rd, the Emperor caused the demand to be renewed through General Bertrand, whom he also directed to apply to Fouché for passports.

This commission of government had assembled at the Tuileries, from whence it had entered upon the exercise of its

powers. On the first day of its installation it sent a deputation to the allied sovereigns, with the view of coming to a pacific arrangement. Fouché sincerely believed that he would now be able to renew the communications which he had opened previously to the return from the island of Elba; and many persons were the dupes of his illusions.

The arch-chancellor gave in his resignation to the commission of government on the very day of its installation. Several other public functionaries followed his example. I was of the number, and threw up my commission of first inspector-general of the corps of gendarmerie.

This commission removed on the same day the commander-in-chief of the national guard of Paris, General Durosnel, and appointed Marshal Massena to succeed him. It likewise displaced General Rapp from the command of the army of the Rhine, and substituted Marshal Jourdan in his stead.*

I was too well aware of Fouché's evil intentions towards the Emperor not to ascribe to him some sinister projects; and I accordingly took measures to obstruct them.

I had never been the dupe of his protestations, and clearly perceived that he was about to avail himself of his position to effect the Emperor's irretrievable ruin: for this course of conduct was calculated to answer any project he might meditate, whether in favour of the elder or the junior branch of the house of Bourbon, or even of the regency. The Emperor's death was indispensable for the security of his own life. He was too deeply versed in the science of revolutions to expose himself to a fresh return. I was engaged in conversation with the Emperor during the whole of the 23rd, representing my uneasiness on this subject; and I did all in my power to impart the same feeling to him, and to procure his adopting the determination of instantly taking his departure.

I shared this opinion in common with many excellent men

* Generals Durosnel and Rapp had been aides-de-camp of the Emperor.

who had also acquired the experience of revolutions, and had come to caution the Emperor. They advised him to remove without loss of time, as those wretches (mentioning Fouché and his adherents) would deliver him up, if necessary, in order to extricate themselves from further difficulties. I abstain from naming the noble-minded men who came to give him this advice, as I am not quite sure that my so doing might not be productive of injury to them.

The Emperor began to suspect the possibility of such a guilty course being actually meditated, and he immediately made every preparation for his departure.

He could have wished to have taken along with him General Drouot, who had accompanied him to the island of Elba. But this officer had been appointed to the command of the imperial guard; and he thought it behoved him not to abandon his post at a moment when France was in danger. The Emperor did not insist any further; but he regretted Drouot, for whom he felt great esteem and attachment.

The parents of General Bertrand had come from the province of Berry to visit him. Although fully persuaded of the general's sentiments, the Emperor did not yet speak to him of the plan which he was forming of going over to America, owing to an apprehension of alarming the sensibility of his family. He asked me whether he could rely upon me to accompany him; and I confess that such a proof of his confidence was more flattering to my feelings than all the honours he had heaped upon me during the most brilliant days of his prosperity. I replied that he might fully dispose of my services, as I considered myself bound in honour to follow him to the spot he might fix upon for his residence; and I instantly left him to make preparations for my departure.

He had not yet bestowed a thought upon his funds. I mentioned the circumstance to him, feeling some apprehension of a seizure, from the opinion I entertained of the manner in which it was intended to put him out of the way. He

gave me certain instructions on the subject, and I proceeded in all haste to the treasury of the crown. The idea was a most fortunate one; for I had hardly left that office when the paymaster received an order to close every credit, and not to part with funds in favour of any individual whatever.

The Emperor was not possessed of much; and what little money he had, consisted of what he had brought from the island of Elba. He had always calculated upon the national generosity, and never attended to his private fortune. There are very few, amongst those upon whom the Emperor had bestowed his liberality, who had not preserved more than what he had at command.

As soon as the Emperor's abdication had become known, groups had collected in every direction, and particularly amongst the artificers, who were greatly attached to him.

The language of these groups was expressive of a strong interest for him; and the rumour was spreading that it was intended to give him up to the enemy. These expressions gained ground from the experience derived from past revolutions; and the palace of the Elysée was surrounded from morning till night by people loudly calling for the Emperor, who was sometimes compelled to show himself. The crowd filled the passage of Marigny, which communicates with the Champs-Elysées from the Rue du Fauxbourg St. Honoré. As often as he appeared, the air was deafened with cries of *Long live the Emperor!* These cries only tended to increase the concourse of people. Fouché became alarmed, and caused it to be recommended to the Emperor that he should withdraw to the palace of Malmaison. He urged as a reason the necessity of calming the public mind, which might be excited to some seditious movements. But it will shortly be seen what were the secret motives which suggested to him the idea of making this intimation.

The Emperor yielded to the suggestion, and quitted the Elysée. The precaution was adopted of bringing his car-

riage into the garden, in order that he might enter it without being seen by the public who surrounded the palace; and it was made to depart through the iron gate opening upon the Rue de Marigny at the extremity of the garden. He assented to whatever was asked of him. His sacrifice was in all respects complete. He had requested to be allowed to remove to a distance from the scene; and was desirous of going to America, or to England, if it were found impracticable to proceed to the United States. But the commission of government had other objects in view: the sequel of its acts will afford a development of them. Its first decree was worded as follows:—

Paris, 26th June, 1815.

Art. I.—The minister of marine shall issue orders that two frigates in the port of Rochefort may be armed for the purpose of transporting Napoleon Bonaparte to the United States.

Art. II.—He shall, if he requires it, be provided with a competent escort as far as the place of embarkation, under the orders of General Becker, who is directed to watch over his safety.

Art. III.—The director-general of the posts shall on his part issue the orders connected with the service of the relays of horses.

Art. IV.—The minister of marine shall give the requisite instructions for the purpose of insuring the immediate return of the frigates as soon as the landing shall have taken place.

Art. V.—*The frigates shall not leave the roadstead of Rochefort until the passes shall have arrived.*

Art. VI.—The ministers of marine, of war, and of the finances, are charged, each one in what concerns him, with the execution of the present decree.

(Signed) THE DUKE OF OTRANTO, COUNT GRENIER, COUNT CARNOT, BARON QUINETTE, CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

The Emperor, therefore, could not take his final departure: a condition had been put to it which was neither foreseen nor called for. It had been made subservient to the receipt of passes, which it was to be presumed could never be obtained. The Emperor, who was far from suspecting such an artifice, directed me to proceed to the minister of marine, for the purpose of ascertaining whether he had received an authority to place the two frigates at his disposal. He recommended that I should see Fouché, with the view of removing every difficulty that might offer, and of desiring him not to delay the transmission of the passports which had been asked of him.

I immediately repaired to the minister, who was himself at a loss what opinion to entertain when he found that the provisional government had neglected to send him forthwith an authority to place the two frigates at the Emperor's disposal. He did not disguise from me the uneasiness which he felt at the circumstance; and gave me to understand that if it were not for the consequences which he apprehended on the score of his personal responsibility, he should not hesitate a moment, but issue orders for the frigates to set sail.

The observations of the minister of marine confirmed me in the opinion I had previously formed. I left him, and hurried away to the Tuileries, where the members of the provisional government were still assembled. I caused myself to be announced to Fouché, as being desirous of speaking to him on the part of the Emperor; but found it impossible to see him until the sitting was over, when I went up to him and to Carnot. I demanded the frigates which were in the roadstead of Rochefort; respecting which the minister of marine must have written to them, since he had just told me that he only waited their answer to place the frigates at the disposal of the Emperor, who was himself in the utmost impatience to take his departure. I added that the prince had directed me at the same time to apply for his passports.

Fouché replied to me with his usual levity of language; which failed, however, in its object of deceiving me.

"You are quite right," he said; "the minister of marine has written to me; but I did not exactly comprehend what he asked, and I forgot to mention the subject to my colleagues. It is too late to settle the matter to-day; but you may rest assured that at the sitting of to-morrow morning it shall be terminated, and I shall send an immediate answer to the minister of marine." *

"I will therefore return to-morrow," was my reply. "But as for the passports, this point depends wholly upon yourself. The Emperor, who is in a hurry to be off, has directed me to ask them of you."

"With respect to the passports," rejoined Fouché, "that is another question. Where does the Emperor intend to go?"

"Where else can he go," I resumed, "but to America? I thought you were aware of it."—"I know it!" said Fouché, "this is the first time the subject is mentioned to me. He is quite right; but I will not take upon myself to let him depart without adopting every precaution for his safety: otherwise, I should be blamed if any accident were to happen to him. I will apply to Lord Wellington for passports for him, as it behoves me to protect my individual responsibility in the eyes of the nation. I should never be forgiven for acting without the requisite precaution."

I could not avoid observing to him that what he proposed to do would take up some time: the Emperor would relieve him from every kind of responsibility; and by hurrying his own departure, would alone be blamed for any consequences that might result from the course he adopted.

Carnot now took part in the conversation, and spoke to me as follows:—"There is no desire to throw obstacles in the way of the Emperor's departure: quite the contrary. It is wished to adopt those measures which are best calculated to prevent his again making his appearance."

* The provisional government met twice a day, morning and evening, at the Tuileries.

I am at a loss for words to express the surprise which I felt at this language. I could not in any manner account for it when I recollected that, less than three months before, Carnot had exerted every effort to obtain the appointment of minister of the interior; and that the Emperor felt a reluctance to employ him, and only gave his consent at the repeated solicitations of M. de Bassano in his favour.

Caulaincourt, who was a member of the provisional government, had remained in the saloon where this conversation had taken place. He accosted me as soon as his colleagues had retired. An old intercourse of friendship had always subsisted between us. He recommended that I should urge the Emperor to take his departure as speedily as possible; adding, that he owed it to me as a mark of friendship to express his astonishment at my following him. I could only blame myself if I fell into difficulties in consequence of the course I was pursuing. I thanked him for the advice, and did not ask him for any further explanation. What he had just afforded me was amply sufficient to fix my opinion in regard to the suspicions I already entertained respecting him. "How can the Emperor take his departure," I said, "unless he be provided with the means of doing so? He wishes it, and only waits for the frigates and the passports."—"Let him be off," was Caulaincourt's reply; "he can never start too soon."

"In that case," I resumed, "why is not his application complied with? There is no reasonable motive for the refusal; and the consequences must necessarily recoil upon the guilty authors of it."

M. de Caulaincourt made no reply, and we separated.

CHAPTER IX.

M. Archambaud de Périgord—Protestations of Fouché — Madame ..... advises the author to mount his corps of gendarmerie, and to rid France of that swarm of wretches who are intent upon its ruin—Arrival of General Becker—The author's apprehensions—His proposal to the Emperor—Fouché's combination—He consents at last to the Emperor's departure—That prince quits the palace of Malmaison.

THE communication just adverted to had so agitated my mind, that I hastened the next morning to the ministry of police at an early hour, for the purpose of again urging Fouché to a decision. I found in his apartment M. Archambaud de Périgord, in the dress of a person on the point of mounting on horseback. I had a strong suspicion of the motive of his visit. He presented himself to take soundings for the day, and no doubt also to receive orders for Lord Wellington's head-quarters.

Fouché came to receive me, and concluded a short conversation in the following words:—"You may assure the Emperor that I shall obtain the decision of the provisional government this very morning on the subject of the frigates, and that the minister of marine will receive instructions for placing them at his disposal. I will also issue immediate orders for expediting his passports."

Fouché paid so little attention to what he was telling me, that he was urging me, at the same moment, to direct the corps of gendarmerie in Paris to fire upon the first white cockades that might be seen in the streets. "You are aware," I replied, "that this no longer concerns me, since I have given in my resignation, and am about to join the Emperor."

He pretended surprise at the information. I asked him whether I might hope that he would not suffer me to be pro-

scribed, nor do me any personal injury. He again answered as follows: "No individual shall be proscribed, unless it be intended to proscribe all France. You are, besides, one of those who have pursued the most even course of conduct."

"Well, then," I said, "we shall see how far you will have borne my request in mind."

I hastened back to Malmaison, to report to the Emperor what had taken place, and to communicate to him all my apprehensions. One of my attendants, who was in search of me, brought me on the road an anonymous letter, which I recognised by the hand-writing to proceed from a person whom I knew to be well informed of whatever was going forward. That person wrote to me as follows: "General, you possess too elevated a mind to become the dupe of your enemies. The time is short, and of the utmost value to you. Take a determination: mount your horse; place yourself at the head of your corps of gendarmerie, and do your duty to the King, by punishing this provisional government, which will otherwise get the start of you. You have no other means left of escaping the utter ruin that awaits you. What motive can prevent you, since you are now free to act, in consequence of the Emperor's retreat?"

I answered in these words, at the foot of the note: "I am fully sensible of the friendly motive which has dictated the advice, and grateful for it: neither am I insensible to its value; but I am not told what is to become of the Emperor. He would undoubtedly be sacrificed. In that case, my reply must have been anticipated: it shall ever be *potius mori quam inquinari*." This was the lady's motto.

The Emperor made me repeat over and over again the information which I furnished to him. He could hardly persuade himself that the public mind could have already made such fatal progress. He was less disposed to trust to me than to any one else in a matter of this kind; because he said that I always saw every thing in the darkest colourings.

He sent General Bertrand a second time to Paris, for the purpose of expediting the matters which he had previously entrusted to me; and it was during his absence that General Becker arrived at Malmaison. As a member of the Chamber of Deputies, he came to announce to the Emperor that he had received orders from the minister of war to repair to his presence, and take the command of the troops entrusted to protect him, and to answer for his person to the provisional government. There was, at this time, at Malmaison a battalion of infantry, and about a hundred dragoons of the guard.

The Emperor sent for me at the moment when General Becker came to acquaint him with his orders, and spoke as follows: "This is something new, which portends no good. How happens it that the minister of war has made no previous communication to me?"

He gave a friendly reception to General Becker,* whom he had known in the camp; and offered no opposition to his carrying into effect the orders confided to him.

Whilst General Becker was entering upon the command of the guard, and receiving the obedience of the officers of that corps, the Emperor was walking with me in the garden. "This proceeding," he said, "savours much more of the revolutionary committee than of a noble-minded government. I am quite at a loss to understand why the minister of war should not have made a previous communication to me. He perhaps saw nothing wrong in this course; besides which, the choice he has made of General Becker is calculated to quiet every alarm I might entertain. Sieyes, however, was right when he told me that they would give me up; nevertheless, I cannot depart without ships or passports; otherwise I should be stopped by the mayor of the first country village. It will be sufficient for him to be told

* General Becker had married the sister of General Dessaix.

that I am carrying away public funds: he will write to Paris; the provisional government will not reply to him: events will come to a crisis; and in this manner my ruin will be accomplished."

I told him that "I feared this was really the object meditated: it might, besides, be no longer possible for him to take his departure, since General Becker was from this moment appointed to watch his movements. I could not disguise from myself that affairs might assume a still darker colouring on the morrow, and he might then be altogether deprived of his liberty; for there could no longer exist any doubt of the motives which occasioned, on the one hand, the delay of giving the frigates and the passports, and on the other, the appointment of General Becker to attend him.

"Becker was, no doubt, a man possessed of a character calculated to allay every suspicion; but as he was known to be quite incapable of embarking in any sinister project, I felt no doubt of his having been selected to perform the first act in the tragedy; and when every thing should be prepared, he would receive orders to transfer his command to another person, who would be charged with the task of bringing about the catastrophe: or it was possible that no one would be sent to replace him, in order to afford freer scope to the Emperor's enemies."

"How can this be remedied?" said the Emperor. "There is but one course," I replied; "it would be madness to proceed on the journey without passports, and without an order for the frigates to take you wherever you might think proper to go; but you must be the bearer of them yourself, otherwise you would afford too many facilities for Fouché to compass your ruin.

"You should also notify immediately to General Becker that it is your intention to proceed to America without delay; and that, in virtue of the orders which he told you he had received to come and watch over your safety, you commissioned

him to make known your determination to the provisional government, and to notify to it that you demanded your passports, and the disposal of two frigates. Without these two conditions you would not proceed, and were resolved to load it with the infamy of delivering you up to your enemies, if the smallest delay were thrown in the way of your reasonable demands; that, in short, you would address yourself to the chambers, for the purpose of being informed whether you were to be considered as a prisoner. You should throw upon them all the odium of a responsibility, which would cover them with shame, if they should pretend to overlook it. There are amongst those deputies a great number of worthy men, who will not allow themselves to be disgraced by Fouché, and will pay a becoming attention to the difficulties thrown in your way, when they shall be made acquainted with them.

"Fouché himself will be disposed to ponder before he allows matters to grow to such extremities. He could not, besides, be allowed the opportunity of conveying the impression that your departure has been delayed by yourself, under the allurement of any vain hope that obstacles have increased in the interval; and that the fatal event which he already meditates was altogether the consequence of your own procrastination

"The subject must be the more seriously attended to, as the refusal of the frigates and of the passports can only be accounted for by supposing the most sinister views; since it is impossible to discover any rational motive for the omission to comply with your demands on the very night of your abdication."

The Emperor clearly saw that I was right in my conjecture; but he maintained a composure which alarmed me. "Could they ever be capable," he replied, (alluding to the provisional government,) "of placing me in the alternative of throwing myself into the enemy's power?"

"No sooner," I replied, "did that commission show a reluctance to yield to your wishes, than we ought to believe it capable of any thing. It will merely attempt to clear itself in the eyes of the nation, by proving that it was unable to control the course of events."

The Emperor summoned General Becker to his closet, and commissioned him to intimate at once to the provisional government his determination to depart without further delay, and to renew the demand he had caused to be preferred to it by the minister of marine, that the two frigates in the roadstead of Rochefort should be placed at his disposal: lastly, he recommended that he would strongly insist upon their being immediately granted, as well as the requisite passports; adding, that if he did not receive a reply without loss of time, he should address himself to the chambers, and proceed to the hall of their sittings, there to await the issue of events, and to assign to them the task of delivering him up to the enemy.

General Becker, who was a man of honourable feelings, and of great experience, immediately perceived the object of the delay, and would have recoiled from affixing his name to the infamous projects meditated. He instantly wrote to the provisional government, and spoke the language of a man of honour. He was informed, in reply, that, for the Emperor's greater security, the government had demanded passports of Lord Wellington; and that, as soon as received, they should be forwarded.

This was evidently another act of perfidy, which was cloaked under the pretence of the interest felt for the Emperor's person. None but dupes could fail to penetrate the true motive of such a course of proceeding.

Our anxiety was, however, in some respects allayed by the arrival of the minister of marine. He came to communicate to the Emperor a dispatch from the president of the commission, which was couched in these words:—

"TO THE MINISTER OF MARINE.

"Paris, 27th of June, in the forenoon.

"Monsieur le Duc,

"It is of the utmost importance that the Emperor should take his departure. The enemy is fast approaching, and is perhaps already at Compiegne. The commission wishes that you should immediately repair to Malmaison, and prevail upon the Emperor to depart, as we could not be answerable for any movement that might take place. With respect to the clause of Article V. of yesterday's decree respecting the passes, the commission authorises you to consider it as of non-effect. All the other clauses are maintained in force.

(Signed) "THE DUKE OF OTRANTO.

"P. S. It would be important that the Emperor should take his departure *incognito*."

This letter could not fail to create some suspicion, since it rested upon a falsehood, and a supposed unwillingness to depart, which did not in any manner exist. But the ground was now clear before us: we imagined that we had nothing more to do than to proceed on our journey. Our mistake was soon made manifest.

The minister of marine had scarcely been a few hours gone when he sent to the Emperor a dispatch, the clauses of which were wholly at variance with those he had come to communicate. Its tenor was as follows:—

"Paris, 27th of June, 1815, two o'clock in the afternoon.

"Sire,

"When I had the honour of appearing this morning before your Majesty, I exhibited to you the letter by which the Duke of Otranto announced to me that Article V. of yesterday's decree respecting the passes was of non-effect.

"On my return to Paris, I met opposite the palace of the Elysée a courier, who handed to me a dispatch from the Duke of Otranto of the following tenor:—'In consequence of the dispatches we have received this morning the Emperor cannot quit our ports without a pass. He must wait for it in the roads. Accordingly, the decree of yesterday remains in full force, and the letter which we wrote to you yesterday for the purpose of cancelling Article V. is null and void. You will adhere to the text of our letter of yesterday.

(Signed) 'DUKE OF OTRANTO.'

"I was too near the Tuileries not to repair thither on receipt of the dispatch. The council of government had adjourned until three o'clock. I found there a third letter, which only waited the return of the Duke of Otranto for the purpose of being signed by him and forwarded to me. M. Berlier delivered to me a copy of it, the original of which will be handed to me this evening. It is to the following purport:—

"'TO THE MINISTER OF MARINE.

"'Paris, 27th of June, at noon.

"'Monsieur le Duc,

"'The commission recalls to your recollection the instructions it transmitted to you an hour ago. You are to attend to the execution of the decree such as it was yesterday drawn up by the commission; in virtue of which decree Napoleon Bonaparte is to remain in the road of L'Isle d'Aix until the arrival of the passports.

"'It is of consequence for the welfare of the state, which he cannot view with indifference, that he should remain there until his fate and that of his family shall be regulated in a definitive manner. Every means shall be employed in order that this negotiation may turn out to his satisfaction. French

honour is interested in it. In the mean while, however, every precaution should be adopted for the personal safety of Napoleon, and for his not quitting the residence temporarily assigned to him.

"'Accept, M. le Duc, &c.

"'THE DUKE OF OTRANTO,

"'The president of the commission of government.'

"It results from the foregoing, that the commission conceives it indispensable for your Majesty's safety that you should proceed on board the frigates at L'Isle d'Aix; and for the progress of the negotiations, that the frigates should not sail until the arrival of the passports.

"Whilst I communicate this state of things to your Majesty, I am on the point of returning to the Tuileries. I shall represent there whatever your Majesty has stated to me, and ask for the orders of the commission, in case that your Majesty, on arriving at L'Isle d'Aix, *should desire to be immediately conveyed to England on board a frigate or any other vessel, instead of remaining in those roads.*

"It is needless I should express to you the painful sentiments I experience at circumstances so untoward for you, which I considered to be already at an end.

"Accept, Sire, &c.

"DECRES."

We shall presently see how the commission replied to the wish manifested by the Emperor of proceeding direct to England. There could not exist a shadow of a doubt respecting such a wavering course of proceeding and such contradictory measures. The English army was fast approaching. Our troops had recrossed the river Oise. It was easy for the plainest understanding to perceive, that instead of granting passports, the enemy might send to carry off the

Emperor from Malmaison, where Fouché had taken especial care to make known that the Prince was then residing.

If it had not been Fouché's intention to let the Emperor fall into the enemy's power, he would not have urged him to quit Paris, where he was protected by the honour of the chambers, and of the citizens of that vast metropolis, and where he might have been apprised, at latest in the evening of the 22nd, of the danger which threatened him.

Fouché no doubt wished to claim the merit of having favoured the views and interests of the Emperor. When did he do so, however? After he had sent to the English army, and consequently when he knew that there could not exist any objection to meet the Emperor's wishes, since they could no longer be productive of advantage to him. He acted towards that Prince as it is customary to act towards those who are about to die. They are no longer refused any thing.

A concurrence of fortunate circumstances saved the Emperor from this first danger.

The minister of war had taken the command of the troops which were retreating towards Paris. As soon as he perceived that the enemy were approaching the river Oise, he sent orders to General Becker to set fire to the bridges in front of Malmaison.

Becker went in person to attend to the execution of that measure; and it is probably owing to this precaution that the Emperor was not taken, or rather killed at Malmaison, which he had left when the Prussian detachment in quest of him arrived on the spot, having been compelled to look out for a passage across the Seine much lower down than it had expected. The detachment must have been led by a man accustomed to hunt in the neighbourhood, since it had succeeded in coming up with such rapidity, and without the slightest hesitation on the road, notwithstanding the circuitous route it had taken.

General Bertrand arrived from Paris with promises; but brought no order for the frigates any more than for the passports.

The Emperor began seriously to reflect on what might be the consequence of this conduct; and as many persons came to see him at Malmaison, he soon discovered what opinion he ought to entertain of Fouché's intrigues. He was placed in a painful position; but he had manifested the intention of again resorting to arms. This threat was sufficient to avert a portion of the danger. The enemy had ventured as far as the Lower Seine; and had thereby exposed themselves to be cut to pieces. The Emperor, who kept a close watch upon their movements, discovered their error, and resolved to take advantage of it. He sent for General Becker; represented to him the state of affairs, and commissioned him to be the bearer to the provisional government of his offer of services to it. "You will explain to them," said he to General Becker, "that it is not my intention to resume possession of power. My only wish is to defeat and crush the enemy, and compel him by means of our victory to give a favourable turn to the negotiations. As soon as this result shall have been obtained, I shall depart, and quietly proceed on my journey." The general transmitted the proposal; but Fouché could not give credit to the magnanimous feeling which dictated it. It interfered too much, besides, with the projects he had formed. He conceived it to be a means of recovering an authority, which the Emperor might nevertheless have easily resumed without resorting to such a subterfuge. He warmly rejected the offer which was made to him, but afforded no satisfaction respecting the demand for the passports and frigates. It really appeared that this provisional government only sought to keep the Emperor in reserve, in order that if the enemy should require the sacrifice of his person, their wishes might be complied with. The question would have been referred to the chambers. Stress would have been laid upon the para-

mount interests of Europe; and, with the view of protecting their dignity, they would have entered into a kind of treaty on the Emperor's behalf: though he would no sooner have been betrayed into the hands of the enemy, than the treaty would have been consigned to the flames.

The offer, however, of again recurring to arms was not lost upon Fouché. The traitor was well aware that if the Emperor showed himself under the critical circumstances in which we were placed, the army and the whole population would greet his appearance with transports of joy. This prince had not failed to perceive the snares that had been thrown in his way. A sense of indignation and of personal danger might drive him to some desperate measure. Fouché determined to allay his anger, and wrote to the minister of marine the following letter:—

"Paris, 28th of June, 1815.

"Monsieur le Duc,

"Great delays having occurred since the demand for passports on behalf of Napoleon, and the existing circumstances giving reason to apprehend danger for his personal safety, we have resolved to consider Article V. of our decree of the 26th of this month as of non-effect. The frigates are accordingly placed at Napoleon's disposal. Nothing can any longer obstruct his departure. The interest of the state and his own well-being imperiously require that he should depart immediately after you shall have notified to him our determination. Count Merlin is to join you on this mission.

"Accept, M. le Duc, &c.

"THE DUKE OF OTRANTO.
"COUNT CARNOT.
"COUNT GRENIER.
"BARON QUINETTE.
"CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

"P.S.—It is of importance that you proceed to Malmaison

immediately on the receipt of this order. Count Merlin is about to call upon you."

It might be supposed from this letter that the Emperor had only to enter upon his journey. But the Duke of Otranto, who laboured in each of his dispatches to represent him as undecided, and even opposed to the project of quitting Paris, was far from intending that he should yet take his departure. The minister of marine shall now lay the artifice open to our view:—

"TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION OF GOVERNMENT.

"Paris, 29th of June, two o'clock in the morning.

"President,

"It is now two o'clock in the morning, and M. Merlin does not make his appearance. I do not even know when he is to arrive, since it has not been possible to find him.

"It appears from the *postscript* of your dispatch of yesterday that I am only to go to Malmaison in his company. There is, however, no time to be lost. In this state of things, therefore, I request you will let me know whether or not I am to wait for M. Merlin ere I notify your orders to Napoleon.

"Accept, &c.

"DECRES."

The commission which the provisional government was sending to the allied sovereigns had taken the road towards Alsace, where it hoped to find them; and the Anglo-Prussian army was accelerating its march towards the capital. That army had got the start of the allies, and was debouching under the walls of Paris. It became necessary to come to an understanding with it. Fouché was unable to complete his treachery: events were hastening too rapidly to a close.

The Anglo-Prussians already occupied part of the country along the Seine. It was doubtful whether the Emperor could escape. Fouché substituted Count Boulay to Merlin, and the minister of marine was at last enabled to hurry off to Malmaison, and announce that the departure was now free from obstacles, as the passports had been sent on the preceding day by Fouché, who added, that the English government would probably direct vessels to cruise before Rochefort with the passes which he had demanded of Lord Wellington, intimating to him at the same time that the Emperor was on his way to that port.

Fouché had unquestionably other objects in view when he made this demand of the English. The Emperor had not commissioned him to do so; he had merely applied for French passports.

It is probable that Fouché had already received a reply from the English army, and that he betrayed as great a want of candour towards Lord Wellington, when he pretended to facilitate the Emperor's departure. He was placing himself between two fires, whilst he still imagined that he could conceal his underhand manœuvres.

The minister of marine did not fail to perform his duty with all the latitude which had been allowed to him. He even went so far as to say, "I have brought with me the order for the frigates, for the purpose of their only receiving it through you, and of preventing all supposition that they might have received another order to cancel the present one." He took leave of the Emperor, and returned to Paris.

M. de Lavalette also came to Malmaison, and brought to the Emperor the orders that might be required for the postmasters on the two roads leading to Rochefort through the provinces of Berry and Poitou.

All the individuals who followed the Emperor's fate were assembled at Malmaison; many others had come to take leave. Princess Hortense was there, with several ladies of

her household. The Emperor sent them off, with the rest of her attendants. He embraced every one, and spoke in affectionate terms to each.

The officers of his guard were anxious to take leave of him. He received and embraced them. All shed tears of grief at parting from him.

Previously to relating what happened to the Emperor after his departure from Malmaison, it will not be deemed superfluous that I should present the following observations.

It has been seen in the course of this work with what eagerness every one deserted their prince at the time of his first abdication, and how they hurried back to Paris for the purpose of assuming a new position under the patronage of their respective friends. The case was the same on the present occasion.

A crowd of administrators, of officers of all ranks, were desirous of following their old leader; but Fouché, who envied the very feelings of those whose fortune was secured to them by the Emperor, had laboured to spread the seeds of defection amongst us. Some were called away to the functions with which they had been invested; others were deceived by false hopes of promotion or of personal safety. The attachment for the Emperor gradually cooled; each one found a motive for withdrawing offers of service which had not been solicited of them. Even the unfortunate Labedoyere recoiled at the moment of departure.

The Emperor waited in vain to bring him away: he had allowed himself to be seduced by false assurances that he would not be molested. He remained in Paris, and fell a victim to his credulity and his confidence in some officious friends. This misfortune is the work of those who, whilst they pretended attachment to the Emperor, were not ashamed to come to Malmaison for the purpose of shaking the resolution of the small number of persons who were linking their fate to their fallen chief. M. de . . . . exerted every

means to seduce Montholon, whilst he kept feeding the Emperor's hopes. As well might he have stabbed him on the spot. Labedoyere allowed himself to be persuaded by him, and his life paid the forfeit of his credulity.

CHAPTER X.

Departure and composition of the convoy—The post-mistress of Chateaudun—Tours; the Emperor sends for the prefect—Saint-Maixent—Occurrence at Saintes—Joseph is arrested—Emissaries sent to follow the steps of the Emperor—Baron Richard—Correspondence of those gentlemen—The Emperor might have reached the open sea, had not Fouché's treachery prevented him—Various solicitations—The Emperor goes on board the *Saale*.

THE Emperor was almost alone at Malmaison when a young merchant arrived there in the utmost haste, to inform him that he had seen from the plain of Saint-Denis a very large body of the enemy's cavalry descending the Seine, and appearing to move towards Malmaison. This young man entreated him to depart as soon as possible. The Emperor felt grateful for this mark of interest, returned him thanks, and ordered up the carriages. His suite was divided into two parties. The first consisted of several carriages, in which were Madame Bertrand and her children,* M. and Madame de Montholon with their child, M. de Las Cases and his son, as well as several orderly officers who had requested leave to accompany the Emperor. All those carriages were to take the road to Orleans, pass by Châteauroux, and reach Rochefort on an appointed day.

The second convoy consisted of a single summer calash containing the Emperor, General Bertrand, General Becker,

* I think Madame Bertrand did not depart until the following morning; but all the rest took their departure at one and the same time.

and myself. The Emperor's valet was on the calash-box, and a courier proceeded half a league before us in order that we might find horses in readiness on our arrival at every post-station.

The Emperor was dressed like ourselves, in a plain frock, without any mark of distinction. We carried no luggage with us; and the calash had no appearance of being intended for a long journey. We were merely provided with every kind of arms.

The Emperor's effects were in another carriage containing two seats. General Gourgaud was in this carriage, which kept at the distance of two hours' journey behind us.

All the carriages came up to the portico of the palace, with the exception of the calash, which remained in the court-yard that divides the castle from the kitchens. The Emperor overtook it with us through the winding walks of the garden, whilst the other persons I have mentioned stepped into the carriages drawn up under the portico.

The calash was the first to depart through one of the walks of the park. As it was less conspicuous in appearance than the others, the public attention was not directed to it, but was fixed on the carriages of the other convoy, to which the picket stationed at the iron gate opening on the high road presented arms, under the impression that the Emperor was in one of them. It had not discovered that he had already passed.

It will soon be seen that this measure of precaution turned out to be a fortunate idea.

The Emperor's calash repaired to Rocquancourt by the Bois du Butard, without passing through Versailles, which was on its left, and proceeded to Saint-Cyr, where it entered the road to Chartres. We reached Rambouillet at night-fall.

Instead of passing through the town, we drove up the grand avenue of the castle, where the Emperor slept that

night; and at an early hour the next morning we quitted it by the avenue leading to the park-gate beyond the town on the road to Chartres.

We proceeded, undiscovered, as far as Châteaudun, where the post-mistress hastened up to the carriage-door in the utmost anxiety to inquire if we came from Paris, and if there was any truth in the report that another accident had happened to the Emperor. She had scarcely uttered this question when she recognised him, and, without saying a word, raised her eyes to heaven, and returned home bathed in tears.

We proceeded, without stopping, through Vendôme as far as Tours, where we arrived in the night-time. The Emperor wished to see the prefect, and the carriage accordingly stopped on quitting the town by the road to Poitiers. I proceeded in search of that administrator, a man of excellent character. The Emperor was moreover anxious to see and put questions to him. He wished to know what was taking place in the country, because, if Fouché had meditated to procure his arrest on the road, it would have been known at Tours that some one had passed through the town with an equivocal mission. If, on the other hand, his satellites were following us, the prefect would stop them, or at least give us timely information of their approach.

The Emperor conversed for a quarter of an hour with the prefect, after which we proceeded on our journey towards Poitiers.

The heat was excessive, and we stopped at the post-house until the air had grown cooler. The Emperor selected that halting-place in preference to any other, because the post-house was outside the town.

We were not recognised, and enjoyed undisturbed repose until two o'clock in the afternoon, when we set off for Niort, at which place we had not intended to stop; but a trifling altercation we had had at Saint-Maixent occasioned us some

alarm. We were unwilling to expose ourselves to shipwreck in the very harbour; we therefore passed the night in that town.

The adventure in which our alarm had originated was as follows. On arriving at Saint-Maixent, within five or six leagues of Niort, we saw a crowd of people in the square of the town-hall. The national guard was upon the alert, since the renewal of the disturbances in La Vendée; it stopped our calash, and demanded our passports. General Becker replied in his capacity of commissioner from the government, and exhibited his passports as well as the orders entrusted to him. No mention was therein made of the Emperor; difficulties were thrown in the way, which his firmness succeeded in overcoming, and we continued our journey; but there is no doubt that General Bertrand or I should otherwise have been compelled to answer for ourselves; we, and necessarily also the Emperor, must infallibly have been recognised.

As Niort was at the same time a place of residence of a prefect and one of the western points at which troops were assembled for the purpose of opposing the insurrection in La Vendée, we were glad to stop in that town, with the view of ascertaining what was taking place in the vicinity.

Night had just set in when we arrived. The Emperor alighted at the post-house, where he sent for the general in command of the town, as well as the prefect. He then proceeded to the prefect's residence, at which he passed the night, as well as the following day.

The report of his arrival became public; from an early hour in the morning, a considerable crowd obstructed the approach to the hotel of the prefecture, where it remained the whole day. The officers, the troops, and the principal citizens, testified the same degree of eagerness, and felt the same regret at seeing the Emperor departing. The prince was no doubt distressed at being unable to avail himself of this opportunity of taking advantage of the general enthusiasm:

General Becker reported it to the provisional government. I am ignorant of the contents of his report; but it gave rise to the two following letters, which cannot fail to suggest deep reflections.

"Paris, 4th of July, 1815.

"Minister of Marine,

"The commission sends you a copy of the letter it has written to General Becker. It is the wish of the commission that you should transmit the necessary instructions to Rochefort, *in order that military aid may be furnished to General Becker, as well as any other assistance he may require towards the accomplishment of his mission.* You will find enclosed the letter addressed to General Becker. The ministers of the interior and of war are apprised that the courier you despatch will take charge of the instructions they have to issue in reference to the same object.

(Signed) "THE DUKE OF OTRANTO.
"CARNOT.
"COUNT GRENIER.
"QUINETTE.
"CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza."

"Paris, 4th of July, 1815.

"General Becker,

"The commission of government has received the letter you have written to it from Niort under date of the 2nd of July. Napoleon must embark without delay. The success of the negotiations mainly depends upon the positive assurance the allied powers wish to receive of his actual embarkation; and you are not aware to what extent the safety and repose of the state are compromised by this procrastination. *Had Napoleon taken his departure immediately,* we have before

us a report from the maritime prefect of Rochefort,* stating that there was a possibility of succeeding on the 29th. The commission therefore places the person of Napoleon under your responsibility; *you must employ every measure of coercion you may deem necessary*, without failing in the respect due to him. Accelerate his arrival at Rochefort, and make him instantly embark. As to his offer of services, our duties towards France and our engagements towards foreign powers do not allow us to accept of them; and you must no longer mention the matter to us. Lastly, *the commission conceives it to be inexpedient that Napoleon should communicate with the English squadron. It cannot grant the permission which is asked on that subject*,

"Accept, &c.

(Signed) "THE DUKE OF OTRANTO."

Two other documents of this extraordinary negotiation are of sufficient importance to be recorded. Those whom, they concern will, perhaps, be pleased to clear up whatever obscurity may be found in them.

* "Rochefort, 29th of June, 1815.

"Monseigneur,

"I have received the two dispatches you sent off to me by an extraordinary estafette. The first, dated the 27th of this month, reached me yesterday the 28th at twenty-five minutes after five o'clock in the afternoon; the second, under date the 28th, at half an hour after midnight on the 29th. In consequence of the arrangements I have adopted, the two frigates will be in readiness this night. They will be supplied with provisions for four months and a half, their crews complete in all respects, besides refreshments, a few choice provisions, and bedding. They will be ready to cut their cables on the first orders they may receive to set sail. For the last three or four days, however, some enemy's cruisers, consisting of a line-of-battle ship, a frigate, and two corvettes have stationed themselves at the entrance of the Perthuis d'Antioche: this will offer some difficulties; but I do not deem them to be altogether insurmountable. I have conformed to your Excellency's orders.

"I beg you will accept the assurance of my respectful attachment.

"The Maritime Prefect, BONNEFOUX."

(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.)

"THE MARITIME PREFECT TO GENERAL BECKER.

"Rochefort, 1st of July.

"General,

"The roadstead of L'Isle d'Aix is closely blockaded, since the 27th of June, by *an English squadron, consisting of a line-of-battle ship, two frigates, two corvettes, and a brig.* That division, which had stood out to sea until the 27th, and extended from the entrance of the river running to Bordeaux to the Sables, has concentrated itself since that period, keeps at a distance of two leagues from the coast right across the roadstead, and comes up every evening to Basque roads for the purpose of watching us; so that it is utterly impossible for our two frigates to attempt sailing whilst the enemy retains his present position. The said division, which has only made its appearance on our coasts since the early part of June, had constantly stood out to sea until the 27th; and I cannot but suppose that there is an extraordinary motive for this change in its manœuvres. It would appear to me to be highly dangerous for the safety of our frigates, and of *what they are to take on board*, that they should attempt to force their way out: it would be proper to wait for a favourable opportunity, which cannot offer for a long time to come during the present season, when the English forces which blockade us, and keep up at the same time a regular correspondence by means of vessels placed at stated distances with the squadron permanently stationed on the coasts of La Vendée, afford no opportunity of succeeding in the attempt to order off our vessels from L'Isle d'Aix. They cannot quit that anchorage for the open sea without being intercepted by the cruisers, which are in superior strength. I am so much broken down in health for the last week, that it is impossible for me to proceed to join you. I am afflicted with a fever which has not left me for the last three days; but M. de Querengal, the military commandant, a man of honour, and entitled to

all your confidence, will take his departure in an hour hence. He will afford you such details as may induce you to adopt some positive determination in the critical circumstances in which we are placed.

"Accept, General, the assurance of my distinguished consideration.

"The Maritime Prefect, COUNT BONNEFOUX."

"TO THE MINISTER OF MARINE.

"Rochefort, 4th of July, 1815.

"Monseigneur,

"I have the honour to report to your Excellency, that Napoleon arrived yesterday at Rochefort, with the suite which accompanies him, at nine o'clock in the morning. The frigates were in readiness; but the English cruisers, consisting of two ships of the line, *two frigates, two corvettes, and a small vessel*, blockade the roadstead and every kind of passage from the Gironde to La Rochelle, so that there is no hope of escaping without being seen, or of forcing a way through. The august personage whom the French nation has taken under its protection, has made all his arrangements for departure. The intentions of the commission and your Excellency's orders shall be executed in every respect, as far as I am concerned. His Majesty is and shall be treated with the consideration and respect due to his situation and to the crown which once encircled his brows. I am so much oppressed with business and difficulties of every kind, that it would be impossible for me to enter into details.

"I request you, Monseigneur, to receive my best apologies, and to accept the assurance, &c.

"The Maritime Prefect, COUNT BONNEFOUX."

(CONFIDENTIAL.)

What was the real object of all those proceedings? Why prescribe coercive measures for the purpose of compelling the embarkation of a man who is anxious to take his departure? What inconvenience could there exist in his communicating with the English squadron? What had M. de Querengal to do in all this? What arrangements had he to make? What motives, in short, had the maritime prefect in view when he exaggerated the enemy's forces which kept watching the harbour? Why did he fancy the existence of a squadron at a place where only one ship was to be found? for we who were at Rochefort knew what credit we should give to the assertions respecting that display of forces which he was so over-anxious to create. The truth may besides be discovered by a reference to Captain's Maitland's narrative. That formidable squadron consisted of the Bellerophon only; the two brigs which were in her company had been sent on a detached service several days before, and the captain was so much at a loss that he was under the necessity of making use of his boat to forward a dispatch to Quiberon Bay.* What was the object of all those measures, those journeys to and fro, those reports? The sequel will explain it. Whilst all were in this state of bustle about him, the Emperor was preparing to proceed on his journey. He was desirous of prosecuting as he had begun it; but the troops at Niort so earnestly requested to be allowed to supply him with an escort, that he could not resist their repeated entreaties. He took his departure with a piquet of light cavalry, and reached Rochefort at nine o'clock in the morning of the 3rd of July. He alighted at the hotel of the maritime prefect, and waited there for the carriages which had proceeded through the province of Berry.

They had met at Saintes with an accident which might have been attended with serious consequences, had it not been

* Captain Maitland's Narrative, page 8.

for the proper feeling displayed by the authorities of that town.

We were the more surprised at it, as along the whole road from Paris to Rochefort respect had been paid to the Emperor's *incognito*, although we could have no doubt of his having been recognised, particularly at the town of Niort. He had been treated every where with marks of the liveliest interest and of the most respectful consideration. Why did it happen otherwise at Saintes? We never could succeed in ascertaining the cause with any degree of accuracy, and could merely indulge in conjectures on the subject.

Prince Joseph had, on his departure from Paris, taken the road to Bordeaux, with the intention of embarking for America. He overtook the convoy on the road, and felt desirous of taking a farewell leave of the Emperor.

His carriages, as well as those of the Emperor, were stopped on their arrival at Saintes: they were conducted to the municipality, under the pretext of examining the travellers, and taking back the millions they were carrying away; a clear proof that scouts had been sent in that direction.

Certain expressions were overheard, which indicated that the Emperor was sought for; and Prince Joseph was stopped in a very uncourteous manner. He was taken to the Maire, who demanded his name. "Sir," replied the Prince, "I travel under such a name which is inserted in my passport; but I am Prince Joseph, the Emperor's brother; you may deal with me as you think proper." The Maire was all attention from that moment, and paid every mark of respect to Joseph. He told him that the whole town had been set in motion by one of the body-guards named Monfort, or Dufort; but that he would do all in his power to restore order, and to get in readiness the carriages, which were just on the point of undergoing examination.

He succeeded accordingly; the convoy continued its

journey; and was escorted by the gendarmerie as far as Rochefort.

I again availed myself of the deference which the officers of that corps still retained for me, my person being very familiar to them, and asked how the disturbance at Saintes had originated without their being apprised of it. What they told me confirmed my previous opinion, that some one (whose name I subsequently ascertained) had followed the traces of the Emperor all the way from Malmaison, with the view to bring him into trouble: and he was certainly not the only one engaged on such an errand. Fortunately, the assassin mistook the carriages. He supposed that the most elegant were those applied to the Emperor's personal use, and had accordingly kept up with them. Another wretch, however, of the same stamp, was not deceived by our humble equipage: he followed us with some of his abettors, and never ceased watching a favourable opportunity for murdering us. He is now loaded with honours: much good may he derive from them!

It has been seen that these attempts did not take me by surprise. I knew, besides, that Fouché had set M. de V. at liberty on the eve of the Emperor's departure; and it will be recollected that this was the same man who had been directed to organise a civil war in the south at the period of the 20th of March. I was aware that, on the return from the island of Elba, he had used every endeavour to find out some desperado, whom he might send to poignard the Emperor.

The provisional government had gone a step farther; it had despatched agents to the coast, and prepared the means of carrying off the Emperor, or at least of preventing his eluding the vigilance of the English cruisers. Baron Richard, amongst others, was employed in setting every kind of plot on foot. He was an old conventionalist; and had been appointed prefect of the Upper Garonne, and of the

Lower Charente, in the days of the empire. Expelled from his situation as a regicide by Louis XVIII., he had solicited and obtained, in 1815, another prefecture, that of the department of Finisterre, from whence he was soon dismissed, in consequence of his extraordinary conduct in the discharge of his new functions. Ever since that dismissal, he followed the Emperor every where, in order to be reinstated into favour. At the Champ-de-Mai, and during the ceremony which took place immediately afterwards in the gallery of the Louvre, he was seen to station himself amongst the electors of the department of the Upper Garonne, in hopes of obtaining some condescending expressions from the monarch. Deceived in his expectations, Richard was walking the streets of Paris without any employment at the time of the formation of the commission of government, presided by his friend the Duke of Otranto.

Richard's condition altered from that moment to his manifest advantage. He was a discontented man; the then governing powers flattered themselves, not without just grounds, that they would render him ungrateful for former services. They sent him on a mission to follow the Emperor, whose route had been traced out by themselves; and they directed Richard to watch him, and to report his movements, when he should have arrived at Rochefort. By this means they had it in their power to seize him as soon as the presence of the foreign troops in Paris should render unavailing any opposition that might have sprung from the enthusiasm still created by the Emperor's painful situation. Accordingly, the commission of government sent Richard to his old prefecture of the Lower Charente; and he was already installed there some time, spreading amongst the newspapers the account of the nautical evolutions he had performed for the purpose of watching the Emperor Napoleon, when the latter embarked on board the Bellerophon. This explains the source of the anonymous advices which Captain Maitland

received whilst on board ship, and to which he refers in his narrative published in 1826.

The *Moniteur* likewise informs us, by the contents of a letter, written on the 15th of July, 1815,* by M. Bonnefoux, the maritime prefect of Rochefort, that M. Richard, *prefect of the Lower Charente*, had embarked in a boat with him, "for the purpose of supplying the chasm in the reports transmitted from the roadstead on the 14th."

If there could exist any doubt of the secret mission given to M. Richard by the commission of government, it would be asked how it happened that, on the 14th of July, he had already been several days installed as prefect of Rochefort, whilst the King had only nominated him to that prefecture by his ordinance of the 14th of July, inserted in the *Moniteur* of the 17th? It would further be asked, if the question were not already explained by the treachery of which Richard had been made the instrument, how he came to be again appointed by the King, on that particular occasion, to a prefecture of which his Majesty had dispossessed him a few months before, as having been one of those who voted the death of Louis

* "Rochefort, the 15th of July, at ten o'clock in the morning.

"With the view of carrying your Excellency's orders into effect, I embarked in my boat with Baron Richard, prefect of the Lower Charente. The reports of the 14th from the roadstead had not yet reached me. I was informed by Captain Philibert, commanding the *Amphitrite* frigate, that Bonaparte had embarked on board the brig *L'Epervier*, armed as a flag of truce, with the determination of proceeding to meet the English cruiser.

"We accordingly perceived it manœuvring at daybreak, for the purpose of nearing the English ship Bellerophon, commanded by Captain Maitland, who, on perceiving that Bonaparte was sailing towards him, had hoisted up the white flag on his mizen-mast.

"Bonaparte was received on board the English ship with all the persons composing his suite. The officer whom I had left to watch his movements had communicated to me this important news, when General Becker arrived soon afterwards, and gave me the confirmation of that intelligence.

(Signed) "BONNEFOUX,

"Captain in the Navy, and Maritime Prefect."

XVI.? It is proper to add, that the proscription, which extended in 1816 to all such voters, did not reach M. Richard, who was the only exception to it.

The Emperor learned, on reaching Rochefort, that two days before an English cruiser had made its appearance in the afternoon, close to the entrance of the Charente; it consisted of a single man-of-war and a corvette. Had it not been for the difficulties thrown by Fouché in our way, we might have set sail previously to its coming in sight.

The carriages, which had taken the road through the province of Berry, had successively arrived at Rochefort. The Emperor was only intent upon his departure, which he was desirous of effecting without loss of time.

He could not suppose that the least opposition would be offered to his voyage to America; and he so confidently indulged in the idea of establishing himself in that part of the world, that he had already made choice of horses and other objects calculated to promote his comfort in his new existence. They were on their way to the coast by easy journies, and were to be shipped in any port where a vessel could be freighted to convey them.

A regiment of marine artillery was quartered at Rochefort; a regiment of sailors was encamped at L'Isle d'Aix, in Rochefort road; fifteen hundred national guards were at La Rochelle; Niort was occupied by a corps of cavalry; and there were about three thousand men of the gendarmerie, horse and foot soldiers, in the vicinity of that town. The greater part of their officers and subalterns had served under my orders, and had received their appointments from me. General Clausel was at Bordeaux with some regiments of infantry under his command. All these troops transmitted to the Emperor the expression of their regret and devoted attachment. Personal services were tendered to him: offers were made to follow his fate. There was not a military man

within a circumference of ten leagues who did not hasten to take leave of him.

The same sentiments were manifested by the population of Rochefort. They remained stationary under the windows of the Emperor, who was sometimes obliged to present himself in order to gratify their impatient eagerness to see him. As often as he appeared, he was greeted with as much respect as if he had triumphed over all his enemies.

Rochefort is one of the cities to the healthiness of which the Emperor had most contributed in a pecuniary point of view. He had never ceased, during a long series of years, to direct the labours requisite for drying up the marshes by which it is surrounded, and to cause the erection of works calculated to promote its internal improvement. All these undertakings had been crowned with success. The inhabitants of Rochefort were grateful for his attentions, and felt no apprehension of manifesting their sentiments. I believe that every inhabitant, without a single exception, participated in our feelings.

The Emperor was desirous of embarking immediately on his arrival at Rochefort; but the naval officers represented to him, that they required some days to put on board the articles he brought with him, and were under the necessity of watching for a favourable wind.

He took up his residence at the maritime prefecture of the town, and remained there until the 8th of July, when every thing was in readiness for his embarkation. He had been visited from all quarters; every one made offers of service to him. He declined those offers, observing, that if he were to accept of them, such an act, on his part, would serve as a pretext for the enemy to oppress France. He had beheld the public mind so much deceived by the impression of his being the only obstacle to general happiness, that he was desirous of setting sail as soon as possible.

He embraced all his old companions in arms, and proceeded to embark on the right bank of the mouth of the Charente, near a fort which, to the best of my recollection, is called the Castle of Fourras.

The report of his departure had become known, and a great concourse of people was collected at the moment of his alighting from his carriage. Every countenance was dejected; and all were heard to mutter, "Is it possible that so great a man should be thus abandoned?"

The Emperor took leave of all the chasseurs of the picket which had accompanied him, and stepped into the boat of the *Saale* frigate, which had come to wait for him close to the castle. The boats of the *Meduse* received the officers; and every person of his suite quitted the shore with him on the 8th of July, at about the hour of four in the afternoon. We arrived rather late on board the *Saale*, the wind being contrary, and blowing with great violence.

The *Saale* and *Meduse* frigates were those which were appointed to convey us to America. There were in the same road two other ships of war, which were placed at the prince's disposal; a brig, and the corvette *La Bayadère*, the latter in the direction of the Gironde. The two frigates were quite new. The *Meduse* carried eighteen-pounders, and had already made an excursion in which it was found to be a very superior sailer. The *Saale* was of a rather larger class; nevertheless, I could not affirm that it carried heavier guns than eighteen-pounders; this was her first attempt at sailing; but all were agreed in opinion that she would also prove an excellent sailer. The crews of both were composed of old seamen, who had returned from the prisons of England since the peace of 1814.

During the five or six days which the Emperor had passed at Rochefort, a small Danish vessel then in port had been prepared for sea, and fully provisioned: a secret recess had even been contrived in it, in the event of its being visited by the English cruisers. It was proposed to the Emperor that

he should proceed in this vessel to America; but he refused, and declined running a risk which might be attended with unpleasant consequences. Nevertheless, he made this small vessel proceed into the road, reserving to himself the power of afterwards considering what course it might be most advantageous for him to adopt.

CHAPTER XI.

General Donnadieu—Singular mission confided to him—The Duke de Feltre—Probable motives of his visit to England—His anxiety of mind, and his projects—Mission on board the Bellerophon—Ignorance still prevailing amongst the English respecting the recent occurrences—Questions put to Captain Maitland—His answers—He is of opinion that the Emperor should take up his residence in England, and offers to receive him on board his ship.

The Emperor was on board ever since the 8th of July. We had now reached the 11th, and the passports announced to us were not yet arrived. Fouché had intimated that the English government would probably transmit them by the vessel cruising off Rochefort: we accordingly conceived that there could be no danger in proceeding to ascertain if they were on board. In any case, it could only be productive of advantage to us that we should reconnoitre the cruiser.

The Emperor was informed that some American vessels which had set sail had already dropped down to the entrance of the river of Bordeaux, and he sent a person to visit them: they were found to be four in number, and had near them a French corvette which was anchored at the mouth of the river.* This reconnoitring was made at the

* General Lallemand who was directed to make this reconnoitring, reported back to us that an English corvette was in front of the Gironde with General Donnadieu on board. This general had a mission from the English government to set to work on behalf of the Duke of Orleans. He endeavoured to open a com-

same time that the Emperor sent on board of the English cruiser.

munication with General Clausel, who commanded at Bordeaux, and proposed to him to act in furtherance of that object.

When I reflected upon the important, as well as the minor events of that period, and called to my aid the knowledge I possess of the character of many individuals who are placed on the wide scene of the world, the following remark occurred to me:

When the King quitted Paris on his way to Lille, the Duke de Feltre proceeded to England, although he shared the opinion of those who considered that the Sovereign was surrounded with dangers. He there saw the members of the government.

It was said that he was entrusted with a mission from the King. If this was the case, the object of his journey is at once explained. Nevertheless, I met in England a highly respectable person, who told me that he there saw the Duke de Feltre in a very desponding and discontented turn of mind. The Duke said to him that he considered the royal cause as altogether lost; and despaired so much of it, that he was desirous to make his peace with the Emperor, and was hesitating between Paris and Ghent.

If he went to London of his own accord, I am inclined to think that he did so with the view of sounding the intentions of the government, to whom he may have made the proposal of presenting the Duke of Orleans to the French nation, observing to the ministry, that the cause of the elder branch was irretrievably lost, (this was indeed the opinion of all those who had favoured its return, or had since attached themselves to it, without excepting Marmont himself); but that the younger branch, the Duke of Orleans, had a strong party in the country.

This opinion is suggested to me by the circumstance of the individual who had gone to Lille for the purpose of advising the Duke of Orleans not to show himself in the enemy's camp, but to retire to England, and wait there (according to his own expression) until the Emperor Napoleon should be worn out, which could not fail to happen before long. He would then naturally be the person called to succeed him.

I think that, under these circumstances, the Duke de Feltre could have no other object in view than to serve the Duke of Orleans, having been attached to the father of this prince previously and subsequent to the revolution.

On combining General Donnadieu's departure from England for the mouth of the river of Bordeaux, with the period of the Duke de Feltre's proceeding to England, I conceive that he was himself directed to propose that mission to Donnadieu, who, although he had accompanied the Duchess of Angoulême to England, possessed in London no means whatever of inspiring so great a degree of confidence to the English ministry, and was connected by no ties with the Orleans party. If the Duke de Feltre did not give this mission, he could not at least be ignorant of,

M. de Las Cases and I were sent by the Emperor as bearers of his message.

M. de Las Cases had a letter from General Bertrand for the commodore on the station. The grand-marshal apprised him that passports were to arrive from London for the Emperor, and accordingly inquired if they had reached him.

We were instructed to afford the commodore whatever explanation he might require, in the event of his not having yet received any passports. Although M. de Las Cases spoke English very fluently, it was agreed that he should feign ignorance of it. We were both dressed in plain frocks, and carried no marks of distinction upon our persons.

and therefore could be no stranger to it. He only returned to Ghent with the view to wait the issue of events which was to determine the course to be adopted by the English ministry.

The battle of Waterloo having placed France at the mercy of that ministry, the Duke de Feltre was quite safe in the position he had assumed.

If the battle had been won, and the Emperor had consolidated his power, he had the means in reserve of being reinstated into favour, by saying that he still had only set the troops in motion against him, because he knew the attachment they bore his person, and that he had surrounded the King with dangers, in order to compel him to quit Paris and France, with the view of avoiding a civil war. For his own part, after having done all in his power, he had gone to England to await the issue of events.

Some of these arguments would also have availed him in the event of its being necessary to promote the cause of the Duke of Orleans.

I the more readily believe that he had a share in the project of placing this prince upon the throne, as I was well acquainted with the Duke of Feltre's animosity against General Donnadieu at the period when a watchful eye was kept upon the latter.

I have seen many violent reports of the Duke de Feltre, which were the occasion of much trouble to General Donnadieu, who did not suspect the origin of it, and frequently indulged in mistaken conjectures on the subject. The Duke de Feltre must have felt great anxiety to calm the general's anger, when he caused his being appointed to the command at Grenoble; for, notwithstanding the spirit of re-action, Donnadieu was far from enjoying any high favour. What he had it in his power to divulge, however, might have greatly compromised the duke, who was much benefited by his silence, at a time when he was causing the army to be decimated with the view of establishing his own credit.

We quitted the *Saale* frigate on the 11th of July, before day-break, to embark on board a small schooner, and take advantage of the tide which was to carry us beyond the point of Chassiron, at the extremity of the island of Oleron, where the English ship kept cruising.

We arrived on board at seven or eight o'clock in the morning. The ship was named the Bellerophon, and was under the command of Captain Maitland; the corvette which accompanied it was called the Mirmidon, and was under Captain Gambier's orders.

M. de Las Cases handed to the captain of the Bellerophon the letter placed in his charge by General Bertrand. We acquainted him with what he was still ignorant of, that owing to a series of occurrences which had taken place since the battle of Waterloo the Emperor had abdicated, and had come to Rochefort with the intention of proceeding to America. We told him that the provisional government of France had demanded passports for him from the general-in-chief of the English army, who had referred the case to London, from whence they were to be forwarded to the cruiser stationed off Rochefort.

M. de Las Cases observed to Captain Maitland, that the Emperor, having altogether closed his political career, was desirous of quietly taking his departure, without being obstructed by any opposition from English cruisers. This was the only reason that made him attach any value to the passports: he was anxious to prevent an engagement between the French frigates and any vessels they might fall in with.

He observed, that in the event of there existing any difficulty on account of the frigates, the Emperor would renounce the comforts he found in them, and take his departure on board of American vessels, which were on the point of quitting the Gironde, or else in French trading-vessels.

Captain Maitland answered M. de Las Cases in the following words, which he spoke in the French language:—"I

am quite ignorant of the details you communicate to me. I only know that the battle of Waterloo had been won. I cannot, therefore, reply to the demand which is the object of your message; but if you will wait a few moments, I may, perhaps, learn something more on the subject, for I discover a corvette which is manœuvring to join me. It informs me by signals that it has just arrived from England, and has letters for me. I shall manœuvre on my side to accelerate her approach. In the mean while, let us go to breakfast."

The captain of the corvette came on board the Bellerophon whilst we were at table, and handed to Captain Maitland all the dispatches which he had been directed to deliver to him. This corvette was called the Falmouth. It had in fact arrived from England, and had passed by Quiberon Bay, for the purpose of delivering dispatches to Admiral Hotham, who was in command on that station.

Captain Maitland read his dispatches, and said to us: "They do not contain a single word of what you have just communicated to me. I even find that at the moment of this vessel's departure, they were still ignorant in England of the facts you have mentioned."

It could not be supposed that Admiral Hotham had received any instructions on the subject; for the corvette having proceeded to meet him previously to its making for Rochefort, he would no doubt have availed himself of this opportunity to issue to Captain Maitland the orders which would have been the necessary consequence of what he might have learned from England respecting the Emperor.

During breakfast, Captain Maitland entered into conversation, in the English language, with the captain of the Falmouth corvette. M. de Las Cases paid attention, without pretending to understand it. Captain Maitland asked the officer of the Falmouth what news was stirring, and where was the Emperor. He was told in reply, that it was reported on board Admiral Hotham's ship that he had just

arrived at Nantes, and was creating a great stir there. Captain Maitland could not suppress a smile; and said to us in French, "They know as little of the truth there as any where else." He then informed the captain of the Falmouth that the Emperor had just arrived at Rochefort.

When breakfast was over, and Captain Maitland had dismissed the officers who were with him, he resumed the conversation with us, and requested we would have the goodness to repeat all that we had told him.

We did so; and he replied to us in nearly the following words:—

"I should be happy to have it in my power to meet your wishes; but you see how impossible it is for me to comply with them. I shall immediately report to my admiral, who is in Quiberon Bay, that you have come on board my ship. I shall also send him General Bertrand's letter to me, and acquaint you with the purport of his answer when I receive it. But I am of opinion that he will deem the matter of sufficient importance to proceed hither in person."

We observed to Captain Maitland that such a course would be productive of delays, and the Emperor was most anxious to take his departure. To which he replied, "The matter does not depend upon me." We then put to him the following questions:—

"The Emperor has no wish to conceal his departure. He can have no personal motive for doing so, as is clearly demonstrated by the step which he has directed us to take. But in the event of the wind turning fair previously to his receiving your answer, and of his taking advantage of it and sailing out with his suite in the frigates or brigs, what course would you pursue?

"If instead of setting sail in the frigates, he were to put to sea in a French trading-vessel, how would you act?

"And lastly, if instead of proceeding in the above vessels,

he should sail out in a neutral vessel, an American ship for instance, what would you do in that case?"

Captain Maitland replied as follows:

"If the Emperor sails out with the frigates, I will attack, and if possible capture them. The Emperor would, in this case, become a prisoner.

"If he sails in a French trading-vessel, as we are at war, I will capture it; and in this case also the Emperor would become a prisoner.

"If he sails in a neutral vessel, and I should search it, I will not take upon myself to suffer him to proceed. I will detain the vessel, and refer the matter to my admiral, who will determine the question."

It was then observed to him, that in this case also he would no doubt make him a prisoner. "Not at all," said Captain Maitland, with warmth; "but I will not take upon myself to decide the matter. This is a question of so extraordinary a nature, that I shall leave the responsibility to my admiral."

This explanation was followed by many details respecting the Emperor's position. Captain Maitland said to us in the course of conversation—

"The Emperor acts very properly in demanding passports, in order to avoid misunderstandings, which would be of daily occurrence at sea. But I do not think that our government would suffer him to proceed to America."

"Where then," said we to Captain Maitland, in return, "would it be proposed to him that he should fix his residence?"

"I am at a loss to form an idea on the subject," rejoined the captain; "but I am almost certain of what I tell you. What repugnance could he feel in coming to England? He would thereby solve all difficulties."

M. de Las Cases answered, that we were not empowered

to discuss this question; personally speaking, he was of opinion the Emperor had not entertained that idea, as he perhaps apprehended the effects of a resentment, which was the natural consequence of the long misunderstanding subsisting between him and the English government. On the other hand, he had a predilection for mild climates, and especially for social intercourse; both which advantages he might find in America, without apprehending any harsh treatment from any one.

Captain Maitland replied, that it was a mistake to suppose the English climate was damp or unhealthy. In some counties, the county of Kent for instance, it was as mild as in France. As to the enjoyments of a social life, they were incomparably superior in England to any thing the Emperor might find in America.

"As for the resentments he might apprehend," said the captain, "his coming to England would be the surest means of extinguishing them. Residing in the midst of the nation, placed under the protection of its laws, he will be protected from every danger, and render the efforts of his enemies altogether powerless." He observed, that if even the ministers were to attempt to molest him, a circumstance which he doubted, they would not do so, because with us, he added, the government is not of an arbitrary character; it is obedient to the laws.

"I dare say," continued Captain Maitland, "that the government will adopt towards him every measure of precaution calculated to secure his repose, as well as that of the country where he may reside; such precautions, for instance, as it adopted in respect to his brother Lucien: but I cannot imagine that any other course would be adopted, because, as I repeat, ministers have no right to do so, and the nation would not suffer it."

M. de Las Cases again observed to Captain Maitland, that he was not empowered to discuss that subject; but he had

not lost one word of his conversation, and would report it to the Emperor; and if this prince should determine upon proceeding to England, he should let him know." He then put this question to him:

"In the event of the Emperor's adopting the idea of going to England—an idea which I shall do all in my power to promote—may he depend upon being admitted on board of your ship, as well as those who accompany him? for such a supposition no longer admits of a passage on board the frigates."

Captain Maitland replied that he would instantly address a dispatch to his admiral on the subject; but that if the Emperor should request a passage on board of his ship previously to his receiving a reply, he should at once admit him.

After this conversation, which lasted a long time, Captain Maitland handed in his reply to the letter written to him by General Bertrand, and promised us that if the expected passports should arrive, he would instantly apprise us of the fact: at any rate, he would come to anchor the day after to-morrow in Basque Roads, where they might communicate with him as much as they pleased.

We took leave, M. de Las Cases and I, of Captain Maitland, to return to the Emperor, who was on board of the *Saale* in the road of L'Isle d'Aix.

He reflected in the afternoon on the purport of the message we had brought back, sent for me during the night, was silent for a moment, and then said—"Go and desire the captain of the frigate, in my name, to set sail immediately." I was aware of the precise tendency of the instructions which he had received from the minister. I went in full confidence to give him the order to set sail; but great was my surprise when Captain Philibert informed me that he had secret orders; "he was strictly forbidden to carry his mission into effect, if the vessels of the state ran any risk!" All this, therefore, I said to him, is a mere deception: the only object intended by the commission of government was, that the

Emperor should be placed under the necessity of delivering himself up to the enemy.—"I do not know," replied the captain, "but I have orders not to sail."

I returned in the utmost alarm, and informed the Emperor of the base snare that had been thrown in his way. "My secret presentiments told me as much," said the Emperor; "I was unwilling to believe it; and felt a reluctance in suspecting that this captain, who appeared a worthy man, should have lent himself to so shameful an act of treachery. What a villain is that Fouché!" Nevertheless, amongst the persons who signed those odious instructions, there was one more guilty than Fouché. The Emperor seeing himself thus cowardly betrayed by men loaded with his favours, had no resource left but to resign himself to his fate. He landed the next morning, 12th of July, on L'Isle d'Aix, where he waited the return of General Lallemand, whom he had sent to examine the American vessels at the entrance of the Gironde.*

They afforded the means of reaching America; and even presented some prospect of doing so without great danger. The Emperor was urged to avail himself of the opportunity. Nevertheless, he refused; and told us that if on quitting France he still retained any after-thought in his mind, he would take his departure in an American vessel; but as he had frankly withdrawn himself for ever from the bustle of a life of agitation, he did not see why he should not be allowed to run out his career unmolested, and at a distance from intriguers and ungrateful men.

* General Lallemand had left Paris shortly after the Emperor, overtook him at Niort, and was to accompany him to America.

CHAPTER XII.

The Emperor determines to repair on board the English cruiser—His letter to the Prince Regent—General Gourgaud—Captain Sartorius—The Emperor is on the point of being arrested at Rochefort—He embarks—Reception given to him—Captain Maitland—Admiral Hotham—He might have effected his escape—Perfect security of the Emperor—Admiral Keith.

THE Emperor remained at L'Isle d'Aix during the 12th and 13th; on the 14th he came to anchor in Basque Roads, and sent again on board the Bellerophon M. de Las Cases and General Lallemand, as bearers of a flag of truce. Explanations took place between these gentlemen and Captain Maitland on the subject of the conversation we had held with him two days before. He had been overtaken by the Slaney corvette, of which Captain Sartorius had the command.

The bearers of the flag of truce returned to L'Isle d'Aix on the same day, and reported to the Emperor what had taken place on board the Bellerophon. M. de Las Cases said, "that Captain Maitland had authorised him to tell the Emperor that if he decided upon going to England, he was authorised to receive him on board; and he accordingly placed his ship at his disposal."

The offer coincided with the arrival of this corvette, which was then descried for the first time. The Emperor sent for all those who had accompanied him; acquainted them with the captain's proposal, and mentioned the particulars of that officer's conversation with the bearers of our flags of truce. He added, that previously to connecting them with his new destiny, he was desirous of informing them of what was going forward.

The opinions of all were nearly unanimous respecting the

confidence that ought to be reposed in the honourable reception he would meet with in the event of his adopting the resolution suggested to him. We trusted the more to that sentiment, as the English were fully aware of the means which the Emperor had at command if he should determine, even by main force, to reach the open sea.

"If it were a question," said the Emperor, "of marching to the conquest of an empire, or of saving one from ruin, I might attempt a repetition of the return from the island of Elba; but I only seek for repose; and if I should once more be the cause of a single shot being fired, malevolence would take advantage of the circumstance to asperse my character.

"I am offered a quiet retreat in England. I am not acquainted with the Prince Regent; but from all I have heard of him, I cannot avoid placing reliance on his noble character. My determination is taken. I am going to write to that prince, and to-morrow at day-break we will repair on board the English cruiser."

Every one withdrew to make preparations for the departure.

The Emperor wrote to the Prince Regent a letter couched in the following terms:—

"Royal Highness,

"Exposed to the factions which distract my country, and to the hostility of the principal powers of Europe, I have closed my political career, and, like Themistocles, am about to seek shelter amongst the British people. I place myself under the protection of their laws, which I claim from your Royal Highness, as the most powerful, the most persevering, and the most generous of my enemies."*

* This letter was dated on the 13th, owing to considerations which it is unnecessary to relate in this place. Captain Maitland has taken advantage of this circumstance to contest the fact of the overtures he had made, and denied that he had

General Gourgaud was appointed to carry this dispatch to London, and received instructions which are of sufficient importance to be recorded; as they prove, better than a volume of assertions, what were the precise considerations which influenced the Emperor's conduct.

"My aide-de-camp, Gourgaud, will repair on board the English squadron with Count de Las Cases. He will take his departure in the vessel which the commander of that squadron will dispatch either to the admiral or to London. He will endeavour to obtain an audience of the Prince Regent, and hand my letter to him. If there should not be found any inconvenience in the delivery of passports for the United States of America, it is my particular wish to proceed to that country; but I will not accept of passports for any colony. In default of America, I prefer England to any other country. I shall take the name of Colonel Muiron, or of Duroc. If I must go to England, I should wish to reside in a country-house, at the distance of ten or twelve leagues from London, and to arrive there in the strictest *incognito*. I should require a dwelling-house sufficiently capacious to accommodate all my suite. I am particularly anxious to avoid London; and this wish must necessarily fall in with the views of the government. Should the ministry be desirous of placing a commissioner near my person, Gourgaud will see that this condition shall not seemingly have the effect of placing me under any kind of confinement; and that the person selected for the duty may, by his rank and character, remove all idea of an unfavourable or suspicious nature.

"If it be determined that Gourgaud should be sent to the admiral, it would be more expedient that the captain should keep him on board his ship, in order to dispatch him in a

held out any hopes. But the instructions that accompanied the dispatch too strongly indicate the hints he had thrown out to allow of any one being imposed upon by his late disavowal.

corvette, and thereby make sure of his reaching London before us.

"NAPOLEON.

"At L'Isle d'Aix, the 13th of July, 1815."

General Bertrand also wrote a letter to Captain Maitland. I feel every wish to avoid this accumulation of authentic documents; but those which I lay before the reader are necessary towards fixing the opinion that ought to be entertained on the subject of the present negotiation.

"Monsieur le Commandant,

"Count de Las Cases has reported to the Emperor the conversation he had with you this morning. His Majesty will repair on board of your ship by to-morrow's tide, at the hour of four or five o'clock in the morning.

"I send to you the Count de Las Cases, a councillor of state, performing the functions of Maréchal-de-logis, with a list of the persons composing his Majesty's suite.

"If, in consequence of the demand you have addressed to the admiral, he should send you the passports requested for the United States, his Majesty will feel great pleasure in proceeding to that country. In the absence of those passports, however, he will willingly repair to England as a private individual, to enjoy there the protection of your country's laws.

"His Majesty has dispatched the Maréchal-de-camp, Baron Gourgaud, to the Prince Regent with a letter of which I send you a copy, requesting you will transmit it to the particular minister to whom you may think it right to refer that general officer, in order that he may have the honour of delivering to the Prince Regent the letter confided to his charge.

"I have the honor, &c.

"14th of July, 1815."

General Gourgaud put to sea in the night from the 14th to the 15th, and soon reached the Bellerophon. Captain Maitland received him on board, and, agreeably to the request made to him, dispatched the general by the Slaney corvette, which immediately set sail for England, where it brought the news of the events that had taken place. During the whole of the passage the general was encouraged in the idea that he might land, and repair to the Prince Regent; but he had no sooner arrived in Portsmouth roads, than Captain Sartorius clandestinely slipped into his boat, and reached the land without paying any farther attention to his promises. The general felt highly indignant, flew into a passion, protested, but was still detained on board. Whilst this act of deception was carrying on, the Emperor was preparing to remove from a land where plots were hatching in every direction around him.

Matters had gone so far, that he had scarcely commenced dressing when General Becker came in all haste to warn me of the fact of an emissary having just arrived at Rochefort with the mission of procuring the Emperor's arrest. He told me that he could suspend the blow for two or three hours; but that after that time he would not be answerable for what might take place.

I instantly proceeded to the Emperor's apartment, and communicated to him what I had just learnt. We hurried on his dress, and took our departure at break of day to meet the boat which was to take us on board the English cruiser.

We were followed by the captains of the two frigates, who had orders to hoist up the white flag, and only waited to do so until the Emperor had reached the open sea.

He soon relieved their impatience; he came down to the beach, and embarked on board of one of the brigs of war which were anchored under the forts. He dismissed General Becker, who, agreeably to his instructions, was not to depart until

he had seen him safely lodged in the hands of the English.* He took advantage of the lowness of the tide to quit the roadstead of L'Isle d'Aix, and to repair on board the Bellerophon, which was anchored in Basque roads.

* Extract from the despatch of the Ministers of the department of the Secretary of State.

Paris, 6th of July, 1815.

Considering the urgent nature of existing circumstances, and that it is of the utmost importance that Napoleon Bonaparte should immediately quit the French territory, with reference to his personal safety, no less than to the interest of the state, the commission of government decrees as follows:—

Art. I.—The minister of marine will renew the orders he has already given for the embarkation and immediate departure of Napoleon with two frigates destined to that mission.

Art. II.—If, in consequence of contrary winds, the presence of the enemy, or any other cause, the immediate departure should be prevented, and there should be a probability of succeeding in effecting Napoleon's removal by a small vessel, the minister of marine will give orders for immediately placing one at his disposal, on condition that the said vessel should sail within twenty-four hours at latest.

Art. III.—If, however, owing to the inconveniences which might be felt on board a small vessel in unfavourable weather, Napoleon should prefer being conveyed immediately either on board an English cruiser, or to England, the maritime prefect of the fifth district will afford him the means of doing so, on his written application; and in that case a flag of truce will be forthwith placed at his disposal.

Art. IV.—In any case, the commander of the vessel destined to convey Napoleon is forbidden, on pain of treason, to land him on any point of the French territory.

Art. V.—Should the commander of the vessel be compelled to return to the coast of France, he will adopt every precautionary measure requisite for preventing Napoleon from landing. In case of need, he will apply to the civil and military authorities for assistance.

Art. VI.—General Becker, who has been made responsible for the custody and personal safety of Napoleon, is not to quit him until he has sailed beyond the Perthuis; and if Napoleon has demanded to be taken on board of the English cruiser, or to be conveyed to England, he is not to quit him until he shall have lodged him on board the said cruiser, or landed him in England.

Art. VII.—As long as General Becker shall be on board the vessel destined to receive Napoleon, the commander of the said vessel shall be under his orders, and attend to all the requisitions the said general may make to him with reference to the object of his mission, and in the spirit of this decree.

It was found very difficult to reach the ship, owing to the prevailing calm. Captain Maitland's boat, with his first lieutenant, came to meet the Emperor.

The Emperor stepped into the boat, and was unable to check his emotion when he beheld the tears of the greater part of the sailors of the vessel he was about to quit. These gallant fellows took leave of him with the customary acclamation of *Long live the Emperor!* and kept their eyes fixed upon him until he got on board the Bellerophon, where the captain of the brig came to take leave of him.

The Emperor went on board the Bellerophon with perfect confidence, entertaining no doubt of his being allowed to enjoy the peaceful existence which was now the sole object of his ambition. He was received by the captain and crew with respectful silence. The vessel exhibited the most perfect order and cleanliness.

The Emperor immediately repaired to the apartment of the captain, who had quitted it for his accommodation. A few moments afterwards, we descried the English line-of-battle ship the Superb, having Admiral Hotham on board. He had come from Quiberon Bay to Basque roads in consequence of the information given to him by Captain Maitland, and after the lapse of a few hours he cast anchor near the Bellerophon.

Captain Maitland went on board Admiral Hotham's ship, where he remained a long time ere he returned to the Belle-

Art. VIII.—The minister of marine is charged with the execution of the present decree, and with its transmission to General Becker, who is to conform, in what concerns him, to the clauses which it contains.

The Duke of Otranto, president.
Count Grenier.
Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza.
Carnot.

(For the secretary attached to the Minister Secretary of State),
Quinette.

rophon. Admiral Hotham came on board shortly afterwards to pay his respects to the Emperor, and to request he would do him the honour to visit his ship the next day, and condescend to breakfast on board.

The Emperor accepted the invitation, and accordingly repaired to the Superb on the following morning, accompanied by captain Maitland and the French officers who shared his fate.

The Superb was fully prepared for the occasion.

The deck, covered with a tent splendidly decorated, was surmounted with the broad pennant of England.

The daily labour on board was suspended on the occasion. The crew were clothed in their Sunday and holiday dress.

The sailors manned the yards, and an excellent band of music was stationed on the poop.

The English officers told us that this ceremony never took place in England except when the King repaired on board the ships.

It is quite clear that Admiral Hotham, who had conversed with Captain Maitland respecting what had occurred previously to the Emperor's arrival on board the Bellerophon, would not have acted in this manner had he considered him a prisoner; for the English naval officers are as deeply versed in those matters as any statesman.

Admiral Hotham presented to the Emperor all the officers and midshipmen of his ship, whom he named in regular succession. When the presentation was over, he took him to visit the batteries, and afterwards had a breakfast served up in as good a style as could have been exhibited in Paris.

After breakfast, the admiral observed that he had better come on board his ship, which was more capacious and comfortable than the Bellerophon, in which he would be confined for want of room. But the Emperor, with his usual kindness of disposition, replied, that it was not worth while for a few days; and he would be sorry to mortify Captain Maitland,

especially if the present circumstance was likely to forward him in his career.

The Emperor was, nevertheless, aware that there existed a friendly intercourse between Admiral Hotham and the Prince Regent, who was partial to him; that this admiral was therefore less exposed to suffer any personal inconvenience than a captain of a ship, who is generally bound to passive obedience, whatever esteem might be entertained for him.

The Emperor, however, was proceeding to England with perfect confidence, and did not apprehend that any unfriendly treatment awaited him there. Bare suspicion was repelled by the reception given to him on board the ships of that country.

He returned on board the Bellerophon, which set sail with the Myrmidon corvette; that is to say, the only vessels cruising before Rochefort up to the 15th of July got under weigh at eight o'clock in the morning.

Two days afterwards, we met the Swiftsure, a seventy-four-gun ship, which was on its way to reinforce the cruisers. This was the first ship that had sailed from England since it was known there that the Emperor contemplated taking his departure from Rochefort. That ship appeared to have been sent off in all haste; for it was only half painted, and did not exhibit that remarkable cleanliness which uniformly distinguishes English vessels.

On the subsequent days, we fell in with other frigates in succession, which were proceeding to the same quarter; but all those ships would have arrived too late to prevent the Emperor's departure, if he had attempted to accomplish it by main force.

We made this observation to Captain Maitland, whose ship was a dull sailer in a smooth sea.

He told me in reply, that he was so little mistaken respecting any chances we might have in our favour, that he had taken measures beforehand in case the frigates should have

stood out to sea pending the negotiations with him. He had imagined that those negotiations had been opened with no other view than to lull his vigilance to sleep; he had therefore prepared himself for the event, and, according to his own explanation, had adopted the following course.

He selected about a hundred of the bravest seamen on board his ship, whom he trained to the manœuvre he had in contemplation. This was to bear rapidly down upon the frigates; overwhelm that which he might first come up with, silence its fire, run alongside, and send forward his chosen men to board her; afterwards proceed in pursuit of the other frigate, and not give up the chase until he should have brought her to. Nevertheless, added the captain, contrary winds would defeat this plan; even calm weather would save us from his grasp.

Let us now consider what were the means at the Emperor's disposal, and compare them with those of Captain Maitland.

He had not, indeed, any line-of-battle ships; but he had two frigates quite fresh from the stocks, carrying eighteen-pounders, even supposing that those of the *Meduse* were not twenty-four pounders.* They were allowed to be excellent sailers. The Emperor had, moreover, a brig and the *Bayadère* corvette, which was at the entrance of the Gironde.

Since Captain Maitland himself acknowledged that in the then season he had cause to apprehend the wind might not be high enough to enable him to overtake the French frigates with his ship, which was one of the oldest in the English navy,† it is not unreasonable to admit that the Emperor had some chance of escaping. If his ship had succeeded in overtaking one of the frigates, their difference of class had de-

* It is not irrelevant to observe, that a French eighteen-pound shot weighs upwards of twenty-two English pounds.

† This ship had been with Admiral Nelson at the battle of Aboukir, and was one of those which were most roughly handled. It had been constantly in commission for the last twenty-two years.

prived us of all hope of defeating him. But the captain would have merely attempted to manœuvre, and gain time; and the safety of the other frigate would have been the better secured by the adoption of that course.

It was not therefore the impossibility of taking his departure by main force that had determined the Emperor to repair on board the English cruiser, where an offer had been made to receive him. I appeal to the whole world, which has witnessed his glorious career; is it supposed that he would have hesitated to run the chances of an action, if he had felt any doubt of the good faith on which he had relied when he surrendered himself? His feeling of security was unbounded. The artifice used towards General Gourgaud gave him a moment's uneasiness; but the admiral declared to him that he had only detained the general because his own officers had got the start of him. This was sufficient: he so far trusted to what Admiral Hotham said to him, that on his reaching Torbay, where the Slaney had already arrived, neither the quarantine flag, nor the great number of soldiers mounting guard on board of her had the effect of undeceiving him. General Gourgaud came to report the refusal made of allowing him to land. "I am aware of it," replied the Emperor; "the admiral has explained the matter to me: he did not allow you to land, because he had already sent the dispatch by one of his officers."

The general returned to the Emperor the letter confided to him for the Prince Regent; and laid great stress upon the precautions taken on board the Slaney to prevent his communicating with the shore. The Emperor felt reluctant to credit such a want of principle: he repelled the suspicions of his aides-de-camp. The English, on their part, were endeavouring to dispel them.

They ascribed to the mere usage in similar cases the severity of the measures which had excited our uneasiness. Those measures were uniformly adopted towards all foreigners; we

ought not to take umbrage at them. The fact, however, was otherwise. The true reason of what was taking place under our eyes was, that no settled idea could be formed as to what determination might be adopted in respect to us.

There existed such little suspicion of what was about to take place, even amongst the officers of the British navy, that Admiral Keith, in congratulating Captain Maitland upon his arrival, wrote to him from Plymouth to Torbay in the following words:

"Tell the Emperor that I shall feel happy at being made acquainted with what might be agreeable to him, and evince the utmost readiness in complying with his wishes. Thank him in my name for the generous attentions which he personally ordered to be shown to my nephew, who was brought a prisoner to him after having been wounded at Waterloo."

It was on the day after the receipt of this letter that Captain Maitland received orders to conduct the Emperor to Plymouth, where Admiral Keith was to issue ulterior orders to him. He was at the same time enjoined to redouble his measures of precaution, for the purpose of preventing all kind of communication with the shore.

The Bellerophon arrived at Plymouth; and, during the whole time of its stay in that harbour, was surrounded in the evening of each successive day by a countless number of boats. To form a correct idea of their number, it will be sufficient to be told that it was found necessary to station the boats of the other line-of-battle ships and frigates in the roads as a guard round the Bellerophon. Notwithstanding this precaution, the boats, filled with persons eager to gratify their curiosity, were in such immense numbers, that they bore the appearance of a close flotilla, covering the surface of the water: they gradually hemmed in the guard-boats, which were driven close under the Bellerophon.

Admiral Keith came to pay a visit to the Emperor. He

was still in ignorance of the course he was to adopt; and even expressed his anxiety for the speedy arrival of the orders he was expecting from London, which, in his opinion, would have the effect of procuring better accommodation for the Emperor than he could find on board a ship. Those orders soon arrived; but were of a very different complexion from what the admiral himself had been led to expect.

CHAPTER XIII.

Arrival of Sir Henry Bunbury—Notification made to the Emperor—Protest of this prince—The midshipmen—The author writes to Admiral Keith—It is proposed that the Emperor should be deprived of his sword—Admiral Keith resists the proposal—The Emperor is transferred on board the Northumberland—Message which he transmits by the author to Captain Maitland—Departure for St. Helena.

SIR HENRY BUNBURY, under-secretary of state, was the bearer of the decision adopted by the English government in respect to the Emperor. He came on board the Bellerophon, was introduced to this prince, and delivered to him, not a letter, nor even a sheet of paper, but a mere slip, upon which were written in the French language, as nearly as I can recollect, the following words; which were, I think, an extract of a letter written by the government to Admiral Keith.

"As it may be of importance that Napoleon Bonaparte should be apprised of the intention of sending him to St. Helena, Sir Henry Bunbury is directed to make a communication to him to this effect, and to notify to him that he can only take four persons in his company: from which number Generals Savary and Lallemand are to be excluded; and that, moreover, the four persons who are to accompany him, must previously acknowledge themselves to be prisoners of the English government."

No signature was affixed to this writing. Those who had discussed its contents must, no doubt, have felt apprehensive of signing their names to it. Such a scrap of paper could be no introduction to the bearer; Admiral Keith supplied what was defective, and made known the nature of Colonel Bunbury's mission.

The Emperor conversed with those gentlemen, and declared to them, that it was very far from his wish to go to St. Helena: he had only come to England agreeably to the invitation given to him to that effect, and to the assurance that he should be in the full enjoyment of his liberty; otherwise, he never would have dreamed of it. There was no fate he would not prefer to that which was reserved for him. He protested in the face of heaven and earth against the violence which was offered to him on board the Bellerophon, where he had been received under the protection of the British flag.

He dismissed those gentlemen, and wrote to Admiral Keith the following letter:

"My Lord,

"I have read with attention the extract of the letter you have communicated to me. I have acquainted you with my sentiments. I am not a prisoner of war, but the guest of England. I came to this country on board the Bellerophon ship of war, after having communicated to the captain the letter I was writing to the Prince Regent; and received the assurance that he had been directed to receive me on board, and convey me to England with my suite, if I should present myself for that purpose. Admiral Hotham has since reiterated the same to me.

"From the instant of my being freely received on board the Bellerophon, I was under the protection of the laws of your country. I prefer death to being taken to St. Helena, or shut up in any fortress. I am most anxious to reside in

the interior of England, in the enjoyment of freedom, and under the protection and vigilance of the laws, and to agree to any previous engagement and condition that may be deemed necessary.

" I neither wish to keep up a correspondence with France, nor to interfere in any political matter.

" Ever since my abdication, it was always my intention to take up my residence either in the United States or in England. I trust that you, my Lord, and the under-secretary of state, will make a faithful report of all the details into which I have entered, for the purpose of proving to you the right of my position. It is on the honour of the Prince Regent, and the protection of your country's laws, that I have placed my reliance, and still continue to rely.

" NAPOLEON."

This letter remained unanswered.

One or two days before Colonel Bunbury's arrival at Plymouth, an unfavourable opinion was already entertained of the turn which affairs were likely to take. The English newspapers gave an account of all the ministerial deliberations, in which the question was discussed of sending the Emperor to St. Helena. They also reported all that had taken place in Paris; that is to say, the King's entrance, and the composition of his ministry. The selections he had made uniformly exhibited the names of the Emperor's personal enemies: it was readily supposed that they would exert every endeavour to procure the adoption of some violent measure against their former sovereign, and would lay stress upon the impossibility of quieting France as long as there should exist any chance of his return. We were therefore of opinion, that the measure about to be adopted, in respect to the Emperor, was as much the work of the French as of the English cabinet.

The officers of the Bellerophon believed it also; and were

greatly mortified, as Englishmen and as warriors, at being made the agents of such an underhand manœuvre.

They had all been well treated by the Emperor. They had fancied him a man of wicked disposition, and they found him kind to excess. Their prejudices against him had accordingly given way to better sentiments.

The Emperor had made one of them dine every day at his table, and had constantly invited the captain. This officer had pleased the Emperor, who expressed himself well satisfied with his conduct.

The midshipmen and Captain Maitland himself openly told us, when they saw what was taking place: "This is a very bad business. If Whitbread were alive, matters would not take this turn. There would be a sharp discussion in parliament."

They advised us to protest against being sent to St. Helena; because they thought that if we opposed a strenuous resistance to that determination, ministers would reconsider it, before they rendered more flagrant an act which was already a direct violation of the laws.

There were on board the Bellerophon a few persons who spoke very sensibly on the subject of the laws of their country, with which the English are better acquainted than we are with ours. One of those gentlemen advised us to resist: he even told us that we incurred very little risk in doing so, and could lose nothing by the attempt. I followed his advice. I wrote to Admiral Keith that I heard mention made of St. Helena. I knew not whether to credit the report; but without prejudging in any manner the determinations of his government, I warned him that it never could enter into my views to go to St. Helena, because I was not at liberty to dispose of myself to that extent. I had contemplated going to England, or proceeding to America with the intention of getting my family to join me. I added, that a transfer to St. Helena excluded such a supposition, which had not besides

entered into my calculation, as I now thought it necessary to declare to him. I then dwelt upon various details connected with our arrival on board the Bellerophon.

I am at a loss to say whether Admiral Keith ever answered my letter.

I acquainted the Emperor that very night with the step I had adopted. I also apprised him that I had found means of writing to Sir Samuel Romilly, without sending my letter through the channel of the captain, to whom we were obliged to deliver our letters unsealed.

It was on the day after I had written to Admiral Keith, or the subsequent one, that Colonel Bunbury arrived at Plymouth from London with the clause of exception relating to myself. As it was evidently not occasioned by any letter written on the preceding day, or two days before, it gave me some uneasiness: for, whatever might have been the rights of my position, it was difficult not to ascribe some sinister motive to the measure which related to me personally.

The Emperor endeavoured to calm my anxiety; but I think he augured as little good as I did myself from the clause.

The Northumberland, which was to convey the Emperor to St. Helena, was not in readiness for sailing. This prince was accordingly left in the same situation on board the Bellerophon, in Plymouth road, until the 6th of August, when it set sail for Torbay, in company of the Tonnant, with Admiral Keith on board, and a frigate, in which were the officers who had come from France with the Emperor.

The Northumberland was to be in waiting at Torbay, to which place it had proceeded from Portsmouth, under the orders of Admiral Cockburn, the officer appointed to convey the Emperor to St. Helena. It was met at sea by the two ships which had set sail from Plymouth; and all three came to anchor at Torbay in the afternoon of the 7th of August.

Admiral Cockburn was on board Admiral Keith's ship,

when the Emperor sent thither General Bertrand, to ascertain from him in what manner he was to be treated during the voyage, as well as during his stay at St. Helena.

The general soon returned; and informed the Emperor that he was considered a prisoner of war, as well as all the persons of his suite, that his money and even his arms were to be taken from him, and that the idea had even been entertained of depriving him of his sword. General Bertrand had loudly protested against such a proceeding: Admiral Keith had taken part with the general, and pointed out to Admiral Cockburn that the sword of an officer taken prisoner on the field of battle was always returned to him; and the present case more particularly claimed the enforcement of that rule. He took upon his own responsibility to leave with the Emperor the sword which he had worn with so much honour to himself.

On the next day, 8th of August, Admiral Cockburn came on board the Bellerophon with Admiral Keith, who appeared distressed at being the bearer of so painful a message.

Admiral Cockburn was accompanied by a person whom he had brought from London, and with whom I believe him to have been connected by the ties of relationship: this was the person to whom he committed the charge of visiting the Emperor's baggage. Every article was examined, one after the other, without excepting his body linen. The inspection was no doubt made in that considerate manner, which softened the rigour of so disgusting a visit; but his money and every article of value were taken away. When the search was over, a message was sent to announce to the Emperor that the boat was in readiness which was to convey him to the Northumberland.*

* General Lallemand, who had overtaken us at Niort, had left Paris after our departure; that is to say, when it was pretty evident that nothing more could be expected for the Emperor's son, or for the Duke of Orleans, either of which party he was in a position to have joined.

He had brought to the Emperor a letter, which this prince was pleased to com-

He embraced his companions in misfortune, who were afterwards allowed to go on board the Northumberland, for the purpose of taking a final leave of him.

He particularly enjoined me to tell Captain Maitland that he should have wished to present him with a token of remembrance, and regretted he had been deprived of the means of doing so; on the other hand, he retained no resentment against him for what was taking place, as that was connected with considerations over which the captain had no control. He did not believe that he would knowingly have deceived him: he had on the contrary found him so honourable in his dealings, that he was persuaded he would be greatly distressed at observing that the confidence with which he had relied upon the protection of his flag, had become a snare into which his unfortunate star had led him; and that he was particularly mortified at finding he had been made the instrument of the most disgraceful infraction of the laws of honour and morality; of every law, in short, which is held in veneration by the least civilised nations.

At the moment of quitting the Bellerophon, M. de Las

municate to me. I told him what I thought of it: my opinion excited his displeasure, which he evinced by saying that I saw nothing except through those angry feelings by which I allowed myself to be borne away. "Very well, Sire," I replied; "do not believe me. But for your personal satisfaction, before we part, perhaps for ever, ask Lallemand, who was in the thick of the business, in whose behalf was the work of intrigue going on at the moment of your return?"

The Emperor took me at my word, and desired me to call Lallemand. I did so, and was present at the conversation. The Emperor asked the general, in whose favour had intrigues been at work previously to his return?—in favour of the Duke of Orleans, replied Lallemand. The Emperor then turned towards me with a smile, which he usually put on when he yielded to any opinion he had at first strenuously resisted. He dismissed us both, and tore to pieces the answer he had made to the despatch brought to him by that general.

Those fragments excited the curiosity of the officers who had remained on board; they collected them, and were greatly surprised on reading the contents of the paper.

Cases, who followed the Emperor to St. Helena, requested of Captain Maitland to sign a declaration respecting certain facts agreed upon between them, when they had conferred together in Basque Roads.

Captain Maitland replied to M. de Las Cases in these words: "Consider, from what is taking place, what little advantage you can derive from my signature: it would only be productive of injury to me. Do you really suppose that my position is much better than your own?"

We had now reached the 8th of August. The Northumberland set sail in the afternoon for St. Helena. On the same day, the Bellerophon and the Tonnant returned to Portsmouth.

CHAPTER XIV.

Observations respecting the conduct of the English government—It yields to the demands of the allied sovereigns—Who is the real author of the Emperor's captivity—Napoleon on board the Northumberland—Confidential communication at Trianon—Public opinion will yet do justice to the Emperor's merit.

WHATEVER motives may have influenced the conduct of the English government towards the Emperor, it has beyond all doubt acted a part at variance with the law of nations and with its own dignity. That government was not insensible to the claims which the Emperor's position had established in his favour; and it is probable that an anxiety to comply with the wishes of the allied sovereigns, who so effectually contributed to his downfall, had induced the English to violate the hospitality shown to the Emperor on board their ships, rather than a desire to avail themselves of a right which had ceased to possess that character after he had been received on board.

The Emperor had caused a negotiation to be opened with Captain Maitland from the 11th until the 15th of July, on which latter day he repaired on board of that officer's ship: he did not adopt the latter course until after the captain had been authorised by his admiral to receive him.

He reached England on the 26th or 27th of that month; and it was not until the 8th of August, whilst he was on board the ship to which he had trusted himself in full confidence of protection, that they declared him a prisoner, and stripped him of his property.

Great stress has been laid upon a convention signed at Paris on the 2nd of August, as the ground for annulling another convention which had been agreed upon at Rochefort upwards of twenty days before.

This convention of the 2nd of August is nothing more than a decree of the allied sovereigns, who not only succeeded in obtaining that it should be carried into execution, but that it should likewise take a retrospective effect in its operation upon the English fleets. If the rights appertaining to the Emperor's position had been of a doubtful nature, they would be fully established by the recourse had to the convention of the 2nd of August with a view to contest them. What necessity was there in fact for resorting to the clauses of that act, if the English had considered themselves justified in depriving the Emperor of his liberty?

It has been urged in reply, that there had not been any written convention at Rochefort: this is certainly true, but quite immaterial to the purpose. Capitulations or written conventions are only used when the object in view is to surrender a fortified town, or to determine the fate of a body of troops.

The Emperor had ceased to appear in any other character than as a private individual; and it would have been deemed an insult to the party about to exercise an act of hospitality to

stipulate any condition whatever. In such a case as this, generosity regulates the conditions and honour fulfils them.

In order, moreover, to stipulate a written convention, Captain Maitland would have required due powers, and he had merely the approval of his admiral, because there was no other question than that of affording a passage to a private individual. It will presently be seen how little Captain Maitland expected that matters would terminate as they did.

On comparing the date of the notification made to the Emperor by Sir Henry Bunbury with that of the convention signed at Paris on the 2nd of August, it will be seen that Colonel Bunbury's message could not have been the consequence of it, since it had taken place at an anterior date; and several days had also elapsed between his departure from London and his introduction to the Emperor on board the Bellerophon; the Emperor's reply to that notification bears date the 31st of July. Colonel Bunbury must therefore have left London on the 27th or 28th of that month: the ministers then were not acting in virtue of a convention already effected, still less of a convention entered into at Paris on the 2nd of August following.

It cannot fail to occur to every one, that the English ministers were fully sensible of the rights inherent in the Emperor's position, as well as of the dangers they incurred in violating the hospitality afforded to him on board of the British ships, where their country's laws are exercised in full force in a case of that nature; but having determined to subject this prince to the harsh treatment which had been long reserved for him, they sheltered their responsibility under the convention of the 2nd of August, which they were causing to be negotiated and signed in Paris, whilst they were carrying it beforehand into effect. To this circumstance is to be ascribed their having repeatedly interdicted all communication with the land.

They no doubt hoped to oppose that convention of the 2nd

of August, to the reproaches of which they apprehended the consequences ere they had presented that important event to parliament, under an aspect calculated to bear them out in the course they had pursued.

It remains for the English to consider whether their dignity has not been assailed, and their laws violated, on that occasion. If they should acknowledge this to have been the case, we may trust to them for indignantly hurling upon whomsoever it may concern the shame which it has been attempted to fasten upon them.

It is difficult to refrain from suspecting an additional motive for the anticipated decision of the English government. A comparison of the particular occurrences of the period in question, will afford some clue to discover the motive of their conduct.

The reader will recollect, what I have already stated, that previously to the return from the island of Elba, Fouché had prepared an insurrection, which was on the point of breaking out, but was disturbed by that event. After the abdication of the 22nd of June, he neglected no means of driving the Emperor into the hands of the English, by insidiously delaying his departure.

If we ascribe his intercourse with Lord Wellington to no earlier date than that which he himself admits, the 15th of June, it is natural to suppose that the English general will have neglected no means of keeping up the illusions of so important a man as Fouché. He will probably have flattered his vanity with the hope that he would favour his projects, in respect to the mode of government to be adopted. This is the more probable, as Wellington might be informed that, in England, the Duke of Orleans had already been thought of.

The result of all this is, that Fouché flattered himself he would direct the proceedings of the allied sovereigns; whereas he became their dupe.

He had witnessed the return from Egypt, as well as that from the island of Elba. He apprehended one from Ame-

rica, if the Emperor should succeed in withdrawing to that country; and afterwards learn, that difficulties were thrown in the way of carrying Fouché's projects into effect. It will be recollected, that he felt no hesitation in saying to one of the Emperor's sisters, that he should be put to death, in order to save the country.

I even think that Fouché had communicated his uneasiness to the provisional government, in order that, in any circumstance that might occur, the whole responsibility might not fall upon himself. This opinion is grounded upon the reply made to me by M. Carnot, (which I have related in its proper place,) when he said, that so far from contemplating to retain the Emperor, it was wished to adopt every measure necessary to prevent his return.

Caulaincourt advised me at the same time to make the Emperor take his departure as soon as possible; but he abstained from dwelling any farther upon the subject.

Considering all these circumstances, it is not venturing too far to suspect Fouché and his party of having, in imitation of Talleyrand, demanded the Emperor's transfer to St. Helena, as a preliminary measure, indispensably necessary for the success of the changes which it was contemplated to effect in France.

He still fancied himself the director of events, and was far from suspecting that he was the mere dupe of others.

He could not make to the English a proposal more in accordance with the projects they entertained against France. Had the cabinet of London wanted a further pretext to justify the course it adopted in respect to the Emperor, it would have found it in Fouché's observations.

This minister, who has during the whole course of his life substituted a spirit of intrigue to the elevated views by which a statesman should be guided, acted on this occasion the part of a madman or of a knave. Plain common sense should have pointed out to him, that the surest means of bringing the allies

round to his views, was to place them between the necessity of adopting those views, and the danger of the Emperor's returning from a country where he would have been in the full enjoyment of his freedom. He was not aware, like those who accompanied the Emperor, how far it was from his intention ever to return to France. He might, whilst satisfying himself of this determination, affect to apprehend any other that was most calculated to bring the allies over to his own political notions; but his vanity, and the agitation of a guilty conscience, in which hatred was still the predominant passion, so far obscured his judgment, that he reserved no resource for himself in the event of any failure in the promises made to him; an assertion fully borne out by his subsequent history.

It was the fate of France and of the Emperor that they should be the victims of Fouché and his satellites.

The Emperor departed with perfect composure, and without exhibiting the slightest symptom of ill-humour. He distributed the greater part of his money amongst those who had accompanied him. The condition to which he was reduced would have drawn tears from a heart of stone.

He paced the ship's deck every afternoon, and was treated on each occasion with the most respectful deference.

I have related with the most rigid adherence to truth every circumstance that has come to my knowledge during that long and active career of glory which is unparalleled in the annals of history.

The hero has fallen; and the sovereigns who entered upon a crusade to dethrone him, have long since discovered that if he had not arrested the progress of the French revolution, they would all have been hurled before him from their thrones.

They were never beholden to him for what he had done in support of every monarchy; and such is the misfortune of his situation, that it will yet be embittered by the reproaches of the very nations that had coalesced against him, when they shall

have discovered that the hopes with which they were fed when they were called on to the struggle were nothing more than snares held out to their credulity, in order to exasperate them against France, and thus accomplish the downfall of her ruler.

They will call the Emperor to a strict account for what they expected from him on behalf of the common interest, without considering the obstacles thrown in his way; and as mankind is generally unjust in its judgments, they will forget that he abolished feudal laws in every country which he added to his system or to his power.

They will demand of him why he abandoned the cause of the people to embrace the cause of kings; and they will add, that the face of the whole world might have been changed after the battles of Austerlitz, of Friedland, or of Wagram, if the Emperor Napoleon had still had it in his power to do what would not have been difficult of accomplishment for the First Consul or for General Bonaparte,* whose career was marked by the most lofty ideas.

He will be styled a tyrant; and yet this was the very character he stood in need of. No man ever did so much good, or met with so much ingratitude.

Great stress will be laid upon the sacrifices which humanity had to endure, and the wars which it was not in his power to avert; but no notice will be taken of the service which he exclusively conferred, of drying up the sources of our civil

* After the misfortunes of Moscow, the Emperor told me one day at Trianon, whilst speaking of the coalition: "Now is the moment of their rendezvous at my tomb. I should give them work, if I were not withheld by considerations which affect them more than they do myself.

"I ardently wished for a son. My wishes have been gratified; and I now find he stands in my way."

He said no more; but it was easy to perceive that were it not for the Empress and his son, he would have let the nations of Europe loose upon those who had set them against him.

discords, and of arresting the torrents of national blood they had caused to flow.

The most rigid severity will be exercised towards him, as a compensation for the profound homage of which he was once the object. The bitterest reproaches will be directed against him by those who were habitually conspiring against his power and his existence. This will be much easier for them than the language of justification.

In spite, however, of all these attacks, his brilliant career remains to defend him: it is exclusively the offspring of his genius; and his immortal works will long remain as objects of comparison difficult of attainment for those who shall attempt to imitate him; whilst Frenchmen will consider them as the proudest records in their history. They will also serve as an answer to all those attacks which a spirit of revenge never ceases to direct against them; and when time, which analyses every thing, shall have disarmed resentment, Napoleon will be held up to the veneration of history as the man of the people, as the hero of liberal institutions. He will then receive his just meed of praise for his efforts to improve the condition of mankind; a correct idea will then be formed of the resistance he must have encountered; a proper distinction will be drawn between a dictatorship rendered necessary and a government ruling by the laws, between the crisis of a moment and the settled political existence which it was intended to impart to the nation. Lastly, it will be admitted that no one possessed in so great a degree as himself the means of rendering France happy; and that she would not have failed to be so, had it not been for the wars into which his enemies had taken pains to involve him in order to obstruct his views for her welfare.

It cannot be expected that the glorious epochas of 1805, 1807, and 1809 will ever return; but if France should ever fall into that state of disorder which had preceded them, a supposition not wholly removed from the range of possibility,

our posterity shall decide whether the punishment of transportation beyond seas should have been reserved for the Emperor, as an enemy of their happiness, or for those proud men reared in the midst of political agitations, whom he had found it so difficult to keep in check, and to whose intrigues he eventually fell a victim.

Public opinion will then be as indulgent to him as it will be severe towards those political agitators whom he had the misfortune to load with his favours, and to present to the confidence of the nation; and who, to gratify their private animosity or unbridled self-love, have sapped the foundations of the noblest edifice of glory upon record.

CHAPTER XV.

Details respecting the officers who were not allowed to follow the Emperor—The author succeeds in procuring the transmission of a letter to Sir Samuel Romilly—*Admiral Keith's displeasure*—Declaration of Captain Maitland—We are conveyed to Malta—Rigorous precautions adopted in respect to us—Probable motives for that severity.

I SHALL close these Memoirs by a narrative of what happened to the officers of all ranks who had followed the Emperor's fate. It will afford a correct estimate of the motives which could determine the English government to extend measures of such excessive severity even to young men of twenty-one years of age.

To those details I shall add personal notices respecting certain individuals, who, having openly displayed their ingratitude towards the Emperor, are not entitled to any consideration. May they one day be at a loss to find a country or a home, and reap all the opprobrium due to treachery and to the blackest ingratitude!

Previously to quitting Torbay, the captain of the Bellerophon received on board his ship the Englishman who had come from London with Admiral Cockburn, and had superintended the search made of the Emperor's effects.

During the short voyage from Torbay to Plymouth we had, General Lallemand and I, a conversation with that Englishman respecting the singular exception of which we were the objects. We were endeavouring to penetrate the motives of it, which we fancied we could already discover in the insertion of our names on the list of the general officers who were accused by the government of having prepared the Emperor's return.

This opinion naturally gave rise to the further one, that the English government intended to have us conveyed back to France. We did not disguise from the person with whom we were in conversation the alarm we felt on the occasion. His replies were not calculated to allay our anxiety. He made use of the following expressions—

"I neither hold any employment, nor possess any influence; but I have friends, and shall be happy to be useful to you. If your apprehensions are well founded, you should lose no time in adopting the necessary precautions. You must be quick in your movements."

I must here do justice to Captain Maitland's character. He signed a declaration for me, stating that he had guarantied my personal safety when he received me on board his ship, to which I had repaired of my own accord. He did the same for General Lallemand. He even wrote to Lord Melville, who was the first lord of the admiralty, and showed me his letter, in which he said that he had received us on board his ship after he had learned the personal dangers to which we might be exposed in consequence of the political events taking place in our country. He had afforded us the protection of his flag, and should consider himself as disgraced if we were taken back to France.

This generous declaration proved of the greatest utility to us. I succeeded, notwithstanding the strict watch kept over me, in transmitting that document to Sir Samuel Romilly, a celebrated lawyer in London, with a request that he would cause to be put upon record the fact of my being on board the Bellerophon; and I declared to him that it was my intention to go to England, or to any other country except France, to which I suspected that the English government intended to send me back against my wishes.

My mind was not at ease until after the receipt of the answer from Sir Samuel Romilly, who acknowledged my letter, adding, that he had already taken steps in consequence, had seen the chancellor, and should not allow the matter to drop.

This circumstance occasioned an unpleasant explanation with the captain of the Bellerophon, whom Admiral Keith had commissioned to express to me his displeasure at my having secretly written to Sir Samuel Romilly contrary to his injunctions. I should have laughed at the charge, had not my mind been a prey to despondency. I had, however, in some respects succeeded in my object; for the louder the report was spread, the more difficult would it be to remove me to France, as it would have been equivalent to an act of assassination, at a moment when the passions in that country were in such a state of excitement.

We were left on board the Bellerophon in Plymouth roads until the 15th of August, when we were transferred to the Eurotas frigate, in which were six other French officers, who had also accompanied the Emperor, and, like ourselves, had been prevented from following him to St. Helena. Some of them were, nevertheless, very young. They were not treated, however, with less severity than I was.

We were then eight in number on board the Eurotas. This frigate set sail on the 18th of August, and put into

Gibraltar on the 1st of September. At this place the same precautions were adopted as in England to prevent our holding any communication whatever with the shore. The frigate again stood out to sea, and arrived on the 18th of September at Malta, at which place the same strict injunction was observed until the 23rd, when we were landed at the Lazaretto, and sent to Fort Emanuel as our place of confinement.

Some idea may be formed of the severity of our detention by a perusal of the instructions (No. 1. annexed) given to the colonel placed in the fort with a garrison of about three hundred men to watch over us. The officers and soldiers of that garrison were even prevented from going into the town, except when they were sent there on service. I was at a loss to account for those rigorous measures of precaution.

I amused myself reckoning the number of men on duty which this garrison furnished every day. The parade took place under my windows, and I saw them filing off. I counted the picket, which consisted of seventy-eight soldiers, thereby inferring that they kept eighteen sentinels: nevertheless this rigorous treatment was combined with extreme politeness, and the utmost anxiety to meet all our wants. It was sufficient for us to manifest a wish, to have it immediately complied with, as long as it did not contravene the severity of the orders connected with our detention.

Previously to entering Fort Emanuel, my effects were subjected to a strict search, which was carried on in a manner repugnant to my feelings. My linen was spread open one article after another; the pockets of my clothes were turned inside out. A closer examination could not have been made, had the search been for the head of a pin.

A very strange idea must have been given of us to the government of Malta, when they could deem such rigid precautions necessary.

The English colonel declined to assist at the search I was

made to undergo. He withdrew; but the officer who effected it dismissed all forms of courtesy. He was almost the only one who gave us any cause of dissatisfaction; for the others were, generally speaking, kind to us. When they found that we were neither malefactors nor criminals, they even bestowed every mark of attention upon us.

We were forced to resign ourselves to our misfortune. The most prejudiced mind, however, could not fail to admit that it arose out of the calumnies and persecutions which unceasingly assailed us.

If the English government had possessed the right of considering us as prisoners of war, what necessity was there for sending us from England to Malta? Since it deemed itself fully justified in its conduct towards us, what had it to apprehend from our complaints?

This isolated measure could only have the effect of creating a doubt as to its justice, whilst the strict watch exercised over us was sufficient to lay open the motives of it. No other can be found, on mature reflection, except the apprehension of the circumstances we might have divulged on the subject of our arrival on board the Bellerophon. The government wished to compel us to silence until they should have succeeded in representing to parliament the violence exercised upon the person of the Emperor, as an act perfectly in unison with the decree of the allied sovereigns.

Peace had been signed in Paris on the 15th of November, and ratified a few days afterwards. Nevertheless, the harsh treatment exercised towards us did not cease until the month of April, 1816. It was, no doubt, brought to an end because its injustice and uselessness had become manifest. It was not until then that we were enabled to recover our liberty.

I was at a loss how to while away a time which grew heavy upon my hands; and I set about writing the Memoirs which have just been read. My prison afforded me no objects of attraction; nothing was calculated to divert my attention:

my mind naturally reverted to the days gone by. I had some excellent geographical maps, and was gifted with a fertile memory. I therefore endeavoured to record all the military events in which I had taken part.

If this voluminous narrative should be found to contain any inaccuracies in respect to dates, it presents no important error of facts: at any rate, these are nothing more than materials which I supply for the use of whoever may undertake to hand down to posterity the details of the most gigantic works, and the most extraordinary disasters ever recorded in the pages of history.

CHAPTER XVI.

Departure from Malta—Smyrna—Intrigues which brought about the peace of Bucharest—The author learns from the journals that he is condemned to death—he is obliged to depart—His arrival at Trieste—His residence at Gratz—Destitute condition to which he is reduced—M. de Metternich—Unpleasant occurrence at Smyrna—He proceeds to England—Adventure at sea—His return to France.

When I quitted Malta, in the middle of April, 1816, I was unable to determine what course I should pursue. I knew the fate of the young and gallant Labédoyère, as well as that of Marshal Ney, which was more recent. I had moreover to guard against a snare which had been laid for me, and with which my wife succeeded in making me acquainted, through the medium of a confidential man whom she dispatched to Genoa. Scarcely a fortnight elapsed after I received this important warning, when the draw-bridges of the fort in which I was confined were lowered before me.

I felt no inclination to sail for America. Besides, I had no choice but to go on board the vessel which was in readiness to receive both me and General Lallemand. I resigned myself to my fate.

Indeed, the circumstances under which I quitted the fort precluded the possibility of long deliberation. I was loaded with clothes; having on a coat, a great coat, and a cloak. In each pocket I carried a little parcel rolled in a napkin, consisting of a change of linen, and my cloak concealed another parcel which I carried in my hand. General Lallemand was accoutred in a similar way. We were both obliged to walk under the scorching rays of the sun the whole distance between Fort Emanuel, whence we had been released, to the inward extremity of the great harbour, where the sloop which was to receive us was lying. We were exhausted with fatigue at our journey's end.

We reached the mouth of the harbour, and got on board an English merchant-vessel which immediately set sail for Odessa.

The ship was to touch at Smyrna and Constantinople; and I at first entertained the design of fixing my abode in the latter city. I however met in Smyrna M. de Vintimille, formerly a knight of Malta, who had followed us to Egypt. Our acquaintance was renewed; and the character he gave me of the European inhabitants of Smyrna, determined me to go no further. Mr. Charles Withel of Liverpool, for whom the vessel was freighted which conveyed us to Smyrna, generously offered us an asylum, and insisted on receiving us at all hazards. From Mr. Withel and all his family General Lallemand and I received the most marked and delicate attention.

At the expiration of a few months, Mr. Withel was under the necessity of proceeding to England. General Lallemand had determined on going to America, and I remained alone at Smyrna. My political situation now became worse than before, but I was at length received by a French family.* M. Etienne Fonton provided for me, and kept me for six months concealed in his house; and when I could not with safety, either to him or myself, remain longer in his house, or even in

Smyrna, he placed me on board a vessel which was to sail for Trieste.

During the few first weeks of my abode in Smyrna, I had an opportunity of becoming acquainted with many Englishmen, as well as several Turks of distinction, among others the Pacha.

The individuals one and all expressed their astonishment that the Emperor Napoleon did not, before the opening of the Russian war in 1812, adopt some measure for securing the concurrence of the Turks, who concluded peace precisely at the moment when it was most to their interest not to separate themselves from France. They added, that the Emperor was wrong to abandon the Turks to the mediation of their natural political enemies; and they assured me that as soon as the war between France and Russia became inevitable, the Russians made every endeavour to prevail on the divan to conclude peace. They declared that the Emperor had proposed to Russia the dismemberment of Turkey; that Alexander had several times rejected the proposition, and that it was with the view of forcing him to accept it that France declared war against him.

This assurance obtained no credit among the members of the divan. The Sultan in particular pronounced it to be improbable; observing, that the plan being highly conducive to the interests of Russia, she would naturally have been eager to accept the proposition had it been made to her.

Nevertheless, intrigue still continued active. Pretended original documents were referred to, and letters from the Emperor were produced, alluding to plans relative to the division of Turkey. As a proof of the real designs of France, it was observed that if that power did not intend entering into an arrangement with the Russians at the expense of the Turks, she would long before have sent an ambassador to Constantinople to urge the vigorous prosecution of the war: that this not being done, it was evident that the Emperor

Napoleon wished to contract no engagement with Turkey; so that he might treat without her, that is to say, sacrifice her.

These perfidious insinuations gained credit, because there was no reasonable excuse to justify the absence of our ambassador; especially when it was recollected that in 1806, before the commencement of the war with Prussia (which it was never anticipated would lead to a difference with Russia), France sent as ambassador to Constantinople General Sebastiani, who had time to establish his credit, when it was necessary to bring the Turks to a decisive course, as was the case in 1807.

In 1812, then, the Turks yielded to importunities with which they were beset. They did so as much from credulity as from indifference, and the fear of being abandoned. They signed a peace, from the consequences of which they are now suffering. The Russians affected to make concessions to them; for which, however, they promised themselves ample amends on the first favourable opportunity.

On comparing the information I received at Smyrna with the events of the time, I find that the Emperor had opened the campaign, and that he was already approaching Smolensko, when he was made acquainted with the state of affairs at Constantinople. This intelligence was the more unwelcome, as it was then the commencement of July; and in spite of the preciseness of his orders, they were so badly executed, that he could not prevent Bagration's corps from rallying the grand Russian army, which thus remained combined and entire.

The Russian army of Moldavia threatened to augment the Emperor's difficulties; and it was probably to avoid coming in contact with both forces at once, that he formed the determination of advancing immediately to Moscow, instead of stopping at Smolensko. He hoped to come up with the enemy's grand army, to destroy it, and then to make a movement on the force which was coming from Moldavia. Thus

ensued the battle of Mojaisk, and the events to which it gave rise.

I lived tranquilly in my retreat at Smyrna; having scarcely quitted my chamber from the commencement of August, 1816, to Ash-Wednesday, 1817. My only occupation was finishing these Memoirs, and perusing the French journals, in which I found recorded the sentences of all those individuals who, like myself, had in July, 1815, been placed on the first list of proscription, in which my name was the very last.

I felt perfectly secure with respect to my impending sentence; for on examining my conscience I found no ground for uneasiness. All who came to see me seemed to participate in my hopes, and scrupulously avoided saying any thing that was calculated to alarm me. Nearly a month had now elapsed since sentence was pronounced on the person whose name stood immediately before mine on the list. I was anxiously counting the days, when a vessel which arrived from Marseilles brought the journal containing the sentence by which I was capitally condemned for contumacy. I received through the same channel letters from my family, urging me to fly without delay.

M. Fonton procured a passage for me in a vessel bound for Trieste. I went on board during the night, and next day we were out of sight of land. Adverse weather kept us seventy days at sea, though the voyage is usually performed in five-and-twenty days. We consequently suffered severe privations before we reached the Lazaretto of Trieste.

I soon found that news of my arrival had got before me; for I was separated from the other passengers, and kept by myself during the quarantine. At length I was removed in the night. A coach was brought into the court of the Lazaretto, and I was placed in it under the escort of a police officer, who informed me that he had orders to convey me to Gratz in Stiria. I was yielding to every melancholy anticipation of my future fate, when to my joy and surprise I

found myself at liberty, and the object of kind attention. I should have been happy but for the sad recollections which preyed upon my heart, and aggravated the distress of my pecuniary situation. I was reduced to the necessity of limiting my expenses to twenty kreutzers per day; that is to say, about fifteen French sous. I anxiously calculated how long my scanty resources would yet suffice to maintain me.

In the mean while, the Emperor of Austria passed through Gratz on his way to Italy. He was accompanied by Prince Metternich. I ventured to request an audience of that minister, and I experienced the most flattering reception. He recommended me to be patient, adding, that he was very far from suspecting that I was reduced to such a state of privation; and that if the Emperor had known it, he would have taken means to relieve me. I immediately replied, that though my misfortunes were doubtless severe, I begged to be spared the humiliation of living upon charity; that though I was forsaken and friendless, yet my courage could not fail me as long as I had no reason to blush for my own conduct. I added, that since Prince Metternich had the goodness to offer me his assistance, I should be happy if he would procure the permission of the French government for my return to Smyrna, where the climate agreed with me, and where the low price of living suited my slender resources. He promised to do so, and he kept his word; for it was through his influence with M. de Richelieu, in 1817, that I was enabled to return to the east. I shall therefore be ever grateful for his kindness. In the interval, my wife, accompanied by my eldest daughter, came to see me. She brought me some pecuniary aid; and shortly after her departure, I received the permission I wanted. I was unwilling to depart without thanking M. de Metternich; and I obtained permission to go to Vienna, where I had the honour of seeing him. Next day I again set out for Gratz, and immediately

after for Trieste, whence I proceeded to Smyrna, where I arrived in June, 1818. I lived tranquilly in that delightful country until April, 1819, when there occurred to me one of those incidents which the most circumspect man cannot always avoid. I was weak; my only protection being public faith, and the respect of the persons by whom I was surrounded.

The French were obliged to keep at a distance from me, but the English gathered round me. I hoped that all difficulties would soon be at an end, when by intelligence from Constantinople I learned that the French ambassador had become my enemy, and had issued severe orders against me. I saw but too plainly that these orders must be executed, or that I should compromise in the utmost degree the English family who had given me refuge. I resolved to depart that very night. An English vessel was on the point of sailing for London. The captain, who was a kind-hearted man, and who had witnessed the dangers that threatened me, consented to take me on board without a passport. He even carried his delicacy so far, as to decline receiving more than the sum usually paid for a passage from Smyrna to London. His name was Brock; and he died, as I have since learned, at sea.

In the course of my voyage, which lasted fifty-five days, an adventure occurred which seemed likely to fill up the measure of those evils which had so long beset me.

The vessel had her yawl slung from the poop. We were off Cadiz, at the confluence of the straits of Gibraltar with the ocean. The weather was very fine; the wind light and favourable. The captain was on the deck, and the mate was sleeping in the yawl as in a hammock. All on a sudden one of the slings to which the yawl was suspended gave way, and the mate was precipitated into the sea before he was well roused from his sleep. Fortunately he had caught one of

the thwarts of the yawl, which served him as a safety-buoy, for he was unable to swim. He called loudly for help; but the vessel sailed on.

The captain, with great presence of mind, cast off the other sling by which the yawl was suspended, hoping that when lowered it would float. But he was unfortunately mistaken. Being supported only at one end, the yawl descended vertically, and was swamped. It was soon, however, hauled up again, and left hanging from the poop as before.

The captain, without losing a moment, got out the long-boat; having himself cut away with a hatchet the stays by which it was fastened to the deck. He had all the sails taken in, except one abaft and one ahead. He begged that I would take the helm, showing me on the compass the point in which I was to keep the ship's head. This done, he, together with all the crew, jumped into the boat, and pushed off in search of the mate, who was by this time completely out of sight and hearing.

I was now left on board the vessel with only the cook and the cabin-boy, a lad about twelve years old.

The boat was soon out of sight, and we began to feel alarmed. The wind had risen a little, and shifted. I had steered so that the sails shivered in the wind, and the vessel was tossed about in a frightful way. We were out of sight of land, and I was growing more and more uneasy, when at length the boat appeared. The captain and the crew had fallen in with some Spanish fishermen, who having witnessed the accident, hastened to the assistance of the unfortunate man, who was thus rescued from the waves.

He was brought back more dead than alive, and we continued our course. It was full time, for we were almost immediately overtaken by so violent a storm, that from Cape St. Vincent to the coast of France the deck was constantly under water.

It was night when we approached the English coast, and

we met in the Channel some Frenchmen who were returning to Boulogne. I begged that they would put into the post-office a letter which I had hastily written to my family, informing them of my unfortunate situation. Through the exertions of my friends, permission was obtained for me to remain a month in London, after being released from quarantine. It was not till then that I became acquainted with the terms of the sentence that had been pronounced upon me.

I resolved to consult Mr. Theodore Martin, whom I have before mentioned; and I was deeply touched by the kind manner in which he offered me all the assistance in his power, namely, his advice and his purse. He was clearly of opinion that I should risk nothing by returning to France; but the case was too serious for him to venture on advising me to adopt that course. I could read in his looks that he thought it most advisable I should decide for myself, and we therefore dropped the subject. He set out for Paris, bearing a letter for my family, in which was enclosed one for Madame H. With this lady I had been acquainted since I was fifteen years of age, and I cherished for her the regard of a brother. She knew tolerably well all my circumstances, and her friendly advice proved very useful to me.

When, on his return from Elba, the Emperor restored Fouché to office, he fully expected a repetition of all the improper conduct of which he had had formerly reason to complain.

He saw the friends of his prosperity wavering, and he ordered me to employ my influence to assist in rallying the spirits of those who were beginning to relax.

He was not remiss in his own exertions for the fulfilment of this object. He wished to see Madame H., with whose principles and talents he was well acquainted. He received her at the Elysée, and he expressed a wish that she would maintain a direct and regular correspondence with him. The

letters of Madame H., which conveyed so much good advice in the most gay and original form, afforded an agreeable relaxation amidst the Emperor's more arduous business.

At the same period the celebrated Madame de Stael endeavoured to open a correspondence with him; but she experienced the same coldness as on former occasions. She was not however discouraged; and as her object always was to acquire consequence, she addressed her letters to King Joseph. The Emperor read them, it is true, though he would never permit them to be addressed directly to himself.

It unfortunately happened that on the departure of Prince Joseph some of Madame H.'s letters were left behind. This was sufficient to warrant the adoption of rigid measures against the writer. She appealed to Talleyrand, whom I had often met at her house; but the diplomatist, as well as Decazes, turned a deaf ear to all her representations. In vain did she observe, that being neither a queen, a minister, nor a marshal, there could be no reason for making her the Iphigenia of the restoration. She was obliged to quit France, and to languish in a foreign land. At length affairs took a turn; hostilities were smoothed down, and Madame H. obtained leave to return to the place whence her old admirer had banished her.

I unfolded to her the state of my feelings; for in all the difficult passages of my life I had been accustomed to repose this sort of confidence in her. She hastened from Paris to London, for the sole purpose of making me acquainted with the state of affairs. She would not take upon her to give me advice; but I could easily guess her sentiments. I had already several times obtained from the English government renewed permission to prolong my stay in England, and it was now necessary to come to a final determination.

I decided for myself, being unwilling to compromise any of my friends. I made Madame H. my confidant, begging her to procure me a passport for Hamburgh, and enjoining

her to keep my secret inviolable, as my life was in her hands. She flew to Paris with the rapidity of an arrow, and I received the passport immediately. It had been agreed between us that she should not alarm my family by giving them any intimation of my enterprise.

I had gained the esteem and confidence of an English officer, who, on learning my bold project, offered to accompany me to Paris, on condition of his obtaining leave to do so. His superior officers not only granted the permission he sought, but also furnished him with letters recommending him and his travelling companion to the protection of the English consuls, in case of shipwreck on the French coast; an accident which was by no means improbable.

The English officer made every necessary arrangement for our journey, and at the appointed time he came to fetch me from my asylum, the residence of Mr. Wilkin, at Tooting, near London. We proceeded straight to Dover, where bad weather forced us to stop. We twice embarked in the Ostend packet-boat, and were twice obliged to put back. Fate seemed to warn me against my temerity; but the die was cast, and I was resolved to die or return to my country. At length I reached Ostend. Here I remained only half an hour, and then proceeded to Ghent and Brussels. In the latter town I stayed only long enough to purchase a carriage. I carried no luggage with me, to avoid the delay of custom-house examinations. I set out, and proceeded by the way of Namur, Dinant, Rochefort, and Bouillon, to the frontiers of my native department. I directed the Belgic postillions to drive from Bouillon by the cross-roads, under pretence of avoiding Sedan, where the gates were closed. I passed through Mouzon, Stenay, Vouziers and Rheims, and at length reached Paris one evening in the middle of December, 1819. I had written letters for the King, his ministers, and my own family, who were in utter ignorance of my proceedings. On arriving at the arcade of St. Denis, I hired a

fiacre, and called on some of my friends, while the English officer conveyed to my family the letters which I have already mentioned.

From that moment I experienced nothing but civil treatment. I was conveyed to prison merely as a matter of form, but they had the goodness to allow me to fix my own day. A staff-officer of the garrison called to convey me to the Abbaye. There I remained eight days, and thus closed a series of misfortunes which I had long thought could only end by some fatal catastrophe. The recollection of all that I suffered is still so forcibly impressed on my mind, that I cannot refrain from laying before the public the documents connected with my trial. They will not, perhaps, be found uninteresting now that the agitation of the period has subsided.

CHAPTER XVII.

Individuals composing the court-martial—Documents for the prosecution—Examination—Inspection of hand-writing—M. Dupin's speech—Sentence.

THE persons composing the court-martial were Lieutenant-General Count Dumas, president; Lieutenants-General Count Lagrange and Count Guilleminot; Colonels Doguerean and Bourgoin, Captains Tarret and Meriel. Captain Lanlay was King's advocate; Colonel Chambeau, reporter, and M. Deschamps, clerk.

The documents for the prosecution were read by the reporter.

They were, I.—The sentence pronounced by the court-martial on the 24th of December, 1816, by which the Duke de Rovigo was condemned to death, as being compromised in the ordinance of the 24th of July, 1815, on the alleged charge of high-treason, and for taking part in the alleged

plot of 1815, for the purpose of bringing back Napoleon to France.

II.—A decree of the 20th of March, 1815, by which the Duke de Rovigo was appointed inspector-general of the gendarmerie.

III.—A letter without either date or address, signed the Duke of Rovigo, and couched in the following terms:—

"I have appointed Dr. Renoult physician of the state prisons. He was dismissed; and he is the person who was last year the bearer and medium of communications between us and the isle of Elba. He is known to the ministry, and will execute well any thing that is required of him. He has served in Italy and Poland."

IV.—The minutes of the examination which the Duke de Rovigo underwent in the presence of the captain reporter. This examination contains the following questions and answers:—

Q.—You see this letter, in which mention is made of Dr. Renoult. Do you recollect having written it?

A.—The writer of this letter has imitated my hand exceedingly well. If a promissory note were presented to me written and signed in this way, I should probably pay it. But this letter, referring as it does to such important facts, could not possibly have escaped my recollection, and I am certain that I never either wrote or signed it. I am aware that during my administration my signature was several times forged, principally for the purpose of being affixed to passports for returning from England to France.

Q.—Did you maintain any correspondence with the isle of Elba in 1815?

A.—None whatever. In the month of June, 1814, a man named Pellarz, who I knew was attached to the Emperor Napoleon, came to me on his return from Elba. He said that he had been directed by Napoleon to inform me that he was well, and to recommend me to be cautious and tranquil

in my conduct, so as to afford no ground for malevolence. I requested the Sieur Pellarz to wait upon M. Beugnot, then superintendent of the police, and to communicate to him what he had told me.

Q.—On what day did you accept the post of inspector-general of the gendarmerie?

A.—On the 21st of March, at the Emperor's levee. He informed me that by a decree, dated the preceding day, he had appointed me first inspector-general of the gendarmerie. I did not say that I accepted it. I requested Colonel Lagorce to wait upon Marshal Moncey, and to beg of him to keep the situation of first inspector-general. The marshal was sensible of the motives which dictated this request, but he declined keeping the place. Next evening I myself called upon the marshal, accompanied by Colonel Lagorce. I renewed my request; but he still refused to retain the situation, and urged me to decline the acceptance of it no longer. I owed some deference to the opinion of a man whom I had seen so often and so gloriously lead our armies to battle. Besides, the post of chief inspector of the gendarmerie merely provided for the security of persons and property.

I looked upon the acceptance of the post as a matter in which my patriotism was concerned; and yet it was not until the 23rd of March that I entered upon my functions.

The documents having been read, the Duke de Rovigo was introduced. His countenance was composed. He wore the insignia of his rank of lieutenant-general and grand-officer of the legion of honour. All the members of the court rose to return his bow.

President.—You are M. Savary, Duke de Rovigo?

A.—I am, Sir.

President.—The law requires that I should ask your name, surnames, birth-place, and residence.

A.—Gentlemen, for the last four years I have ardently wished for the arrival of this day. During that interval, cir-

cumstances, which it was out of my power to surmount, have kept me banished in foreign lands, and prevented me from appearing before the court-martial, which first decided on the accusation brought against me. I should have appeared before that court with all the confidence with which I present myself here, convinced that, at the tribunal of the brave, justice dismisses all partialities, and honour exercises all her rights. It was not in my power to shorten the period of my exile:—this will readily be believed by every Frenchman who knows the anguish of being absent from his country. By me this anguish was so severely felt, that scarcely was I free from the thralls which kept me abroad than I hurried back to France. I was full of confidence in the justice of my cause, and to have hesitated would have shown a want of confidence in the equity of the government.

My wishes are fulfilled in thus finding myself in the presence of my military peers. I resign myself to their decision with the same confidence with which I would again fight by their side.

I beg, gentlemen, that you will be kind enough to listen to the counsellor who lends the aid of his professional talent in a situation in which a man, whatever may be his conviction of his own innocence, cannot rely upon himself.

I have particularly directed him to render an account of my conduct during my exile.

President.—Duke, I renew my question respecting your name, surnames, &c.

Duke de Rovigo.—My name is Anne Jean Marie René Savary, Duke de Rovigo. I am forty-five years of age, a lieutenant-general in the army, a grand-officer of the legion of honour, of the order of fidelity of Baden, and a knight of the iron crown.

The court now proceeded to the examination of the witnesses.

Dr. Renoult.—I have seen the letter in which I am alluded

to. I do not believe it to be written by the Duke de Rovigo. I do not recognise it to be his hand-writing. The facts stated in it are totally false, and the Duke de Rovigo could not be the person by whom such assertions were made. It is said that I solicited the post of physician to the state-prisons; but I knew very well that the state-prisons were suppressed, and were not to be restored. It is also affirmed that I was the bearer and medium of communications between the isle of Elba and France; but I was then in the medical service of the department of the prefect of police, where I had daily to sign my name, a circumstance which would scarcely be compatible with journeys to the isle of Elba. I have produced evidence to prove these facts, and was, in consequence, set at liberty, after being imprisoned for three months in 1816, on account of the letter now in question.

Colonel Lagorce, and M. Yvert, head clerk of gendarmerie, confirmed by their evidence the statements of the Duke de Rovigo respecting the scruples he felt about accepting the situation of inspector-general, and the period during which he exercised the functions of that office.

Two inspectors of hand-writing declared that, in their opinion, the letter bearing the signature of the Duke de Rovigo was in the hand-writing of the Duke.

The reporter here observed that the charge rested solely on the letter attributed to the Duke, and on the decree by which he was appointed inspector-general of gendarmerie. Notwithstanding the evidence of the inspectors of hand-writing, he doubted that the letter was written by the Duke; and besides, he thought it very difficult to derive from that letter any proof of the Duke's guilt. On the second head of the accusation, founded on the circumstance of the Duke having, before the 23rd of March, accepted the situation of chief inspector of gendarmerie, the reporter also expressed his doubts, and submits his opinion to the wisdom of the court.

M. Dupin:—"Gentlemen, trusting to the evidence of his

own conscience, and relying confidently on the justice of the King, the moderation of the government, and the equity of his judges, the Duke de Rovigo, a lieutenant-general in the French army, has returned to the capital, surrendered himself a prisoner, and solicits, not pardon (which it is for the guilty only to crave and to receive), but impartial judgment on the charge brought against him.

"During a period of misfortune and re-action, while the Duke, being an involuntary exile in a foreign land, was deprived of the right of defending himself, judges, doubtless conscientiously impartial, but unavoidably warped by unfavourable prejudices, pronounced upon him sentence of death.

"But such is the nature of condemnations for contumacy, that they must necessarily fall to the ground on the appearance of the accused. Whenever he shows himself, the case immediately stands as it did before, and must be tried again without any prejudice arising out of the former decision.

"He must therefore be grateful to Providence that this trial comes on at a period when, the government being better consolidated, party violence is softened down, and every thing concurs to facilitate the justification of the accused.

"That that justification may be complete is my sincere hope.

"But, in the first place, gentlemen, I must, in conformity with my instructions, lay before your eyes the conduct of the Duke de Rovigo, and acquaint you with the circumstances which, independently of his will, have hitherto prevented him from appearing before you.

"This, gentlemen, is the first time I ever had the honour of addressing a court-martial; but I venture to hope that the commanders of our army will lend an indulgent hearing to an advocate who has devoted himself to the cause of the officers who have been accused or proscribed.

"The Duke de Rovigo frankly acknowledges that he owes

to the Emperor Napoleon the fortune, the honours, and the high rank he enjoyed during his reign; but gratitude never led him to betray his duty to France and the government which the restoration has brought back to us.

"In April, 1814, the Duke de Rovigo retired to his estate at Nainville, ten leagues from Paris. No post was offered to him, and he was the object of no court favour. Notwithstanding his high rank, he was not even made a knight of Saint Louis, he was not required to take any oath, and, in short, he lived on his half-pay, without place, power, or employment.

"He resided at Nainville for nearly a year, visiting Paris only twice, and on each occasion only for a day, for the purpose of satisfying himself of the state of the Duchess's health during her accouchement.

"The police, had it been properly constituted, must have known the retirement in which the Duke de Rovigo lived. He saw nobody but the members of his family, and some of those friends, generally so rare, whose attachment survives the disgrace of men in place.

"To maintain correspondence with the isle of Elba was, of all things, farthest from the Duke's thoughts. The only occasion on which he received any direct communication from the Emperor is that mentioned in his examination. That communication was merely an ordinary testimony of civility, and was in no respect calculated to excite alarm. Besides, the Duke took the precaution of making the government acquainted with the circumstance, which called forth no disapproval.

"The Duke had thus lived for several months, devoting himself to agriculture and the education of his children, when the news of the landing at Cannes gave a shock to public tranquillity.

"The Duke was immediately suspected, and threatened

with arrest. But this supposed accomplice of Napoleon, who, it might naturally be imagined, would have flown to join his master's party, took an opposite course. He came to Paris, and kept himself concealed, providing for his own personal safety, and taking no part in the passing events.

"Napoleon arrived in Paris. The Duke was summoned to the Tuileries, where he presented himself on the evening of the 20th of March. The circle was numerous, and the Duke had an opportunity of seeing that the invitation he had received was any thing but exclusive.

"What then was to ensue? What reception was to be given to the Duke de Rovigo? If he were one of the conspirators,—if he prepared or facilitated the return from Elba, it might be naturally expected that he would receive the reward of his services. If he did not obtain an accession of power and credit, he would not, at least, on Napoleon's return, be appointed to a post inferior to that which he filled on his departure. However, the Duke was not recalled to the ministry, and it was not until the second interview that Napoleon said to his former minister of police —'*I have appointed you inspector-general of the gendarmerie.*'

"Far from eagerly accepting this favour, the Duke hesitated for several days. He even tendered his resignation. He ultimately determined to accept the post, only on the consideration that it was not of a hostile character, its principal object being the maintenance of order, and the safety of persons and property. Finally, he accepted it only in the hope of doing good, and he quitted it with the consciousness of having done so, having performed a multitude of private services. Thus, on his return to Paris, the Duke has been rewarded by the kind interest evinced in his favour by men of all classes and all opinions.

"I pass rapidly over the hundred days.

"The battle of Waterloo was lost, . . and General Savary went on board the Bellerophon.*

"He thought himself only a prisoner of war, but he was made a prisoner of state. He was separated from Napoleon, taken to Malta, and imprisoned in a fortress.

"Meanwhile his enemies were busy against him. A list was made out. The Duke was inscribed on it, though, notwithstanding the malignity of his enemies, even his accusers were of opinion that his name ought not to be set down till the very last. The Duke wishes to remain ignorant of the individual whom he has to thank for his proscription; and should the fact ever come to his knowledge, he will bury it in oblivion. However, I will merely observe, that on the 24th of July, 1815, no charge existed against him; for, by the report made to the court-martial, when the sentence for contumacy was pronounced,† it is proved that the letter without date, address, or authenticity, which subsequently became so fatal a weapon in the hands of the Duke's enemies, was not discovered, produced, or created, until the *end of August*, 1816.

"The Duke entertained so perfect a conviction of his own innocence, that, during his captivity at Malta, (which lasted until April, 1816,) he constantly entreated that he might be conveyed back to France and tried, conformably with the laws. He could not believe, what was frequently told him by the officer commanding his guard, that he was better off in Malta than in Paris. He was ignorant of all that was doing in France, and knew not to what a degree, under the best of kings, unbridled passion rendered the laws subservient to hatred, revenge, and re-action.

"However, when he learned the death of Marshal Ney,

* The Duke, having followed Napoleon's fortunes, could not abandon him in his reverses. He embarked with him.

† See the Moniteur of the 27th of December, 1816.

the words of the English officer recurred to his memory; and when, in April, 1816, he succeeded in effecting his escape from Malta, he embarked in a vessel which was sailing for the Archipelago.

"On the 18th of April, 1816, the Duke arrived at Smyrna; he landed on those shores, once the scene of the glory and liberty of the Greeks, but now subject to what European pride is pleased to denominate Turkish despotism. There, however, misfortune is respected, and the rights of hospitality observed.

"No sooner had the Duke landed than his thoughts again turned to his family and his country. He wrote to Paris, renewing his solicitations to be brought to trial. The first answer he received, pointed out the danger which would attend his return. He wrote to the Duke de Feltre; and the answer he then received, was his sentence of death.

"This unexpected stroke would have determined him to remain quietly at Smyrna; but some sanguinary spirit pursued him even beyond the confines of Europe.

"Molested by the French diplomacy, he sought and found protection among the consuls of foreign nations. He embarked in an Austrian vessel sailing for Trieste, which place he reached on the 1st of April, 1817. He demanded an asylum; and the town of Gratz, in Stiria, was assigned to him as a place of residence. There it must be acknowledged he experienced the noblest hospitality under the protection of the Emperor of Austria, and he gratefully exclaimed: Honour to those governments which thus prove by their acts that civilization consists not merely in the progress of the sciences, the arts, and industry, but in the practice of the dearest duties of humanity.

"From Gratz the Duke wrote to the keeper of the seals of France, demanding a trial; but he received no answer.

"He then wrote to his wife, who, accompanied by her

daughter, joined him on the 16th of August, 1817. Neither distance, fatigue, nor ill health intimidated this courageous woman.

"Amidst so many reverses, after two years of misfortune and exile, the Duke at length enjoyed the happiness of embracing his wife and daughter.

"The Duchess shortly returned to Paris, bearing letters to the different ministers. The Duke again urgently solicited permission to return to France to obtain the reversal of his sentence for contumacy.

"Communications which the Duke received from private individuals, and which were founded on good authority, intimated: 'That there would be a law of amnesty, and that it was better to wait and take advantage of it than to submit himself to the uncertain judgment of men.'—'Madness still rages,' says one of these letters.

"The Duke then determined to return to Smyrna, on the assurance given him, in the name of the French government, through the medium of the Austrian legation, that he should not be molested.

"On his second arrival at Smyrna (June, 1818), the Duke de Rovigo devoted himself to literary occupation, and for the space of nearly a year the tranquillity of his life was interrupted only by an incident, annoying no doubt, through the imprudence of the person who occasioned it; but the French general, protected by the law of nations, ultimately obtained the respect due to his person and character.

"This event (of which the journals rendered an account) having given the Duke reason to apprehend new persecutions, he determined to embark on board an English vessel bound for London, where he arrived in June, 1819.

"Whatever might be the policy of the English government, which the Duke had no right to scrutinise, he cannot forbear rendering homage to the noble generosity with which several English families offered him an asylum. In

England it may be truly said that every citizen's house is a secure place of refuge, an impenetrable stronghold, where no agent of authority dares to force an entrance. This admirable system of legislation elevates man, by giving to private individuals the happy power of placing the unfortunate outlaw under the protection of their household gods.

"The recollection of English hospitality consoles the Duke for the ministerial annoyances of which he was the object during his stay in England.

"He was given to understand that he must proceed to Hamburgh. But, weary of so many fluctuations and uncertainties, he resolved to make an end of the unsettled life which he had led for four years.

"He examined the items of the accusation; he questioned himself, and, finding nothing that could afford a ground, or even an excuse for the sanguinary rigour with which he had been treated, he suddenly formed the determination of returning to France, and appealing immediately to the justice of the King.

"Passports were refused, and he contrived to do without them. He embarked at Dover on the 4th of December, 1819, landed at Ostend, and proceeded to Brussels. There he purchased a carriage, and repaired immediately to Paris, without being molested on the road, and without taking any precaution, save that of avoiding those telegraphic machines which have proved fatal to more than one accused party.

"On the 17th of December he alighted at his hotel under the escort of a young English officer, who had kindly undertaken to restore him to his family, following the example of his three generous countrymen, who, four years before, had removed from France, and saved from the punishment of death, the unfortunate man whose name immediately preceded that of the Duke de Rovigo on the list of the 24th of July.

"The bare mention of this fact shows how much times are changed . . . .

"If the Duke wished to come to Paris, it was not for the purpose of braving authority. Such an idea seldom enters the head of an outlaw! But he reflected that if he were arrested, or if he surrendered himself prisoner in a frontier town, his family would become alarmed; he would be deprived of their assistance, and that of his friends, and perhaps it would be less easy to find an advocate to defend him. In short, he conceived that in Paris, under the very eyes of the government, where the law was more active, powerful, and better regulated than elsewhere, he might, without delay, obtain that justice to which he confidently trusted his life and his destiny.

"How much reason had he to congratulate himself, gentlemen, on having adopted this determination, when his Sovereign pointed out the tribunal before which he was to be arraigned, and nominated as his judges his old companions in arms, distinguished no less by the firmness of their principles than for their courage!

"It has been necessary to enter into these details, gentlemen, in order to lay open the conduct of General Savary before the eyes of his countrymen, and all those whom he had had reason either to blame or to thank.

"By the arrival of the Duke the sentence for contumacy is annulled and effaced. There now remains only an accusation, which is scarcely supported, which indeed cannot be supported, and with respect to which I should deem all discussion superfluous, if the rank of the Duke, the name he bears, and the recollections attached to it, his honour, and that of his family, did not require that I should annihilate, as I can and will do, every trace of those first impressions which have arisen to his prejudice."

After this statement, which excited a high degree of inte-

rest among his auditory, M. Dupin proceeded to examine the charge. We will analyse this part of his pleading.

He began by rendering homage to the impartiality of the reporter. The charge, he said, he reduced to two heads: the Duke is accused, first, of having carried on criminal communication with the isle of Elba, and of having favoured the return of Napoleon; secondly, of having installed himself in power before the 23d of March, 1815.

The first head is supported by the letter attributed to the Duke de Rovigo; but, on the one hand, M. Dupin denies that the letter was written by the Duke; and, on the other hand, if it even were his, he affirms that no charge could be grounded on it.

M. Dupin in the first place examines the question, whether the letter is written by the Duke? To be convinced of the contrary, he says it is sufficient to attend to the following circumstances:—

First—This letter was not produced until the end of August, 1816; and yet the Duke was banished on the 24th of July, 1815. Thus he was banished in anticipation and in the expectation of proof being brought against him.

Second—It is without date or address, so that it cannot be referred to any fixed period, or to any particular person.

Third—How happened this letter to appear on the trial? — It is alleged that it was addressed to the Duke of Otranto. It was he then who produced it? That can scarcely be supposed; for the letter states that Renoult was the medium of communication between the isle of Elba and *us:* this last word therefore would compromise the Duke of Otranto as much as the Duke de Rovigo. The Duke of Otranto would therefore have suppressed it, if not during the hundred days, at least subsequently, when he changed, not his office, but his master and his opinions. He would have suppressed it, had it been only in the month of July, when he

countersigned the ordinance of the 24th. But if the Duke of Otranto did not give up the letter, how came it to be introduced on the trial? Those who have examined the documents of 1816 must have observed among them the following letter:

"GENERAL STAFF OF PARIS, FIRST MILITARY DIVISION.

"Paris, August 28th, 1816.

"Sir,

"I have herewith the honour to transmit to you a letter written and signed by the Duke de Rovigo (Savary), in which he recommends to the Duke of Otranto, to whom the letter is addressed, Dr. Renoult, as the agent of a correspondence between the isle of Elba and the usurper's party.

"This *indisputable* monument of the *guilt* of Savary will serve at once to complete your instructions, and to enlighten the court respecting the intrigues of the accused.

"COUNT DESPINOIS,

"The general commanding the 1st military division.

"To A. M. VIOTTI, reporter."

M. Dupin remarked upon the partial tone of this communication, which should have been merely a letter conveying an enclosure, but which contains not only an accusation, but in some degree a sentence, since the writer speaks confidently of the guilt of the accused. "Such," said he, "was the sort of feeling which presided at the trial of the Duke de Rovigo in 1816! But there is one circumstance which still remains unexplained: From whom did Count Despinois receive this letter?

"Add to this the absence of all recollection on the part of the Duke de Rovigo of having written any such letter, and his conviction of its being a forgery. You will not then be surprised at his refusal to acknowledge it.

"But, it will be said, inspectors of hand-writing have

proved by their evidence that the letter was in the same hand as a piece of writing executed for the purpose of comparison, by the Duke, in the presence of the reporter.

"Gentlemen, the multiplicity of forgeries, the difficulty of detecting them with certainty, and the numerous errors which have been committed by the most honest men when called upon to pronounce their opinions in such cases, have long since caused the verification of hand-writing by inspectors to be regarded as wholly conjectural and uncertain.

"In spite of their high-sounding scientific phraseology—*the rigidity of the moving agents, the flexibility of the fingers and lower arm, the general aptitude of the body and hand,* &c. &c.: notwithstanding this learned mixture of anatomy and metaphysics, the art of verifying hand-writing is vain; and of our inspectors we may truly say, what the Romans used to say of their augurs:—that it is difficult to conceive how they can look at one another without laughing. (Here some persons in court looked towards the inspectors and laughed.)

"In fact," continued M. Dupin, "what can be proved by the inspection of hand-writing? Not that the document has been written by such or such an individual. On that point there can be no certainty. They merely bear testimony to the general appearance of the document, of the similarity or dissimilarity of the writing and characters.

"Thus an inspector of hand-writing, who appears to have been weary of giving evidence, set about writing a book. Levayer de Boutigny, who published a work *On Proof by the Comparison of Writing*, speaks of his art in these terms: 'It is certain that, in the general opinion of the learned, the comparison of hand-writing is all a matter of *doubt and uncertainty*. It can at most only lead to a so-so presumption (*une présomption telle quelle*).' Now," said M. Dupin, "open the dictionary of the Academy at the term *telle quelle*, and you will find the explanation to be *rather bad than good*.

"At what period, I would ask, were inspectors of writing, or, as they are termed, *écrivains experts*, first employed? In an age when justice was administered by feudal lords who could neither read nor write.* It was therefore necessary to refer to inspectors. But when knowledge became more diffused, and our judges, by increased information became capable of deciding such questions for themselves, the art of comparing and verifying hand-writing, though preserved by custom, has fallen into discredit.

"How many examples might be quoted of errors committed in this way, not only by professed inspectors, but by persons called to recognise their own writing! How many merchants, for instance, have been known to pay bills which they had really never signed! The reason is evident. If there were any obvious difference in the writing, there would be no forgery, properly speaking; for the forgery consists only in the imitations of the genuine document. *Nihil aliud est falsitas, nisi veritatis imitatio*, says the Roman law. Now this imitation is sometimes executed to perfection.

"In such cases the law trusts, not to the evidence of inspectors, but refers the whole to the prudence of the judge. In the present instance there is only one point to be considered, namely, the great similarity between the writing of the letter and the hand-writing of the Duke; and we must inquire whether the circumstances of the case tend to confirm or destroy the inference which might at first be deduced from this similarity.

"I must beg of you to bear in mind all the remarks I have already made on the letter attributed to the Duke. To these I would add the following:—First, the letter is a reply: where then is the one conveying the inquiry? Had the Duke been so imprudent as to grant a recommendation in those

* So-and-so "declares that he does not know how to sign on account of his rank of gentleman," is said in most of the notarial acts passed in the good old feudal times. Historians inform us that the Constable de Montmorency himself, great captain as he was, could not write.

terms, he could not have imagined there was any danger in preserving the petition. Secondly, the letter is a recommendation: where is the individual recommended? M. Renoult denies having either solicited or obtained this recommendation. His declaration could not be refuted at the time, and he now comes forward to repeat the statements with which he defended himself. First, the place was suppressed, and he knew to a certainty that it would not be restored. Next, how could the term *bearer* be applicable to him? He has not quitted Paris since 1811; and while he filled the situation of physician to the prefecture of police, not a single day elapsed when the duties of his office did not require him to affix his signature to the office lists. Thus the contents of the letter must be false; then the letter itself is false.

"But who is the author of this forgery?

"Were it necessary, gentlemen, for the Duke's defence to go to the fountain-head . . . , it would not, perhaps, be impossible to discover the author. Let it not be forgotten that this letter was not produced until a year after the Duke's proscription, and only at the time of his sentence for contumacy in 1816.

"But we may dispense with all comments on this head, because it is sufficiently evident that the letter is not written by the Duke, and because, even supposing it were, it would prove nothing against him.

"The letter mentions communications with the isle of Elba: but all kind of communication with that island was not prohibited. There was a French post-office there for the correspondence with the island.

"We must therefore inquire whether these communications were innocent or criminal.

"This point remains for the prosecutor to prove; yet he not only proves nothing, but he specifies no fact; and the reporter, with that honesty and impartiality which he has so

decidedly manifested in the course of the present trial, admits that he has no document relating to this point.

"Besides, it is sufficient to examine the conduct of the Duke de Rovigo to be convinced that he had no communication with the isle of Elba. He was living in retirement in the country, seeing scarcely any one. He was the object of active, and at the same time easy supervision; for he resided on a detached estate. On an examination of the police reports which refer to him, it will be seen whether his conduct was suspected. Who would he have employed? His old police agents, or his old gendarmes? Was he visited by any one of these? . . . Had the Duke aided the return from Elba, he would, when he was molested in March, have flown to join Napoleon; yet he fled precisely in the opposite direction.

"After the arrival of Napoleon, if the Duke went to see him, it was not until after he had, in common with all the distinguished personages of the capital, and all the old heads of office, an invitation to present himself at the Tuileries. And, after all, what favour, what great place did he obtain that could be looked upon as a reward for the services he had rendered to the captive of the isle of Elba? A post very inferior to that which he had previously occupied.

"This brings us to an examination of the second head. But with respect to the first, it is certain that the letter is not written by the Duke; and if it were, it is not proved that the communications to which it alludes are of a criminal nature.

"The first head of the accusation is therefore entirely groundless.

"Let us then proceed to the second. Did the Duke assume power before the 23rd of March, 1815?"

Here M. Dupin entered upon a preliminary discussion on the ordinance of the 24th of July, 1815. "It is not," he

observed, "a penal law. It does not define offences; it does not inflict punishments; it relates only to the sentence. It is an ordinance of the kind formerly denominated *lettres excitatives de juridiction.*"

The terms of the first article are — "The generals and officers who betrayed the King before the 23rd of March, or who attacked France and the government with arms in their hands, and those who by violence assumed power, shall be arrested and arraigned before competent courts-martial."

M. Dupin next inquired whether the Duke de Rovigo came within the terms of the article. "No," said he, "the Duke did not betray the King. What is the meaning of the word betray? It may be easily defined before a tribunal composed of French warriors. To betray is to turn against any one a power which has been received from him only for his defence and protection. For instance, a commander betrays when he delivers up to the enemy a town which he has been ordered to defend at the price of his blood. But the Duke de Rovigo had no mission, no place, no authority. He did not therefore turn against the King a power which he had received from the King. Consequently, he has not betrayed the King.

"Was he a rebel? He would doubtless merit that title if, according to the terms of the ordinance, he had attacked France and the government with arms in his hands. But he is not even accused of this crime; therefore I have not to justify him.

"Did he assume power?"

M. Dupin here remarked that the question was of a complex nature; and that the terms of the ordinance required that it should be considered under three different divisions.

First—Did the Duke assume power?

Second—Did he assume it by violent means?

Third—Did he assume it before the 23rd of March, 1815?

The want of one of these circumstances renders the ordinance inapplicable. It would be more especially so, if all three were wanting.

In the first place, what is meant by assuming power in the sense of Article I.? It is, for example, going, at the head of a troop of armed men, to take possession of a mayoralty, a prefecture, or an office; but the case is different with respect to those who never sought it, and who have received it, as it were, in spite of themselves.

Thus, to apply this distinction to the Duke de Rovigo, if, on the 20th of March, he had repaired to the office of the minister of police, with a picket of gendarmerie; had he driven away the individual who occupied it in the King's name, and resumed his former functions, he would then have come within the purview of the ordinance of the 24th of July.

On the morning of the 20th of March, the English and Austrian ambassadors, apparently supposing him to be fully reinstated in his functions, because the Emperor had slept at Fontainebleau, and was expected in Paris, applied for their passports to the Duke de Rovigo, as minister of the general police. He replied that he had no official character, and referred them to M. Dandré, the King's minister, to whom they were accredited.

The clerks of the prefecture, fearing to compromise themselves if they acted on their own responsibility, begged the Duke de Rovigo to give them orders, alleging that the police required to be kept every hour, and every moment, in a state of uninterrupted activity. The Duke's reply was:—*Do as if the prefect were absent, dead, or sick.*

The same argument holds good with regard to the inspection of the gendarmerie. Had the Duke de Rovigo proceeded to the hotel of Marshal Moncey, and by violent means taken possession of his offices, he would have been guilty.

But his conduct was the very reverse of this.

He did not assume power; it was consigned to him.

He was nominated by a decree, which the war-minister enjoined him to obey.

Far from readily yielding, the Duke resisted.

On the 21st he sent Colonel Lagorce to Marshal Moncey, requesting him to retain the post which he had so honourably filled. Next day (the 22d) the Duke himself went to repeat the solicitation in person. On the same day (the 22d) at nine o'clock the Duchess, who had that day dined at the Tuileries, presented, after dinner, her husband's resignation to Napoleon. Was this, I ask, *assuming* power? Above all, is it assuming power by *violent means?*

But there is another circumstance. It is necessary, at all events, that the Duke should have assumed the power in question previous to the 22d of March. However, on an examination of dates, it will be found that this third circumstance is wanting.

The decree of nomination of the 20th of March has been mentioned. That decree might have been issued on the 15th, 10th, or 1st of March. No matter! That is the act of the person nominating, while the question at issue is the act of the individual who is supposed to have accepted the appointment.

Now it was not until the 21st of March that Napoleon said to the Duke—'*I have appointed you*,' &c. The Duke did not that day accept the appointment. At four o'clock on the 22nd, he was still urging Marshal Moncey to accept the appointment; and at nine in the evening of that same day he had given in his resignation. But, it will be said, he ultimately accepted it. What signifies that? It is certain, at all events, that he did not accept the post *before* the 22nd of March (as expressed in the ordinance), but *after*.

Besides, the mere acceptance of an appointment is not the matter in question. Otherwise it would be necessary to prosecute all who were in office during the hundred days, and the number would be great indeed; for I know of no place

that remained unfilled at that period. The *assumption of power* and its exercise are the points under consideration.

Now, it is certain that the Duke de Rovigo exercised no functions at the Hotel Moncey. He only took possession at the Rue Cerutti, whither the offices were not removed until the 23rd or 24th. M. Yvert, who was at the head of these offices, has assured you that the Duke could not give his signatures until the 25th.

Where are his official acts previously to that period? None can be named. The inspector-general being superseded, other changes ensued in secondary situations. Let those individuals be examined who, at the period alluded to, were dismissed or removed. There is not one who was not so situated before the 25th.*

On the first trial, mention was made of an order of the day drawn up on the 23rd; but, besides that the date does not come within the terms of the ordinance, it has been proved by the printer's register that the printing of that order of the day was not completed until the 24th: consequently it could not be issued until the 25th.

It has been stated as a circumstance against General Savary, that he had received his pay from the date of the 20th of March. But in reply to this, he himself observed, that it was the constant custom in the military service to pay the officers from the day of their appointment, and not from the day on which they entered upon their duties.

Having thus overthrown all the charges successively, M. Dupin deduced from his arguments the following conclusions: 1st, That the Duke de Rovigo maintained no criminal correspondence with the isle of Elba; 2nd, That he did not assume power, that he did not assume it by violent means, and finally, that he did not assume it before the 23rd of March.

* The president of the court himself was so situated. He was superseded on the 25th.

"Is it not," said M. Dupin, "with reference to this last circumstance an established principle, that the law should warn before it strikes? *Moneat priusquam feriat,* says Bacon. A penal law, in particular, should always precede the offence; but in the case under consideration, the ordinance which prohibits the assumption of power before the 23rd of March, is dated the 24th of the July following.

"What arbitrar yproceedings must result from this? The King quitted Lille on the 23rd; and on that very day, ere his Majesty had scarcely overstepped the frontier-line, while he was yet within sight, an audacious hand might with impunity have pulled down the royal standard, and substituted another in its stead: and those who, on the preceding day, accepted appointments on the shore of Cannes, which had then been occupied for two-and-twenty days, would be found guilty.

"But why should I dwell on this?" said M. Dupin in conclusion. "You will rise to other considerations. You are not only judges, you are jurymen. All may and must be thrown into the balance of your decision. Deign to listen to me.

"If it be true, that on its first establishment or re-establishment a government can be consolidated only by acts of rigour, it will at least be admitted that such acts are superfluous, and even dangerous, when the security of that government is no longer threatened.

"We will say nothing more of 1816. . . . The public mind, which has been so long kept on the rack, now seeks repose.

Eh quoi! toujours de sang et toujours des supplices,

is the exclamation constantly repeated from mouth to mouth.

"What an extraordinary difference is seen in the fate of men, who all incurred similar chances, and deserved to be all judged alike!

"The Duke de Rovigo is charged with having recommended Dr. Renoult in an affair which, had it really existed,

would have principally compromised the doctor; and yet the latter was pronounced to be innocent even in 1816. Is then the Duke de Rovigo to be condemned for the same offence in 1819?

"The Duke is accused of accepting functions consigned to him by the Prince of Eckmuhl.

Quand le bras a failli, l'on en punit la tête.

Here, on the contrary, the Duke de Rovigo has been condemned for obeying; while he from whom he received the order is a prince, a peer, and a marshal, and truly worthy of the honours he enjoys.

"Listen, gentlemen, to the voice of your country, or rather listen to the dictates of your own hearts,—to that inspiration which never misleads,—and which now enjoins an end of bloodshed, punishment, revenge, re-action, and enmity. Let *union and oblivion* be your motto.

"General, banish the recollection of your past misfortunes, and rely on the justice you will obtain. Seek henceforth in the retirement of domestic life, in the bosom of the family by whom you are adored and beloved, to console yourself for all that you have suffered in your political career.

"As for myself, gentlemen, since Providence has ordained that it should be my task to defend the individuals whose names stand first and last on a fatal list, may the unanimous voice which will acquit the one console the manes of the other. These trials have now, I hope, reached their conclusion; and I trust that I shall not again be called upon to lend my professional aid to the brave men who have so long and so gallantly defended their country!"

After deliberating for three quarters of an hour, the court unanimously pronounced the Duke de Rovigo not guilty; and he was ordered to be immediately liberated.

ADDITIONAL CHAPTER.

General Kellermann claims for himself exclusively the honour of the victory of Marengo—His letter—Anonymous pamphlet—My observations—The 9th light regiment—General Desaix—The Austrian staff assigns to each individual his proper share of glory.

I HAD written these Memoirs, as I have already stated, during my detention at Malta, and my sojourn at Smyrna; at which latter place I concluded them. Having proceeded to England in 1819 with the intention of returning to France, I heard of the claims which had been set up with reference to the battle of Marengo. They appeared to me of so extraordinary a nature, that it never occurred to my mind that General Kellermann could have put them forward. I ascribed them to the zeal of some indiscreet friend; and contented myself with adding to the account of that great battle the reflections that conclude it. They neither contest the merit nor the à-propos of the charge; and they leave to the general a share of glory sufficiently splendid to gratify his ambition. They have, nevertheless, excited great displeasure: *a friend of truth* contested their fairness, and met them by insinuations and assertions which it behoved me not to leave unanswered. I had to call in aid my recollections; but the anonymous writer had warned me that they could not be relied on; I therefore searched amongst written documents. Great was my surprise, on running over the *Bibliothèque Historique*, to find that I was mistaken; that the honour of the victory of Marengo was not claimed by General Kellermann's friends on his behalf, but by the general himself!

He addressed the following letter to the director of that literary collection, under date the 8th of October, 1818: "Sir, I have read in one of the numbers of your third volume an article respecting a monument erected at Marseilles to the

memory of General Desaix. I therein find that you share the error, so common at the present day, regarding the last circumstance of his life: an error which has been propagated and countenanced by a man whose ambition and envy found it more to his purpose to extol the glory of the dead than that of the living.

"The article in question asserts, that General Desaix purchased, at the price of his life, the gain of the battle of Marengo.

"God forbid I should presume to lessen the glory of that illustrious warrior and virtuous citizen! But he has gathered a sufficiently abundant harvest of it not to stand in need of its being further augmented by the portion belonging to others. Had he lived, his mind was of too noble a stamp to allow it, and to refuse to each one his proper meed of praise. Had he lived, he would have refused all claim to a glory which did not belong to him. He would have restored it to the individual who has an *exclusive right* to it: for the fact is, that General Desaix had *no share in the decisive event which restored victory to our standards at the battle of Marengo.*

"This will be made manifest to you by the following brief statement.

"At the commencement of the action, the French army consisted of the corps of Lieutenants-general Lannes and Victor. Exhausted of men, of ammunition, and of artillery, it was compelled, towards noon-day, to desist from the combat, and abandon the field of battle. Its half-destroyed battalions retreated across the plain, under cover of the brigade of cavalry of the general of brigade Kellermann, son of the marshal of that name; and thanks to the tardiness with which the Austrian army debouched from the marshes of the Bormida, and to the wrong direction taken by its immense cavalry, those scattered remains took shelter behind Desaix's corps.

"The First Consul, proud of the success of the action of

Montebello, fancied he was proceeding on a mere hunting excursion, rather than to a deadly strife, and had sent that corps, if it deserves the name, towards Novi, in order to cut off the retreat to Genoa from the enemy, who was supposed to be in full flight. Desaix was recalled in all haste; he had just established himself at the position near San-Juliano, on the left of the road from Tortona to Alexandria, when General Kellermann's brigade of cavalry came up to that spot. He found there the aid-de-camp Savary, who was waiting for him; this officer announced that the battle was about to be resumed, and handed to him the First Consul's directions that he should support the attack of General Desaix.

"General Kellermann had only four hundred troops left, belonging to the 2nd and 20th regiments of cavalry, who were exhausted by eight hours' fighting and by repeated charges. Valiant regiments, your numbers did not exceed those of Leonidas; but you were more fortunate than the Spartan soldiers: the country was on this occasion indebted to you for its safety; the names of each of the gallant men present on the occasion should have been handed down to posterity.

"It was therefore with the corps of Desaix, amounting at most to three or four thousand infantry, and with four hundred horsemen under General Kellermann, that the battle was resumed. This handful of warriors moved forward once more, whilst the Austrian army was advancing in a compact mass to a victory, which it entertained no doubt of securing.

"The two corps approached each other: a discharge of artillery was heard; Desaix was mortally wounded; but there was too great a disparity of numbers. The remains of the French army so imprudently thrust forward were unable to resist the shock; they were broken in, and took to flight. Being masked by the vineyards, General Kellermann quickly perceived the disaster of his own party and the disorder of the enemy, who incautiously gave themselves up to the pur-

suit. At this critical moment, he only consulted the courage of his companions in arms, rushed headlong into the midst of the Austrians, whom he surprised with their fire-arms unloaded, and in the disorder of victory; six thousand grenadiers were trodden under the horses' feet, or instantly laid down their arms. The mass of the enemy's army being panic-struck, and imagining they were opposed by an unexpected reinforcement, fled in confusion towards the Bormida, and resigned to us a victory which they had it yet in their power to dispute.

"The weak corps of General Kellermann found itself alone for a short time in the midst of the two armies; and the army of the First Consul was in such a state of annihilation and disorder, that it was found impossible to collect sufficient troops to complete the enemy's destruction.

"Nevertheless, the Austrian general acknowledged himself defeated; and sent the next day to propose a capitulation, which restored to us the possession of Italy.'

"The foregoing is an exact statement of the occurrence which decided the fate of the battle: there are a sufficient number of eye-witnesses in existence to attest its truth, and no one can presume to contest it.

"Desaix, therefore, had been slain, and the troops were in flight, when General Kellermann plunged in the midst of the enemy, and wrested the victory from their grasp. It belongs to that general and to the gallant men who devoted themselves along with him. If the general-in-chief of the French army, with the view of evading the duty of gratitude which he owed to the men who (unintentionally no doubt) had placed the crown upon his head, omitted to acknowledge services which were rather rendered to the country than to himself; if he deemed it consonant with his interest to avert the glory of it towards a deceased warrior; if General Kellermann persevered in a modest silence, and was satisfied until now with the good opinion of his comrades, it becomes his

duty to break that silence, and to restore the truth respecting a memorable and unheard-of military achievement, at this moment when it is studiously affected to make it the brightest gem in General Desaix's civic crown.

"I do not ask of you to publish this letter: for what purpose could now be answered by recalling victories, the results of which have been rendered ephemeral by the ambition of a madman? The battle of Marengo is as far removed from us as those of Zama and of Pharsalia, for any useful purpose we have derived from it.

"But I request of you to correct, when an opportunity shall offer, what you have advanced on that subject, and to restore to each one the share that belongs to each.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"KELLERMANN, Lieutenant-general."

The pamphlet of *the Friend of Truth* is hardly any thing more than a long paraphrase of the general's letter.* It has

* The Duke of Rovigo has just published fresh memoirs illustrative of the *history of Napoleon*. From the very first pages of that new publication, it will have been discovered that his recollections were not much to be relied on; and when we come to the account of the battle of Marengo, and to the charge effected by General Kellermann, an opportunity is offered of observing the justness of this remark.

We therein find, at page 182 (Vol. i. part 1.) this singular phrase:—

"Since the downfall of the Imperial government, some pretended friends of General Kellermann have presumed to claim for him the merit of originating that charge. This is too bold a pretension; and it is certainly not set up by that general, whose share of glory is sufficiently splendid to gratify his ambition."

The author of the refutation proceeds as follows:—

Those reflections, besides being rather uncourteous towards General Kellermann, are not in accordance with the truth. This is not the first time that certain individuals have contested to him the glory of the inspiration of a feat of arms so closely bordering upon the marvellous, that he is much more disposed to ascribe it to chance, than to any merit on his part.

So legitimate, so incontestable a property has already been claimed for him, as it is again found necessary to do at the present day: why, in fact, should he con-

the advantage over the latter in the choice of its expressions and in the sentiments which pervade it. This difference

tent himself with the share to which the Duke of Rovigo again pretends to reduce him, when he has a just right to the whole?

There is felt no hesitation in affirming that the happy inspiration of the charge of cavalry, which on that day had the effect, not of deciding the victory, but of bringing it back to our standards, belongs to General Kellermann. With respect to the glory of the execution, he shares it in common with the handful of gallant men who all, without exception, plunged headlong, at his command, on the enemy's compact body of troops.

If the idea did not originate with him, who then can lay claim to it? No one has hitherto ventured to do so in explicit terms, not even the First Consul himself. If the then aide-de-camp Savary had set up such a pretension on his own part, it would be of a still more daring character. No such injury will be done to that officer as to ascribe to him the merit of it. There was too great a distance between him and the aforesaid general, young as he was, that he should have pretended to issue directions to him. If the Duke of Rovigo has written in the interest of the First Consul, why does he not say so, and prove his assertion? He is satisfied with throwing out the insinuation, and obscuring the truth. He gives to understand in page 181 (Vol. i. part 1.) that he did not quit General Kellermann until after the dispersion of the Hungarian column. It may be positively asserted that M. Savary has had no personal knowledge of the fact: he was not near General Kellermann when the latter flew to the relief of his comrades, with that instinctive feeling which induces a person to plunge into the water in order to rescue a fellow-creature from drowning. Chance presented him with this opportunity: he eagerly grasped at it: five minutes sooner or later, his timely interference would have failed of its object.

No such injury will be offered to the memory of the First Consul as to suppose that the Duke of Rovigo has made himself in this place the interpreter of his private sentiments; it would be ascribing a weakness of character to him, from which his well-established superiority ought readily to screen him.

The man who, at twenty-six years of age, had begun his career by the campaign of 1796, in Italy, who had made the conquest of Egypt, had been borne on the shoulders of the French from Fréjus to Paris, had planned and executed the wonderful passage of the St. Bernard, and conceived the idea of stopping Melas by pulling him back, as it were, by the skirts of his coat, of forcing him away from France, into which country he was about to penetrate, and compelling him to fight for his own safety, such a man, I say, could have no need of a few more laurels, he who already possessed the splendid treasure of a still maiden and undefiled glory. Does not, besides, the glory of a battle definitively belong at all times to the general-in-chief?

When success has been attained, the conqueror is at liberty to describe his battle

readily explains itself; but it is not the less entitled to remark. I shall presently return to this discreet friend, who remains in the back-ground in order not to compromise the object of his affections. I will first reply to the individual whom he has so improperly claimed the credit of defending. I acknowledge my reluctance at bringing forward a document dictated by the misfortunes of the times. Nevertheless, as it assails the character of two men, whose memory it behoves me to preserve unsullied, it becomes a duty for me to discuss that document. I turn to the allegations which it contains:—

Desaix took no part in the decisive occurrence which brought victory back to our standards.

The Austrian staff will presently reply to this impudent assertion. Let us confine ourselves to the artful manner in which it is set forth. No doubt Desaix took no part in the charge of cavalry which routed the Hungarian grenadiers. But is this the only decisive circumstance? Is there nothing decisive, in the appearance of an unbroken column which debouches upon the field of battle at the moment when the corps are about to disband, which rallies and covers our flying troops? What would General Kellermann have done, since he acknowledges having set himself in motion to support General Desaix, if the latter had not guessed to a certain degree in what direction the action was about to be

as he thinks proper. He will represent a rout as a change of front; he will acknowledge no other error than that which he claims the merit of having repaired, though he often owes it to mere chance. The truth is, as the Duke of Rovigo himself admits, that Napoleon did not calculate upon a battle.

He considered, in fact, that the enemy was more intent on escaping from than on fighting him. Fully bent upon this idea, he had sent Desaix forward towards Novi, in order to cut off the road to Gerres; and having himself left a portion of his troops in the rear, he was closely following Melas with less than twenty thousand men, with twelve pieces of cannon, and ammunition insufficient for a battle. The latter was no sooner broken by the engagement of Castigio, than he suddenly turned round, and the battle of Marengo was the consequence.

decided; if he had not suspended his march; and if, at the risk of the personal consequences with which such a halt on his part might have been attended, he had not placed himself in an attitude to take a share in the struggle which was engaged on the banks of the Bormida? How could this fresh attack, of which General Kellermann claims for himself the glory, have been undertaken if the modest victor of Sedi-man had adhered to the literal execution of the order which he had received to march upon Novi, and had not stopped his division as soon as he heard the thundering reports of the artillery on the field of Marengo?

There was the inspiration. That halt, and the retrograde movement, decided the fate of the battle. Had the First Consul been accessible to the passions which are ascribed to him, he would have shown great want of dexterity in adding to the glory of a celebrated warrior, instead of concentrating the merit of the action upon an officer, a distinguished one no doubt, but who was yet in the outset of his career. The monument, however, which has been erected on the Great St. Bernard attests in what manner the First Consul dispensed rewards, and how he evinced feelings of jealousy.

The First Consul fancied he was proceeding on a mere hunting excursion. Is this the expression of a general officer, of a man who boasts of brilliant achievements? What! the First Consul had drawn troops from the heart of Brittany, and directed them to Italy by forced marches with the same indifference with which a hunting excursion is arranged! This assertion refutes itself: it is needless to dwell upon it.

I found Savary, the aide-de-camp, there. This is incorrect: Kellermann did not find me. He was standing in order of battle when I came up to acquaint him with the operation about to be undertaken, and in which General Desaix was to take the principal share. I was the person who informed Kellermann, (whom we had not seen since our departure for Egypt,) that General Desaix had arrived on the

spot. I pointed out the position which he occupied; for Kellermann could not discover him from the place where he stood. Now, when General Desaix dispatched me to the First Consul, the space between the 9th light regiment forming his first line and the Austrian column just halted, did not exceed two hundred paces. The least movement on either side must have brought on an engagement. General Desaix, at least, so considered it, since he sent me to request the First Consul would order him to be supported, as he was under the necessity of boldly commencing the attack, to avoid the risk of being broken.

The danger was pressing; not a moment was to be lost. General Bonaparte accordingly directed me to proceed to Kellermann, make known to him the importance of the crisis, and point out at the same time the precise spot through which General Desaix was about to appear on a scene where General Kellermann was stationed since the morning, and where he stood almost alone at that moment.

The First Consul had his own aides-de-camp about him; but he preferred availing himself of my services, because I had witnessed the circumstances I was about to report.

Now, as I knew from ocular evidence General Desaix's position at the moment of my departure, as I was the bearer of an order of so much importance from the First Consul to Kellerman, is it consistent with common sense that I should have gone to wait for the general at a spot to which he might not have repaired? Nothing can be more improbable than such a supposition. It is, besides, contrary to the fact. I did not wait for General Kellermann. I hastened to overtake him at the very place which the First Consul himself was pointing out with his finger. I conveyed to that officer the order confided to me; and had scarcely done so when General Desaix commenced his attack. This may readily be explained; for it will be recollected that the First Consul, in giving me his instructions for Kellermann, sent another officer

with directions for General Desaix to advance upon the Austrians. All this occurred in the space of a few moments; and Kellermann, who claims the merit of originating the charge, had not even any time for reflection.

The remainder of the French army were unable to resist the shock: they were broken in, and took to flight. Took to flight! this is the first time I read such an assertion. Undoubtedly I have no right to give it a positive denial, since it is vouched by General Kellermann, and I was engaged in conveying to him the First Consul's orders at the moment when the flight is alleged to have occurred. But from the point where he was stationed with his troop, neither of us could discover Desaix's division. He therefore makes so grave an assertion upon nothing more than hearsay. I may then be allowed to doubt its accuracy.

The first line of General Desaix consisted of the 9th light regiment, one of the most formidable in the army, which was commanded by Colonel La Bassée, who is still alive. This regiment, and its chief, were wont to affix their names to every field of battle upon which they had to contend. They were never known to hesitate at the sight of danger; and I can attest that, as I was proceeding after Kellermann's charge, to overtake the division which was debouching, upon the left of San-Juliano, I beheld at the head of the column the 9th light regiment, which certainly bore no resemblance to a regiment just broken in.

This accusation is rendered still more improbable by another circumstance. The First Consul was fully aware of all the occurrences of the day. The reports could not have left him in ignorance of those acts of weakness or of courage which had marked the vicissitudes of the battle. Nevertheless, he congratulated the 9th light regiment upon its conduct, and assigned to it the title of the *incomparable* regiment. Now, it is a fact of general notoriety that, how-

ever well disposed to distribute praises, he was never lavish of them.

If these considerations were deemed insufficient, I should invoke a testimony which General Kellermann would no doubt be disposed to admit; for none could be better aware than the Austrians themselves which of the two contending corps was broken in. The following are the expressions contained in the account published by the staff of the vanquished army. I regret that a French general officer should have placed me under the necessity of bringing such a quotation in opposition to him. But the Austrians have done justice to his accusation. It is no fault of mine if the nations we have so long conquered have acted more equitably towards our soldiers than some of the chiefs who commanded them.

"The corps of General Lannes," says the Austrian account, "and Mounier's division, took up a position on the right of General Desaix, beyond the corps of General Vior. General Boudet's division came next, and was placed upon two lines in front of San-Juliano. The first line extended on a plain covered with vineyards and trees; its right was protected by twelve pieces of cannon, and its left by General Kellermann's brigade of cavalry.

"General Zach had no sooner debouched by the heights of Casina-Grossa than he deployed his advanced guard on two lines. The first consisted of three battalions of the regiment of Michel-Wallis, which had on their left Lichtenstein's regiment of dragoons and the second line of Lattermann's brigade of grenadiers. The offensive movement towards San-Juliano continued at the sound of music. The advanced guard had already reached the vineyards, when the regiment of Wallis was opposed by a strong cannonading, and a sharp fire of musketry. *It was repulsed, and fell back upon the second line, which stood its ground, and opened to make room for the*

fugitives. It formed again as soon as they had passed, and answered the enemy's fire by slowly moving forward. At the same time, the fire of two batteries was directed towards the position of the French at San-Juliano. The regiment of Wallis rallied during this manœuvre, and again marched up to the enemy.

"Bonaparte then discovered the cavalry of the Austrian light wing, which gave him some uneasiness respecting the safety of his cannon. He ordered in consequence General Kellermann to execute a charge by the right wing of Boudet's division. This movement was effected at a brisk trot by passing between the lines. *General Desaix, at the head of the 9th light half-brigade, debouched with great impetuosity from the enclosures of the vineyards, and threw himself headlong in the midst of the Austrian battalions. This movement was followed by the remainder of Boudet's division.* The residue of Lannes and Mounier's divisions also took part in the engagement.

"*The Austrians were not proof against the boldness and vigour of this attack. Their batteries moved rapidly to the rear, in order to avoid falling into the hands of the aggressors: the advanced guard began to give way.* At this critical moment General Desaix fell from his horse, having been struck dead by a ball.

"*The French, transported with rage, penetrated the first line of the Austrian advanced guard, and compelled it to fall back.* Nevertheless, General Zach succeeded with his grenadiers in arresting their progress; but General Kellermann debouched with his cavalry. Lichtenstein's regiment of dragoons was unable to resist its superior strength. It did not even await the charge, but fell back upon the Austrian cavalry, which was at the head of the main column. Kellermann caused this regiment to be pursued by a part of his brigade, surrounded with the remainder the eight battalions of the advanced guard, and penetrated them on all sides. This un-

expected attack, which was executed with astonishing rapidity, threw the Austrian infantry into disorder, dispersed it, and occasioned the loss of a considerable number of soldiers, mowed down by the sword, &c."

This is rather a lengthy quotation; but it accurately describes the circumstances and progress of the action; stating to what point it was brought by Desaix; where it was taken up by Kellermann; what was the conduct of the 9th light regiment, and adjudging to each one his share of glory, in a manner so simple and natural, as to carry conviction of its authenticity; for none can be better aware than the Austrian staff of the incidents and progress of an action so fatal to their troops. Defeated as they acknowledge themselves to have been, it is of little consequence to them to whom belongs the honour of their having been so defeated; they espouse the vanity of no party, and only write in the interest of the military art and of truth.

I now come to *the Friend of Truth.* There is much talent displayed by this discreet friend, who remains in the background for fear of compromising the party he has undertaken to defend: his wit so far oversteps all bounds, as to be often substituted for common sense. But there is no remedy for it.

This is not the first time I have discovered that nothing was so difficult as to reconcile with each other the different military writers who relate an event in which they have not all acted a part.

General Jomini is almost the only exception, because his mind always places itself in the focus of the action of which he is giving an account, and follows it in all its developments.

I have used every endeavour to avoid entering into tactical details, which are tedious, and devoid of interest for most readers. Had I not adopted this course, I might have written twenty volumes. There are, besides, many military writers of the same period who are better able than I am to follow these developments. I have only spoken of the battle

of Marengo, from what the First Consul did me the honour to relate to me respecting it; for I was with Desaix's division on the road to Novi when it took place. I only arrived at the moment when the First Consul, after having ordered his columns to retreat, had concentrated them for the purpose of attempting a last effort.

The *friend of truth* is, no doubt, better acquainted with the state of affairs than the chief who directed every thing. Let us, however, consider this point.

He says, that in order to justify errors, stress is exclusively laid upon the merit of having repaired them; that with this view, routs are called changes of front, &c. &c. and such-like frivolous expressions, which prove that his notions on military tactics were fixed in his mind previously to the publication of my work. He had also carried on his siege of Malta; and his self-love was still elated at his own prowess.

Had he divided the action, as a friend of truth ought to have done, he would have placed the routs and reverses at the time which elapsed from the commencement of the action until noon-day.

He would have found that from that moment the First Consul was constantly engaged in manœuvring; that his success is exclusively owing to his change of front, which brought to one focus the efforts of all the troops remaining to him against a portion of the enemy's army. This comprises the whole combination of his movement.

Chance had no share in the success which he obtained. Let us, however, proceed.

The *friend* pretends, in the fourth line of page 2, that this is not the first time certain individuals have denied to General Kellermann the glory of conceiving the idea of a feat of arms so closely bordering upon the marvellous, that the general is much more disposed to ascribe it to chance than to any merit on his part, &c. &c.; and yet, in the second line of the second paragraph, in the same page, he says that *no*

one has hitherto ventured to claim it in explicit terms, not even the First Consul himself. I have, indeed, no hesitation in believing it. He would have smiled with contempt, had he read such observations previously to his death. But this could not make it the less incumbent upon the *Friend of Truth* to be consistent with himself, and to have a correct notion of what he meant to say.

I am at a loss to guess why I should be brought upon the scene in the same paragraph; for I have not set up any personal pretensions. I might no doubt recall the self-abnegation contained in my recital, and take advantage of the admissions that have escaped you; for this is what you state in a note appended to your 10th page. "When the aide-de-camp, Savary, had conveyed to Kellermann the First Consul's orders, the general said to him: 'I have been fighting ever since six o'clock in the morning. I have already made six charges, and have lost one half of my men. The troops are quite exhausted: get us replaced by fresh ones.' Savary replied: 'You alone remain to us; the rest have disappeared or are too far off. It is necessary to go forward. Here are the remnants of two regiments of dragoons: rally them to your column.' Kellermann admitted the urgency of the case, and made his arrangements accordingly."

By his account, therefore, it was only upon my representations that the charge was effected. I had caused the adoption of that course. But I have no such exalted pretensions; I leave the glory of the action to those who deserve it, and limit myself to the humble part which I performed.

Let me ask you, however, what was the great distance between us which you take such pains to proclaim? Kellermann was at that period a general of brigade; that is to say, a maréchal-de-camp; and I was a chief of brigade, or colonel. We had both been fighting since the period of his declaration in 1792. Now, this being the case, would the First Consul have greatly offended against the rules of propriety in em-

ploying me even in the duty of directing a general of brigade, at a moment when it was of the utmost importance that his orders should be literally executed?

He had not yet, at that period, a single aide-de-camp holding the rank of general. Your tender feelings, moreover, have obscured your visual faculties; for I have never said that I was instructed to direct Kellermann.

You are no doubt the only man who has failed to penetrate the real object I had in view in writing my Memoirs. You are as yet the only one who has ascribed to me any motives of a private nature. You pretend that I have no *personal* knowledge of the facts which I relate; that *I was not near General Kellermann when he flew to the relief of his comrades, with that instinctive feeling which induces a person to plunge into the water in order to rescue a fellow-creature from drowning.*

Consider again what you have committed to print. It is as well, however, that I should lay it before you.

Can you pretend to convey the belief that Kellermann stood alone on the field of battle? If the object of your assertion be not to offer me a gratuitous insult, that assertion would prove that you were not on the spot; and laying aside the paltry gratification you have afforded to your own feelings, you ought to be aware that I am sufficiently well known in the army to be able to dispense with your suffrage and with that of your hero, in whose behalf you attack me in such uncourteous language. Was it the too great distance between him and me, or any other equally discreditable sentiment that prevented his perceiving me? At any rate, you may have discovered, that when I rose above him, I did not forget myself so far as to lose all recollection of my old companions in arms.

You are well aware that the First Consul was not indiscriminate in the choice of his aides-de-camp. You know it the better, as you never could obtain that appointment in

spite of all your efforts. Your comparison of drowning men, whom an instinctive feeling induced Kellermann to rescue, is more than irrelevant. No one was in that predicament; all knew what they were about to do, and for what purpose they stood in their respective positions. Kellermann had just received the specific orders I had brought to him: there was no room for hesitation. Attend to what you have yourself stated in the 10th and 11th pages.

You say, in the second paragraph of page 5, "that no such injury will be offered to the memory of the First Consul, as to suppose," &c. &c.

If you read the letter of the 8th of October, 1818, you may therein find the sentiments which your imagination seeks to discover in others, and have an opportunity of judging in what quarter a lowness of mind is displayed.

With respect to your 6th and 7th pages, what could I reply to them? You insist that a general of brigade, acting as such at the head of his brigade, on a field of battle, must be better acquainted with the real state of affairs than the First Consul himself. You confound the two actions of the day to make an incomprehensible chaos of them; in which there can only be discovered a solitary object on your part; that of fixing errors upon the First Consul, in order to elevate your hero. It is impossible to make those see clear who refuse to open their eyes at all.

I have now reached your tenth page. Boudet's division was neither more nor less than the division of Desaix. Now, I have already mentioned that Kellermann failed to discover it. I found Kellermann on the right of the road from Tortona to Alexandria, and in advance of San-Juliano, which he had on his left, a little to the rear in an oblique direction; and when I quitted General Desaix, he was on the left of that road, with the same village a little in advance on his right. Those two corps, which were about to enter into action, were out of sight of each other.

You state that "as soon as my mission was accomplished, I had to return to my general, who could not be far removed; and I disappeared altogether." My mission could not be accomplished until after the charge; and it behoved me not to withdraw so long as it had not taken place. The note appended to that tenth page would almost inspire me with pride, as I have already observed to you: it is a manifest contradiction of your assertions; since, according to your own account, I had need to stimulate the general, who pretends that he had not seen me. Do me at least the justice to acknowledge that I had not boasted of this in my narrative of the battle of Marengo.

Generally speaking, a coward by nature delights to fall in with incidents which help to save appearances without humbling his self-love. Now, it is attempted to fix that character upon me; and yet it is admitted that I was forced to reply to Kellermann's observations, and to remove his objections. The happy idea of the charge had not therefore, as yet, occurred to him. If it subsequently came upon him, where is the extraordinary merit of his conduct?—why make so much noise about it?

Murat, Beliard, Lasalle, Excelmans, Pajol, Domergue, who have executed so many successful charges, have never had such tender feelings. They were satisfied with having well performed their duty, and never claimed the merit of winning the battles of Austerlitz, Wagram, Montereau, the Beresina, &c. because they had contributed to our success.

You state that General Desaix's corps could not be at any great distance: you could not, therefore, discover it; and yet you have just pretended that you had fallen in with Boudet's division.

The end of each of your paragraphs invariably contradicts what you had asserted in the beginning of it.

Your 12th page is a tissue of absurdities, proving that neither you nor your Mecenas have at all understood the arrangements which you pretend to criticise.

General Desaix only occupied one point in the new combination of manœuvres. The First Consul made him assume the offensive to prevent his being forestalled by the enemy, who was about to enter again upon operations, and probably to follow up the successes he had obtained in the early part of the day.

General Kellermann is too much of a military man to have supplied you with these details: such notions could only spring from hatred and discreditable feelings.

I will not advert a second time to the imputation cast upon the 9th light regiment: it has been sufficiently answered by the quotation from the report of the Austrian staff. I merely repeat your text in order to afford a ready means of comparison.

You state that "at the point of Cassina-Grossa Desaix's corps attacked the formidable mass of the Austrian army, and was broken by it. The 9th light infantry, which had deployed and marched forward, was unable to resist the shock of the Hungarian column charging in front.

"It halted; showed signs of hesitation; retreated in haste; and forced back the whole line along with it. The enemy's columns inconsiderately urged on in pursuit, rapidly passed General Kellermann, and presented to him an unprotected flank. Kellermann saw their error, rapidly changed his order of battle into an order of column, with his left in front; and only considering the danger of his comrades, fell like lightning upon the left flank of the Austrians, and took them by surprise whilst in the confusion of victory, and unprotected by their artillery. In an instant six thousand men laid down their arms."

I appeal to all those who have known that brave regiment, what opinion are we to pass upon an assertion which aims at nothing less than depriving it of the splendid glory it had acquired on that day—an assertion belied by the very troops which that regiment had defeated? It is preposterous to

attempt inflicting disgrace upon a whole corps, in order to flatter the vanity of one man.

You are right in asserting in the 13th page that the rapidity of Kellermann's movement made him find the Austrians unprotected by their artillery; for if they had had time to wheel to the left, in order of battle (they were marching in column by division; that is to say, with from twenty to thirty men in front), and had commenced firing, Kellermann would have been annihilated previously to coming up to them. In the same page, 13, you criticise what I state in page 183 (Vol. I. Part I.), in a manner which clearly indicates that you did not understand me, because you read the page I allude to under the influence of your passions. A man of cool judgment would rather have discovered in it an eulogium, than a criticism of Kellermann.

Kellermann was not to charge until General Desaix's attack should have commenced. Now, as he did not even know that Desaix was on the spot, it was necessary that he should be informed of the fact; and this was the commission confided to me by the First Consul. Nothing can be more natural or straightforward than what I have related; and I cannot dissemble my satisfaction at having written it in presence of the cotemporaries of that period.

You pretend, on the contrary, that the whole army had given way, with the single exception of Kellermann. Well, then! as you deny facts, I imitate your example, and appeal to public opinion. You do all in your power to impose upon it; whereas I do not depart from my straightforward and natural course.

You ask me in the same paragraph, with reference to page 181 of my work, "for what reason, if I actually remained near Kellermann, I did not propose to him to make the charge sooner," &c. &c.

You have not read that page more attentively than the one previously adverted to. The order of which I was the bearer

to Kellermann, was of a positive nature, and left no latitude of interpretation: the moment of its execution was strictly laid down.

The only case in which I might have taken upon myself to lead, or, using your own expressions, to exercise control, would have been that of the non-execution of the order I had just communicated. Now, such a case did not occur: there is no necessity therefore to dwell upon conjectures. Heated by your imagination, your anger places you in contradiction with yourself. Kellermann was ignorant of what he was to do (14th page) until I came to explain what was expected of him in that decisive moment. A perverse judgment alone can deny this fact. There is still less propriety in your observation in the same page, "that we had not yet reached those days when Napoleon sent his aides-de-camp to control his general officers."

A military man, who had really been on a field of battle, would be laughed at for making such an assertion.

An aide-de-camp of the Emperor, of the First Consul, or of General Bonaparte, was usually the bearer of verbal orders, when sudden occurrences placed that celebrated warrior under the necessity of altering the instructions he had issued.

From your statement it might be supposed that the First Consul, and at a later period the Emperor, selected his aides-de-camp any where else than in the army. Was it by chance, in closets, or religious houses?

Let us then consider which of those gentlemen were not as capable as yourself of commenting upon an order, of directing its execution, and even, to use your own expression, of controlling a general of brigade.

Can you mean Duroc? He was a colonel at Marengo; and unquestionably he has often exercised a control much better than a general of brigade could have done. Though you pretend to deny facts, even you have not escaped him.

Was it Lauriston? He was likewise a colonel of artillery at Marengo. You will, perhaps, find that it is in the command of the battery of eighty pieces of cannon at Wagram that he failed to justify the Emperor's choice. It is very true that he has not had the merit of claiming that heroic action, nor of keeping himself aloof from the army; for when sent to Vienna in 1810, to perform the duty of captain of the guards near the person of the Empress Maria Louisa, he replied to the compliments which the Archdukes condescended to address to him on the boldness of his offensive movement in that action, that he had done no more than execute the Emperor's order. Was it perchance in the defence of Ragusa, or in the command of the corps confided to him in 1813, that he incurred your displeasure? Consult the records of your topographical department; they will show you what opinion you should entertain of him.

Was it Lemarrois? He was a colonel at that period, having served during the whole war, and especially in the first conquest of Italy, as an aide-de-camp of General Bonaparte. You may, perhaps, find that in his arduous government of Rome in 1809, and in his defence of Magdeburg in 1813 and 1814, he has not justified the confidence of the First Consul.

Was it Lacuée (Gérard)? He was the First Consul's aide-de-camp, and unquestionably equal to the task of controlling many men of high pretensions. But, perhaps, you may be of opinion that he displayed his incapacity by allowing himself to be killed at the head of his regiment.

Was it Lefevre-Desnouettes? He is sufficiently well known for his enterprising character, to render it superfluous to speak of him.

Was it the Duke of Placentia (Lebrun)? He was the First Consul's aide-de-camp at Marengo, and had received his orders to keep near General Desaix during the battle, because I was alone in attendance upon that general, Rapp and Clément, my two comrades, not having yet arrived.

Lebrun received General Desaix in his arms when he was struck by a ball. I do not, however, discover in this circumstance any thing calculated to wound your susceptible feelings.

After the battle, Rapp and I were named aides-de-camp of the First Consul. With the view of following the order of the picture, I shall place myself in the fore-ground.

I am probably the person who was deemed incapable of controlling any one. I have therefore no pretension to such exalted duties. If it has sometimes been otherwise, as it will have been discovered in the course of this work, the Emperor would have it so. It even appears that he has occasionally condescended to speak of the object of his choice in terms free from complaint. You will no doubt find that he should have placed his confidence in safer custody. What is to be done? it is now too late to remedy the evil. It was your duty in fact to warn him that he was committing an error which could never be repaired; that he was mistaken on this occasion, as he had been when he gave to a rout the appellation of a change of front.

I now come to Rapp, who was so well known for his courage, and was wounded wherever he fought. It was perhaps at the siege of Dantzic that he showed himself incapable of controlling a general of brigade. He had been in the service, however, previous to the revolution, and had, as well as myself, been made a colonel in Egypt.

Caffarelli, although our senior in the service, was only named aide-de-camp to the First Consul on his return from Marengo to Paris. Could he by chance have been deemed incapable of controlling a general officer?

It is very true that he had only fought as yet at the head of the 9th light regiment, with the army of Sambre and Meuse, under General Jourdan. You will perhaps find that this was not a sufficient ground for the First Consul's confidence. Let us consider then by what acts Caffarelli may

have failed to justify it. I shall only select one out of a hundred cases I might appeal to; and I make choice of that case because General Kellermann is mentioned in it. It is as follows:—

Caffarelli commanded at Austerlitz one of the divisions of infantry of the corps of Marshal Lannes. He was stationed on the right of the road leading from Brunn to Olmutz.

Kellermann was with his cavalry on the right of that division, and a little in the rear of it.

The attack had just commenced, when, from the spot where he stood watching his marshals, the Emperor perceived Kellermann's cavalry about to make a forward movement. He was at a loss to account for that movement of cavalry at the commencement of the action, and he was too well aware of the fatal effects which invariably attend any disorder of cavalry not to feel some anxiety on the occasion.

He sent me off in all haste to ascertain the meaning of that operation, and to desire that Marshal Lannes would order back those troops. I started at full gallop in the direction of the cavalry, and overtook it at the moment when it was driven back by the hulans of the Russian guard, who were mixed pell-mell with our troops, and kept up a running fight with them in their retreat.

I rode up to Kellermann, whom I perceived in the thick of the conflict (perhaps he may say on this occasion also that he did not see me). The moment was ill-suited to a discussion. It became necessary to follow the torrent which was falling back in disorder upon Caffarelli's division. The confusion was such, that if Caffarelli himself had not hastened to the spot, and ordered intervals to be opened in his battalions, so as to allow a passage for that cavalry, there is no knowing what might have occurred. The artillery-men who were doing duty with some pieces of cannon in advance of Caffarelli's division, were compelled to abandon them for a moment, and to retreat behind the infantry, which at last

opened its fire, when Kellermann was relieved from his painful position. This charge was assuredly not a happy idea: it was, indeed, the only doubtful movement in the whole action; and were it not for Caffarelli's determined coolness, it must have been attended with serious misfortunes.

The Emperor was greatly displeased at that outset, and gave high encomiums to the steadiness displayed by Caffarelli, on whom he bestowed the grand-cross of the legion of honour. He afterwards appointed him minister of war in Italy, and finished by calling him back to be in attendance about his person; a distinction he constantly retained from that moment. This man was also fully adequate to the task of exercising a control in case of need.

Count de Lobau comes next in order after Caffarelli. This was perhaps the general who was so far wanting in experience as to be unable to control any one. Since you are pleased to refute facts, allow me to assist your recollection. Count de Lobau was engaged in active service since 1792. He had been aide-de-camp of General Joubert, who was killed at the battle of Novi.

He afterwards became colonel of the third regiment of the line. He belonged to the garrison of Genoa, where he was severely wounded. The Emperor took him for his aide-de-camp at the camp of Boulogne, where he had noticed the uniform good appearance of the soldiers commanded by this officer.

Count de Lobau is not equal to you in writing poetry; but if you were at the head of a regiment armed with muskets, and he were ordered to attack you with a regiment armed with sticks, I should not venture to bet in your favour. Was it perchance at the battle of Essling that he failed in the performance of his duty?

Let us see if in that case you could again dispute the accuracy of my memory.

At the most critical moment of that ill-fated action,

Boudet's division was driven from the village of Essling; the occupation of which was indispensable towards securing the retreat of the army, and of Massena's corps in particular, which was on our left, and the farthest removed from the bridge we had thrown over the Danube for the purpose of securing our retreat in case of need.

This was an alarming moment; and every thing might be lost by the slightest hesitation.

The Emperor ordered Count de Lobau to take with him the four battalions of fusileers of the guard, and, cost what it might, to carry the village of Essling. Count de Lobau, who had measured the extent of the danger, plunged headlong with those four battalions against a mass of enemies three times his own numbers; carried the village; and although severely wounded, refused to quit the field until he had secured Massena's retreat.

To perpetuate the memory of this deed, the Emperor gave to his aide-de-camp the name of Lobau (an island of the Danube, to which the army retreated); and affixed to the title an allowance commensurate with the satisfaction he experienced at the service performed. In 1813, this general commanded a corps of troops; the Emperor must therefore have considered him fully competent to control general officers. I now come to Durosnel.

He was likewise in active service since 1792, and a colonel of horse-chasseurs.

He afterwards became a general, and an aide-de-camp of the Emperor. Did he perhaps fail to justify the Emperor's confidence in him, when he executed, at Jena, the charge of cavalry which threw the Prussian army into disorder, and determined its retreat?

He was also competent, therefore, to exercise a control over any officer, no matter how high his rank.

Is it General Reille whom you deem unworthy of giving directions to a general of brigade?

He was actively employed since 1792, in the capacity of aide-de-camp to Massena; was with the army of Italy since the first conquest; and was appointed the Emperor's aide-de-camp in 1807.

At the battle of Wagram, he was stationed by the Emperor near Marshal Massena to make up, at the moment of the grand and decisive attack, for any deficiency on the part of that marshal, who was unable to mount his horse, in consequence of an accident he had met with.

The Emperor made him take the command of the brigade of fusileers of the guard, for the purpose of flanking the movement which he was causing Macdonald to execute under cover of the whole artillery of the guard.

Ever since that glorious day, he has been almost constantly employed at the head of a corps: it seems, therefore, that the Emperor considered him competent to exercise a control in case of need, since he so frequently appointed him to a command. The turn of Drouot comes next. Could it be possible, sir, that in your anxiety to refute facts, you should also pretend to include him amongst those aides-de-camp, whom you deem incapable of exercising a control?

Drouot commanded, under Lauriston, the formidable battery of Wagram; he commanded in chief the battery of the no less celebrated engagement at Lutzen; and, in short, he took a particular share in most of the actions which marked the conclusion of the long struggle we were maintaining against Europe in arms. You may, perhaps, in this case also, be of opinion that the Emperor might have made a better choice.

Corbineau was not allowed an opportunity of becoming the object of your criticism, since he was killed by a cannon-shot at Eylau, whilst receiving the Emperor's orders for one of the corps of his army. You will, no doubt, deem that circumstance a fortunate one, as it spared the army from one of its controllers.

I recommend you to revenge yourself upon his brother, who was appointed to replace him; for the Emperor showed him an equal degree of confidence, and often sent him to exercise a control.

I perceive that I have forgotten General Bertrand. Was he, perhaps, unequal to the task of controlling a general of brigade? Such a supposition, if attempted to be brought forward, would excite contempt. Such, however, were the aides-de-camp whom the Emperor employed as the bearers of his verbal orders. No marshal of France ever found fault with their mission: you are as yet the only person who have dared to avow that ridiculous tenderness of feeling.

You are altogether mistaken in the assertion contained in your 14th page.

M. de Melas was fully justified in believing that we had lost the battle. He had returned to Alexandria after ordering that we should be pursued in our retreat; and General Zach was acting in execution of those orders, when he was stopped by General Desaix, and charged by Kellermann.

Fortune turned against him; and to add to his disappointment, he was himself taken prisoner. The approach of night was alone sufficient to prevent M. de Melas from repairing the defeat, although he hastened to the spot as soon as he learned the disaster which had befallen his own troops. He deemed himself fortunate in being enabled to employ the night in ordering across the Bormida a part of the troops which he still had on our bank of the river; and yet there is no doubt that if he had had a few hours longer of daylight, he was still possessed of the means of attempting a fresh effort, whilst those of the First Consul were quite exhausted.

Kellermann did not reach alone the bank of the Bormida; having remained with his brigade, it was possible for him not to see the movement which the army had made by the First Consul's order; but this does not warrant him in asserting that he was left unsupported.

It was not his entreaties to the horse-grenadiers that determined them to join him; it was never found necessary to resort to such means for the purpose of inducing that corps to face any kind of danger: the corps was, moreover, following in this case the direction given to it in the general movement where its proper place was marked out. Your account, however, might lead one to suppose that the presence of General Kellermann calmed the fears of the horse-grenadiers.

Read the report of M. de Melas respecting that action, in the 249th page (*Journal des Sciences Militaires*, number 32, 1st of May, 1828); you will there find that General Oreilly was attacked at Marengo whilst effecting his retreat. This is readily accounted for, when it is considered that the First Consul's movement was nearly completed, and that the troops on reaching their new position fell in with the retreating Austrian troops.

Your 15th page breathes the most bitter feelings against the First Consul, because he related some honourable expressions of General Desaix when on the point of expiring! That criticism is so discreditable, that I must decline replying to it.

I have some cause to be surprised at it, after all the efforts I have witnessed on your part in order to obtain some share of favour in the days of his power; but my astonishment ceases, when I see the pains you are taking to disfigure or efface the monuments of his glory. *

At the end of your 15th page, I am again brought upon the scene; I reply as follows:—

On calculating the time requisite to proceed from General Desaix to the First Consul, and from the latter to Kellermann, as well as to witness the execution of the orders which I conveyed to this General, for my mission only ended there; and bearing in mind the precise moment at which General De-

* See the *Journal des Sciences Militaires*, number 32, 1st of May, 1828, from page 260 inclusive.

saix was killed; that is to say, at the very outset of his attack, it will readily be discovered that I could not be in immediate attendance upon him.

I may farther assert, that had I not stopped to witness Kellermann's charge,* but had repaired to General Desaix, as I could only have done so by rounding San-Juliano, which I should have left on my right hand, I never could have arrived in time.

The very thought, however, of so quick a return never occurred to me; for I had scarcely communicated the order to Kellermann, and replied to his objections, when Desaix commenced his attack.

I shall add to this answer, that when any person directs such a reproach to another, and is not himself a coward, he signs it with his name in large letters, because those details are not of an historical nature.

It seems, however, that the First Consul did not entertain such a suspicion as you do: nevertheless, he was well acquainted with men in general, and especially with those whom he employed in his service.

In your 17th page you improperly reproach the friends of the First Consul with their finding fault with General Kellermann. If you had calmly read my Memoirs, you would have discovered that I find no fault. The whole of your reply is a tissue of criticisms against the First Consul. Now, if you deem it such an honour to attack him, others may be allowed to think that they are at liberty to defend him, without being ashamed of the task.

Consider for a moment the language you ascribe to the First Consul in your 17th page, when you make him address Kellermann in these words: "*You have made a tolerably fair charge.*" You conclude from this expression, that on

* I beheld with my own eyes General Zach taken prisoner by a trooper of the 2nd regiment. His name was Lebœuf, as he told me in answer to my inquiry.

the very night of the battle the First Consul was anxious to shake off every feeling of gratitude towards Kellermann. I shall not contest the accuracy of the expression; for I was not present on the occasion; but I must candidly tell you that I doubt it, for the following reason: I attended a grand levee held at St. Cloud in 1811, or 1812, at which General Kellermann was present. He fancied he had reason to apprehend the effects of certain reports to his prejudice, which had been addressed to the chief of the state, and was anxious to clear himself of the charges. Every one had retired. The Emperor desired me to stop, according to his practice, when he wished to converse with me on any particular subject.

He gave audience to Kellermann, who immediately entered upon the explanation which had brought him to St. Cloud. The Emperor did not allow him to conclude; but expressed how painful it was for him to be spoken to on such matters, and set Kellermann's mind at ease by the following words: "General Kellermann, as often as you are named to me I remember Marengo." I ask the reader whether it was possible for the Emperor to lose on the very night of the battle a recollection which he still retained in 1812?

I now come to your 18th page. If the First Consul had been threatened with all the dangers you depict, in case the battle had been lost, it would have been madness in him to have fought it; because, from Hannibal to his own time, no general ever relied beforehand upon gaining a battle, even when fighting it with every probable chance of success; and this was far from being the case at Marengo. In opposition to what you authoritatively assert in the beginning of your 18th page, I shall observe to you, that if the First Consul had lost the battle; that is to say, if the combined efforts of Generals Desaix and Kellermann had failed of success, he would, at most, have been compelled to retreat to the Po, without however crossing it; because he would have rallied

to his army the divisions of Duhesme, Loison, and Chabran,* as well as the small corps of General Lapoype. With such means at his command, and by the aid of movements combined with the corps of Massena and Suchet, which had resumed operations, he would eventually have overwhelmed M. de Melas, after placing him in the alternative of forcing the passage of the Po, or of marching against Massena. Whichever course that general might have adopted, he would, in either case, have had an enemy in front, and another in his rear. Now, after such a siege as that of Genoa, the battle, whether won or lost, would have exhausted the enemy's ammunition. The First Consul had taken possession of all the Austrian parks of artillery on the line of operations of M. de Melas from Brescia to the Po. This general's ammunition would therefore have shortly failed him. Now, in such a state of things, I appeal to yourself, on which side was the danger? Let us even admit that, contrary to all probability, M. de Melas had been wholly indifferent to the principles of his art, and had left the First Consul's army on the Po; that he had crossed that river at Valence, in order to make a rapid march, and cut off our retreat by the Alps, he was running to a still more certain destruction; because, by such a manœuvre, he was actually promoting the junction of Massena and Suchet with the First Consul. He consequently lost the advantage which he possessed of being able to act against either of them singly; and assuredly the First Consul could not have failed to hasten in pursuit of him with every means at his command. The whole road from France to the Po was moreover covered with troops in full march towards Italy. Independently of

* The three first had already crossed the Po. The First Consul met them behind Tortona, on his return to Milan, two days after the battle. I was with him at the time.

this circumstance, the First Consul had at Dijon a fine corps of reserve completely organised,* which he might have ordered to join him.

You perceive, therefore, that the dangers you depict are quite imaginary.

The First Consul ventured upon a last effort at Marengo, because he had a perfect knowledge of his resources.

You also say, in page 18, that M. de Melas was not aware of the means at his command and of our position, when he adopted the determination to retreat. I am, on the contrary, of opinion that he opened a communication, from the very circumstance of his having a perfect knowledge of our respective resources. You will probably be convinced of it on perusing that part of the Austrian account which relates to this determination. I will now bring it forward; for it is proper, when blame is thrown upon any resolution adopted, that the public should know by whom, and under what circumstances, it came to be resorted to. You will, no doubt, find that the names affixed to that resolution are such as to claim that you should be circumspect in your animadversions. The account runs as follows:—

"General Melas called a council of war, consisting of Generals Ott, Kaïm, and Schettemberg, and of Colonel Best, who performed the duties of quarter-master-general. After having laid before them the exact situation of the army, considered under every aspect, and pointed out that the supply of provisions was only secured up to the 20th of June, he submitted to the council of war the four following questions:—

"1st.—Would it be proper to risk another battle with an army weakened by the loss of ten thousand men, in order to reach the right bank of the Po, and thereby to restore the

* The First Consul passed it in review on his return from Milan to Paris, about a fortnight after the battle.

communications with the hereditary states by the way of Placentia?

"2ndly.—Would it be preferable to choose a passage across the Po, either at Casal or at Valence, and proceed from thence to the Tesino or the Adda?

"3rdly.—Should we leave the whole of our artillery and baggage in the enemy's power; force our way through the French army; reach Genoa, and shut ourselves up in that city?

"4th, and lastly.—Considering the critical position of the hereditary states in consequence of the disasters which have befallen the two armies of Germany and Italy, would it not be more desirable to open a communication with the First Consul, and thereby enable the general-in-chief to bring back to the assistance of the hereditary states a still numerous, well-equipped, and well-conditioned army?

"After a long and mature deliberation, the council of war unanimously adopted the fourth and last proposition. The generals were of opinion that it was no doubt possible to fight an unlimited number of battles in regular succession; but they offered too uncertain a prospect of success; and even a complete victory would not bring about a result so decisive as might be obtained by means of a convention, which would relieve the army from the painful and precarious position into which it had just been involved by peculiar circumstances. The march to Genoa was beset with difficulties, as well as the passage across the Po in the vicinity of Casal. The movement of the army along the Bormida towards Aqui, after abandoning its artillery and baggage, could as little be carried into effect, considering that Bonaparte might get the start of it at Ovada, by keeping the line of the Orba; so that the imperial army would be closed in between the army of reserve and that of Massena. In the second hypothesis, the divisions of Chabran and Lapoype were in a condition to defend the Tesino for a sufficient length of time to

enable the army of reserve to cross the Po; and it would then become impossible to penetrate to Mantua.

"The council of war accordingly determined immediately to propose an armistice of forty-eight hours, for the purpose of burying the slain, and of exchanging the prisoners. They were of opinion that some opportunity would offer in that interval for opening negotiations.

"Major Count Nepperg of the quarter-master-general's staff was sent to the head-quarters of the First Consul. As soon as he made his appearance beyond the *tête-de-pont* the firing ceased, and he was conducted to Bonaparte's head-quarters at Torre di Garofolo. The latter accepted the proposal of the Austrians, on condition that they should instantly evacuate the right bank of the Bormida, and cross over to the left bank.

"Melas gave orders for executing this movement. The armistice was ratified by Bonaparte, and General Skel repaired to the French head-quarters, with the view of opening a negotiation with the First Consul in the name of the Austrian general-in-chief.

"The principal conditions which General Skel was authorised by the council of war to stipulate, were as follows:—

"That the Austrian army should withdraw from the territory of Genoa; even remove its garrisons from Genoa and Savona; and evacuate the whole of the Piedmontese territory and fortresses; but that it might, on the other hand, take up a position along the Tesino, with all the appendages of war, and there wait the orders of its government.

"A staff-officer should proceed to Vienna for the purpose of explaining the situation of the army; and hostilities should cease until his return.

"General Skel repaired to Torre di Garofolo on the 15th of June, at noon-day; but in spite of his endeavours to obtain the conditions proposed by the council of war, or at

least the possession of the Adda, or even of the Oglio, he was unable to succeed. Bonaparte would not yield an inch of ground. It was found necessary to submit to the law of necessity, and abandon to the French the whole of Piedmont, with the fortresses of Tortona, Alexandria, Turin, Cunea, Ceva, Arona, the state of Genoa, including the fortress of that name, Savona, Santa-Maria, the duchy of Parma, including the fortress of Placentia (which surrendered, however, on the 16th of June), the greater part of Lombardy, with the fortress of Pizzighitone, and the castle of Milan.

"The Austrian army retained its arms, artillery, and baggage. It bound itself to evacuate all the fortresses just named, and to retire in three columns behind the Mincio."

You will, I think, be of opinion, after perusing the above sketch, that Melas acted in strict accordance with military rules, by not exposing himself to a fresh disaster, which might have been attended with incalculable misfortunes, even for the hereditary states, which he was called upon to protect from invasion. Had his forces been greater by thirty thousand men than they actually were, he ought still to have acted as he did, in the position in which the course of events had involved him.

Fortunately for him, the capitulation suited the views of the First Consul, who felt it necessary to create a deep impression upon public opinion, in France as well as in Italy, by a blow which might overawe the agitators of disturbance, cement the repose of the western provinces, inspire confidence in timorous minds, and afford him leisure for reorganising Italy. These objects might have been very doubtful of attainment, had he not accepted the proposed capitulation.

There is madness, to say the least of it, in attributing to the battle of Marengo the events of the fifteen years of the Emperor's reign; and no less so in appealing to the foreign

newspapers of the time, in favour of your opinions, when so many eye-witnesses of that event are yet in existence. A person capable of writing such frivolous nonsense would be a much fitter inmate of a madhouse than of the war-office.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS.

TREATY OF THE 25th OF MARCH.

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia and Hungary, and his Majesty the King of Great Britain having taken into consideration the consequences which the invasion of France by Napoleon Bonaparte, and the present situation of that kingdom may have in respect to the security of Europe, have resolved, in concert with his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, and his Majesty the King of Prussia, to apply to this important circumstance the principles consecrated by the treaty of Chaumont. They have accordingly agreed to renew by a solemn treaty, separately signed by each of the four powers with each of the other three, the engagement to preserve against any inroad the order of things so happily re-established in Europe, and to determine the most effectual means of carrying that engagement into effect, as well as of giving it, in the present circumstances, all the extension which is imperatively called for.—With this view:

The said plenipotentiaries, after exchanging their respective full powers, have agreed to the following Articles:—

Art. I.—The high contracting powers above named solemnly bind themselves to unite the resources of their respective states for the purpose of maintaining, in all their integrity, the conditions of the treaty of peace concluded at Paris the 30th of May, 1814, as well as the stipulations laid down and signed at the congress of Vienna, in order to fulfil the clauses of that treaty, to guaranty them from any inroad, and in particular against the designs of Napoleon Bonaparte.

To this effect they agree to direct, in case of need, and in the sense of the Declaration of the 13th of March last, with common concert and accord, all their efforts against him, and against all those who may have already joined his faction,

or may hereafter do so, in order to compel him to desist from his projects, and to place it out of his power ever more to disturb the general peace and tranquillity, under the protection of which the rights, liberty, and independence of nations had just been placed and secured.

Art. II.—Although so elevated and so beneficent an object does not allow of any consideration as to the means destined to obtain it, and the high contracting parties are determined to consecrate to it all those which their respective situations may enable them to command, nevertheless, they have agreed to keep constantly on foot the full complement of a hundred and fifty thousand men each, including at least the proportion of one-tenth part in cavalry, and a due proportion of artillery, independently of the garrisons, and to employ them actively and in concert against the common enemy.

Art. III.—The high contracting powers reciprocally engage not to lay down their arms except by common accord, and until the object of the war, which is defined in Article I. of the present treaty, shall have been attained in so far as that Bonaparte shall have been *absolutely* deprived of the means of exciting disturbances, and of renewing his attempts to seize upon the supreme power in France.

Art. IV.—The present treaty being principally applicable to existing circumstances, the stipulations of the treaty of Chaumont, and those in particular which are contained in Article XVI., shall again be in full force and vigour, as soon as the present object shall have been attained.

Art. V.—Whatever relates to the command of the combined armies, to the means of subsistence, &c. shall be regulated by a special convention.

Art. VI.—The high contracting powers shall have the faculty of respectively appointing near the persons of the generals commanding their armies accredited officers, who shall be at liberty to correspond with their governments, with the view of informing them of the military events, and of whatever relates to the operations of armies.

Art. VII.—The engagements stipulated by the present treaty having for their object the maintenance of the general peace, the high contracting parties agree amongst themselves to invite all the powers of Europe to accede to it.

Art. VIII.—The present treaty being exclusively directed to the object of supporting France, or any other invaded country against the enterprise of Bonaparte and his adherents, his Most Christian Majesty (the King of France) shall be specially invited to give in his adhesion, and to make known, in the event of his having occasion to require the force stipulated in Article II., what assistance circumstances may enable him to adapt to the object of the present treaty.

Art. IX.—The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged in two months, or sooner, if possible.

In proof of which, &c.

DECLARATION OF ENGLAND WITH RESPECT TO THE TREATY OF THE 25th OF MARCH.

The undersigned, in exchanging the ratifications of the treaty of the 25th of March last, is instructed to declare that Article VIII. of the said treaty, by which his Most Christian Majesty is invited to accede to it under certain stipulations, must be understood as binding the contracting parties, under principles of mutual security, to a common effort against the *power* of Napoleon Bonaparte, in execution of Article III. of the said treaty; but that it is not to be understood as binding his Britannic Majesty to follow up the war with the view of *imposing any particular government upon France.* However solicitous the Prince Regent may be to see his Most Christian Majesty restored to the throne, and however desirous to contribute, conjointly with his allies, to so happy an event, nevertheless, he deems himself called upon to make this declaration, at the moment of the exchange of the ratifications, as much out of consideration to what is due to the interests of his Most Christian Majesty in France, as in accordance with the principles upon which the English government has invariably regulated its conduct.

ADHESION OF AUSTRIA TO THE DECLARATION OF ENGLAND.

The undersigned minister of state and of foreign affairs of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria having informed his august master of the communications made to him by Lord Castlereagh, concerning Article VIII. of the treaty of the 25th of March last, has received his Majesty's orders to declare that the interpretation given to that article by the British government is in perfect accordance with the principles upon which his Imperial Majesty intends to regulate his policy during the course of the present war.

Although irrevocably determined to direct all his efforts against the usurpation of Napoleon Bonaparte, in the manner in which that object has been expressed in Article VIII. of the said treaty, and to act with his allies in the most perfect concert; nevertheless, the Emperor is convinced that the duty which is imposed upon him with reference to the interests of his subjects, and to his own principles, does not allow him to pursue the war with the view of *imposing any particular government upon France.*

However sincere may be the wish entertained by his Majesty the Emperor of

seeing his Most Christian Majesty replaced upon the throne, and however constant his desire of contributing, with his allies, towards the attainment of so desirable an object, his Majesty has nevertheless deemed it right to reply by this explanation to the declaration delivered in by his Excellency Lord Castlereagh on the occasion of exchanging the ratifications of the treaty, which declaration the undersigned is fully authorised to accept.

(Signed) METTERNICH.

Vienna, 9th of May, 1815.

EXTRACT FROM THE RECORDS OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Council of Ministers.

SITTING OF THE 29th OF MARCH.

The Duke of Otranto, minister of general police, represents that he is about to read a Declaration, dated Vienna, the 13th, and which is supposed to have emanated from the Congress :—

That this declaration appears to him to be apocryphal, as it encourages to assassinate the Emperor. If it could be true, it would be unexampled in the history of the world. The libellous style in which it is written gives reason to suppose that it should be classed amongst those documents fabricated by party spirit, and by those pamphlet-writers who have of late years taken upon themselves to meddle in all state affairs. It is pretended to be signed by English ministers; and yet it is impossible to believe that the ministers of a free nation, that Lord Wellington in particular, could have adopted a step which is contrary to the legislation of their country, and to their character. It is pretended to be signed by the ministers of Austria; and yet it is impossible to conceive, whatever political dissensions may otherwise exist, that a father could recommend the assassination of his son; it is contrary to every principle of morality and religion, and an attack upon the loyal character of the august sovereigns whose representatives have been thus compromised by the libellers. This declaration was known for some days past; but, owing to the considerations just adverted to, it could only be deemed worthy of profound contempt, and was not held to be of a nature to claim the attention of the ministry, until official reports received from Strasburg and Metz had communicated that it was brought to France by the couriers of the Prince of Benevento; a fact established by the result of the inquiry made, and of the interrogatories which have taken place. It is demonstrated, in short, that this document, which cannot have been signed by the ministers of Austria, Russia, England, and Prussia, has emanated from

the legation of the Count de Lille at Vienna; which legation has added to the crime of provoking assassination, that of falsifying the signatures of the members of the Congress.

The pretended declaration of the Congress, the reports from Strasburg and Metz, as well as the inquiry made, and interrogatories taken by order of the minister of general police, and which prove that the said declaration has emanated from the legation of Count de Lille at Vienna, shall be sent to the presidents of sections of the council.

(A true copy)
(Signed) THE DUKE OF BASSANO,
Minister Secretary of State.

DECLARATION.

The Powers which have signed the treaty of peace, being united in congress at Vienna, and informed of the invasion of Napoleon Bonaparte, and of his entrance into France by main force, owe to their own dignity, and to the maintenance of social order, a solemn declaration of the sentiments with which that event has inspired them.

By thus breaking the convention which had established him in the island of Elba, Bonaparte destroys the only legal title to which his existence was attached. By re-appearing in France with projects of disturbance and convulsion, he has deprived himself of the protection of the laws, and has manifested in the face of the world that there can exist neither peace nor truce with him.

The Powers accordingly declare that Napoleon Bonaparte has placed himself out of the pale of civil and social relations, and that as an enemy of public repose and a disturber of the world, he has laid himself at the mercy of public vengeance.

They declare, at the same time, that being firmly resolved to maintain in their integrity the treaty of peace of the 30th of May, 1814, and the clauses sanctioned by that treaty, as well as those which they have since adopted, or may further determine upon with a view to complete or consolidate that treaty, they will employ all their means and unite all their efforts to the end that the general peace, the object of the wishes of Europe, and the constant aim of their labours, may not be again disturbed, and that it may be guarantied from any attempt which might threaten to involve the nations composing it in the disorders and calamities incidental to revolutions.

And although they entertain a full conviction that the whole of France rallying round its legitimate Sovereign will immediately crush this criminal and powerless attempt, all the Sovereigns of Europe, being animated by the same sentiments and guided by the same principles, declare that if, contrary to every expectation, there could possibly result any real danger from this event, they are ready to afford to the King of France, and to the French nation, or to any

other government that might be attacked, as soon as a demand might be made to that effect, every assistance requisite for the purpose of restoring public tranquillity, and to make common cause against all those who might attempt to compromise it.

The present Declaration, inserted in the protocol of the Congress united at Vienna in the sitting of the 13th of March, 1815, shall be made public.

Done and certified a true copy by the plenipotentiaries of the eight Powers which have signed the treaty of Paris.

Here follow the signatures in the (French) alphabetical order of the courts.

Austria	Prince de Metternich. Baron de Wessenberg.
Spain	P. Gomes Labrador.
France	Prince de Talleyrand. Duke de Dalberg. La Tour Dupin. Count Alexis de Noailles.
Great Britain	Wellington. Clancarty. Cathcart.
Portugal	Count de Palmella. Saldanha. Lobo.
Prussia	Prince de Hardenberg. Baron de Humboldt.
Russia	Count de Razoumowski. Count de Stackelberg. Count de Nesselrode.
Sweden	Loewenhielm.

Louis, by the grace of God, King of France and of Navarre, to all those who these presents shall see, greeting:

Art. XII. of the Constitutional Charter specially enjoins us to make the necessary regulations and ordinances for the security of the state. It would be vitally compromised if we did not adopt prompt measures for the purpose of checking the enterprise just formed on one of the points of the kingdom, and arresting the effect of the plots and attempts which have a tendency to excite a civil war, and to destroy the government.

For these reasons, and upon the report made to us by our trusty and beloved knight, chancellor of France, the Sieur Dambray, commander of our orders, with the advice of our council, we have ordered and declared as follows:—

Art. I.—Napoleon Bonaparte is declared a traitor and a rebel, for having introduced himself by main force in the department of the Var. All governors, commandants of troops, national guards, civil authorities, and even plain citizens, are enjoined to pursue, arrest, and bring him forthwith before a council of war, which, after assuring itself of his identity, shall call for the application against him of the punishments decreed by the law.

Art. II.—The same punishments shall be inflicted upon military men, or persons otherwise employed, whatever may be their rank, who have accompanied or followed the said Bonaparte in his invasion of the French territory, as being guilty of the same crimes, unless within the space of eight days, reckoning from the publication of the present ordinance, they surrender themselves to our governors, commandants of military divisions, generals, or civil administrators.

Art. III.—All civil and military administrators, chiefs, or other persons employed in the said administrations, paymasters and receivers of public funds, even plain citizens who may directly or indirectly afford aid and assistance to Bonaparte, shall likewise be pursued and punished as abettors and accomplices of rebellion, and of attempts aiming at an alteration in the form of the government, and at provoking a civil war.

Art. IV.—The like punishments shall be inflicted, conformably to article 102 of the penal code, against those who by speeches in public places or meetings, by the distribution of placards, or by any printed documents, shall have taken part, or induced the citizens to take part in the revolt, or shall have abstained from opposing it.

Art. V.—Our chancellor, our ministers secretaries of state, and our director-general of police, each one in what concerns him, are charged with the execution of the present ordinance, which shall be inserted in the *bulletin des lois*, addressed to all the governors of military divisions, generals, commandants, prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors of our kingdom, with orders that they shall cause it to be printed and posted up in Paris and other towns, and wherever it may be deemed necessary.

Done at the palace of the Tuileries, the 6th of March, 1815, and the twentieth year of our reign.

(Signed) Louis.

By the King.

(Signed) Dambray, Chancellor of France.

LETTER FROM THE EMPEROR TO GENERAL GROUCHY.

M. le Comte Grouchy, the King's Ordinance, under date the 6th of March, and the Declaration signed on the 13th at Vienna by his ministers, might authorise

me to treat the Duke d'Angoulême as the said declaration and ordinance directed that I and my family should be treated. Persisting, however, in the motives which had induced me to order that the members of the family of the Bourbons should be allowed to quit France unmolested, it is my intention that you should give instructions for conducting the Duke d'Angoulême to Cette, where he is to be embarked; and that you should watch over his personal safety, and prevent his meeting with any ill usage.

You will merely take care to remove the funds which have been carried away from the public chests; and to demand of the Duke d'Angoulême that he shall bind himself to procure the restoration of the crown diamonds, which are national property. You will make known to him, at the same time, the clauses of the laws emanating from the national assemblies, which have been revived, and which apply to the members of the family of the Bourbons who should enter the French territory. You will thank, in my name, the national guards, for the patriotism and zeal they have displayed, and the attachment they have shown to me in these important circumstances.

At the palace of the Tuileries, the 11th of April, 1815.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

ADDRESS OF THE CHAMP-DE-MAI.

Sire,

The French people had assigned the crown to you. You laid it down without their consent; their suffrages have just imposed upon you the duty of resuming it. A fresh contract has been formed between the nation and your Majesty. Assembled from all points of the kingdom round the tables of the law, where we come to inscribe the vote of the people, that vote which is the only legitimate source of power, it is impossible for us to omit proclaiming aloud the unanimous voice of France, of which we are the immediate organs, or to neglect saying, in the presence of Europe, to the august chief of the nation what she expects of him, and what he has a right to expect from her.

Our expressions shall be clothed in that gravity of language which is inspired by existing circumstances.

What is the object aimed at by the league of allied Sovereigns, with that demonstration of war, so terrifying for Europe, and so appalling to humanity?

By what act, by what violation, have we provoked their vengeance, or given a motive for their aggression?

Have we, since the peace, attempted to impose laws upon them? We merely pretend to enjoin respect for those which are adapted to our manners.

We reject the chief whom our enemies pretend to impose upon us; and we make choice of him whom they reject.

They dare to proscribe you personally; you, Sire, who, so often master of their capitals, have generously secured them upon their tottering thrones!.... This hatred of our enemies increases our affection for you. If the humblest of our citizens were proscribed, we should deem ourselves bound to protect him with equal energy; like you, he should be placed under the shield of the law, and of the power of France.

We are threatened with an invasion! And yet, although confined within limits which nature has not imposed upon us, and which, a long time previously to your own reign, victory and peace itself had extended, we had not broken down that circumscribed limit, because we felt a respect for treaties which you have not signed, but which you offered to abide by.

Is no apprehension felt of recalling to us a time and a state of things so widely different in former days from what they are at present, and which might yet come to pass? Are guarantees the only object required? They are all to be found in our institutions, and in the will of the French people, which is henceforth united with your own.

This would not be the first time that we should have defeated the whole of Europe armed against us.

Those sacred and imprescriptible rights which the most insignificant people has never claimed in vain from the tribunal of justice and of history, are attempted to be denied to the French nation for the second time, in the nineteenth century, in the face of the civilised world!

Because France insists upon still remaining France, must she be degraded, torn asunder, and dismembered? Is the fate of Poland reserved for us?

In vain is it attempted to cloak evil designs under the appearance of the mere attempt to separate us from you, and yield us up to masters with whom we no longer have any thing in common, whom we no longer understand, and who are incapable of understanding us; who neither seem to belong to the age nor to the nation which has received them for a moment within her bosom, merely to witness the proscription and degradation by them of her worthiest citizens.

Their presence has destroyed every illusion that still clung to their name.

They could no longer trust to our oaths; we could no longer rely upon their promises. The system of tithes, of feudal tenure, of privileges, whatever was most odious to us, was too manifestly the object and aim of all their thoughts; when one of their number, with the view of assuaging the impatient feelings of the present moment, was assuring his confidants that he would guaranty the future to them.

What each one of us had considered for twenty-five years as a title to glory, as services worthy of reward, was deemed by them to be a title of proscription, a stamp of reprobation.

A million of functionaries, of magistrates, who for the last twenty-five years follow the same maxims, and amongst whom we have just selected our represen-

tatives; five hundred thousand warriors, our strength and our glory; six millions of land-owners, whose rights are sanctioned by the revolution; a still greater number of enlightened citizens, who make a deliberate profession of those ideas which have grown up to be political dogmas amongst us; all those worthy Frenchmen were not the French of the Bourbons: these would only reign for a handful of privileged men, who have been either punished or pardoned for the last twenty-five years.

Public opinion itself, that sacred property of man, has been subjected to rigorous search, and persecuted by them in the very sanctuary of literature and the fine arts.

Sire, a throne restored for a moment by foreign armies, and surrounded by incurable errors, has crumbled the very instant you appeared; because you brought us back from a place of retirement, which is prolific in mighty conceptions for mighty characters only, all the elements of our true glory, all the hopes of our true prosperity.

How could your triumphal march from Cannes to Paris have failed to open every eye? Does the history of any nation or of any age exhibit a more national, a more heroic, a more imposing scene? Is not that triumph, unbought by a single drop of blood, sufficient to undeceive our enemies?.... Do they desire a more sanguinary one? Well then, Sire, you may expect from us whatever a hero, the founder of an empire, has a right to expect from a nation alike faithful, energetic, generous, and immoveable in her principles, unchangeable in the object of her efforts, which consists in securing her independence of every other nation, and her internal freedom.

The three branches of the legislature are about to commence their functions; one sentiment will animate them. Confiding in the promises of your Majesty, we repose in our representatives and in the Chamber of Peers the care of revising, consolidating, and perfecting in concert, without precipitancy or convulsion, but, on the contrary, with maturity and wisdom, our constitutional system, and the institutions which are to secure to us the guarantee of its enjoyment.

Nevertheless, if we are compelled to fight, every breast must send forth this uniform cry: "Let us march to the enemy, who would pretend to treat us like the lowest in the scale of nations! Let us rally round the throne, where sits the father and chief of the people and of the army."

Sire, nothing is impossible; nothing shall be spared that may secure to us our honour and our independence, treasures more valuable than life itself. Every thing shall be attempted, every thing effected, with the view of repelling an ignominious yoke. We proclaim it aloud to all nations. May their chiefs hear our voices! If they accept our offers of peace, the French people will expect from your administration, equally distinguished by its strength, its liberal and its paternal sentiments, sufficient motives of consolation for the sacrifices which the peace shall have cost her. But if we are only left the alternative of war or degradation, the whole nation rises up in arms. She is ready to release you from those offers,

perhaps too moderate in their nature, which you have made in order to spare Europe from a fresh convulsion. Every Frenchman is a soldier: victory will accompany your eagles; and our enemies, who calculated upon our internal dissensions, will soon regret having provoked us.

THE EMPEROR'S REPLY.

Gentlemen electors of the colleges of departments and districts;

Gentlemen deputies of the land and sea-forces at the *Champ-de Mai*;

Emperor, consul, soldier, I hold every thing from the people. Whether in prosperity or adversity, on the field of battle, in the council, on the throne, or in exile, France has been the only, the constant object of my thoughts and of my actions.

In imitation of a king of Athens, I sacrificed myself for my people, in hopes of witnessing the realisation of the promise given, that France should be maintained in her natural integrity, her honour, and her rights.

Indignation at beholding those sacred rights, acquired by twenty-five years of victories, disowned and lost for ever, the cry of tarnished French honour, the wishes of the nation have brought me back to that throne which is dear to me, because it is the palladium of our independence, of the honour and rights of the people.

Frenchmen, whilst crossing in the midst of public rejoicings the various provinces of the empire on my way to my capital, it was natural for me to rely upon a peace of long duration; nations are bound by the treaties concluded by their governments, whatever may be the form of those governments.

My mind was, therefore, exclusively bent upon the means of establishing our liberty by a constitution in unison with the will and the interest of the people; I convoked the *Champ-de-Mai*.

I soon learned that Sovereigns who have disowned every principle, crushed public opinion, and the dearest interests of so many nations, pretend to wage war against us. They meditate to give extension to the kingdom of the Low Countries, and to assign for its limits all our fortresses on the northern frontier, and to conciliate the differences which still keep them disunited, by dividing Lorraine and Alsace amongst them.

It became necessary to prepare for war.

Nevertheless, as I am about to run the hazard of battles, my first care has necessarily been to constitute the nation without further delay. The people have accepted the act which I have presented to them.

Frenchmen, after we shall have repelled those unjust aggressions, and Europe shall have acquired a just sense of what is due to the rights and independence of twenty millions of Frenchmen, a solemn law, drawn up according to the forms

required by the Constitutional Act, will combine the different scattered clauses of the constitution at present in existence.

Frenchmen, you are about to return to your departments; tell the citizens that the present crisis is of the utmost importance; that with union, energy, and perseverance, we will come victorious out of this contest of a great people against its oppressors; that future generations will severely scrutinise our conduct; that a nation has lost every thing when it has lost its independence. Tell them that foreign kings whom I have elevated to the throne, or who owe to me the preservation of their crowns, who have one and all, in the days of my prosperity, courted my alliance and the protection of the French people, now direct all their blows against my person. If I did not perceive that they aim at ruining our country, I should willingly place at their mercy that existence which appears to excite all their rancour. But you will likewise tell the citizens, that as long as the French shall retain for me those sentiments of affection, of which they give me so many proofs, that rage of our enemies will be altogether powerless.

Frenchmen, my will is that of the people; my rights are its own rights; my honour, my glory, my happiness, can be no other than the honour, the glory, and the happiness of France.

INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE MINISTER OF MARINE TO CAPTAINS PHILIBERT, COMMANDING THE SAALE, AND PONCE', COMMANDING THE MEDUSE.

(MOST CONFIDENTIAL.)

The two frigates are destined to transport to the United States of America the individual who was recently our Emperor.

He will embark on board the *Saale*, with such persons of his suite as he may point out.

The rest will embark on board the *Meduse*.

The private baggage will be distributed on board the frigates in the manner he may desire.

If either before the departure or during the passage the *Meduse* should appear to be a much better sailer than the *Saale*, he would embark on board the *Meduse*, and Captains Philibert and Poncé would exchange commands.

The greatest secrecy must be observed with respect to the embarkation, which is to be effected under the special superintendence of the maritime prefect, as well as with respect to the individual on board.

Napoleon travels *incognito*; and he will himself make known the title and name which he may be desirous to assume.

Immediately after his embarkation, all communication with the shore must cease.

The commanders of the frigates, the officers and crews will find in the dictates of their hearts sufficient motives for treating the individual on board with all the consideration and respect which is due to his situation, and to the crown which once encircled his brows.

The utmost honours shall be paid to him on board, unless he should decline them. He will dispose of the interior of the frigates for his accommodation in the manner best suited to his wishes, without interfering with their means of defence. His table and personal service shall be attended to according to his own directions.

He will dispose of whatever may contribute to the accommodation of his voyage, without any attention to expense; and the maritime prefect has received instruction to that effect.

The prefect shall send on board as much provisions for himself and his suite as is consistent with the impenetrable secrecy to be observed respecting his abode and his embarkation.

Napoleon being once embarked, the frigates shall put to sea within twenty-four hours at latest, if the wind should permit, and if the enemy's cruisers should not obstruct their departure.

They will remain twenty-four hours in the roads after Napoleon's embarkation, only in case he should desire it; for it is of importance that they should set sail as soon as possible.

The frigates will proceed with the utmost rapidity to the United States of America, and land Napoleon and suite at Philadelphia or Boston, or any other port of the United States which they might find it easiest to reach within a shorter delay.

The commanders of the two frigates are forbidden to enter any roads from which they might find it equally difficult and attended with delay to extricate themselves. They are only authorised to do so in case it might become necessary for the safety of the ships.

They will avoid every ship of war they may fall in with. If compelled to fight against superior forces, the frigate on board of which Napoleon shall not be embarked will sacrifice itself to draw off the enemy, and to give to the one which conveys him the means of effecting its escape.

I have no occasion to remind the commanders that the Chambers and the Government have placed the person of Napoleon under the safeguard of French loyalty.

Once arrived in the United States, the landing is to be effected with every possible dispatch; and unless the frigates should be prevented by superior forces, they are not to remain there, under any pretence whatever, for a longer time than twenty-four hours; but must immediately return to France.

The laws and regulations respecting the police of ships at sea, and the military

subordination of persons embarked as passengers, with reference to the commanders of those vessels, are to be observed in all their rigour.

I recommend to the inward sense which the captains entertain of their duties, and to their delicacy of feeling, every object that might not have been foreseen by these instructions.

I have nothing to add to what I have above stated, that the person of Napoleon is placed under the safeguard of the loyalty of the French people; and this deposit is specially confided in the present circumstance to the captains of the *Saale* and of the *Meduse*, as well as to the officers and crews of both ships.

Such are the orders which the Commission of Government has directed me to transmit to Captains Philibert and Poncé.

THE DUKE DECRES.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER.

M. de Villoutrey—His complaint—My reply.

THE newspapers have just published a complaint with reference to the account I have given of the affair at Baylen: this document contains assertions which it behoves me not to leave unanswered.

At the period in question, I was commissioned to direct the operations of the various corps which held military occupation of Spain; I could not therefore feel an interest in imputing to any one the faults which applied to another; for, by whomsoever committed, I was in no manner affected by the consequences.

I only learned the unfortunate occurrence at Baylen by the report of M. de Villoutrey, who brought me at Madrid the tidings of that wretched capitulation. The details I have related were furnished me by himself. He, no doubt, took the natural precaution of omitting on that occasion certain circumstances ill calculated to create an impression in his favour; but this very reserve on his part called for the subsequent revelation of facts. I had transmitted the report, such as it was furnished to me: the Emperor deemed it of an obscure and incomplete nature; and insisted upon knowing what it was attempted to conceal from him. He directed General Nansouty to call for the deficient information. In his character of first equerry to the sovereign, the general sent for his subordinate officer, and subjected him to a formal interrogatory. We were then at St. Cloud. Feeling impatient to learn the full particulars of this unpleasant business, the Emperor overwhelmed me with questions, to which I could only reply by affording the particulars which M. de Villoutrey had furnished to me.

As these were inconclusive, and failed to clear up his doubts, the Emperor sent me to attend the interrogatory which the person who had made those communications to me was then undergoing. I obeyed his injunctions. The questions put were equally clear and precise; M. de Villoutrey was unable to elude them, and admitted all the circumstances which he now pretends to deny. His avowals were of such a nature, that, after having received them, General Nansouty deemed it incumbent upon him to urge his giving in his resignation. Now, I ask, how can this act of rigour be reconciled with the version now tendered by M. de Villoutrey? If the share which he took in the disgraceful transaction at Baylen was confined to a mere transmission of orders, to what cause are we to ascribe his silence at Madrid, his avowals at St. Cloud, and his consequent expulsion? Let us, however, dismiss these questions, and consider whether the part of an equerry was so irresponsible as he pretends it to be.

General Dupont found himself, with one of his divisions, separated from the two centres of his corps of troops by the position taken up by the Spanish general, Reding. He failed in an attempt to dislodge him, and resorted to a negotiation with the view of extricating himself. When he opened a communication with the Spaniards, he was ignorant of the movement which General Vedel was undertaking for the purpose of extricating him: it was, no doubt, natural for him to suppose, that the report of the firing would reach his subordinate officer, who would necessarily hasten to his relief; but, in short, he had not received any intimation that could afford him such a security, and he could only rely upon his own resources to clear himself from the difficult position in which he was involved.

He had accordingly just concluded an armistice with General Reding. Now, in a situation already sufficiently painful, what could General Dupont dread more than that General Castaños, whom he had left at Andujar, should be

made acquainted with his embarrassment, and hasten to the spot in order to complete his misfortune, as it actually came to pass? I ask it of military men of all nations, and particularly of those who have known General Dupont: can it possibly be credited, that in this state of things he should have sent of his own accord one of the officers of his staff to inform General Castaños of that which it was most important not to make known? This is revolting to common sense; and until I see the order signed by General Dupont himself, I cannot believe the assertion, and must abide by the admissions made at St. Cloud in my presence; which admissions are in accordance with what had been told to me at Madrid, and are corroborated by the natural order of things: for it is clear that Dupont must have sent upon the road to Andujar, for the purpose of ascertaining if Castaños was approaching, and of acting accordingly.

Had it not been for this absurd excursion to M. de Castaños, Dupont, who had just obtained the terms of being allowed to recross the Sierra Morena with arms and baggage on his return to Madrid, might have compelled General Reding to carry his engagement into effect. It was the more in his power to enforce it, as General Vedel's arrival had altered the aspect of affairs; and the position of the Spanish general had become as intricate as that of General Dupont previously to the junction of his subordinate officer. The march of General Castaños brought on a fresh change in the relative circumstances of both parties.

Whatever M. de Villoutrey asserts respecting the pretended knowledge possessed by General Castaños of what was taking place at Baylen, and especially respecting Vedel's arrival, is manifestly false. In consequence of the position occupied by General Dupont, Reding could have no sure means of communication with Castaños, except by Mangibar and the left bank of the Guadalquivir. M. de Villoutrey states, that the latter did not reach Baylen until the 20th.

Now, how is it possible to suppose that he would have remained inactive at Andujar, knowing that Reding's division might from one moment to another be compelled to lay down its arms? This assertion would be sufficient to show what degree of confidence is due to M. de Villoutrey's version of the affair.

I have another observation to make: this officer left Dupont in order to repair to General Castaños: the armistice was concluded; but nothing indicated the proximate arrival of Vedel, which did not take place until the afternoon of the same day. Vedel attacked Reding at the instant of his arrival; how then could the success which he obtained have been known at the Spanish head-quarters, when M. de Villoutrey made his appearance, since he had left Baylen previously to Vedel's arrival, and had taken the direct road to Andujar? On the other hand, the officer whom Reding is supposed to have dispatched to Castaños could only have proceeded on his journey after the battle: he must have passed through Mangibar, and have followed the left bank of the Guadalquivir; notwithstanding which, he had arrived before M. de Villoutrey! Such an assertion refutes itself.

M. de Villoutrey complains of not being able to obtain satisfaction: satisfaction for what? For his valuable services? let him apply to Castaños. For the sentiments he has inspired me with? his conduct justifies them. For the severity of the Emperor, who dismissed him from his household? let him apply to the police of Bordeaux, which gave the information that this officer, who was sent in all haste to Madrid, made no difficulty of throwing away twenty-four hours in exchanging Spanish gold, and procuring drafts upon Paris. Such circumstances were not calculated to recommend him: for the Emperor was well aware that the paymaster did not issue money in doubloons; and had he done so, a subaltern officer never received them in such quantities as to be overburdened with them. M. de Villoutrey is, besides, fully

aware that, had I offended him, I was not the first in order of date: he no doubt recollects M. R——, and the treatment he received at his hands; why did he not first call upon him? I must, however, declare that I never received the challenges which M. de Villoutrey alleges that he sent to me. Had he so far forgot himself, had an humble staff-officer presumed to call out his general-in-chief, as he boasts of having done, in that case it must be acknowledged that the hatred *I bear towards him for the last twenty years* did not much engage my attention, or that I am not likely to take advantage of my position to gratify a feeling of personal revenge; for had I wished to press heavily upon M. de Villoutrey, I do not think that materials were wanting to me.

M. de Villoutrey appeals to the army! What has he in common with it? Having entered our ranks *in virtue of orders*, he was almost immediately driven from them in consequence of the share he had taken in an act unheard-of in our annals. Our reverses placed the army at the mercy of his accomplices. He was recalled, was even dignified with the title of superior officer, and signalised himself by an action worthy of his first outset. Distinguished as an officious commissioner of Castaños at Baylen, as a deserter at Waterloo, by what right does M. de Villoutrey claim connexion with the gallant men whom he abandoned in the moment of danger? By what title does he take advantage of a kind of military companionship in which he never held any share?

M. de Villoutrey, however, is uncandid in his complaints: for he cannot have forgotten that the only time I ever met him, since that transaction of the month of July, 1808, was on the occasion of his soliciting an audience of me (I was then a minister), for the purpose of requesting that I would extricate him from the painful situation in which he was involved in consequence of the aforesaid transaction; and unquestionably, had I taken advantage of all the details I have

just related, and communicated them to the imperial solicitor of the supreme court before which he was interrogated, matters might have turned out very differently in respect to him. The Emperor had also recommended that no advantage should be taken of the equerry's admissions to General Nansouty; he considered them in the light of confidential avowals, and forbade any use being made of them. This does not savour much of those sentiments which form the ground of M. de Villoutrey's complaints. It appears to me that, on the part of the sovereign as well as of the minister, there was exhibited a degree of magnanimity which demanded a suitable acknowledgment from the person who was the object of it. When an individual is thus circumstanced in public opinion, a sense of shame and propriety should render him more circumspect in the choice of his language, and in recalling facts to recollection. Previously to coupling the Emperor's name with an insulting expression, it would behove him to remember how he came to be admitted to his presence, and never to forget by what unlucky accident an humble equerry was transformed into a staff-officer. A prince possessed of less kindness and indulgence would not have deemed such a transformation possible; he was mistaken, and sent the *inpromptu* officer to Spain. But it ill becomes M. de Villoutrey to make such a mistake a matter of reproach against the Emperor; neither ought he to complain that the sovereign should have so soon closed the career of his services. His first outset had been far too brilliant not to call for the immediate sentence upon it: this is quite enough.

THE account of the battle of Austerlitz exhibits a chasm, which will no doubt have been noticed by the reader. It is to be ascribed to the omission of a sheet, accidentally mislaid during the author's absence. The reader will therefore consider the following passage as being to be added after these words: *The night was so dark;* in page 137, 2nd part of vol. 1.

The night was so dark that we lost ourselves on our return to head-quarters; and had we not fallen into the bivouacs of Caffarelli's division, there is no knowing what might have happened to us.

The Emperor came to pass the night in a miserable hovel on the road to Brunn, situated at its point of junction with the road to Austerlitz. He was much exhausted with fatigue, but so well satisfied at the same time with the manner in which every one had done his duty, that he was in excellent humour, and granted every request which was made to him. He invited all present to sup with him. When I talk of supper, I mean to say that every one sat down to table, and that provisions were supplied by the soldiers stationed in the vicinity. The Emperor's attendants were seeking for him on the field of battle, and did not arrive until he had composed himself to rest. He had given directions that the cavalry should scour the country from break of day, in order to ascertain in what direction the Russians had retreated. These reconnoitrings, which are so essential in warfare, were always injudiciously carried on in our army: on this occasion, especially, Marshal Murat was on the point of committing a signal fault. He reported to the Emperor that the Russian

army had advanced during the night, for the purpose of resuming the road to Olmutz. This intelligence was the more readily believed, as their line of operations passed through that road, and all their baggage and ammunition were still in that town. In consequence of this report, the Emperor directed the whole of the cavalry and of the corps of Marshal Lannes to take the road to Olmutz, and made the remainder of the army manœuvre accordingly. He had even sent orders to Marshal Davout to unite Friant's division with that of General Gudin, and march upon Goding, where a bridge is built over the Marche; a river equal in size to the Marne, or from twenty to twenty-five toises in breadth, which separates Moravia from Hungary.

Whilst the army was commencing this movement, the Emperor mounted his horse, and directed the whole of his mounted guard to follow him. He took the road to Austerlitz; riding, according to his usual practice, from one height to another, and sending officers in every direction where he could not repair in person. He arrived at the village of Austerlitz, and inquired who was the owner of the castle. He was told that it belonged to the *Prince de Kaunitz*. This was the first, not the property of Prince Lichtenstein, which we had met with in Moravia. He sent for the burgomaster and keeper of the castle; and learned from them that the Emperors of Russia and Austria had passed the night at the castle of Austerlitz, which they had left that very morning, four or five hours before, taking the road leading to Olitsch: the army had proceeded in the same direction.

The Emperor interrupted the conversation, vented some expressions of ill-humour against Marshal Murat, and sent orders for the army to take the road to Olitsch. This retrograde movement was attended with delay, and took up some time, so that the day was almost wholly lost to us. It would have been altogether so, had he not sent M. de Thiars with his

mounted guard to ascertain what had become of the enemy. This officer returned after the lapse of an hour, having found the Russians posted at a short distance. The Emperor ordered up the nearest troops, which were those under the command of Bernadotte, and sent them in the direction where M. de Thiars had left the enemy.

Whilst waiting until that corps had filed off through Austerlitz, and until Marshals Lannes and Murat should return, the Emperor entered the castle, where he established his head-quarters. An Austrian courier was found there who had been *dispatched* from Vienna, by M. de Stadion, to the Austrian minister for foreign affairs. He was taken with his dispatches and his portmanteau, having been unable to procure horses, and keep up with the head-quarters at the moment of its departure. On breaking the seal of all those dispatches, the Emperor was furious that M. de Stadion should take advantage of his position to afford intelligence to his sovereign, which was altogether foreign from the object of his mission, and to keep up any other correspondence than such as usage authorises in a similar case. *The courier had not been observed to pass through* any of our head-quarters; and yet *M. de Stadion*, in his character of plenipotentiary, could have found no other means of forwarding his dispatches.

The officer whom the Emperor had sent to Marshal Davout with orders to collect his corps and march upon Goding, had been obliged to pass through Brunn, &c.

THE END.

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